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This book takes its starting point by considering a threefold polarisa-
tion within the EU: an increasing demographic concentration in and 
around the bigger cities with population decline in many other regions, 
economic development favouring a smaller number of capital and met-
ropolitan regions with seemingly less economic prosperity in most other 
regions as well as a spatially and socially uneven distribution of wealth 
with a growing number of people feeling neglected and favouring right-
wing conservative or even extremist political positions in a number of 
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recent national elections. At the same time, the future of cohesion pol-
icy is again being discussed at the EU level—as happens every couple 
of years. And there is again the question whether cohesion policy will 
turn back to its original objectives of supporting the worse off regions 
in the European Union or whether it will follow the neoliberal course of 
recent years to foster competitiveness and growth.
Based on these observations, the book asks a couple of questions: What 
actually is meant when we are speaking about regional and cohesion 
policies in these times? In which ways is socio-spatial polarisation (re-)pro-
duced and how should policy respond to these processes? To what extent 
should we rethink current spatial policies when aiming for more just ways 
of development? What are the alternatives to the neoliberal mainstream?
1  Setting the Scene: Territorial Cohesion as a 
Core Issue of the European Union
Since the adoption of the Single European Act in 1985 and at least since 
the introduction of the Territorial Agenda of the European Union in 
2007, socio-spatial cohesion has been identified as one of the core issues 
of the European Union. However, the goal is far from being achieved. 
Whereas on a national level, economic development between the dif-
ferent European countries converged (albeit to different degrees), it is 
apparent that regional inequalities within national states further increased 
considerably during recent years (Neufeld 2017, 27; Iammarino et al. 
2017; for growing income inequalities within states see also OECD 
2016). Across Europe, we are witnessing demographic growth and the 
E. Nagy 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences (CERS-HAS), Békéscsaba, Hungary
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increasing economic prosperity of a small number of big agglomerations, 
mainly capital cities and their surroundings. This seems to be at the 
expense of a growing number of rural and old industrial regions. These 
regions are characterised by economic and demographic stagnation or 
even decline (see Eurostat 2017) and the outmigration of mainly young 
people to the better off, mainly metropolitan areas which also attract the 
largest share of transnational migrants (Lang and Haunstein 2017; Dax 
and Fischer 2017). In a growing number of declining regions, those peo-
ple who stay have an increasing feeling of being left behind (Neu 2006). 
Thus, the big metropolitan areas and urban agglomerations can be seen 
as the winners of regional polarisation, whereas rural and old industrial 
regions face increasing development problems. However, this is only 
one part of the finely grained picture which is characterised by multi-
ple divides across Europe. Diverging economic and social developments 
can be witnessed on various scales “between states and regions; within 
regions, between core areas and peripheral areas; and between prosperous 
metropolitan regions and less prosperous ones” (Iammarino et al. 2017, 
4) and, we would add following Kuus and Hadjimichalis in this volume, 
also between states or groups of states.
Since the 2004/2007 enlargement of the European Union, it has 
never been as apparent as it is now that cohesion policy continuously 
fails to achieve its ultimate goal, a balanced development of all regions 
in Europe which, at the end, would lead to more spatial justice. The 
growing focus on competitiveness and growth—deeply rooted in pre-
vailing neoliberal logics of development—along with constraining 
policies of austerity even contradicts the efforts undertaken to balance 
uneven development in Europe (Faragó and Varró 2016; Agnello et al. 
2016). Given their high importance for the economic, social and polit-
ical future of the European Union (Iammarino et al. 2017), cohesion 
policies, the underlying power structures and their impacts have to be 
questioned, and new responses to regional polarisation have to be devel-
oped. Whereas there are numerous studies at different spatial levels 
evaluating and analysing the impact of EU regional and cohesion pol-
icies and stressing their limited success (e.g. Hadjimichalis and Hudson 
2014; Piattoni and Polverari 2016; Begg 2010), this book suggests 
a perspective that goes beyond the analysis of current forms of policy 
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and governance. It works out the political geographies of spatial injus-
tice and seeks alternative approaches to regional and local development 
offering new avenues towards socio-spatial cohesion instead of further-
ing polarisation through focusing on global competitiveness.
Based on recent research about socio-spatial polarisation and periph-
eralisation processes in Europe, the book combines conceptual contri-
butions and empirical research, both aiming to better understand these 
processes and linking it to current debates on territorial cohesion. We 
argue in favour of a political geography approach which adds to these 
debates the notion of “spatial justice” (e.g. Soja 2009; Harvey 1973). 
The growing focus on neoliberal concepts in EU and national poli-
cies such as competitiveness, innovation and growth shows us that it is 
very timely to discuss our understandings of “territorial cohesion” in its 
multiple dimensions. The normative concept of (spatial) justice allows 
us to question these prevailing foci, analyse the impacts of such poli-
cies and discuss arising alternatives. In this context, the book shall also 
contribute to the debate what kind of regional and local development 
approaches are fruitful to reduce current disparities and achieve progress 
towards a more balanced territorial development (see Pike et al. 2017b).
In the following section of this introduction, we expand, on the one 
hand, more on our understandings on socio-spatial polarisation and, on 
the other hand, spatial justice as a useful concept to overcome a nar-
row economic understanding of development. The third, fourth and 
fifth sections will introduce the three main parts of the book and their 
respective contributions. The third section is dedicated to the contribu-
tions of this book dealing with questions of power, since unequal power 
relations, especially on the European level, do play a considerable role 
when we are speaking about socio-spatial polarisation. In the fourth 
section, we shed light on the reasons why cohesion policy fails in cre-
ating a more balanced territorial development and instead reproduces 
socio-spatial disparities. In contrast, the fifth section of the introduction 
will show that, in spite of increasing regional disparities, there is some 
room for alternative perspectives and responses to polarisation that 
show potential to influence decision and policy making in the long run. 
Finally, we conclude with a call to rethink regional policies and find 
more just answers to current problems of regional development.
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2  Spatial Justice as a Means to Overcome 
Polarisation
In recent years, an understanding of polarisation as a relational, multi- 
dimensional and multi-scalar concept has emerged (see also PoSCoPP 
2015; Nagy et al. 2015; Lang 2015; Kühn 2015, 2016) which includes 
at the same time processes of peripheralisation as well as centralisation. 
These processes comprise not only economic, but also infrastructural, 
political as well as social and discursive aspects (Kühn and Lang 2017; 
Kühn and Weck 2013). Leading to very different problems in fast grow-
ing, mainly metropolitan regions and shrinking and/or economically 
declining regions, centralisation as well as peripheralisation cause spe-
cific patterns of polarisation and affect the ultimate goal to achieve terri-
torial cohesion or, in other words, spatial justice.
This development is closely linked to a shift in European cohe-
sion policies during recent decades. During the 1980s and the early 
1990s, the goal was to ensure balanced growth between the regions 
by compensating those areas which did not profit from the integrated 
European economy. From the late 1990s onwards, and particularly after 
the 2005 relaunch of the Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 2020 strat-
egy, the focus of the Structural Funds and Cohesion Policy changed 
to the promotion of faster growth and more employment, enhancing 
the overall competitiveness of the whole European Union (Faragó and 
Varró 2016, 7; see also Avdikos and Chardas 2016). This holds even 
truer after the 2007/2008 crisis. In its aftermath, territorial solidarity 
between European regions decreased further and even more attention 
was directed to cities and city-regions as economically and politically 
strong centres at the expense of the so-called “peripheries” (Faragó and 
Varró 2016, 8).
Although the EU as a whole seems to be back on a growth path 
(judged from a mainstream perspective), the newly generated wealth 
does not reach the people in a sufficient and territorially balanced way. 
In recent decades, economic growth has de-coupled from the growth of 
well-being and life satisfaction. This is in particular visible in Central and 
Eastern Europe where the focus on a competitive and innovative econ-
omy has led to further centralisation and peripheralisation and, as a result, 
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to “consequential geographies of (in)justice” (Soja 2010, 1) or, in short, 
spatial (in)justice. The people living in places affected by this spatial injus-
tice seem to have the increasing feeling that their places of living “don’t 
matter” to decision-makers and urban elites (Rodríguez-Pose 2018).
In contrast to this evidence, Edward Soja (2010) defines “spatial 
justice” as the equitable distribution of resources, services, and access. 
In this sense, it can be seen as a basic human right and thus a pow-
erful concept to overcome polarisation. It is not restricted to the eco-
nomic realm but links social justice with space and can bring notions of 
well-being, quality of life, as well as ecological aspects in the debate on 
territorial cohesion (see Jones et al. in this volume).
In this sense, “spatial (in)justice” is not only the outcome of social, 
political, economic, ecological and cultural processes (e.g. outmigra-
tion, diminishing public services, etc.), but also a “dynamic driving 
force affecting these processes in significant ways” (Soja 2010, 2; for the 
dialectic relation between the different dimensions, see also Pike et al. 
2007, 1258). This means that the socio-communicative peripheralisa-
tion of certain regions in turn affects these processes. It could lead to 
a vicious cycle of decline and stigmatisation and hinder regeneration 
of the affected regions. Nevertheless, recent studies show that polarisa-
tion and peripheralisation have to be understood as dynamic processes 
that can be influenced and reversed (Lang 2015; Kühn and Lang 2017). 
Residents of peripheralised regions, for example, can even use negative 
images to get access to specific funds and support structures and open 
up new paths of development (Plüschke-Altof 2017). More spatial jus-
tice would be achieved if the people affected by peripheralisation pro-
cesses gained greater control over the development of their region(s) and 
were capable of building “multiscalar institutional and informal net-
works of solidarity” (Hadjimichalis 2011).
Thus, the question of what kind of regional and local development 
is needed (Pike, Rodríguez-Pose and Tomaney 2007) is of utmost 
importance to finally achieve “spatial justice” or, in EU terms, territo-
rial cohesion. Today, it seems widely acknowledged that development 
not only comprises an economic dimension but includes also social, 
ecological, political and cultural concerns leading to more complexity 
in decision-making. This complexity asks for a continuous debate about 
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fundamental values like democracy, equity, justice, fairness, liberty and 
solidarity (see Hadjimichalis 2011; Soja 2010; Pike et al. 2007). It is a 
highly political question what regional and local development should 
look like as it concerns “competing visions of the ‘good society’” (Pike 
et al. 2007, 1262) which are constantly changing over time. Which of 
these visions prevails in the debates on regional development depends 
upon the institutional structures and power relations and the underly-
ing interests of the involved actors as we will show in the chapters of the 
first part of the book.
3  Socio-Spatial Polarisation in the European 
Union and Questions of Power
The recent crisis and the following economic recession raised new 
polarities and reproduced historical fault lines within Europe, mak-
ing the failure of policies that targeted stronger cohesion apparent and 
placing the relevance of institutional structures, practices and underly-
ing principles at the centre of public discourses. Nevertheless, as is dis-
cussed in academic and also in policy papers, recent shifts in economic 
power and political conflicts are rooted in two developments which 
had already evolved prior to the crisis: (1) in the long-term geopolitical 
and geo-economic changes that questioned the dominance of the global 
North in controlling global flows and placed the European economy on 
a slow-growth track (UNCTAD 2010, 2017; Hudson 2016) and (2) 
in the pre-crisis inequalities within Europe that manifested in uneven 
patterns of capital flows, innovation and knowledge production, labour 
productivity and migration (Hadjimichalis 2011; Ehrlich et al. 2012). 
The changing position of the European economy in global flows, per-
sisting inequalities and the recent emergence of new dimensions of 
unevenness (indebtedness, the spread of deep poverty, and the decay 
of public services resulting from austerity schemes, etc.). Moreover, the 
regulative deficits revealed by the crisis raised criticism towards existing 
institutional structures and reheated debates on institutions as agents of 
change also in academic circles (Pike et al. 2017a; Hadjimichalis and 
Hudson 2014).
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The unfolding discourse on institutions as mediators of power driv-
ing uneven development is linked to debates on retheorising power 
itself. The latter results in a shift from understanding power as a force 
and authority exercised by individuals or institutions to advance their 
(or particular groups’) interests towards a process- and practice-focused 
approach and considering power as a relational effect that is at work in 
all social interactions. Accordingly, the multi-dimensionality of power 
and the variety of fields of power in which individuals are acting simul-
taneously gained more attention, and various modalities of power were 
identified from coercion, domination, authority to manipulation and 
seduction (Hudson 2007; Allen 2003). Relying on this broad under-
standing of power, scholars of various academic fields researched insti-
tutions as arenas of social struggles embedded in a multiplicity of actual 
social relations, being changed from inside and outside, yet preserving 
and reproducing historical values, norms and practices. Studies with 
such foci highlighted how institutional structures and practices (regu-
latory regimes, power geometries, policies) are shaped by and reproduce 
power relations and how they operate and shape everyday social prac-
tices and consequently regional and local development in a multiple and 
uneven way (Brenner 2009; Hudson 2007; Massey 1993).
Research on institutional practices, their socio-cultural contexts and 
underlying power relations advanced and deepened our knowledge on 
the mechanisms of polarisation processes, the emergence of new dimen-
sions of inequalities and the differentiation at a European scale and 
also within European ‘cores’ and ‘peripheries’ at national and sub-na-
tional scales (Peck et al. 2012; Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013; 
Ehrlich et al. 2012; Kuus in this volume). Even though multiple insti-
tutional rearrangements (of markets, firms, NGOs, state and semi-state 
organisations, etc.) were identified as drivers of growing socio-spatial 
inequalities that all had their spatial implications, it was the reorgani-
sation of state power that was placed at the very heart of debates, due 
to the centrality of state agency (as a context and as a cause) in the 
unfolding globalisation and the neoliberalisation processes underpin-
ning it (Brenner 1999; Jessop 1993). The latter embraced the privati-
sation of public assets along with shrinking state roles in operating the 
systems of collective consumption, liberalisation of flows, re-regulating 
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the labour–capital nexus by weakening the former’s position, and 
the involvement of non-state organisations in governing social rela-
tions (Harvey 2007; Bockmann 2012). By driving such changes, the 
state emerged as an agent of uneven distribution of power and wealth 
through the changing regulative framework and the related institutional 
practices (backing financialisation, introducing austerity schemes, sub-
ordinating social policies to economic growth, shifting responsibili-
ties to regional and local actors, etc.) and the production of narratives 
and new normalities for the social reality of the unfolding regime such 
as competitiveness, flexibility, and self-interest/reliance (Jessop and 
Osterlynck 2008; Hudson 2007).
The changing role of state institutions has been widely discussed in 
relation to their spatial reorganisation. Rescaling processes of national 
state power were a central issue even though scalar reorganisation was 
going along with other spatial transformations such as the rise of hori-
zontal networks, new modalities of place making and changing territo-
rialities (Brenner 1999). The debates were revolving around the state as 
the key agent of producing a new spatial (scalar) fix in the neoliberal 
regime of capitalism (Jessop 2010), the significance of architectures of 
institutional models driving state reorganisation (Bohle and Greskovits 
2007), and the technologies of power in particular socio-spatial con-
texts. Yet, the growing body of scholarly work on the European con-
text (i.e. on the emerging networked governance, changing border 
regimes, the growing importance of horizontal organisations in insti-
tutional learning and policy translations, rescaling processes as highly 
complex power games within European institutional settings—see also 
Kuus in this volume) and, moreover, the lessons of the recent crisis led 
to more complex understandings of the agency of various state institu-
tions in uneven development (Jessop 2010; Kuus 2011; Hadjimichalis 
and Hudson 2014). The rise and the post-crisis revival of neoliberalism 
have been widely discussed as series of re-regulative processes reinforc-
ing market rule over social relations, placing not only historical national 
institutions as agents in focus, but their international embedding result-
ing in conflicts, learning, policy experimentation and structural changes 
across scales. Relying on this (relational) approach, the institutional 
landscape driving socio-spatial polarisation has been researched and 
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discussed as a highly variegated, rapidly changing set of structures and 
practices that embody shifting power relations from elected bodies to 
experts, from national institutions to international bodies and financial 
organisations that mediate particular national/group interests (Brenner 
2009; Peck et al. 2012).
Understanding the power relations and strategies driving institutional 
restructuring, as well as the socio-cultural diversity and interrelated-
ness of institutional practices, we can reveal (and also challenge) their 
bias towards reproducing inequalities, and gain deeper insight into the 
mechanisms behind reproducing unevenness and the failures of cohe-
sion policies in making a more just European society. By doing that, we 
can also enhance existing knowledge on the recent crisis and the resur-
gence of neoliberalism through the lens of complex, interrelated and 
contested European institutional settings, such as the limits of national 
state agency (austerity schemes imposed on national governments, pub-
lic policies geared towards supporting capital accumulation instead of 
socio-spatial solidarity, the re-regulation of labour-capital relations, 
etc.) and emerging conflicts in the arenas of international organisations 
(Jessop 2010; Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2014).
Along these lines, the first part of this book engages with current 
power structures in Europe and the resulting polarisation processes. 
Ray Hudson and John Pickles engage in a conversation based on their 
seminal works on critical economic geography and regional develop-
ment. They emphasise that (economic) uneven development is inherent 
to capitalist economies and goes hand in hand with political asym-
metries and democratic deficits which manifest themselves in urban 
and regional policy networks favouring “the main centres of growth 
and affluence” and marginalising the region(s). Ray Hudson frames 
the European Union as “a project of and for the political and capital-
ist economic elites in Europe” (Hudson 2017, 139) where uneven and 
combined development is reproduced, “especially between the national 
economies and states of ‘north’ and ‘south’ and ‘east’”. Given this 
uneven nature of capitalism, they do see the risk to “rais[e] hopes that 
cannot be delivered”, although there are some forms of capitalism that 
seem to be more progressive and should be encouraged and supported. 
Hence, they see a clear need for a political economic geography.
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In a similar vein, Costis Hadjimichalis argues that the so-called 
“cohesion policies” are contradictory to the priorities established in the 
Lisbon strategy which are “regional competitiveness”, “knowledge econ-
omy” and “growth and jobs”. These strategies are defined more or less 
solely by the economically “successful” states such as France, UK, the 
Benelux states, Scandinavia and particularly by Germany that aims at 
imposing its “ordoliberalism” on the whole European Union. The path 
dependency of the regions and questions of redistribution seem to be 
widely ignored. Instead, only a few successful star-regions are promoted 
as “best practices” favouring at the end only large cities at the expense of 
smaller ones and agricultural regions. The recent crisis has shown that 
these strategies do not lead to territorial cohesion but to increased spa-
tial injustice. Furthermore, three other factors, “financialisation”, “the 
rise of a new rentier economy”, and “private and public debt”, have 
been introduced. These factors strengthen the existing power imbalances 
and further the importance of metropolitan regions and the continuous 
marginalisation of rural peripheries.
The contribution of Hadjimichalis already indicates what Merje 
Kuus reveals in her chapter on state power, spatial inequality and 
their interrelationship with the flows and networks of  (geographical) 
 expertise. Spatial planning in Europe is becoming an increasingly 
transnational process that combines national, sub-national and inter-
national elements in new and ever-changing combinations. Thus, the 
centres and margins of policy expertise are fluid and depend not only 
on formal training and negotiation skills, but also on personal networks 
and a certain feeling for Brussels’ parquet. Diplomats from the richer 
member states do seem to have a better stand as they tend to dispose 
of these networks as a result their pre-Brussels training and can build 
on long-standing traditions of policy expertise. Nevertheless, European 
and national interests cannot be isolated from each other, but are inter-
twined and often diffuse. Therefore, Kuus points to the difficulties in 
grasping these specific and at the same time diffuse patterns in scientific 
analysis and argues for overcoming the “methodological nationalism of 
our analytical toolbox” and applying a transnational lens while doing 
research on “the ever-shifting patterns of economic, political and sym-
bolic peripherality”.
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4  Regional and Cohesion Policies  
(Re-)Producing Socio-Spatial Disparities
The chapters in the second part of the book discuss European and 
regional policies and their impact on territorial cohesion within and 
between EU member states. Looking at the Europe 2020 strategy 
and its three priorities of “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” 
(EC 2010), there is apparently a contradiction between the goals to 
enhance social and territorial cohesion on the one hand and to achieve 
competitiveness of each single region and Europe as a whole on the 
other hand. While regional policies claim to contribute to a decrease 
in regional disparities and to foster convergence between the regions, 
their application often actually intensifies regional polarisation, espe-
cially in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe (Hadjimichalis in this 
volume).
This spatial polarisation is not a linear process but a consequence 
of a combination of various factors. Governance is one of them. For 
instance, Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) carried out 
numerous administrative and public policy reforms during the last 
25 years (Swianiewicz 2010). There are several factors that made CEE 
governance evolve considerably differently from governance in the 
older member states of the European Union. Decision-making was 
concentrated into larger, arguably globally more competitive units. 
Consequently, the centralisation of power from lower administrative 
tiers to the national central agencies led to a (political) peripheralisa-
tion of remote regions. At the same time as Western Europe contin-
ued on a devolution track, CEEC made a sharp turn and did gradually 
centralise their public administration (Loewen and Raagmaa 2018; 
Loewen 2018). Although many academics and policy makers saw mul-
tilevel governance and several other EU policy catchwords as  promising 
approaches to development, they do not seem to work everywhere in a 
similar manner (Špaček 2018). Europeanisation has never been a uni-
form and parallel process in all countries and European policy  concepts 
have obtained different meanings in different countries due to distinct 
administrative structures, normative development models and politically 
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accepted regional policy paradigms (Loewen and Raagmaa 2018). 
History and an administrative culture rooted in the past do matter: 
path-dependency is one of the factors shaping the real application of 
policy.
Many authors have underlined that there are no one-size-fits-all solu-
tions (Rodríguez-Pose 2018; Iammarino et al. 2017). However, EU 
directives often ignore the specifics of European peripheral regions and 
countries. Furthermore, there are many more hidden contestations. In 
order to secure the usage of EU structural funds, for instance, double 
standards have been created: official project reports normally show good 
results and are in turn summarised in regional and country reports as 
a great success (Raagmaa and Stead 2014). For the purpose of fighting 
against fraud, the European Commission has strengthened accountabil-
ity (at the same time preaching about simplification) resulting in even 
more centralisation. The related complex bureaucratic rules nurture 
a city-based project class and specialised firms and exclude peripheral 
localities that are unable to co-finance and manage such projects. That 
way, the gap between real needs and what policies can achieve for con-
crete places, thus spatial injustice, is rising.
The authors in the second part of this book criticise the strong 
growth-oriented focus of European cohesion and regional policies. Rhys 
Jones et al. argue that more attention should be paid to the academic 
literatures on spatial justice, human capabilities and agency that might 
help to spatialise the European Union’s social model in more effective 
ways. The authors claim that applying more plural and long-term con-
ceptions of ‘development’, ‘well-being’ and ‘justice’ could help to for-
mulate regional policies that contribute more directly to the well-being 
and welfare of people in various parts of Europe.
The focus on economic development in cohesion policies is also 
apparent for Bradley Loewen and Sebastian Schulz. They have 
observed that despite the theoretical incompatibility between cohe-
sion and innovation policies, the two areas often converge in a com-
mon economic strategy and further rather than diminish regional 
disparities. “Nevertheless, the traditional aims of Cohesion Policy to 
support backward regions are still seen to be important for stabilising 
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socio-economic processes related to regional growth and decline, as 
national policy experts have been shown to recognise incompatibili-
ties between cohesion aims and growth-through-innovation strategies”. 
Given this fact, the authors argue that economic growth and innovation 
objectives should be disconnected from Cohesion Policy and refocus on 
its traditional domains, such as infrastructure or social investment in 
underdeveloped regions.
The same shift from employment and social objectives to growth and 
innovation is revealed by the analysis of Stefan Telle, Martin Špaček 
and Daniela Craciun. However, looking closer at cross-border cooper-
ation programmes between Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia in the funding periods 2007–2013 and 2014–2020, they have 
found a significant difference in the strategic focus in old (Germany and 
Austria) and new (Czech Republic and Slovakia) member states with a 
stronger emphasis on growth and innovation in old and on employment 
and cohesion in new member states.
Along with the focus on growth and innovation, spatial development 
policies often centre on urban growth poles assuming that their success-
ful development will create spillover effects that drive the development 
and economic growth of more remote regions. József Benedek, Ștefana 
Varvari and Cristian Marius Litan contradict this assumption in their 
chapter by highlighting that regional disparities in Romania (and in 
other countries) still increased in the current funding period despite the 
new growth pole strategies. These growth pole strategies are good exam-
ples for a Europeanisation process that is uncritically pushed further 
without taking into account national and regional characteristics.
The reproduction of socio-spatial unevenness through a very spe-
cific policy area (housing) is observed by Zsuzsanna Pósfai and Csaba 
Jelinek. They reveal the strongly dualistic pattern of Hungarian housing 
policies and trace how capital investment in housing is channelled and 
mediated by public policies. The authors claim that state intervention 
in Hungary has deepened inequalities in the housing market on various 
scales—from the European to the neighbourhood scale—by promoting 
a middle-class oriented, depth-based property model while having very 
little support for social housing models.
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5  Responses to Regional Polarisation 
and Alternative Perspectives
The third part of the book will focus on strategies to cope with regional 
polarisation on a micro level to address the responses of individuals, 
firms and communities while acknowledging their limitations. The 
chapters in this part are based on the conviction that a dignified life, 
creativity and satisfaction (Iammarino et al. 2017, 3) are as important 
as social innovations, new economic approaches and diversification of 
the economic basis of the region. Scholars have increasingly argued 
in recent years for place-sensitive and distributed policies (Iammarino 
et al. 2017; Jones et al. in this volume; Küpper et al. 2017) that address 
all dimensions of regional development alike and do not focus solely 
on the economic realm. We think that every region or locality has its 
own specific needs and concerns, which have to be addressed (Dax and 
Fischer 2017; Jones et al. in this volume).
The first chapters in this book show that regional and innovation poli-
cies often further regional polarisation instead of achieving cohesion. 
Neoliberalism is about to hollow out the foundations of a social mar-
ket economy. Within most operational programmes, the overempha-
sised competitiveness objective overruns distributive elements and often 
hinders innovative bottom-up movements. Nevertheless, such local ini-
tiatives do exist across Europe: for example, there are many quite suc-
cessful social economy initiatives working in small niches towards a 
more just form of economic development that focuses on the well-be-
ing of individual people (Küpper et al. 2017). There are teams of local 
decision-makers managing to re-invent formerly stagnant places and 
regions by introducing new forms of local and regional governance 
and turning around negative images of places (Plüschke-Altof 2017; 
Plüschke-Altof and Grootens in this volume). There are also busi-
ness cases of innovative companies operating far from the so-called 
hotspots of the global economy, yet still managing to be successful in 
global markets (Graffenberger in this volume). Thus, regional devel-
opment strategies have to take into account the specific social and 
economic needs of regions and of regional and local actors. In many 
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cases, traditional approaches to regeneration (e.g. attempting to restore 
growth by attracting enterprises, investment, and a skilled population) 
are not the best option for such regions. There are alternatives that main-
tain good quality of life for the populations of “peripheral” regions and a 
good economic environment for existing enterprises (Küpper et al. 2017, 
230). One key element here could be to build communication platforms 
and support networking activities (see Graffenberger in this volume).
However, regional development is not only a question of empowering 
regional and local actors. Governments have to set the necessary frame-
works to support structurally weak regions and locations (e.g. regulations 
for public service provision, municipal income, etc.). The responsibil-
ity for that must not be shifted to local and regional actors but is in the 
very competence of the state (Plüschke-Altof and Grootens in this vol-
ume; Plüschke-Altof 2017; see also the debate about regional engagement 
of businesses and civil society organisations in Knieling et al. 2012). It 
is a question of how exogenous (state-influenced) and endogenous (bot-
tom-up) approaches can be coordinated among the different levels to 
bring about harmonious collaboration in all dimensions and to reduce ine-
qualities (Jones et al. in this volume; Hudson and Pickles in this volume).
The contributions in the third part of the book seek to better under-
stand the currently dominant social, political, economic and discursive 
tendencies towards polarisation and ask what we can learn from such 
cases and initiatives and how we can help to achieve more equal socie-
ties and more balanced spatial development.
Aura Moldovan outlines out-migration as an individual life strategy, 
which ultimately affects local development capacities. Using the example 
of North-West Romania, she shows that commuting or migration flows 
are, on the one hand, contributing to uneven development while being at 
the same time an outcome of regional inequalities. In focusing on individ-
ual life stories of people coping with the increasing disparities of the region 
they live in, she uncovers the issues that they are facing like missing higher 
education and high-income employment opportunities. Furthermore, she 
reveals the dependency of the researched regions on external funding to 
implement modern infrastructures and develop local potential.
Dependence on external funds is also visible in the case of the 
Hungarian and Romanian community-based initiatives that Sorin 
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Cebotari and Melinda Mihály are investigating. Renewable energy 
projects and social and solidarity economy initiatives that use these 
external funds do have important strategic potential for community- 
centred sustainable local development. However, the room for manoeu-
vre of community-based initiatives is constrained by a centralised logic 
of organisation, limited space for public participation and existing 
policy practices and administrative norms. Consequently, communi-
ty-based initiatives in Hungary and Romania still fail to fully exploit 
the existing potential for community-centred, more sustainable local 
development.
Nevertheless, the example shows that social innovations do emerge in 
peripheral places. The same is true for business innovations. However, 
firms in peripheral regions are often confronted with complex situ-
ations, which limit their efforts in organising innovation activities. 
Martin Graffenberger presents examples from South Estonia and the 
Erzgebirgskreis in Germany that show how firms can overcome the lim-
itations of their regional environments by adopting a dual strategy of 
strategically mobilising ties to external actors and maintaining/expand-
ing internal capacities.
In the last chapter of the third part of the book, Bianka Plüschke-
Altof and Martiene Grootens point to the limits of a purely actor-cen-
tred approach to regional development. Using the concepts of leadership 
and place-making as analytical lenses, they acknowledge the potential of 
both approaches in dealing with regional polarisation. However, they see 
the need to critically reflect on newly emerging problems in structurally 
disadvantaged rural areas, such as the idealisation and responsibilisa-
tion of local leadership. Local response strategies do have certain limits 
and practitioners and researchers have to reflect upon the complexity of 
regional and local development and regional polarisation.
6  Time to Re-think Spatial Policies
Currently, regional policies are widely discussed at the EU level with 
regard to a most likely more restricted budget due to the exit of the 
United Kingdom. The 7th Cohesion Report (EC 2017) shows that 
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cohesion policies do have a considerable impact on so-called “lagging” 
regions in Eastern and Southern Europe where GDP growth is the 
highest in Europe. However, this impact is foremost an economic one. 
At the same time, the EU Social Progress and the European Quality of 
Government Indices have the lowest scores in these regions (EC 2017). 
Thus, economic growth does not seem to go hand in hand with polit-
ical and social satisfaction, public participation or individual well- 
being. This fact underlines our plea to re-think spatial policies consider-
ing alternative approaches going beyond purely economic growth.
This book describes the current power structures and prevailing pol-
icy paradigms and argues for a critical re-consideration of the effects 
of the last two programming periods of European funding. It seems to 
us that global, European and national policies are slowly, but increas-
ingly aware of the challenges we are facing. For instance, the United 
Nations address with their Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2015), 
besides inclusive and sustainable economic growth and many others, 
explicitly the reduction of inequalities and poverty as well as the pro-
motion of well-being (in a similar vein, see OECD 2016). In Europe, 
policy makers do acknowledge existing inequalities although mostly in 
the economic realm and with different propositions for their solution. 
For instance, the migration of well-qualified people from Eastern to 
Western European countries and from rural to urban areas and its nega-
tive consequences on regional and local development (such as the loss of 
social capacities) is widely recognised (EC 2017).
Up to now, politics and regional development policies tend to 
focus on so-called best practice examples neglecting the wider context 
in which these are embedded (see Hadjimichalis in this volume). It 
is often assumed that these examples can be transferred to any other 
region in a top-down manner without taking into account the specific 
institutional arrangements, decision-making structures and local actors 
in the regions. Actors in the economic and political centres define the 
(European) priorities for development and choose the correspond-
ing best practices from their perspective. In contrast, we are calling on 
people in every region and locality and on society as a whole to think 
about which priorities based on which values should be set (Pike et al. 
2007, 1255).
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Spatially just policies should give, on the one hand, greater control 
to those people who are affected by polarisation processes, giving them 
the voice, the power and the capabilities to define their own priorities 
and develop place-based approaches to overcome peripheralisation (see 
Jones et al. in this volume). On the other hand, there are structural 
challenges in many peripheralised and marginalised places that cannot 
be neglected by the centres. Governmental decision-makers have to be 
aware of multiple peripheralisation, take over the responsibility and 
adjust existing policy frameworks towards a cooperative and participa-
tory democracy (Piattoni and Polverari 2016) based on the values of sol-
idarity and cohesion (see Plüschke-Altof and Grootens in this volume). 
Policies have to focus on people enhancing their opportunities where 
they live (Rodríguez-Pose 2018) and providing them with a solid and 
stable policy framework and appropriate social and physical infrastruc-
tures. This book aims to be a resource for all scholars in academia and 
practice working towards these issues.
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Part I
Socio-Spatial Polarisation in the EU and 
Questions of Power
29
As part of the RegPol² Project “Socio-economic and Political Responses 
to Regional Polarization in Central and Eastern Europe” Ray and 
John were invited to hold a wide-ranging conversation about critical 
economic geography and regional development. The context for the 
conversation was an on-going research programme involving schol-
ars based in Leipzig and their colleagues interested in the intense pro-
cesses of regional change in Central and Eastern Europe. The wider 
 project—“Coping with uneven development: socio-economic and 
political responses to regional polarisation”—focused on two key issues: 
First, post-1989 political and economic transformation and the emer-
gence of spatially complex forms of representative democracy and eco-
nomic forms of private instead of state-led markets. Second, the more 
recent emergence of new forms of social and regional polarisation and 
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the corresponding political renewal of authoritarian state power in sev-
eral Visegrad countries. We hope this conversation on the theme of 
contemporary critical economic geography contributes to the broader 
discussions about post-socialist regional futures.
John: Democratisation, liberalisation and privatisation after 1989 
resulted in massive changes in post-socialist Europe. For some, oppor-
tunities increased as individuals entered real estate, commercial, and ser-
vice sector occupations, particularly as state institutions and enterprises 
were hollowed-out and new management installed. For others, job loss 
and industrial decline led to regional involution and rapid deepening 
of social and regional inequalities. Across Central and Eastern Europe 
the record of the past two decades has thus been highly uneven across 
national economies and within and between regions. In the past few 
years, the political consequences of these regional economic transforma-
tions, the globalisation and integration of post-socialist economies, and 
the deepening of fiscal and legitimation crises in the EU and Eurozone 
have become ever sharper. Regional inequalities, unemployment and 
precarious futures have deepened experiences of economic marginalisa-
tion and social alienation, as shifting patterns of population have deep-
ened xenophobia and petty nationalisms and support for authoritarian 
populist parties.
In these circumstances, it is no surprise that economic geographers 
in Central and Eastern Europe have increasingly turned their atten-
tion to questions of regional development, economic change, innova-
tion and involution, socio-spatial inequality, and spatial justice. Some 
have developed and promoted new journals in regional science and 
regional economics to address questions of efficient resource allocation 
(see the Hungarian Regional Statistics ). Some have focused on institu-
tional and ecological economic geographies (see the Polish European 
Spatial Research and Policy ). Others have focused on the complexities 
of regional innovation and uneven development (see the Slovak Region 
Direct ). The RegPol2 group has taken uneven development, peripheral-
isation and regional inequality as its primary focus of training, research 
and publication. It is to this their latest book in this project that we 
have been invited to contribute a conversation (see also Lang et al. 2015 
2 Geographical Uneven Development and Regional …     31
and the special issue of the Hungarian Geographical Bulletin Vol. 64 (3) 
2015 on “Discussing inequalities from the periphery”).
I think it is interesting to note that we each came of age intellectu-
ally and politically in parallel contexts to those in the 1960s and 1970s, 
you in the Northeast of England and me in the Northwest. Each of 
our home regions was a key centre of nineteenth and early twentieth 
century industrialisation (the Northeast in coal, steel and shipbuild-
ing, the Northwest in coal and textiles). Each benefitted from post-war 
regional economic rebuilding underwritten by Keynesian policies and 
state investments, the expansion of state-owned transport systems, and 
rapidly improved living standards and expanded forms of social con-
sumption (particularly in health and education). The resulting consol-
idation of working-class power was—in the 1960s—inflected with new 
workers recruited from the Caribbean and South Asia and the resulting 
mobilisation of racialised notions of identity, rights, and entitlements, 
with different effects on the Northeast and Northwest. With Enoch 
Powell’s articulation of the race card and what it meant to be “British” 
or “English” there began a long-term organic crisis of the working class, 
which was rapidly further fractured with Thatcherism and its mobili-
sation of head-on attacks on trade unions (especially the power of the 
National Union of Mineworkers) and working-class unity. These con-
ditions and the shifting balance of social forces, in turn, led to a war 
of manoeuvre on the part of conservatism and business alliances. 
Mobilising the logics of crisis, Thatcherism launched a head-on attack, 
first on the National Union of Mineworkers and later on organised 
labour movements generally. Stuart Hall has called this period “the long 
march of the Neo-liberal Revolution” (Hall 2011, 1–2) where “open, 
competitive and unregulated markets, liberated from state interven-
tion and the actions of social collectivities… is the response of a revived 
capitalism to the crisis of Keynesian welfarism” in the 1970s (Theodore 
et al. 2011, 15) fused with the evasion of state intervention by “going 
global”.
Thatcher’s rejection of the ‘social’ as a meaningful category for pub-
lic policy was underpinned by the idea that the social welfare state’s 
commitment to social and regional redistribution weakened the fab-
ric of individuals and families (welfare cheats, lazy workers, parasitic 
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unemployed…) and was the cause of an economic crisis whose solu-
tion was a turn to radical individualism and markets. The result was an 
assault on forms of socialised common-good and the creation of vari-
ous rounds of sectoral and regional crisis. You felt this directly with the 
deepening regional crisis of coalmining, steel making and shipbuilding 
and the rise of unemployment as Thatcherism bit ever more deeply, a 
crisis that drew university researchers into the domain of public action 
and economic geographers into the orbit of Marxian analyses of capi-
talism. For me the parallel experience was of regional crises of coal and 
textiles in Lancashire, periodic rounds of firm collapse and labour force 
shedding, and later the deepening regional impacts of racial capitalism 
in apartheid South Africa and regional economic involution following 
the collapse of central planning and the imposition of largely unreg-
ulated privatisation programmes in Central and Eastern Europe. In 
each of these cases, we have both been concerned to investigate in var-
ious ways the geographies of capitalist transformations and the ways in 
which they were politically determined, often at institutional levels well 
beyond the capacity of local communities to control.
This issue has been an abiding concern of your own work and in 
your 1991 Area paper “The North in the 1980s: new times in the ‘Great 
North’ or just more of the same” you addressed it directly by question-
ing the political role of discourses about regional revival and new times, 
arguing that state management of the regional economy was not ended 
by Thatcherism and neoliberalism, but its form of state intervention was 
changed. The new economy with its emphasis on affluence and housing 
market growth was, instead, “characterised by a continuing marginalisa-
tion of the region relative to the main centres of growth and affluence, 
both within the European Community and globally” (Hudson 1991, 
55). At the time, you saw this form of dependency and marginalisation 
as “a structural feature of a state-managed region rather than a cultural 
attribute of its people” (Beynon 2017, 123), and this seems a particu-
larly important and salient corrective to bear in mind when thinking 
of the contemporary conjuncture in post-socialist Europe, and perhaps 
Europe more generally.
Perhaps we might usefully begin with these experiences, not to sug-
gest that the processes and patterns of today in CEE were prefigured 
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in the UK decades earlier, but to think how the theories and practices 
of economic geography were developed out of specific contexts and 
conjunctures in post-war Britain. In them, post-war opportunity and 
optimism for a new social democratic future quickly deflated as new 
policies, forms of state action and configurations of political power 
emerged. Perhaps in these experiences, and in the ways economic geog-
raphy responded to them, there may be lessons for the ways in which 
post-socialist economic geographies are experiencing and responding to 
the intensely uneven experiences of optimism, involution, and illiberal-
ism of the present conjuncture.
Perhaps we can begin with a brief overview of how you came to 
economic geography, what your initial influences were in choosing 
that path, and how you see it has changed over the decades of your 
involvement.
Ray: Surprising as it may seem now, when I first went to Bristol as a 
geography undergraduate in 1966, I was more interested in physical 
geography; from what I’d experienced at school, it seemed to offer a 
more rigorous approach. So much of the rest seemed to be essentially 
regional description, with very little emphasis on explanation. However, 
once exposed to the new emerging human geography and locational 
analysis, with its focus upon the explanation of spatial patterns my 
interests quickly shifted. Peter Haggett was a wonderful teacher and 
then of course there was David Harvey, who taught economic geog-
raphy and a third-year course on philosophy and methodology, which 
essentially became Explanation in Geography. But even as a third-year 
undergraduate I was becoming critical of the ways in which economic 
and social processes were conceptualised within the locational analysis 
approach, grounded in highly unrealistic assumptions about what peo-
ple knew and why they made the choices in the economy that they did, 
and conscious of the need to delve more deeply into the why people 
behaved as they did. This was the time when behavioural geography was 
briefly flourishing and my PhD at Bristol was firmly in this mould. But 
by the time I was finishing, I was already becoming critical of the way 
in which the focus on individual decisions in its turn also provided a 
very under-socialised account of the economy and its geographies. 
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So when I moved to a lectureship in Durham in 1972—and became 
conscious of the dramatic changes that had affected the economy of 
Northeast England, and the reasons for this—I began to be interested 
in more political-economic approaches, initially via underdevelopment 
theories but increasingly via Marxian political economy and the struc-
tural and institutional constraints and inequalities in class power that 
meant that while people made economic geographies, they did so in 
circumstances that were not of their own choosing. This set me on a 
path that I followed, with the odd diversion into some interesting cul-
de-sacs, for the last 45 or so years.
John: In 1989, you began Divided Britain with the comment that 
Prince Charles had pointed to the danger of Britain becoming a divided 
realm. In the book you and Allan Williams argued that Thatcherism 
was creating ever deeper divisions among regions and social classes, an 
almost apartheid-like spatial ordering of the neoliberal space economy 
with rapidly emerging complex arrangements of new economic spaces 
and class forces competing with pockets of un- and under-employment 
across the region. This seems like an ideal opening for our discussion 
and its relation to this book’s focus on regional uneven development 
and peripheralisation. How did you see this issue of division in Divided 
Britain?
Ray: From my point of view, Divided Britain was and remains a book 
very much shaped by the times in which it was written. It was published 
four years after the miners’ strike came to an end, a strike for which 
the Tories had prepared meticulously when in opposition in the 1970s, 
had backed off conflict with the miners earlier in the 1980s, holding 
back until the situation was favourable and then deploying the power 
of the state to ensure that the miners were defeated. This was savagely 
demonstrated in the way in which police ran riot through the village 
of Easington Colliery in the summer of 1984 and most dramatically in 
the “battle of Orgreave”. For once the miners had been defeated and 
the National Union of Mineworkers marginalised, then the attack 
on the post-war settlement, on the achievements of what, follow-
ing Timothy Mitchell (2011), we might denote as a form of “carbon 
2 Geographical Uneven Development and Regional …     35
democracy”, could be pursued with greater vigour as the boundaries of 
the state were selectively rolled back. One effect of this, coupled with 
the priority given to financial services and the City of London, was to 
inscribe regionally uneven development even more deeply into the land-
scape of capitalism in the United Kingdom as Thatcherism sought to 
sharpen and re-define socio-spatial divisions within the Divided Realm. 
It seemed to me important to document this and emphasise the way 
in which (re)producing socio-spatial division and uneven and combined 
development was not some unintended by-product but was a deliberate 
part of a political strategy.
John: Indeed, in the 1980s this notion of geographical uneven and 
combined development became a crucial concept for critical economic 
geography more generally. Adapted through various traditions of World 
Systems Theory, the development of underdevelopment, and depend-
ency theory, Lenin’s concept of combined and uneven development 
seemed to speak to many of us at the time. In particular, it provided 
a useful framework for breaking free of more traditional concepts of 
the region as bounded and unique by offering a richer, more political 
understanding of the relational nature of space and regional change. 
That the regional problem of, for example, industrial regions had so 
often been treated as a problem of the region itself, seemed theoret-
ically banal and politically disingenuous. That the regional problem 
was always a problem of a wider series of spatial policies, processes, and 
practices was gradually becoming much clearer. Interestingly, in 1985 
you published with Jim Lewis Uneven Development in Southern Europe. 
How did this focus on the economic geographies of southern Europe 
and the conference on which it was based (‘National and Regional 
Development in the Mediterranean Basin’) emerge?
Ray: As you rightly say John, by the 1980s the notion of uneven and 
combined development had come to occupy a central place in eco-
nomic geography and some geographers were increasingly seeing regions 
as a product of both endogenous and exogenous processes; Doreen 
Massey had a significant influence here. I was also interested in seeing 
the changes that had occurred in the economy of the Northeast in a 
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broader comparative context. Reflecting this, I began to spend time 
and carry out research in a range of other European regions—for exam-
ple, regions that seemed to have a similar economic structure to the 
Northeast of England, such as the Ruhr in Germany, and Lorraine in 
France—and others that had had very different structures and devel-
opmental trajectories—for example, Jutland in Denmark and those 
regions of Northeast Italy which became known as the “Third Italy”. 
In this context, southern Europe raised some interesting questions, not 
least because of the political transition from dictatorship to democ-
racy in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and their subsequent entry into the 
European Community in 1981 and 1986. And other Mediterranean 
economies had also entered into a variety of trade and labour migration 
arrangements with Germany and France in particular. As a result, this 
raised questions for me about how these macro-scale changes in polit-
ical economies related to changing patterns of uneven and combined 
development at national and sub-national scales. It was issues such 
as these that we hoped to explore through the conference and bring 
together in the book; the more limited focus on southern Europe was 
very much a reflection of the ways in which the three recent entrants 
to the European Community and Italy could be seen to share common 
characteristics but also important differences that reflected the uneven 
and combined character of development within the larger shared space 
of the European Community.
John: It is very interesting to me how these two works (one on com-
bined and uneven development in Britain and the second a compara-
tive analysis of uneven development in southern Europe) map out very 
useful methodologies for addressing the so-called ‘regional problem’ 
relationally and conjuncturally. In 1989, in the same year as Divided 
Britain you published another fascinating book: Wrecking a Region: 
State Policies, Party Politics, and Regional Change in North East England, 
in which you turned to the more detailed conditions of regional eco-
nomic involution that were so deeply affecting the lives and livelihoods 
of people and places in the Northeast. How did Wrecking a Region 
with its rich local and contextual analysis come about and why did you 
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choose in that book to focus on the role of state policies in shaping 
regional futures?
Ray: Good question! There is a real sense in which the book is autobi-
ographical. I was born and brought up in Alnwick, a small market town 
in rural mid-Northumberland, just off the northern tip of the Great 
Northern Coalfield. My father worked as an electrician at Shilbottle 
Colliery, just south of the town. So, when I was growing up Alnwick 
was then located on a sort of cultural divide—mining areas to the 
south, agricultural ones to the north. Then in 1966 I went off to Bristol 
University, returning periodically in the university holidays to Alnwick. 
Over the six years that I was in Bristol, on these return visits I became 
increasingly conscious of coal mines closing, new factories opening; rail-
way lines and stations closing while new roads opened; town centres 
ripped apart and then re-built in a very different style, often with new 
office blocks springing up alongside new shopping centres. There was 
all too visible evidence that the economy and built environments of the 
region were changing. All this raised questions about what was going 
on, and why; and talking to friends over the occasional pint seemed to 
confirm this sense that things were on the move, though not necessarily 
for the better. Then in 1972 as a result of a quirk of the academic labour 
market—and a paucity of available jobs—I was lucky to be offered a job 
at Durham, back in the region (albeit on the wrong side of that critical 
cultural divide, the river Tyne, the “big river” that Jimmy Nail was later 
to celebrate in song). And living back in the region, I became more and 
more aware of the way in which the region was changing and curious as 
to why it was changing in these ways. This seemed something that was 
worth investigating further, a promising new line of research that could 
have some practical and political relevance in the region.
As I began to research these issues—I was fortunate as a very jun-
ior academic to obtain a couple of quite big research grants from the 
Social Science Research Council and the Centre for Environmental 
Studies—what quickly became clear was the significance of state policies 
for the region; in a phrase, it had become a state-managed region. Its 
industrial economy was dominated by the nationalised coal, steel and 
shipbuilding industries, while the expansion of the welfare state had 
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resulted in education, health care and public administration being the 
main sources of service sector employment and central to a significant 
change in the gender composition of the labour force. Put another way, 
the region, its industries and people had very much become a prod-
uct of the broader post-war settlement, of the “One Nation” strategy 
that had been shared by Conservative and Labour governments alike 
over the post-war period. And it was this of course that Thatcherism 
sought—and from its point of view, successfully—to destroy. As such, 
taking apart the nationalised industries and public services that were 
central to economy and society in the Northeast was in turn central to 
the Thatcherite project and the region was to be on the front line, dis-
proportionately affected by the transition from a “One Nation” to “Two 
Nation” strategy (which, as we discussed above, I’d written about more 
generally with Allan Williams). Focusing on the effects of the chang-
ing forms of state policies, of the ways in which nationalisation led to 
rationalisation, capacity cuts and job losses on a massive scale, and then 
the privatisation of what was left of those industries that had been at the 
heart of the regional economy therefore seemed to be important, both 
intellectually and politically.
John: Interestingly, Wrecking a Region appeared in the Pion Series 
‘Studies in Society and Spaces’ edited by Allen Scott and Michael 
Storper. The first volume in the series was Mick Dunford’s Capital, 
the State, and Regional Development, Wrecking a Region was the second 
volume, and Allen Scott’s New Industrial Spaces was the third. In vari-
ous and different ways, each of you were drawing on Marx’s critique of 
political economy to expand the horizons of economic geography. How 
did you come to enter this scholarly space of economic geography and 
Marxian analysis? And, perhaps also, what was the specific conjuncture 
to which your work was responding at that time? What were the par-
ticular influences that shaped your thinking?
Ray: As I’ve sketched out earlier, from the early 1970s I began to get 
interested in Marxian political economy as a framework in which to 
begin to understand the uneven geographies of capitalist economies. 
There were a couple of loose organisational groupings that were impor-
tant for me in developing my understanding of these issues. The first 
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was the Regionalism Group of the Conference of Socialist Economists 
in the United Kingdom. Participation in this group, which included 
colleagues from a range of disciplinary backgrounds, became an impor-
tant source of inspiration and support. Members of the group included 
James Anderson, Doreen Massey, Mick Dunford, Di Perrons, Gareth 
Rees, Mike Cuthbert, Andrew Sayer, Nick Rogers, and Martin Boddy. 
It met fairly regularly and provided a forum in which left- leaning 
academics could discuss their work and more generally the ways in 
which the “regional problem” was both changing and being under-
stood in new ways. In addition to, and in parallel with, this, I found 
engagement with a number of people in Europe—Alain Lipietz, 
Pieter van Hoogstraten, Viggo Plum, Henrik Toft Jensen and Costis 
Hadjimichalis, for example—very helpful, as was the influence at a dis-
tance of David Harvey. This European context opened up literatures of 
which I’d previously had little knowledge—for example, German state 
theory, and Italian social scientists studying uneven development in 
Italy—and perspectives that were both cross-national and cross-discipli-
nary. In the 1980s the establishment of the “Seminars of the Aegean” 
provided an important ongoing forum in which these issues could be 
discussed further. The seminar met every two or three years on various 
Greek Aegean islands and provided a very positive, constructively crit-
ical cross-disciplinary and cross-national cultural setting that brought 
together a range of leftist academics, predominantly drawn from Europe 
and with occasional visitors from across the Atlantic such as Ed Soja 
and Dick Walker. Regular participants included Costis Hadjimichalis, 
Dina Vaiou (who, with other Greek colleagues both committed a great 
deal of their time to the organisation of the seminars), Lila Leontidou, 
Lois Labrianidis, Maria Dolors Garcia Ramon, Vicente Granados, 
Giacchino Garofoli, Enzo Mingione, Enrico Pugliese, Alain Lipietz, 
Henrik Toft Jensen, Viggo Plum, Mike Edwards, Mick Dunford, Jim 
Lewis, Di Perrons and Andrew Sayer. Some of us also became involved 
in European Community ERASMUS networks.
John: Given the importance currently placed in European universi-
ties and funding agencies on research networks, these earlier collabora-
tions and exchanges are important to know about. The period certainly 
was an exciting one as the European Left struggled with the growing 
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consolidation of neoliberalism and its attacks on organised labour and 
the wider gains of socialism and social democracy. You take this on 
directly in your writing, which is clearly grounded in a deep commit-
ment to what might now be called variously ‘activist’ or ‘engaged’ schol-
arship and grounded research methodologies, particularly around the 
miners’ strikes and the struggle with Thatcherism.
Ray: Yes, the miners’ strike of 1984/1985 had a very important longer-
term consequence for my work. Because a growing shared interest in 
the future of deep coal mining in County Durham, and the threat 
posed to this by the Thatcher government, led me to begin to work 
with Huw Beynon, a collaboration that has now continued over almost 
four decades and given rise to a number of joint publications (for exam-
ple, see Beynon et al. 1991). In the years leading up to the strike, Huw 
had been both researching and working with the Durham Miners 
Association and he became actively involved in the strike itself. In par-
allel I was working with Easington District Council to demonstrate the 
implications of closing collieries and the loss of jobs from mining on 
the labour market in Easington. This covered the costs of job loss in 
terms of increased public expenditure on welfare, but also the less tangi-
ble costs to individuals and to communities in terms of family break-up, 
social dislocation, growing problems of mental health and so on. We 
produced a major report, Undermining Easington, which became the 
focus of a televised party-political broadcast by the Labour Party. Along 
with other research, this led to my involvement as a Special Advisor to 
the House of Commons Select Committee on Coalfield Regeneration 
and as Special Advisor to a National Audit Office evaluation of the 
regeneration programmes. There’s one more thing worth adding at this 
point. In the early 1980s Huw and I had both come to the conclusion 
that there was a clear link between the expansion of private sector open-
cast mining in Durham and the closure of the nationalised deep mines 
and this led to a further major research project on the expansion of 
opencast and its effects (see Beynon et al. 2000). And we continued to 
document the longer-term effects of the closure of the mines and this 
will be the focus for our next book (Beynon and Hudson 2019). In all 
of this we have worked closely with a succession of research students 
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and researchers, involving the residents of the former coal districts and 
the miners’ unions, and involving both local residents and former min-
ers as researchers.
John: As we have seen, in your research and writing from the 1980s 
and 1990s you were closely involved in analysing the complex rela-
tionships between local and national struggles over public policy and 
regional development. By the early 2000s your work seems to have 
changed its tone and focus a little. Here ‘place’ seems to have become 
more central, at least in framing the titles of your writing. For example, 
in 2000 you published Production, Places, and Environment: Changing 
Perspectives in Economic Geography and in 2001 your Producing Places 
was released. Did this use of ‘place’ as a central concept reflect impor-
tant shifts in your thinking and engagement with economic geography 
at the time? I wonder how you see the relationship of place as a political 
object, as well as an object of theory and analysis, to your earlier con-
cerns with the future of regions?
Ray: There is a sort of connection between those two books, as the 
first was essentially a collection of previously published work while 
the second was an attempt to provide a new and more thorough state-
ment of the way I was seeking to understand economic geographies. 
And as I made clear in the Preface to Producing Places, it can also be 
seen as developing ideas that were rather briefly stated in the Preface 
to Wrecking a Region. There was a deliberate sense of ambiguity in the 
title of Producing Places, focused on the meaning of “place”. On the one 
hand, it referred to those places in which the activities that constitute 
the economy are performed (factories, offices, shops, homes and so on) 
and the ways in which these places fit into technical, social and spatial 
divisions of labour, within and across both private sector companies and 
public sector organisations. Secondly, however, it refers to the produc-
tion of “places” as located at the intersection of realms of use values and 
exchange values. In these places capital—supported directly and indi-
rectly in a variety of ways by the state—seeks to produce profits via the 
exploitation of labour but these are also places defined by the fact that 
people live there beyond their existence merely as the providers of the 
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commodity labour power. They are socialised human beings, with a 
variety of attachments and ties to their place, to other people and other 
places. As a result, places are porous, constituted via the interplay of 
endogenous and exogenous processes, and are always reproduced in pre-
carious conditions, as the requirements of capital and states on the one 
hand and people in their place on the other can become dislocated and 
come into conflict. This became very clear in the strikes in the French 
steel industry in the early 1980s and in 1984/1985 in the miners’ strike 
in the United Kingdom, for example. Put another way, the institutions 
and mechanisms through which places are reproduced as such are a 
matter of some political importance. However, as Raymond Williams 
made clear, moving from place-specific “militant particularisms” to 
more broadly-based political movements can be problematic and one 
consequence of this is that “places” can be drawn into conflict and com-
petition for investment and jobs, often as a result of local or regional 
alliances between the institutions of capital and labour, dividing the 
working class on the basis of place.
There’s one more thing I’d mention about Producing Places, how-
ever, which is an explicit recognition that economic activities always 
involve material transformations, relations between the social and nat-
ural as well as the social and spatial. Given the empirical focus of a lot 
of my research—on the coal, chemical and steel industries for exam-
ple, industries in which the chemical and physical properties of mate-
rial and products was critical in the production of use values, and hence 
exchange values—this was something I felt had been rather neglected to 
that point in my own work and by most economic geographers more 
generally. To put it simply, coal is far from being a homogeneous sub-
stance, with a variety of chemical and physical properties that constrain 
its uses, while the steel produced for car bodies is very different to that 
produced for the working parts of engines. And these differences matter. 
Although what I had to say about these issues there was limited, it did 
point to one direction in which my work would extend more deeply 
in future—and also suggested that economic geographers interested in 
these issues would need to engage seriously with work in the natural 
sciences to understand processes of material transformation.
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John: Following along this line of thinking about the changing con-
cepts and forms of inquiry in economic geography, I was intrigued and 
excited by your 2005 Economic Geographies: Circuits, Flows and Spaces. 
My own work in socio-spatial theory, political economy of develop-
ment, cultural studies, and post-socialism has been heavily influenced 
by Althusserian Marxism, Foucauldian genealogy, the diverse and alter-
native economics projects of JK Gibson-Graham, David Ruccio, and 
others, and the development of Gramscian conjunctural analysis in the 
cultural studies of Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey, Larry Grossberg, and 
John Clarke among others. From these perspectives, the analysis and 
diagnosis of the regional problem of inequality and peripheralisation 
requires a complex articulation of forms of over-determination, relation-
ality and context that is both economic, cultural, and political. This was 
the project of my book with Adrian Smith and colleagues (Articulations 
of Capital and earlier with Theorizing Transition and Environmental 
Transitions ). Your Economic Geographies is fascinating in this sense 
because of its open view of the field. It is organised around a series of 
shifts in emphasis occurring at the time from economic geographies of 
production to the ways in which geographers were focusing on patterns 
of consumption, nature, and culture in economic life. Here explanation 
grounded in socio-spatial relations of production are reworked into a 
fascinating and pedagogically useful framing of the thoroughly com-
plex, contingent, and over-determined nature of economic life. These 
currents opened up some sharp engagements among various readings 
of economy, class, and identity among political economists. Yet you 
seem to have always risen above those fractures and often sharp engage-
ments. At the time, how did you navigate these wider currents changing 
the kinds of questions about the region, place, and politics that had so 
infused your earlier work?
Ray: Well to some extent Economic Geographies can be read as seeking 
to fill in some of the gaps in Producing Places, and in so doing to engage 
with new and emergent strands of economic geography. Even before 
the publication of Producing Places, I had become increasingly aware 
of three related areas of development in economic geography and, in 
some respects, in the social sciences more generally. First, there was an 
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increasing interest in consumption (or perhaps more accurately in many 
cases, the moment of sale and the realisation of surplus value embodied 
in commodities), complementing the emphasis in much earlier work on 
production and the labour process at the point of production. Secondly, 
something I’d recognised and begun to register, albeit inadequately, in 
Producing Places, a growing interest in the grounding of the economy 
in nature and the centrality of relations between ecology and economy 
(or perhaps better, economies). And thirdly, a growing interest in cul-
tural approaches to understanding economic geographies, which were 
seen as offering alternative “bottom up” approaches to the variety of 
“top down” political economy perspectives that for the previous two or 
three decades had been dominant (and on which I had drawn heavily in 
Producing Places ). These developments raised some intriguing questions 
for me.
In part, this was because in various ways they took me back to much 
earlier work. My PhD thesis, for example, produced in the dim and 
distant past environment of behavioural geography, was very much 
concerned with how consumers made choices about which shops and 
shopping centres to patronise, and how they learned about the retail-
ing environment. Much of my subsequent research had in one way or 
another focused on the geographies of the coal, chemicals and steel 
industries, each of which in its own way raised important questions 
about the materiality of production and the relationships between 
economy and environment, as I indicated above. But more fundamen-
tally, these developments revived important theoretical questions about 
understanding the totality of the production process in capitalism, the 
links between processes of production, exchange and consumption and 
their relationship in socio-spatial divisions of labour and their signifi-
cance for the process of capital accumulation.
What I was seeking to do in Economic Geographies was to develop a 
more nuanced approach, drawing upon a range of theoretical perspec-
tives, that allowed economic geographies to be explored in a number of 
registers and draw upon political economy and cultural perspectives as 
complementary, while holding on to the established strengths of politi-
cal economy perspectives. In many ways it can be seen as an attempt to 
return to the traditions of political economy prior to the neo-classical 
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marginalist revolution, which reduced economics to an arid technical 
exercise in mathematical modelling of the patently unrealistic, and to 
reconnect analyses of production, exchange and consumption, sensitive 
both to the cultural construction of economies—the constitutive activ-
ities of which are always meaningful and intentional, although with 
effects that are not always those intended—and the material grounding 
of the economy in the natural world.
John: I find the centrality of this concept of the cultural construction 
of economies to be a productive one, in part because it means that we 
can no longer ‘simply’ read off the politics of a group from its economic 
or class position. This was the great challenge facing political economy 
grounded as it was in earlier assumptions of productivism and very par-
ticular conceptions of class. Engaging with the multiple ways in which 
people construct their relationship to economic and political issues is 
one of the abiding strengths of critical geography, although its success 
remains a question for many. I think the concepts of cultural construc-
tion, intended and unintended consequences, and materiality help 
a great deal in opening up what contemporary economic geography 
might mean.
A crucial form of such grounded materiality is, of course, embodi-
ment. The struggle of the miners was often, and perhaps always about 
the integral relations of the body of coal and the body of the miner; one 
torn out of the earth to create use value, the other wracked to create 
surplus value. These two forms in turn contributed to a wider embodi-
ment and gendering of the family. In my own home region, the mould 
of mining family structures was, to some extent, reworked as women 
found employment in textile factories. Linda McDowell and Doreen 
Massey have written wonderfully about the consequences of this gen-
dering of work and space and for the differential politics of Thatcherism 
among working-class men and women and feminist geographers, in 
particular, have opened up questions of how agency and power are 
understood in economic geography (McDowell and Massey 1984; 
McDowell 2004).
Another fundamental shift that was taking place in the Northeast 
and Northwest was, of course, expanded immigration. From the 
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1960s/1970s on increased numbers of immigrants arrived in the 
Northeast from the Caribbean and in the Northwest from South Asia. 
My initial teenage experiences of the resulting regional and cultural pol-
itics were focused mostly on the pleasures of popular culture, the music 
of Motown and Northern Soul, struggles of the American Civil Rights 
Movement, national media and political closure around the claims of 
anti-colonial liberation movements and the population of radicalism 
following the worldwide events of 1968. The lasting effects of these and 
subsequent cycles of immigration have, however, been very different 
from those we hoped for as white working-class attitudes have hardened 
and social and urban lives have become deeply segregated. I left Britain 
in the 1970s but I have returned regularly and often. Over this time, 
and while some parts of British life have become more diversified and 
cosmopolitan, in the Northwest the racialisation of space and divisions 
between communities have deepened. White working-class attitudes 
towards internationalism and solidarity, once strong in a region where 
the Suffragette Movement and Independent Labour Party took root 
early, seem to have given way to Little Englandism, xenophobia, and 
deep social rifts.
Ray: Coming from a mining background, I’d always been conscious 
of the relationship between the embodied work of male miners under-
ground—work that was dangerous and that all too often led to fatal 
accidents—and the domestic labour of their wives and daughters in the 
home that was crucial to the reproduction of the mining labour force. 
In families in which both fathers and sons worked on different shifts in 
the collieries women could be involved in a constant round of provid-
ing hot meals and hot water around the clock because of the nature of 
shift working underground. The unpaid domestic labour of women was 
crucial in sustaining this. Family life and the social fabric of the mining 
communities became structured around the sound of the hooter signal-
ling the start and end of shifts. But at the same time the critical social 
institutions—the trade union, the Labour Party and the working men’s 
clubs—were dominated by men. Quite a few clubs wouldn’t let women 
through the door, and in those that did they were confined to a par-
ticular room. So there were tensions, and it is important to recognise 
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this. But as became clear in 1984/1985, a year in which many women 
became heavily involved in supporting the strike, they were prepared to 
fight in defence of their place. One of the consequences of the events 
of that momentous year is that a number of women became politically 
active in the former mining communities, as well as many more becom-
ing the main wage earner in families in which redundant miners became 
part of the long-term unemployed. In these ways, gender relations both 
in the home and community became changed in important ways across 
the former coalfield communities.
I think the issue of ethnicity and race worked out rather differently 
in the Northeast as compared to the Northwest. There were certainly 
immigrant communities in parts of Tyneside and Teesside, long-estab-
lished and linked to the maritime history of the riverside conurbations, 
but more generally the region was relatively unaffected by the waves of 
immigration from the Commonwealth. There were certainly some well-
known West Indian cricketers who were recruited by local league teams—
Rohan Kanhai for example at Ashington (incidentally, once the world’s 
largest coal mining settlement, and the place where my father’s family 
came from)—but by and large the region remained one dominated by 
the white English. This, coupled with an industrial past that was often 
linked to producing the means of destruction that were central to the pol-
itics of the Empire—guns and warships and so on—did have an effect on 
the nature of politics, on the character of the Labour Party and its dom-
ination by a socially conservative Labourism, and in places on the devel-
opment of a regressive nationalism—one expression of which was the 
vote to leave the European Union in the referendum in 2016, in places 
with little experience of immigration but in which people nonetheless 
expressed fears of waves of non-existent immigrants taking their jobs ….
But one of the implications that I drew from all this in terms of how 
we should think about economic geography is that it needed to take on 
board these ethnic and gender differences and effects in the way that 
it understood the formation of identities and their relation to more 
structural understandings of class position as well as the economic and 
social restructuring of regions like the Northeast and divisions within 
the working class more generally. I began to explore some of this in 
Producing Places in a preliminary way.
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John: You revisited these themes in your 2005 Antipode Lecture 
to the RGS/IBG where you frame the notion of a “pluri-theoret-
ical” geography while arguing for the continued importance of 
Marxian approaches. Critical economic geography in Central and 
Eastern Europe has several challenges in taking on-board such a criti-
cal pluri-theoretical approach. First, it has had a very different experi-
ence of Marxism through Marxism-Leninism of a very particularly state 
socialist or state capitalist form. Here, neoliberalism was initially, and 
perhaps today still is, embraced for the political power of liberalism in 
confronting authoritarian politics, whether of a state socialist form or an 
unregulated, mafia-oligarchic capitalist form. Second, in the early years 
following 1989 regional science and locational analysis emerged as par-
ticularly important forms of economic geography because of their per-
ceived ‘clear’ value for state planning agencies in transitioning centrally 
planned and collective infrastructures to emerging market-based private 
property regimes. In your various engagements with post-socialist schol-
ars, how have you come to deal with the ways critical thought is situ-
ated and inflected differently? Or perhaps more concretely, how do you 
see Marxian approaches contributing to the analysis of uneven develop-
ment and peripheralisation with the space economies of post-socialist 
Europe? What is Right about keeping Left in this context?
Ray: This is a tricky one, especially in conversations with those who 
were subjected to, as you nicely put it, “Marxism-Leninism of a par-
ticularly state socialist or state capitalist form”. So, at the risk of repeat-
ing myself, I would continue to argue that Marxian political economy 
is fundamental to understanding uneven and combined development 
in capitalism. As with other regions in (so-called) “emerging econ-
omies”, this is the case for those parts of Central and Eastern Europe 
that are being incorporated into the dominant circuits of capital, a 
process which is transforming their economic landscapes, inscribing 
new forms of uneven and combined development, and in some ways 
reinforcing existing ones. Marxian political economy is the only per-
spective that seeks to develop a holistic conception of the way in which 
capitalist economies are constituted and change, structured around the 
capital–labour class relation, and that allows a rigorous specification of 
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the structural parameters of capitalist social relations. That said, let me 
make a couple of qualifications. First, capitalism now is very different 
to the capitalism that Marx was dealing with in the middle of the nine-
teenth century, and indeed from the capitalist world that Lenin and 
Luxemburg analysed in the early decades of the twentieth century. And 
as we’ve discussed above, in the latter decades of the last century, there 
was a significant shift in the advanced capitalist world from social dem-
ocratic to neoliberal forms of regulation and capitalist (dis)organisation. 
As a corollary of such transformations in the character of capitalism, it 
is necessary to develop modes of analysis that are sensitive to and can 
deal with such variation, with what have become referred to as “varie-
gated capitalisms”, while recognising that these continue to be forms 
of economy grounded in the fundamental class relations of capital. So, 
reflecting this, I do not see Marxian political economy as a fixed dogma 
but rather as an evolving, analytically powerful, conceptual framework 
that allows the changing character of capital accumulation and capital-
ist economic geographies to be grasped and understood. Put another 
way, it is to see Marxian political economy as something that needs to 
be worked upon and worked with—as David Harvey has brilliantly 
demonstrated. That said, I would also argue that other perspectives, 
such as those of feminism, and other political economy perspectives—
evolutionary and institutional economics, for example—can comple-
ment Marxian approaches, since they focus on aspects of how capitalist 
economies develop and function, but it is only Marxian political econ-
omy that has the question of why they develop as they do at its heart. 
I’ve explored some of this further in a more recent book, Approaches to 
Economic Geography: Towards a Geographical Political Economy (2016).
John: The value of linking Marxian analysis to pluri-theoretical tradi-
tions and diverse concepts of space and economy is also the theme of 
your engagement with networks, regional development and democratic 
control with Costis Hadjimichalis (Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2006). 
I think our readers might first be interested in learning a little more 
about your collaboration with Costis and the kinds of linkages there 
are between your work and his on regional development and political 
economy. Second, I want to ask about how this concept of regionally 
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embedded networks and urban and regional policy networks might 
operate as a useful analytical tool for thinking about the contempo-
rary conjuncture in post-socialist societies. We have already talked a 
little about relational concepts of space. Here relationality is mobilised 
through a slightly different term or metaphor and perhaps to a dis-
tinctly political intervention in policy development, particularly as such 
networks “deny their constitutive inequalities, asymmetries and demo-
cratic deficits” (Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2006, 858).
Ray: Well I’ve known Costis for well over thirty years and we’ve 
worked together at various times over those years. There are a couple 
of things that I think are particularly significant about his work. First 
of all, he has always had a political view of Marxian political economy. 
Secondly, a concern with differing forms of uneven development has 
always been central to his work. And thirdly, he has a deep grasp of the 
specificities of uneven development in the context of southern Europe. 
Thus, in many ways, although the empirical foci of our research have 
been quite different, conceptually we share common ground, which 
opened up opportunities to collaborate and bring together work on the 
connections between uneven development in the ‘north’ and ‘south’ 
of Europe. As the quotation above makes clear, we share a healthy 
scepticism about the claims being made for networked approaches to 
regional development in the peripheries of Europe, in particular the way 
in which—along with much of the rest of the ‘new economic geogra-
phy’—they erase a concern with inequalities in power which we would 
see as central to capitalist economies. So in response to your specific 
question about how such concepts of urban and regional policy net-
works might be used for thinking about the contemporary conjuncture 
in post-socialist societies, my response would be: “if you use them at all, 
do so very carefully and cautiously. But in fact, you’d be better off not 
using them at all, because of the risks of amplifying rather than narrow-
ing socio-spatial inequalities in pursuit of allegedly but in practice unat-
tainable win-win outcomes”.
John: Thinking of Costis and networks reminds me that you and he 
were involved in one of the first Erasmus networks in 1983, initially 
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with Durham, Roskilde and Thessaloniki (Hadjimichalis 2017, 126). 
We have both long held strong views on the importance of collabora-
tion with colleagues across the region and have made many commit-
ments to building collaborative networks and publishing with them. In 
the face of increasing pressure on younger scholars to publish in Tier 1, 
often English-language journals, and to focus more and more on single 
authorship, this commitment to collaboration and co-authorship is ever 
more difficult in post-socialist academies. I wonder in what ways you 
might see the Erasmus experience and the subsequent collaborations 
with colleagues across Europe to have methodological lessons for the 
practice of contemporary critical economic geography?
Ray: I’ve already alluded to the importance of the links I developed 
with colleagues in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, and the ERASMUS 
networks in which quite a few of us became involved—I think by 
the mid-1990s there were around 25 of us involved in the biggest of 
these—were very important in extending our collaborative work beyond 
research into education and teaching. As well as allowing students to 
study in different European countries, to experience often radically dif-
ferent styles of learning and teaching, it also allowed staff—especially 
those at or near the start of their careers—to get experience of life in 
universities in other countries and to form collaborative links with 
colleagues there—which of course often developed to include joint 
research. I think this was quite important in creating the sort of net-
work that is valuable to those of us interested in developing understand-
ing of the varied geographies of capitalisms. I think it is also fair to add 
that while these were schemes funded by the European Community, 
and many of us shared a commitment to Europe (ask me my nationality 
and the answers, in order, are Northumbrian, European, English …), 
this was not the neoliberal post-Maastricht European Union but rather 
a transformed European Union, one committed to, at a minimum, a 
social democratic project. It is a matter of some regret that this looks off 
the agenda for the foreseeable future.
John: The ERASMUS program sought to create new forms of schol-
arly internationalism as part of the project of building a transnational 
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Europe and it began shortly after you published Regions in Crisis. New 
Perspectives in European Regional Theory. The European project today 
looks a great deal different than it did in 1980 and 1983, although the 
analytical focus on crisis may still be a useful one. Recently, you have 
questioned the project of the EU because it has remained an elitist and 
top-down project where widening and deepening processes failed to 
build popular consent. As a result, not only is the EU now seen by some 
as coercive, competing with national interests, but it has been “a project 
of and for the political and capitalist economic elites of Europe, creating 
a new space for capital accumulation and a new political territory that 
would allow those who rule to have an equal voice with the USA and 
USSR on the world stage. Put another way, the emergent EU was an 
expression of a certain class conception of Europe and Europe’s place in 
the world” (Hudson 2017, 139). Here your criticism of the class project 
of this particular form of ‘Europe’ perhaps refracts in interesting ways 
with other possibilities of thinking ‘Europe’, such as the internation-
alism of the early ERASMUS networks. Given the apparent deadlock 
of political forces around the Brexit referendum and the deepening of 
national antagonisms towards the EU project in other member states, 
do you see any alternative paths for the reconstitutions of an “other 
Heading” (as Derrida (1992) suggested) or an ‘After Europe’ (as the 
Bulgarian Ivan Krastev [2017] has argued).
Ray: Well, the short answer is that I’m afraid I see no scope for opti-
mism here. There was a time when it did seem that there was scope for 
some optimism but the way in which the European Union has devel-
oped post-Maastricht has put an end to that. The creation of the euro 
and Euroland, with the fraudulent construction of statistics to enable 
economies such as Greece disastrously to join, dominated by a mone-
tary policy that is de facto that of the Bundesbank, deeply engrained 
in an ordoliberal view of the policy world, is guaranteed to reproduce 
heightened forms of uneven and combined development in the shared 
European space, especially between the national economies and states of 
‘north’ and ‘south’ and ‘east’. The European Union is trapped between 
the aspirations of political and economic elites for further political inte-
gration driven from the top down and growing resistance, much of it 
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framed within regressive right-wing nationalisms and regionalisms 
that seek to assert older political rights. As such, it staggers from crisis 
to crisis, with the Brexit episode providing a focus around which the 
remaining member states can for the moment agree. But once the UK 
leaves—assuming it does—then the tensions among member states 
around other issues will re-surface with a vengeance. In the absence of 
a democratic mandate from the citizens of Europe, further attempts at 
political integration seem doomed to failure—and so does any realis-
tic prospect of a more socially and economically progressive vision of 
Europe.
John: In the light of the Brexit referendum, Scottish independence 
possibilities, and the deepening of the North-South divide with the 
continued growth and dominance of London and the Southeast, I won-
der how you might conceptualise Divided Britain, Wrecking a Region, or 
Producing Places were you to write them today?
Ray: Interesting question! Huw Beynon and I are just finishing a book 
that argues that the Brexit vote in the coalfields of Durham and South 
Wales represented the end-point of a long historical process. To put 
it very briefly, while nationalisation in 1947 seemed to be a great vic-
tory for the coal miners and the coalfield communities, the subsequent 
reality proved very different. By the 1960s hundreds of collieries were 
closing and miners were losing their jobs in large numbers. But there 
did seem to be a political commitment from the Labour government 
to attract alternative jobs to the coalfields. After a brief period in the 
1970s when it seemed coal again had a bright future, the election of the 
Thatcher government in 1979 made it very clear that this was not the 
case. While the redundant miners and those living on the former coal-
fields had little expectation of help from the Tories, they did so from 
Labour, not least because of the historical links between the Labour 
Party and the mining unions. Consequently, when it then became clear 
that Blair’s New Labour had simply adopted the economic policies of 
the Thatcherite Tories, a deep disillusionment both with New Labour 
and with party politics irrespective of party developed on the former 
coalfields. The experiences of austerity under various governments after 
54     R. Hudson and J. Pickles
the global crisis of 2007/2008 simply reinforced this view. People felt 
powerless, their needs ignored, disillusioned with the politics of rep-
resentative democracy as falling participation in elections revealed. As 
a result, when the opportunity to stick two fingers up to the political 
system came for the first—and only—time with the Brexit referen-
dum, the view of many was “well, if the politicians think it’s a good 
thing, then let’s vote against it”. The argument from the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, George Osborne, that leaving the European Union 
would put what you had at risk cut absolutely no ice with people who 
saw themselves as having lost all they had many years ago. Given all 
this, any analysis of uneven and combined development in the United 
Kingdom today would have to start from a recognition of deeply 
engrained socio-spatial divisions at multiple spatial scales, of decades of 
economic and spatial policies that have reinforced this, of a context in 
which there is deep distrust of politicians of all parties, and with the 
United Kingdom’s position in the global as well as European economy 
in doubt. While the decline of financial services in the City of London 
might reduce some socio-spatial inequalities, it would be in the context 
of a weakened national economy as for all the talk of re-balancing the 
economy, sectorally and spatially, there has been scant evidence of any 
revival of manufacturing or of the narrowing of socio-spatial divisions. 
Indeed, Brexit would be likely to see further deindustrialisation as cap-
ital re-locates in response. However, in terms of seeking to understand 
how and why this has come about, a starting point in Marxian politi-
cal economy would be at least as important as when I first wrote those 
books.
John: This last series of exchanges leads me to think about engaged 
scholarship and the relationships between research, policy, and politics. 
Perhaps more than most economic geographers, you have taken your 
scholarly work into regional and national organisations, as well as into 
university administration. I think of Doreen Massey who exemplifies 
the former and perhaps Nigel Thrift the latter. You have done both and 
I wonder what this means for how you have come to understand the 
value, and perhaps limitations, of contemporary economic geography in 
dealing with regional inequalities and possible new futures.
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Ray: I think it’ll be clear by now that in the present conjuncture I’m 
not optimistic about the possibilities for narrowing regional inequalities 
in the UK. There has been quite a lot of talk at various times about 
spinning out intellectual property from university scientific research as 
the basis for innovative new high-tech firms that would form the basis 
of revived regional economies in regions such as Northeast England and 
South Wales. But while there have been occasional ‘success stories’—
which have been richly rewarding for those academics whose research 
results have become commodified in this way—overall such develop-
ments have had, at best, a marginal effect, a thin veneer drawn over 
and barely scratching the surface of otherwise depressed economies. Of 
course, whether it was ever sensible to suggest anything other than such 
an outcome is another question, but many universities seized on the 
possibility as a way of seeking to justify their existence while regional 
development organisations were only too happy to cling to this particu-
lar straw. That is not to say that university research could not have a 
positive role in ameliorating the consequences of uneven development 
and informing alternative development strategies, but this was more 
likely to be research in the social rather than the natural and engineer-
ing sciences and to focus on coping with and adapting to new economic 
circumstances. Certainly, there could be a role for some sort of eco-
nomic geography in this, but not those that claim to see the world as 
one in which a few changes in individuals’ attitudes and institutional 
change at the local and regional level would suffice to guarantee eco-
nomic regeneration. In some ways the lessons from Marxian analyses 
of uneven and combined development are painful ones for they make 
clear that for many places and the people living in them there are no 
quick and easy solutions—or even slow and painful ones. The real-
ity of capitalist economic development is that it is genetically uneven 
and combined but what we can learn from the economic geographies 
of “variegated capitalisms” is that some forms of capitalism are more 
progressive than others, that some forms of capitalism are preferable to 
others, and that we should seek to encourage and support these. And 
my final comment would be this: there is great danger in raising hopes 
that cannot be delivered, not least as this runs the risk of undermin-
ing the democratic process and without the active engagement of people 
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in political projects that seek to find new ways of organising economic 
activities, then economic development will continue to be marked by 
deep socio-spatial inequalities. Economic geographers—among oth-
ers—need to engage in the intellectual project of understanding exist-
ing forms of uneven development and imagining forms of development 
that would provide an alternative to these. Economic geography needs 
to be explicitly a political economic geography.
John: I am sure that this understanding of thinking politically and 
geographically about the structures of variegated capitalisms reso-
nates clearly not only with British scholars struggling with the United 
Kingdom’s internal and external regional relations, but also with our 
colleagues throughout Central and Eastern Europe whose own eco-
nomic geographies have had to adjust to rapidly changing political 
economies in recent years. They have experienced rounds of intense 
optimism and pessimism about the efficacy and effects of wildly dif-
ferent forms of regional policy and the consequences each has had for 
economic development. Ray, it has been a pleasure to discuss these 
matters and I hope our time here contributes usefully to those ongoing 
conversations.
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The European Union during the last 20 years has been suffering from a 
deep multi-dimensional crisis threatening its existence, a crisis which is 
a combination of economic, social, political and cultural elements. The 
years of austerity and the economic crisis since 2009, the undemocratic 
mode of governance and the revival of nationalistic and xenophobic 
divisions seem to challenge the promises of unity and cohesion. New 
inequalities are produced while older ones are intensified, highlighting 
the never-ending importance of uneven geographical development. In 
this context, the notion of socio-spatial peripherality acquires a renewed 
importance, free from older binary and static interpretations.
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It is widely accepted that the socio-spatial production of peripheral-
ity is the outcome of the longue durée of uneven and combined devel-
opment, deeply rooted in the operation of capitalist market forces. As 
Gunnar Myrdal noted in the 1950s: “…the play of forces in the mar-
ket normally tends to increase, rather than decrease, the inequalities 
between regions” (Myrdal 1957, 26). Different processes of periph-
erality relate also to how particular places are integrated into the inter-
national division of labour and are excluded from each time dominant 
economic activity. Particular institutional regulations may periodically 
reduce or reinforce unevenness, but without uneven development, 
capital would surely have stagnated, as David Harvey (1982) long ago 
noted. However, unevenness across space and consequently the repro-
duction of socio-spatial peripherality is not restricted to the needs of 
capital only. It is combined with the uneven ideological imaginations 
and with the cultural power that constructs the Other as inferior, with 
the uneven political power of elites and institutions that impose regula-
tions, and with the uneven conditions of social reproduction in unem-
ployment, education, housing and health, among others.
Uneven geographical development as a framework enables us to 
approach the social production of peripherality in a dialectical way to 
avoid a static and binary distinction between cores and peripheries and 
to see peripherality as a contested concept. For example, remoteness and 
rurality, two major indicators used by the dominant explanations, do 
not always lead to peripherality. Rural gentrification and the existence 
of peripheral/marginal groups and places within wealthy areas of cities 
and regions, challenge these two major indicators. Many other contra-
dictory and multi-scalar processes produce and reproduce socio-spatial 
peripherality in the context of international and European division of 
labour. Among those, I note capital’s contradiction between fixity and 
motion, the relative immobility of labour, the production, circulation 
and realisation of value, path dependency, place-specific devaluations, 
cultural prejudices and imaginations and finally, institutions regulating 
all the above (Hudson 2005). Although these processes are key parame-
ters in the reproduction of peripherality, in this chapter I would like to 
discuss two other parameters, which in my view are equally important, 
particularly to the recent European crisis-driven conjuncture. Firstly, how 
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imaginations of peripherality shape development theories and policies 
and secondly, how imaginations and development policies may contribute 
to deepening unevenness and peripherality. I will conclude by raising 
some questions concerning the current socio-spatial situation in the EU.
2  Imagining and Conceptualising  
Socio-Spatial Peripherality
A key starting point is this: “Who frames capitalist development prob-
lems and how?”. After the 1950s, international development theo-
ries, inspired in part by the problems of the Global South, labelled as 
“Peripheral” all those countries and regions not belonging to the “north-
ern” birthplaces of European and North American capitalism, labelled 
as the “Core”. Theories such as development and underdevelopment, 
core-periphery, import substitution, strong state intervention in pub-
lic infrastructure investments and the like, came from this period. 
Economists, geographers and sociologists started to use a series of indices 
such as accessibility and transport infrastructure, income and con-
sumption per capita, capital supply, degree of industrialisation, export 
performance, illiteracy, etc., to measure the distance between “periph-
eral” regions and countries, with “core” regions as the norm. Measuring 
development distance between nations and regions through such indices 
became the new dogma and “peripheral” in general became the new 
international prototype of backwardness. International development the-
ories were transplanted to the regional scale in the 1960s and the 1970s 
and replicated similar assumptions and indices to measure regional back-
wardness. Since then, “peripheral” in economics, economic geography 
and regional development theories has become synonymous with under-
development. This has resulted in three major theoretical problems, with 
devastating effects that persist today.
The first concerns the indices themselves. Although they appear as neutral, 
universal and technocratic, they are deeply biased, based on historically and 
geographically specific social and cultural experiences and choices. Those 
who use and apply the measures are mainly from the “core developed” 
countries and regions, from whence the historical roots of European 
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and North American imperialism and industrial capitalism originate. 
They put forward as a prototype the particular development trajec-
tory of those areas, which is, of course, different from those places in 
the periphery. “Different” here does not necessarily mean lagging, less 
important or inferior which are definitions deriving from the vantage 
point of the dominant formulations imposed by the indices. Measuring 
development through indices ignores the variety of actual uneven capi-
talist development, which takes different forms in different socio-spatial 
formations; what Bob Jessop (2011) called “variegated capitalism”.
The second theoretical problem concerns the linear, economistic and uni-
versal development trajectory assumed by these indices and by those who 
use them. At one end stand the “core/developed” countries or regions 
having the highest or best indices, while at the other end are those 
“peripheral/underdeveloped” places. The dominant assumption is that 
“lagging” peripheral regions need to “catch-up” with developed ones 
and to do this, they need modernisation, outside assistance and a lot of 
effort. Several decades ago, the economist Charles Kindleberger called 
this model the “gap approach”: you subtract the indices of periph-
eral regions from the core ones and the rest is your development pro-
gramme. In this model, there is no option for a different development 
path, no alternatives, and imagination of the “peripherality” as met-
aphor has entered a self-reinforcing cycle in which it is stereotyped 
(Massey 2006).
The third theoretical problem concerns explanations of backwardness and 
peripherality. Developmental problems in peripheral areas are explained, 
on the one hand, as solely the outcome of internal/endogenous factors, 
such as remoteness, capital scarcity and inadequate technology and 
infrastructure. Social and cultural factors were added, with local peo-
ple accused of being “traditional, lazy, irresponsible and less energetic”, 
fuelling negative prejudices. These explanations ignore inter-regional 
relations with the rest of the country and the world and interventions 
by particular states and capital interests. On the other hand, periph-
erality is explained as the sole outcome of imposed exogenous exploitative 
relations, such as multinational capital and/or particular institutional 
interventions by core capitalist countries. The role of local social actors 
is totally ignored, assuming their passivity. However, uneven capitalist 
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development in general and the reproduction of peripherality in par-
ticular, depends always on the contradictory articulation between 
internal/endogenous and external/exogenous factors (Hadjimichalis 
and Hudson 2007, 2014). Cities, regions and countries are not closed, 
bounded entities, but are open and porous; their firms, people and 
institutions interact, building relations at multiple scales, from local to 
global and vice versa. There is a shifting importance between these con-
ditions, which are always uneven and combined in particular places and 
times, introducing dynamic characteristics dependent on changes in the 
spatial division of labour, from global to local.
Following these imaginations and conceptualisations, several poli-
cies in the 1960s and 1970s were introduced in the global North, and 
particularly in Europe, to develop regional peripheries. Among them, I 
recall the building of traffic infrastructure to challenge remoteness; the 
construction and operation of social and cultural infrastructures such 
as schools, universities, hospitals, housing and museums to improve 
conditions of social reproduction; large capital investments to provide 
employment in planned industrial growth poles or in industrial branch 
plant economies and many more. In summary, these policies had in 
common a strong external/exogenous intervention, either from the state 
or by private capital. For some time, these policies worked in parallel 
with the wider compound capitalist growth and did manage to ame-
liorate conditions of peripherality, a period known as “welfare region-
alism” largely based on Keynesianism and social democratic political 
principles. However, major changes in the European and global division 
of labour, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern block, the 
rise of neoliberalism, financialisation and massive de-industrialisation, 
all acted as catalysts to show, once again, the impasse inherent in these 
assumptions.
In the 1980s and 1990s, a major paradigm shift occurred in 
 economic geography and regional development. Parallel to slow com-
pound growth and as a reaction to the inadequacies of exogenous 
national and regional development frameworks, the focus shifted 
from lagging peripheral regions to cases of regional success and a new 
scale was introduced, the local. Regions and localities such as Third 
Italy in northeast–central Italy, Silicon Valley and Orange County in 
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California, the ‘M4 corridor’ in southern Britain and southern Bavaria 
in Germany became paradigmatic cases, while subsequent research 
came to include many more examples in other parts of the world. The 
new analytical framework, known as the “Third Way” of thinking, was 
now “endogenous” development, in which small firms in these regions/
localities successfully combined market opportunities, supposedly with-
out external assistance (Hadjimichalis 2006, 2017). They succeeded by 
mobilising locally existing resources (particularly knowledge and learn-
ing) and new forms of production organisation such as flexibility and 
networking. These new industrial spaces highlighted the role of compe-
tition and cooperation at the local/regional level, with the assistance of 
strong endogenous cultural traditions and local institutions and associ-
ations. Researchers and policy makers agree that a distinctive feature of 
these places and localities is the embeddedness of certain non-economic 
factors such as social capital, trust and reciprocity, based on  familiarity, 
face-to-face exchange, cooperation, embedded routines, habits and 
norms.
As is by now well known—and so just briefly mentioned here—
this ‘Third Way of thinking’ is identified with two major schools of 
thought: first the so-called New Economic Geography (NEG) or “geo-
graphical economics” and second, New Regionalism (NR). Without 
forming a coherent body of theory, NR promotes several proposals for 
“learning, networked and flexible” regions, “innovative and  intelligent” 
regions, “clusters”, “creative” cities, “communicative planning” and 
the like (Storper 1997; Cooke and Morgan 1998; Healey 1997; Amin 
and Thrift 2005). They appeared within the panoply of local/regional 
 development theories in the 1980s and 1990s. According to both 
 theorists and policy makers, while in the past local/regional develop-
ment took place endogenously in a spontaneous manner, now it can 
be designed to implement a policy “from below”. International organ-
isations, such as the OECD, World Bank, European Union (EU) and 
several national governments initiated programmes to promote such 
policies, using the aforementioned success stories as “best practice”.
Perhaps the most important omission from this research framework 
and much of the “New Regionalism” literature, which really remains 
unspoken, is the uneven relations among regions/localities, successful 
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and unsuccessful alike; in other words the burning question of uneven 
geographical development under capitalism. This was evident in how 
little attention was paid to the capitalist crisis that was already visible 
from the mid-1990s in some of the emblematic localities and regions. 
Just at the very moment that policy prescriptions based upon the 
assumed bases of success in these localities were becoming generalised 
within regional and urban policies across the globe, the conditions on 
which success was based in these exemplar regions were being eroded 
(Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2014).
3  Imagining Backwardness and Dealing 
with Peripherality in the EU
Much of the previous discussion finds application in the different 
phases of EU regional development policies. From the mid-1960s—
when the EC’s “regional problem” was for the first time identified—
until the mid-1980s, peripherality was imagined mainly as inadequate 
infrastructure, degree of industrialisation, unemployment and lack 
of adequate income. It guided a modest attempt towards redistrib-
utive policies that, together with the highly generous CAP, resulted 
in differentiated regional improvements, particularly in Southern 
Europe, France and the UK. During this period, European regional 
development indices were introduced followed by a European univer-
sal development trajectory while there was a relative balance explana-
tion of peripherality between endogenous/exogenous factors (Thoidou 
and Foutakis 2006). This period coincided with the first signs of 
de-industrialisation and the rise of neoliberalism, first with Thatcherism 
in the UK and later with ordoliberalism in the then West Germany.1
From mid-1985 to the early 2000s, several enlargements added 
new members and in all EU documents and declarations there was an 
explosion of interest in conversion and cohesion. The exact meaning 
and content of the two new terms were ambiguous and contradictory, 
because the allocation of more funds to peripheral regions aimed to 
compensate for the prospective loss of their competitiveness. It was a 
major change in the imagination and conceptualisation of peripherality, 
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introducing directly the neoliberal rationale of “regional competitive-
ness” deriving from the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Competition among 
regions introduced indirectly the endogenous analytical framework. 
Many concepts of “Third Way” thinking, particularly those of learn-
ing, innovative and intelligent regions, made their appearance in policy 
recommendations.
From the early 2000s to 2014, we lived in the era of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the enlargement to 28 members and the euro crisis. The Lisbon 
Treaty contributed directly to weaken the promotion of the, already ill-
funded, cohesion objective, while the euro crisis and, after 2015, the ref-
ugee crisis, changed dramatically what we once knew as United Europe. 
From a spatial point of view, since the 2000s, regional unevenness in 
the EU has increased and this increase highly correlates with particular 
EU policies. During the early euro years, 2000–2013, all development 
policies of the EU, including regional policies, were subsumed under 
the Lisbon strategy. It was assumed that Regional Competitiveness, 
as the main development axis, would provide “growth and jobs”. All 
EU regions became eligible for funding and although extra funding 
was available for the less developed regions, this policy shift benefited 
peripheral regions in the East and the South the least, although sup-
posedly, drafted for them. The euro crisis in the regions of Southern 
Europe and persisting structural deficiencies in many ex-socialist regions 
of the East fuelled regional divergence during the period 2000–2015 
(European Commission 2017). The sequel to this story is Europe 2020, 
a strategy promoting “smart, sustainable, inclusive growth” (European 
Commission 2010). By then, everything in Europe was supposed to be 
“smart” to “improve the business environment”. In addition, all policies 
should follow neoliberal “fiscal discipline” and finally: “Fiscal consolida-
tion and long-term financial sustainability will need to go hand in hand 
with important structural reforms, in particular of pension, health care, 
social protection and education systems” (European Commission 2010, 
24). In short, austerity.
The major problem with cohesion funds is the contradiction between seek-
ing neoliberal macro-economic policies that impose austerity while pursu-
ing solidarity and economic and social cohesion. The cornerstone of any 
regional development programme consists of socio-spatial redistribution 
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aiming at reducing unevenness and socio-spatial injustices, something 
that is inconsistent, theoretically and practically, with austerity.
The latter is documented in the 7th Report on economic, social 
and territorial cohesion (European Commission 2017) with evidence 
of economic and social gaps between Southern/Eastern Europe and 
regions in more developed nations in Northern and Western Europe. 
Using known indicators such as, among others, GDP per head, gen-
eral and youth unemployment, education and training, poverty and 
exclusion, the report highlights the increase in regional inequality in 
all the above indices during the period 2000–2015, i.e. when neolib-
eral austerity was generalised across the EU. The Report also identifies 
four “income clubs”: very high, high, medium and low income “clubs” 
(p. 23). The geography of these “clubs” corresponds to the familiar 
uneven development pattern, known since the 1990s. Very high- and 
high-income regions are located in a band from London through Paris, 
the Benelux and Germany, down to some northern Italian regions and 
up to Scandinavian regions. Medium- and low-income regions instead 
are located in Southern and Eastern Europe. General and youth unem-
ployment, poverty and social exclusion show a similar geographical 
pattern. Furthermore, the EU itself promotes neoliberal policies and, 
following the new Economic Governance established in 2012, could 
use cohesion funds as a threat tool, since Brussels is allowed to suspend 
funding for countries that fail to meet their deficit targets. Thus, it is 
hardly surprising that after 30 years, regional and cohesion programmes 
have failed to achieve their main goal: creating a more economically 
homogeneous Europe. The main reason behind this failure is austerity 
cutting across all these indicators, depending, of course, on the particular 
variety of neoliberalism applied in each country.
The 2014 reform of EU Cohesion Policy (EUCP) to strengthen the 
efficiency of the policy and to increase the performance of the recipient 
regions, made the whole process more complicated. The three pillars of 
the new EUCP consist of “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”. The 
first two pillars of the 2020 agenda are reduced to the goal of regional 
economic competitiveness, whilst the third requires solidarity among 
member states and regions in contradiction of the former two pillars. 
In the post-2014 period, two types of conditionality are in operation. 
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First, the macro-economic conditionality operates as part of the Fiscal 
Pact, imposing economic surveillance of budgetary limitations, i.e. 
imposing permanent austerity. Second, there will be conditionalities 
operating inside the context of the EUCP. All countries have to spend 
allocated funds in two years; otherwise, they must return the money. The 
reorientation of post-2014 EUCP promotes an endogenous approach 
that views “region” in functional terms: a bounded entity that deter-
mines economic action and every region should “compete” and achieve 
convergence through growth. A familiar approach that re-introduces 
endogenous processes also emphasising “Third Way” concepts such as 
non-economic factors such as knowledge (especially tacit), capacities to 
generate consensus and trust and social capital, innovative capacities of 
firms and organisations and high labour skills (Hadjimichalis 2006).
The objectives and discourses of “growth through competitiveness, 
innovation and flexibility” have superseded the pursuit of cohesion and 
convergence through redistribution. The Lisbon Treaty and Europe 2020 
contributed directly to the weakening of the promotion of the cohesion 
objective as part of EU policies. Despite the rhetoric in documents and 
the Brussels jargon, the reproduction of socio-spatial peripherality via 
austerity and uneven geographical development is alive and well.
4  In What Sense Peripherality  
in the Twenty-First Century?
I borrow the above question from Doreen Massey’s late 1970s’ seminal 
paper, where she introduces the concept of spatial division of labour. 
Among many other points, Massey (1979, 236) argued that:
…‘The economy’ of any given local area will (…) be a complex result 
of the combination of its succession of roles within the series of wider, 
national and international, spatial divisions of labour.
The current situation in the various peripheries of Europe, which has 
stayed more or less stable since the 1990s, strongly depends on the 
“succession of roles” within the spatial division of labour, from local to 
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global, incorporating endogenous and exogenous factors. In this respect, 
uneven conditions of peripherality in the twenty-first century are hardly 
“new” and build upon major restructuring processes that have taken 
place in recent decades. Among these, I can briefly mention the uneven 
enlargement of the EU towards Eastern Europe; the combination of 
de-industrialisation and de-localisation of productive activities result-
ing in unemployment and regional decline in “traditional” agglomera-
tions and the rise of new ones; a massive class, gender, age and ethnic 
recomposition of the EU labour markets including incoming migrants; 
several institutional restructurings such as the Maastricht Treaty, trade 
regulations such as the Outward Processing Trade; and finally, the major 
financial break with the introduction of the euro. This restructuring in 
the spatial division of labour resulted in deepening uneven development 
between and within countries that further marginalised the position of 
EU peripheries (see also Smith 2013).
As shown in the previous section, regional/local development poli-
cies have been inadequate in dealing with peripherality questions. The 
major crisis of 2009–2010 in Europe and beyond introduced three 
other important factors visible since the 1990s but acquired critical 
importance after the global turmoil in 2009. These are: (a) financial-
isation, (b) the rise of a new rentier economy, and (c) private and pub-
lic debt that rarely entered the discussion of local/regional development 
theories and policies. From the late 1980s onwards, financialisation 
took the lead with the help of active intervention by the state (Hudson 
2010; Sayer 2015). The productive sector in EU regions exhibited slow 
growth, but did so variably between regions, with German regions and 
their satellites the obvious example. Instead, rent-seeking activities such 
as investments in bonds and securities, in privatised public utility com-
panies, in insurance and in real estate and land grabbing started dom-
inating EU economies. Deregulation of old welfare apparatuses and 
re-regulation for the benefits of capital plus technological innovation 
helped the financial sector to create new “products” and to attract the 
majority of surplus capital. Moreover, welfare cuts, lower wages and 
credit card expansion made middle-, working-class households become 
increasingly dependent on formal finance, and they incurred debt in 
order to secure access to vital goods. Finally, due to diminishing public 
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revenues, states, regions and municipalities began to depend more and 
more on bank loans or investments in securities to finance their daily 
operations and to build speculative real estate. Their debt accumu-
lated while financialisation proceeded and in this way, private, public 
and municipal debt became a mechanism for capturing social wealth 
and political control. As the French Regulation School and Maurizio 
Lazzarato argued, it was a major shift in the “regime of accumulation”, 
away from the Fordist and post-Fordist productive regime towards the 
“regime of accumulation with financial and debt dominance” (Aglietta 
2000; Boyer 2000; Lazzarato 2012).
The above shift is highly uneven geographically but reproduces the 
familiar polarisation in the EU discussed in the previous section. Some 
regions in central–north Europe retained their productive capacity, 
exported performance, and accumulated surpluses, while the peripher-
ies of Southern and Eastern Europe accumulated debt. The rise of the 
so-called FIRE economy (finance, insurance and real estate) increased 
the importance of metropolitan regions and further marginalised rural 
peripheries. None of these developments attracted attention and so the 
crisis of 2009–2010 exploded out of a deep sleep.
In addition, the authoritarian and unaccountable mode of EU 
Governance facilitated the rise of technocracy that de-politicised all 
development problems. Since the 2000s, neoliberal and “Third Way” 
regional development theories and policies operated on the same track 
so that both promoted policies for a competitive and entrepreneurial 
city and region. Thus, the way they formulated Doreen Massey’s orig-
inal question “In what sense a regional/peripheral problem” has been 
de-politicised when a frontal attack against neoliberal policies was 
needed. The trouble in these times is that most policy makers have no 
idea who Keynes was and what he really stood for and do not know 
Myrdal’s “cumulative causation” and “backwash effects”; uneven devel-
opment sounds “too political” while the understanding of Marx is 
negligible.
So what is the response of the dominant EU institutions to the 
above developments and critical comments? I am afraid very inade-
quate indeed. Unable or unwilling to face the results of their own prac-
tices, European leaders met in March 2017 in Rome to celebrate the 
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EU’s 60th “birthday”. Among the celebratory speeches and in the Rome 
2017 Declaration, three important concepts, the lack of democracy, 
austerity and the euro crisis, were absent. It is hardly surprising that 
political leaders had little self-critical to say about the issue. Instead, 
in classical Brussels’ jargon, the Declaration promised that the Union 
“will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary”. This 
is how the European establishment covered the proposal for a “multi-
 speed ” Europe, launched by German, French, Italian and Spanish elites. 
The proposal, known also as “variable geometries”, “differentiated inte-
gration” and “concentric circles” had been around for several years 
in Brussels and in meetings of experts, but it was opposed by British 
and some other countries’ elites. It has been indirectly included in the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Schengen agreement and finally in the Eurozone. 
These agreements gave the power to individual states to join policies 
and treaties selectively on a voluntary basis and, in combination with 
neoliberalism and financialisation, made clear that real integration and 
convergence was not an EU target. Uneven development, covered as 
always with nice words about social and territorial cohesion, was finally 
de facto accepted by the EU and silently framed as the deserved price 
for those not willing to join proposed policies.
We don’t yet know the exact ingredients of the new proposal, except 
that it openly challenges one of the foundational principles of the then 
European Common Market, agreed in Rome in 1957, namely that all 
countries are equal. At that time, European integration was a hegem-
onic project in the sense that the dominant powers promoted their 
class interests, while looking after the popular masses via social cohe-
sion, redistribution and social welfare. Of course, socio-spatial equality 
existed only in principle and in the course of time capital accumulation 
and political intervention (e.g. the Maastricht Treaty and the introduc-
tion of the euro) made some countries, regions and social groups within 
them “more equal” than others. Neoliberalism and its German version, 
ordoliberalism now dominant in the EU, violently changed the rem-
nants of the old hegemonic project and guided the EU and particularly 
the Eurozone into crises, ceasarism and austerity. At the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, dominant class interests still lead the project 
but without hegemony. The widespread de-legitimisation of EU policies 
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that came unfortunately mainly from ultra-right xenophobic politi-
cal forces and less so from left anti-systemic movements and parties is 
indicative of the present condition.
In the 2017 celebrations in Rome, inequality and uneven develop-
ment were cynically packed in fancy wrapping and offered as the solu-
tion to the EU malaise, as a positive new paradigm supposedly facing 
forwards while refusing to look backwards that is, without “coming to 
terms with continuing uneven development in Europe”, as Ray Hudson 
(2017) argues. Some of the Heads of State supporting the idea argued 
that “multiple speeds already exist in Europe”, and Angela Merkel added, 
“we cannot stop countries wishing to increase their speed of integration”. 
Their cynicism is blind to the fact that the enterprise of European inte-
gration, instead of moving at multiple speeds, is at a standstill, or worse, 
in reverse. Furthermore, it is not accidental that EU leaders and the 
class interests they represent avoided coming to terms with the existing 
undemocratic EU structure. In the Rome Declaration, they promised to 
“promote democratic, effective and transparent decision-making” in clear 
contradiction to the acceptance of Treaties and the practices of EU insti-
tutions responsible for applying undemocratic and opaque procedures.
I am aware that the current elitist ruling order in Europe and the 
stock of regional development policies they use are incapable of dealing 
effectively with these issues and of restoring confidence and solidarity 
among sharply divided populations. Therefore, a major political change 
away from neoliberalism and austerity is needed as the necessary pre-
condition, but perhaps is not enough to handle the “new” questions of 
peripherality. Thus, besides much-needed macro-political changes, I pro-
pose to look also inward, into our field. Much contemporary regional 
development theory and policy were crafted in the 1990s, a period of 
relative stability, integration and growth that ended in economic crisis 
and high uncertainty. Existing mainstream theories and policies are weak 
and proved incapable of explaining these conditions and this demands 
fresh thinking. So, a paradigm shift is required, one that goes back to 
earlier political economy theories and policies, avoiding mistakes of the 
past; and one that looks forward integrating lessons from the euro and 
the refugee crisis and the effects from austerity policies.2
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The previous critical comments could be seen as an invitation to start 
thinking towards the required shift, in which we should fight to re- 
politicise regional development issues by asking who is gaining/losing 
and why, because neither success nor failure is entirely endogenous or 
exogenous. In other words, if a region fails it is not only of “its” own 
endogenous problems but it is also part of the price of others “succeed-
ing” to become centres, materially or imagined. We should also pursue 
policies and actions that challenge socio-spatial injustice and the lack 
of democracy and accountability, both at home and in EU institutions. 
These steps by themselves cannot challenge the neoliberal dogma, but at 
least could open new paths of knowledge and emancipation, so impor-
tant nowadays for younger researchers and policy makers. Not an easy 
task but one worth the effort. After all, experience tells us that lost fights 
are only those that were not fought.
Notes
1. Ordoliberalism became the dominant mantra of law and order in 
Germany after the 1980s and was characterised by the following features: 
strong central state intervention to secure competition; an independent 
central bank committed to monetary stability and low inflation; a bal-
ancing of tax revenue against government expenditure; privatisation of 
public services and public assets; deregulation of the labour market and 
putting in place a minimum wage. The State is necessary to achieve the 
market ideal, but a particular kind of State. Ordoliberals have limited 
faith in democracy and instead they strongly believe in independent, net-
worked institutions that are unaccountable and operate parallel to the 
State. The trouble with ordoliberalism, as Aziz (2015) notes, is that when 
situations/basic parameters change, the rules of independent institutions 
stay the same, and if that means the problem is not solved, then so be it. 
This is how the EU and Eurozone operate nowadays.
2. For reason of space, I cannot explain here further the requirements of 
this shift, but the interested reader should consult Hadjimichalis and 
Hudson (2014) and Hadjimichalis (2017).
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1  Introduction: Policy Expertise 
in Transnational Processes
This chapter is about policy, state power, and research method. My 
practical questions are about the everyday creation of policy expertise. 
I ask: how is expert authority made in transnational policy settings? 
More specifically, how is the everyday creation of policy expertise 
changing today, as ever more state and non-state actors participate in 
policy-making at both national and international levels? Where are the 
centres and margins of expertise in a political space like the European 
Union and how do the fortunes of specific places rise and fall in these 
processes? What is the role of states and national institutions in this 
process and how are these institutions transformed in the process of 
transnational policy-making?
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Intersecting with these practical questions about state power are 
methodological puzzles and dilemmas about how we ought to study 
transnational policy expertise and the role of states in it. What can we 
take as evidence of transnational dynamics in the context in which most 
information is produced by nationally affiliated experts and commenta-
tors? The chapter is indeed as much about research method as it is about 
policy, expertise, or state power in Europe.
The chapter will proceed in three steps. I will first make an argument 
about the transnationalisation of policy knowledge in Europe: the ways 
in which policy expertise, including state-governing expertise, is pro-
duced in ambiguous and ephemeral transnational networks. I will then 
highlight some of the ways in which that process of transnationalisa-
tion is fundamentally uneven and may indeed accentuate rather than 
reduce existing inequalities in the field of policy expertise in Europe. I 
will finally foreground some of the methodological challenges encoun-
tered in the study of transnational policy processes. My empirical exam-
ples come from the fields of diplomacy and diplomatic training, but my 
effort is to illuminate the dynamics of knowledge production in policy- 
making institutions more broadly.1
Diplomacy and other such knowledge-intensive fields are important 
to examine because experts in these fields craft the knowledge claims 
on which basis policies are made in the first place. Experts do not sim-
ply tell us how things work or ought to work. Experts also tell us what 
exists, what is significant, and what is possible. Policy-making is in part 
an administrative practice. It is also an intellectual and imaginative 
social practice.
My empirical analysis is based on ten years of work. It draws in part 
from about 160 one-to-one loosely structured interviews with foreign 
policy professionals, mostly diplomats. The interviews were conducted 
with over ninety such professionals between 2007 and 2017, in small 
sets of 10–15 interviews per year. They were carried out mostly but 
not exclusively in Brussels (cf. Kuus 2014, 2017a). My goal was not to 
find out what diplomats think about particular policy issues. Rather, 
I tried to elucidate the rules for the production of rules in diplomatic 
institutions. My enquiry is ultimately about knowledge and state 
power.
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Most of the direct quotes that I bring from that material come from 
a smaller and more recent sub-set of the material: about fifty inter-
views that focus specifically on the transnationalisation of regulatory 
power and the diplomatic profession today. These fifty interviews were 
conducted in Brussels and eight other nodes of diplomatic know-
ledge in the last three years. Most of them probe the transnationalisa-
tion of state-governing expertise: the transnational networks of ideas 
and influence through which state power is produced and transformed 
today.
2  Transnationalisation of States
In the facet that is easily visible in daily practice and academic research, 
diplomacy is about the inter-national negotiation of national interests. 
So is EU policy-making. The most important decisions in the EU are 
taken intergovernmentally and inter-nationally. Even in the supposedly 
supranational settings of the European Commission, national perspec-
tives are clearly discernible and carefully guarded. “The most important 
skill in Brussels is nationality”, a long-time observer remarks causti-
cally about EU policy-making. Many if not most issues and debates in 
Brussels are habitually plotted onto a national matrix in which power is 
viewed in terms of the competition and collaboration among pre-given 
entities called nation-states (Kuus 2015).
Yet, the daily grind of diplomatic work is becoming increasingly 
trans-national rather than inter-national: it involves substantial trans-
national circulation and mutation of ideas and practices. When one 
looks at how diplomats actually do their work, and when one really 
tries to notice what one usually does not notice, the picture is not so 
inter-national. When one tries to see not only what diplomats do today 
but also what they are willy-nilly being trained and socialised to do in 
twenty years, a more transnational scene emerges.
As an example of the ambiguous feel of the shifts at hand, consider 
this culinary metaphor from a national diplomat in Europe. The great-
est difficulty in European Union decision-making, he observes, is coor-
dinating the underlying approaches to issues: the ways of looking at 
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problems, the methods of addressing them administratively. You can 
develop procedures for communication, but the often unconscious 
lenses, deeply rooted in national cultures, are hard to alter. The diffi-
culty is often underestimated, the interviewee observes. “There is a nice 
European sauce that someone has poured over the differences [he makes 
a gesture of pouring something over a dish carelessly and in copious 
quantities]”, but this often only coats and masks rather than harmonises 
the differences.
At first glance, this diplomat stresses the inter-national character of 
diplomacy. The sauce is cast as a useless obstruction on an inter-state 
scene. But it is noted. There is something in addition to the inter-national 
shaping that dish. If we overemphasise the sauce, we lose something. But 
if we ignore the sauce, we also miss something. There is a tendency to 
focus on the so-called real stuff—states—underneath the sauce. The ten-
dency is there in part because the causal powers of the sauce cannot be 
neatly identified. It is easy to identify a state as an actor. In diplomacy and 
in EU policy-making, these are literally states who speak in negotiations 
settings: France says this or Germany says that. Identifying an agent in a 
diffuse transnational web of activity is far more difficult.
In diplomacy, foreign ministries still do most of the professional 
training. At first glance, the various initiatives, which I will not review 
here (see Kuus 2017a), seem to illustrate mostly the inter-national con-
nections of state institutions. In addition to the business as usual, diplo-
matic training also extends beyond state structures and operates through 
transnational competition for resources both material and symbolic. 
Most visibly, many courses operate at the margins or outside of formal 
ministerial structures, via universities, research institutes, foundations, 
or consulting companies.
State power also operates through long-term structural tenden-
cies rather than specific formal policies. For example, a number of EU 
member states, more so the richer than the poorer ones, offer scholar-
ships to their nationals to study at the College of Europe, a specialist 
post-graduate institution that has long served as a training ground of 
EU civil servants. The states do this in the hope that these graduates 
subsequently succeed in EU institutions and put their national per-
spectives in play in EU structures. These initiatives do not amount to 
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diplomatic training in formal terms, but they illustrate the recognition 
among nation-states that effective long-term influence requires actions 
much beyond the national capital (Kuus 2018).
When one tries to understand what places matter in the European 
field of diplomatic expertise, one needs to consider not only states or 
institutions as such. One also has to consider the various institutions’ 
and training initiatives’ alumni networks in Brussels and around the 
world. In such networks, state power is modulated through intangible 
symbolic resources, such as reputation. For example, how do we assess 
the importance of an alumni network around the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, the Johns Hopkins University Centre 
in Bologna, the European University Institute in Florence, or Tufts 
University in Cambridge, Massachusetts? If we look at diplomatic train-
ing as a broader social field of connections and struggles, we begin to 
discern patterns that are not neatly intergovernmental or inter-national, 
but operate along transnational axes of differentiation.
Many of the diplomats I interview in Europe note the distinctiveness 
of EU-level diplomacy: both the negotiations among the member states 
and the external diplomacy of the EU as a whole. “The Brussels skill…
[a diplomat says, while appearing to be sifting sand through his fingers] 
… you cannot apply what you learned in your ministry”. Influence in 
the EU, The Economist (2013) magazine remarks along similar lines, is 
like the Brussels drizzle: ubiquitous but hard to pinpoint. It is observa-
ble not in its application at any one point in time but in its cumulative 
effects over time. It may be fashionable in some capitals to glorify the 
‘big boys’ bilateral diplomacy over what The Economist calls the “deli-
cate dance” (The Economist 2014) in Brussels, but the diplomats sent to 
do the dance are often the most skilled these same capitals can muster. 
When Britain’s Permanent Representative resigned unexpectedly in early 
2017, many noted that losing someone so well-versed in the “silken cul-
ture” of Brussels ought to worry London (D’Ancona 2017).
Even in large foreign services, skilled diplomats recognise that 
Brussels ups the game for them. In a national diplomacy, a diplomat 
observes, you advance the national interest, which, for practical pur-
poses, is expressed by the government in office. In EU diplomacy, you 
further the European interest. But what is that? It has to be distilled, 
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felt: it is constantly challenged and revised. Several interviewees, in dif-
ferent diplomatic services, instinctively reach for tactile gestures to char-
acterise the process. It might be a gesture of feeling a fabric between 
their fingers to test its quality. Or the gesture of sifting sand through 
their fingers to feel its grain. Or feeling something amorphous and hard 
to grasp. As my work on diplomatic training has progressed, remarks 
about what I call the cloth gesture increasingly appear in my notes as I 
learn to notice such gestures.
The gestures convey something intangible and qualitative: something 
that can be discerned, but not measured. Once I dare to consider the 
references to silk and drizzle as evidence of slow and diffuse shifts in 
atmosphere and relations, different long-term futures come into relief. 
Once I ask what kinds of spaces diplomats are being prepared for, not 
in the next year but in the next twenty years, I realise that inter-national 
spaces these are not—at least not in the minds of the more light-footed 
among the dancers.
As an example, consider the following vignette. When Brussels began 
to ponder the impending retirement of Pierre Sellal, France’s Permanent 
Representative, and the acknowledged Sun King of the Brussels diplo-
matic scene, even the admirers of his “light-footed charm” noted that 
Sellal may be the last of his kind. His “parlour games” of big player alli-
ances, Salmon Mousseline, and bottles of Grand Cru worked well so 
far, but the new representative may need to work with a broader range 
of actors. In the “somewhat regretful” characterisation of the parlour 
game from a diplomat from an Eastern European who said: “Pierre 
never had to approach me for support. He had always his majority 
arranged and … elegantly presented at the meeting” (De la Baume and 
Vinocur 2016). Some of those in the parlours take note of that regret-
ful tinge and wonder whether France can afford to be so confident 
about its influence. “He’s sometimes too French”, a French diplomat 
says of Sellal: “He is the Frenchman who knows the Brussels machine 
best. The question now is, the diplomat continues, whether this version 
of Brussels corresponds to the reality of today” (ibid.). If the French, 
whose diplomacy is highly regarded in Brussels, may need to reconsider 
their approach, is the big power game really an option for any member 
state?
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Traditional categorisations of interest and identity have modest util-
ity in these circumstances. The neat terminology of levels and stages of 
decision-making—national, European, Brussels, and so on—is of lim-
ited value as the actual daily horse-trading does not follow the binaries 
of national vs. European or intergovernmental vs. supranational. The 
question is not who has the upper hand in the relations between Brussels 
and the member states. The question is how to analyse regulatory power 
in Europe without that binary of Brussels and the member states and 
without the national matrix that imagines power in state-based terms 
and thereby unimagines transnational connections (Kuus 2017b).
3  Uneven Europe
Yet, this is not some kind of mythical harmonised space of European 
expertise. It is a space of knowledge articulated through existing power 
relations. I will thus briefly delve into some of the uneven and unequal 
patterns in that space. One of such intangible resources concerns soci-
etal wealth—both government spending and the broader societal wealth 
discernible through the sophistication of the media, education, and 
social scene more broadly.
Diplomatic protocol codifies the nominal parity of states and encour-
ages the polite pretence of it. Specialist literature customarily presents 
the profession in terms of national perspectives. It implies that one 
can jump from power centres to power margins with examples; that 
the training programmes, university research, or journalistic reporting 
generated in different countries are usually on par. The little secret is 
that diplomatic expertise is expensive. Its production requires long-term 
strategic spending much beyond the foreign ministry. Put bluntly, sym-
bolic capital costs money.
This comes to the fore in Brussels. In that node of global power, work 
is more “sociological” than traditional bilateral diplomatic practice, an 
interviewee explains. It requires a certain intangible feel for the game. 
That feel does not come cheaply. The richer countries can start with a 
better prepared pool of applicants because they have better universities 
and a more sophisticated media landscape. These more affluent systems 
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can weigh and debate the importance of thematic, regional, or other 
forms of expertise. They can appoint advisors to do some of this work. 
They can rotate diplomats widely and benefit from the diverse networks 
forged in the process. The less well-to-do systems focus on the skills that 
they can train quickly and cheaply in-house.
For some of the poorer EU member states, seconding junior diplo-
mats to the EU diplomatic service as desk officers at geographical units 
is their best chance to give these professionals some exposure to dis-
tant places. Without continuous exposure to regional expertise in the 
home capital as well, the long-term effect is uncertain. The impact of 
such long-term exposure is difficult to measure. Qualitatively, it plays. 
One can see, a council official speaks of the negotiations there, that big 
rich countries’ diplomats’ knowledge of, say, Africa, is qualitatively bet-
ter from what those from small Central European countries can mus-
ter. The small countries are understandably sensitive to their immediate 
neighbourhood. In EU settings though, the game is often bigger and 
Eurocentric knowledge is insufficient.
In theory, the smaller and poorer countries can use digital technol-
ogies to access information and networks without training diplomats 
to be present physically. In practice, there is, to quote two different 
interviewees, a “huge”, even “growing” gap between possibility and 
reality. In addition to the visible power, visible from things like dip-
lomats being around the table, there is, what yet another interviewee 
calls the invisible power of personal networks. That invisible power can-
not be acquired via an e-mail list: it requires long-term inter-personal 
relationships of professional trust. In Brussels, what plays is not only the 
instructions and negotiation skills in Brussels, but, more broadly, the 
pre-Brussels training and socialisation (Kuus 2018).
The differences in wealth should not be overplayed and the une-
venness cannot be captured by GDP figures. Generalisations must be 
done tentatively. “It seems to me”, I solicit feedback from a senior dip-
lomat, “that if someone comes from a relatively rich diplomatic ser-
vice, where there is some space for a certain—relaxed—exploration of 
complex social issues, that person is better prepared for Brussels than 
someone who comes from a shoestring ministry, equipped with unreal-
istic instructions and little else”. “The important word there is ‘relaxed’, 
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not ‘rich’”, the person responds. Stable ministries with long traditions, 
including the traditions of mentoring, fare better, but it is the tradition 
rather than the budget that plays. There are examples, the interviewee 
continues, of relatively poor countries with strong diplomatic services 
owing to that benefit of tradition. Nobody cites a rich country without 
a strong tradition. Wealth brings you the tradition in any event (see also 
Kuus 2018).
The picture that is beginning to emerge is a networked trans-
national market for diplomatic expertise. Nation-states, aided by 
nationally based foundations and universities, buy and sell their 
expertise in Europe and beyond: the poorer ones tend to buy and the 
richer ones tend to sell. The boundaries between state and non-state 
actors are growing more ambiguous and permeable. Formal institu-
tional structures matter alongside intangible symbolic resources like 
connections and reputation. Transnationalisation does not undo 
national power or the pecking orders of states. It complicates these 
orders and it problematises the whole idea of a nationally based peck-
ing order.
4  Method: Studying Everyday Practice
The preceding material raises methodological questions about what we 
take as evidence, and what conclusions we draw on the basis of that 
evidence—or, more broadly, how we know what we know. The rest of 
the chapter focuses on that question. It thereby probes some of the key 
methodological difficulties with analysing opaque transnational policy 
processes.
Power in Brussels is fundamentally about contextualisation: about the 
capacity to advance long-term national interests in the context of that 
specific place. Much of that knowledge is contextual, place-based, and 
atmospheric. It is in the air like a drizzle, like water vapour, like fra-
grance. And it is embodied, tightly linked to the personal knowledge, 
skill, reputation, and networks of individual diplomats. Looking for 
clear or hard evidence cannot uncover it. Methodologically, bringing 
out the subtle transnationalisation of European diplomacy (and policy 
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expertise) requires that we work with the “regretful tinge” and the barely 
discernible criticism of parlour games from the French themselves. But 
how to articulate such atmospheric issues in a rigorous scholarly man-
ner? To what degree are references to silk and dance and mousseline, 
or the cloth gestures, serious evidence rather than anecdotes, interpreta-
tions, or otherwise insubstantial speculation?
Analysing a transnational field requires attention to patterns that 
are at once diffuse and specific. This is difficult given that data sources 
are national and the interviewees tell stories that are national both at 
the level of overt talking points and at the level of subterranean angles 
and habits. Telling a different story requires a sustained effort to start 
somewhere else than an intergovernmental network of national foreign 
ministries. In order to trace the transformation of state power in dip-
lomatic practice, we need to move beyond common-sense labels like 
nation-states or Europe and closely trace the blurring of these catego-
ries in empirical terms. This requires that we move beyond institutional 
dynamics and take the mundane and informal building blocks of daily 
life as our object of analysis.
Methodologically, this requires that we take the ephemeral, metaphor-
ical, and opaque remarks about the transformations of diplomatic work 
seriously. References to “the Brussels skill”, “the delicate dance”, “the 
drizzle” of influence, or the “silken” character of the EU scene indicate 
not a different hierarchy of states but a certain deliquescent and diaph-
anous transformation of the diplomatic field. The effect of “the Brussels 
drizzle” can be discerned not in any one moment but in the social field 
over time. Methodologically, the task is to give an account of the con-
tingency of diplomatic practice without squashing it into a pre-made 
typology, model, or storyline. The task is equally to notice practices 
that exceed and evade formal institutional structures and governmental 
positions. In the study of transnational spatial practice, empirical data 
are necessarily more fragmented and amorphous than official papers 
would lead one to believe. Such a study requires not only a matter of 
different data, such as interviews and direct in situ observations. It 
also requires that we notice different things in the data and not purify 
the messiness of daily life in advance of the analysis (Barry 2013, 27). 
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We must keep in mind that ‘careful’ and ‘comprehensive’ are not the 
same thing: in the study of diffuse phenomena, the two goals may 
indeed contradict each other (Kelty 2008, 20). Focusing on place as a 
central component of the context helps one to discern the silken delicacy 
of situated and place-specific relationships in ways that the content anal-
ysis of policy documents disallows. We cannot overcome the constric-
tions of structuralist models (Adler-Nissen 2016, 2) by the methods that 
produced these models.
It is one thing to note such details as anecdotes; it is another to craft 
a rigorous scholarly study from them. Transnational connections are 
emergent and evaporative: nationally produced documents do not tout 
them and national civil servants do not highlight them. Discerning 
these patterns requires concerted analytical effort.
To study practice is to explore:
the ways of frequenting or dwelling in place […] and on the many ways 
of establishing a kind of reliability within the situation imposed on an 
individual […] Like the skill of a driver in Rome or Naples, there is a skill 
that has its connoisseurs and its aesthetics exercised in any labyrinth of 
powers, a skill ceaselessly recreating opacities and ambiguities—spaces of 
darkness and trickery—in the universe of technocratic transparency. (De 
Certeau 1984, 18, xxii)
Efforts to codify all procedures, by giving maximum location and iden-
tification data on the interviews, for example, can obscure rather than 
reveal these opacities and ambiguities. Michel de Certeau (1984, 21), a 
French cultural theorist, writes:
Of the practices themselves, science will retain only moveable elements 
(tools and products to be put in display cases) or descriptive schemas 
(quantifiable behaviours, stereotypes of the staging of social intercourse, 
ritual structures), leaving aside the aspects of society that cannot be so 
uprooted and transferred to another space: ways of using things or words 
according to circumstances. […] Indeed, like Schreber’s God, who ‘com-
municates only with cadavers’ our knowledge seems to consider and toler-
ate in a social body only inert objects.
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The kind of study de Certeau advocates requires us to see different pat-
terns in the ephemeral intersubjective situation of iteration. The task is, 
in part, to wilfully focus on what does not seem to exist. This is tricky. 
Wilful interpretation can easily become wishful thinking. Labelling 
something transnational rather than intergovernmental in origin does 
not make it that.
The references to dance and silk and mousseline are all direct 
quotes from journalistic reporting. I just make more of these fleeting 
references than I usually dare to do. I take them seriously as evidence 
of a series of transformations in state power and state-governing 
expertise in Europe. I accentuate the individual, the contextual, the 
embodied, the experiential, and the fleeting in both primary and 
secondary research. I make much of the small comments and half-
thoughts that destabilise the business as usual but tend to be brushed 
aside in traditional state-centred accounts. A big part of such data is 
publicly available, in gossip, newspaper commentary, and daily life. I 
do not necessarily need to do a traditional ethnography in Brussels. 
There are plenty of observant people in Brussels and they write 
plenty. What I need, and often find difficult, is a different kind of 
awareness and risk-taking ahead of the collection of data. We must 
be keenly aware of the distinction between categories of practice and 
categories of analysis. Ask a practitioner of diplomacy about her pro-
fession and she will tell you a story of national interests. But this does 
not mean that your analysis of diplomatic practice has to be state-
based as well.
Analysing a transnational field requires attention to patterns that are 
at once diffuse and specific. This is difficult: data sources are national 
and the interviewees tell stories that are national both at the level of 
overt talking points and at the level of subterranean angles and habits. 
Telling a different story requires a sustained effort to start somewhere 
else than an intergovernmental network of national foreign ministries. 
In order to trace the transformation of state power in diplomatic prac-
tice, we need to move beyond common-sense labels like nation-states 
or Europe and closely trace the blurring of these categories in empir-
ical terms. This requires that we move beyond institutional dynamics 
4 State Power, Spatial Inequality, and Geographical Expertise …     91
and take the mundane and informal building blocks of daily life as our 
object of analysis.
This underscores the importance of methodological and concep-
tual pluralism in the study of international practice and social power. 
Diplomacy is a fine empirical lens through which to practise such plu-
ralism. To effectively represent the interest of their states, diplomats 
must be open to encounters with difference. This, in turn, requires that 
they wear their pre-existing assumptions about places lightly. The sin-
gle most frequent qualifier in my interview material concerns the con-
tingency of interests, alliances, priorities, policies, outcomes. The more 
experienced the diplomat, the more likely they are to cite contingency 
and context-specificity. True, such performative production of contin-
gency is partly a habit of negotiation: to cite contingency is to guard 
your cards. The category is not entirely devoid of substance, though; 
alert openness to context and contingency is central to diplomatic skill. 
“The first and best advice I can give a young man entering this career”, 
the Earl of Malmesbury wrote in 1813, “is to listen, not to talk—at least, 
not more than is necessary to induce others to talk” (Roberts 2009, 619, 
emphasis in original).
5  Conclusion: For Open-Ended Questions
The chapter made three points. The first concerned the transnationali-
sation of policy expertise, the second concerned the uneven character of 
the process, and the third concerned the methodological difficulties of 
trying to create an analytically rigorous and empirically nuanced account 
of these processes. My overall effort is to nudge us toward a more open-
ended analytical and methodological framework, less beholden to the 
usual formulations around the levels and scales of analysis.
A central difficulty with comprehending spatial planning in today’s 
Europe stems from the methodological nationalism of our analytical 
toolbox. The power of European institutions and the patterns gener-
ated by EU-level funding, knowledge, and influence tend to be fitted 
into an international framework. As a result, EU power is treated as a 
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veneer on an otherwise national picture. This obscures the parallel pro-
cess: the ways in which national labels serve as a veneer on EU regula-
tions. The analytical task is not to figure out where the nation-state ends 
and the EU begins, but to acknowledge that Europe and its member 
states are not distinct politically or analytically. European Union regu-
lations present themselves to the observer in national form, but they are 
transnational rather than national in content and origin (Kuus 2017b). 
To highlight this is not to imply some mythical happy family of united 
Europe. The continent has been a deeply unequal space economically 
and politically since the inception of the modern idea of Europe in the 
eighteenth century. An explicitly transnational rather than national 
starting point gives us a more flexible framework in which to investigate 
the ever-shifting patterns of economic, political, and symbolic periph-
erality. The methodological argument reminds us about the inherent 
ambiguity and indeterminacy of these processes. The methodological 
dilemmas about what exists, how we know this, and how we come to 
know this, cannot be resolved: they can only be pondered.
Faced with such interminable ambiguity, I end with a quote from one 
of my interlocutors in Brussels. Whatever else diplomats might do, that 
experienced practitioner observes, they “must be open, to see new pat-
terns”. An intellectual and experiential openness is good advice for those 
interested in unpacking the emergent transnational patterns of expert 
knowledge and state power.
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Part II




One the key principles of the European Union has been its emphasis on 
the need to promote a Social Model, one which seeks “to give to the peo-
ple of Europe the unique blend of economic well-being, social cohesive-
ness and high overall quality of life” (European Commission 1994, 1). 
But, of course, one of the most significant aspects of this Social Model is 
the fact that it has also been spatialised in fundamental ways. From the 
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1980s, there has been a growing academic and policy focus on the spe-
cific ways that “Europe was divided into a geographical and development 
core and periphery” (e.g. Sarmiento-Mirwaldt 2015, 433). It was also 
acknowledged that a concerted set of interventions was needed in order to 
reduce these territorial inequalities. The European Commission (European 
Commission 2004, 27), by the beginning of the new century, stated that 
it wanted “to help achieve a more balanced development by reducing exist-
ing disparities, preventing territorial imbalances and making both sectoral 
policies which have a spatial impact and regional policy more coherent”. 
Convergence policies of different kinds have used this explicitly spa-
tialised way of thinking as a way of targeting under-performing regions, 
while at the same time seeking to improve the overall competitiveness of 
all European regions. And yet, despite high levels of investment and insti-
tutional support, such convergence policies have experienced limited suc-
cess. For example, some EU countries such as Hungary and Poland have 
long been receiving a large share of Cohesion and European Regional 
Development Fund funding and yet they have introduced certain illib-
eral social and political reforms that are in stark contrast with often- 
mentioned “fundamental values” of the European Union. At the same 
time, EU-orchestrated austerity policies imposed on these countries 
have only served to underline the entrenched and worsening charac-
ter of regional and socio-economic inequalities. For instance, empiri-
cal data demonstrate that 16 out of 26 countries in the European Union 
(with available data) have registered increases in regional GDP disparities 
for NUTS3 regions between 2007 and 2011 (including France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK). It is against 
this backdrop that many academics and policy-makers are beginning to 
question some of the fundamental principles that underpin the European 
Social and Spatial Model. It is against this conceptual and empirical back-
drop, too, that we write this chapter.
We have two main aims in this chapter. Our first aim is to review 
academic and policy engagements with the ideas of territorial and 
regional inequalities within Europe, drawing particular attention to the 
emphasis that has been placed on understanding such inequalities in 
relation to ideas of territorial cohesion (TAEU 2007). We discuss some 
of the conceptual limitations of the idea of territorial cohesion. Our 
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second aim is to deliberate the conceptual and more policy-related ben-
efits that potentially arise from the notion of spatial justice.
Spatial justice is a concept that has gained some conceptual traction 
since the early 1970s (e.g. Harvey 1973; Lefebvre 1970) and there is 
some evidence to show that it is now being viewed by European poli-
cy-makers as a viable alternative or even substance to territorial cohesion 
policies. We outline some of the potential benefits that might accrue 
from framing European interventions that seek to reduce territorial and 
regional inequalities through reference to ideas of spatial justice.
While the idea of spatial justice does not represent a policy pan-
acea, we maintain that it has the potential to: (1) allow academics, 
policy-makers and the public alike to coalesce around a positive and 
aspirational end goal, centred on the idea of justice; (2) enable a more 
progressive discourse on regional development to emerge, which focuses 
on the capabilities of regions and territories to develop and succeed 
(rather than being a discourse that views regions and territories as ones 
that exist merely to receive financial and institutional support from the 
outside); and (3) allow plural understandings of development, justice, 
well-being and the ‘good life’ to emerge—ones that are attuned to the 
regions and territories from which they emanate.
2  The Rise and Fall of the European  
Union’s Territorial Cohesion: From 
Competitive to Inclusive Europe?
The European social model and conceptions of economic competitive-
ness within Europe have increasingly been viewed in spatial terms since 
the late 1990s. From this period onwards, the European Commission 
began to use the concept of territorial cohesion as a policy tool to tackle 
regional differentiation and spatial disparities (European Commission 
2001). Implementing territorial cohesion as part of the European 
Social Model has aimed at extending the principle of social protection 
into more spatial realms (Davoudi 2007, 81). Territorial cohesion, 
thus, seeks to tackle place- and region-specific problems that have the 
potential to undermine attempts to establish the European Union as 
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a strong political and economic territory. The emergence of European 
spatial planning agendas and practices, for instance, has been explicitly 
concerned with reducing socio-economic inequalities between different 
European states and regions (Abrams 2014; Faludi 2010). Structural 
funds represent another important tool that the European Union has 
used as a way of addressing spatial inequalities, with varying levels of 
success (Allen 2005). These kinds of policies have involved an explicit 
articulation of the European Union’s territorial cohesion agenda. The 
idea of territorial cohesion was re-emphasised in 2005 after the enlarge-
ment of the European Union. Since then, addressing territorial ine-
qualities within the framework of the European Union has grown in 
importance due to the 2008 economic crisis and the notable wave of 
immigration from outside the Union, which peaked in 2016.
The idea of territorial cohesion has, therefore, grown in significance 
since the turn of the century, in both policy and more academic con-
texts. Figure 1 illustrates the cumulative number of hits for the term 
‘territorial cohesion’ on the basis of a Google Scholar search. The fig-
ure reveals that the number of academic works using the term territorial 
cohesion has grown at the same time as territorial cohesion has emerged 
Fig. 1 The cumulative number of hits for the term ‘territorial cohesion’ on the 
basis of a Google Scholar search
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as a policy priority within the European Union. Until the publication 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, ‘territorial cohesion’ gives around 150 search 
engine hits, while the search for the period from 1997 to 2002—the 
year following the publication of the Second Report on Economic and 
Social Cohesion (European Commission 2001), which devoted a sepa-
rate section to territorial cohesion—gives around 250 hits. The search 
for the next five-year period (2003–2008) indicates a booming era for 
research on territorial cohesion within academia (over 2100 hits). This 
is not a big surprise, given that this period witnessed key milestones 
in the European Union’s spatial policies, most notably the publica-
tion of the Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (European 
Commission 2004), the publication of the preliminary results of the 
politically influential ESPON programme (ESPON 2004), the publi-
cation of the proposal for the EU constitution, and the launching of 
the Territorial Agenda of the EU, whose final version was published 
in 2007 (TAEU 2007). In all these documents, territorial cohesion is 
brought to the fore as a significant political agenda both for the EU and 
for the individual member states (cf. Davoudi 2005). Not surprisingly, 
such developments also acted as the source for considerable academic 
debate. Since 2009, the number of academic publications referring 
to territorial cohesion has grown even more remarkably. The almost 
12,000 hits with Google Scholar indicate that the concept has not only 
been consolidated in the policy vocabulary of the European Union 
(in the Directorate General on Regional Policy in particular), but also 
that it is no longer addressed solely within a small cadre of European 
planners and planning scholars, or EU bureaucrats. Instead, it has been 
grasped across disciplinary boundaries by a wide range of scholars inter-
ested in issues of spatial policies and development within and beyond 
the EU.
And yet, a purely statistical account of the growth of the significance 
of territorial cohesion as an approach to governance and as an academic 
concept does not say much about the meaning that is ascribed to the 
term. In broad terms, we maintain that territorial cohesion policies 
have enabled the territory of the European Union to be treated as a sin-
gular geopolitical object that can be measured, mapped, analysed and 
acted upon (Luukkonen and Moisio 2016). Territorial cohesion, viewed 
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in these broad terms, is a political technology of territory that seeks 
to engender territorial solidarity and identification at the scale of the 
European Union, and in so doing challenges nation-state centred forms 
of identification. And yet, when one digs deeper, it becomes apparent 
that the idea and practice of territorial cohesion in the European Union 
have been characterised by multiple goals and even slightly contradic-
tory objectives. It is not surprising, therefore, that territorial cohesion 
has been named as a highly ambiguous and contested term with many 
different layers of meaning (see, for instance, Mirwaldt et al. 2008; 
Servillo 2010; Atkinson and Zimmermann 2016; Schön 2005; Evers 
2008). Significantly, from a more geographical perspective, it has been 
suggested that territorial cohesion might mean different things to dif-
ferent member states and actors, with the concept being appropriated 
to fulfil various policy demands in different places (Faludi 2015). In this 
sense, territorial cohesion has remained an elusive and complex con-
cept, open to many different and varied interpretations. In essence, it is 
a flexible and normative European policy goal that can be manipulated 
in order to promote specific priorities in different national/regional 
contexts.
Adopting a genealogical or historical approach shows a strong con-
nection between territorial cohesion and two pre-existing and contrast-
ing conceptual frameworks. At one level, the discourse and practice of 
territorial cohesion have their roots in the decades-old French regional 
political idea of aménagement du territoire, a sort of spatial planning or 
regional policy that is directed towards maintaining territorial (national) 
unity by decentralising powers and mobilising regional and local actors 
around national territorial policies (e.g. Davoudi 2005; Faludi 2004). 
At the same time, there are links between territorial cohesion and the 
German tradition of regional policies called a comprehensive integrated 
approach. Compared to the French tradition, which is sometimes seen 
as a regional economic approach to spatial planning, the German tra-
dition conceptualises space and spatial policies somewhat differently. 
Faludi (2004) has noted that from the French perspective, territorial 
cohesion is seen as ensuring balanced economic development and the 
establishment of solidarity between regions, whereas the German tradi-
tion directs towards the broader perspective of sustainable development.
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Focusing on these genealogies demonstrates that the idea of territo-
rial cohesion—almost from the very outset—has been characterised by 
different emphases and, potentially, inconsistencies and contradictions. 
These tensions become even more apparent when one seeks to chart 
the different ways in which territorial cohesion has been discussed and 
applied within different policies since the beginning of the new century. 
We identify three different approaches to territorial cohesion in these 
more recent academic and policy engagements with the term.
The first approach examines territorial cohesion from the perspective 
of shifts in governance. In these studies, territorial cohesion is under-
stood as something that provides new opportunities or frameworks for 
governing the European Union as well as national spaces, with struc-
tural funds being particularly significant. The governance perspec-
tive on territorial cohesion and development highlights the existence 
of a “fourth tier” of governance within the European Union (Holder 
and Layard 2011, 2) which potentially “unbundles” state territorial-
ity. In this perspective, the idea and the concept of multilevel govern-
ance are seen as a way of providing new possibilities for cross-sectoral 
and cross-border cooperation between different forms and levels of 
governance.
The second approach involves those studies that conceive of terri-
torial cohesion as an explicit policy objective. Studies in this category 
examine the tensions between the policy objectives of, on the one hand, 
promoting spatially balanced economic development and, on the other, 
ensuring the competitiveness of regions and territories within Europe. 
In some of these contributions, territorial cohesion is seen as a way of 
combining these two objectives. Schön (2005), for instance, argues 
that pursuing territorial cohesion contributes to the redistribution of 
resources and the promotion of economic competitiveness by putting 
into practice integrated and holistic spatial development approaches. 
According to this politically popular reasoning, territorial cohesion pol-
icy has the potential to both reduce disparities and strengthen competi-
tiveness by enabling regions to exploit their endogenous potentials (see 
Faludi and Waterhout 2005; Evers 2008).
The third approach to territorial cohesion in the scientific literature 
focuses more explicitly on those spatial frameworks or configurations 
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that have the potential to reduce inequalities. In some studies, terri-
torial cohesion is considered to give new stimulus to the European 
Spatial Development Planning agenda of promoting a polycentric spa-
tial pattern for Europe, which would ultimately lead to balanced and 
sustainable development (Faludi 2005). Besides polycentricity, territo-
rial cohesion is also connected—at least in implicit ways—to the idea 
of place-based development. Deriving from the Barca Report (2009), 
place-based development refers to the idea that public policies ought 
to be context-sensitive in a way that better takes into account the spe-
cific needs, characteristics, and potentials of places and regions. This is a 
theme that we will return to in the following section.
There is obvious overlap between these different approaches to terri-
torial cohesion. Moreover, these approaches highlight the elusive nature 
of territorial cohesion within the academic and policy literatures. In 
both EU policy documents and academic debates, it is not always clear 
whether the concept refers to a policy objective that is pursued through 
a particular policy means or whether territorial cohesion is the policy 
tool or technology itself that is used to achieve certain policy goals. 
What is common in each of these approaches, however, is the empha-
sis that is placed on economic measures of territorial inequality and/or 
cohesion. Territorial cohesion, in this way, is primarily understood as a 
difference in economic production (in terms of GDP) between regions 
within Europe. Despite some limited references that are made to social 
forms of solidarity, the justifications that are used in order to promote 
territorial cohesion are almost invariably made on the basis of economic 
forms of accounting. Variance in regional GDP is viewed as being prob-
lematic, in this regard, because the European Union cannot afford the 
economic burden of ‘lagging regions’ (e.g. Hübner 2005). This empha-
sis on the economic dimensions of territorial inequality over and above 
social ones also highlights the agenda to label the allocation of struc-
tural funds as an act of investing rather than being a redistribution of 
public money. The concept of territorial cohesion and related spatially 
focused funding instruments of the European Union have been strug-
gling with their public image and there has been a persistent political 
strategy within EU rhetoric to label these “spatial” funding instruments 
as investments rather than a redistribution of resources.
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Perhaps as a result of the elusive nature of the term, some have begun 
to question the usefulness of territorial cohesion as a policy concept 
and policy goal. As claimed by Hadjimichalis (in this volume) “terri-
torial cohesion was high in the agenda but after 2008 and particularly 
after the crisis in 2010, it has been totally lost from any EU document”. 
While Hadjimichalis may be overstating the situation somewhat, it is 
evident that more recent understandings of territorial cohesion within 
EU documentation have become more limited, ‘hollow’ and multifac-
eted than ever. For example, the recent Cohesion Report from 2017 
(European Commission 2017) is structured in chapters on economic, 
social and territorial cohesion. Territorial cohesion is now treated as an 
issue that is somehow separate and distinct from economic and social 
ones, with territorial cohesion being viewed in relation to different envi-
ronmental challenges (e.g. climate change and pollution) affecting EU 
regions and with regard to various territorial cooperation schemes (e.g. 
cross-border connections). While these themes are obviously impor-
tant for the future of the European Union at large, the nature of their 
connection to an economically and socially equal and just Europe is far 
from being clear.
We maintain that the above comments illustrate an increasing uncer-
tainty in relation to the meaning of territorial cohesion and, arguably, 
a growing doubt—among policy-makers and academics alike—about 
its descriptive, analytical and normative value. From our perspective, 
beyond the general level of uncertainty that exists about its actual mean-
ing, some of the more problematic aspects of the term territorial cohe-
sion are as follows. First, there is potential for a discourse of territorial 
cohesion—especially when it is allied with talk of territorial inequali-
ties—to reinforce a perception that certain ‘under-performing’ regions 
and states are somehow problematic or lacking, whether in relation to 
economic, social or environmental measures (and, of course, these are 
measures that are defined by those regions and states that are success-
ful). In focusing on such issues, there is a danger that a status of inad-
equacy or even victimhood is ascribed to these regions. Second, and 
following on from the previous point, the traditional focus on terri-
torial cohesion tends to promote an academic and policy discourse in 
which these ‘problematic’ or ‘lagging’ regions must receive external aid 
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in order to succeed. Again, such a discourse tends to emasculate cer-
tain regions and states. Third, the discourse of territorial cohesion—in 
focusing on particular economic, social and environmental measures of 
success or failure—tends to define understandings of development, jus-
tice, well-being and the ‘good life’ in narrow ways, with little scope for 
alternative measures of success or progress to emerge. Lagging regions, 
in this way, are forever doomed to try to ‘catch up’ with their more suc-
cessful counterparts, playing a game whose rules have been defined by 
the ‘winners’.
There is a dire need, we argue, to ask whether spatial protection 
(Davoudi 2007) that is associated with the European Social Model can 
be imagined in alternative ways. It is in this context that we believe 
that a consideration of questions of spatial justice can offer some useful 
insights. Spatial justice, as we proceed to demonstrate below, allows: (1) 
various stakeholders to develop a common discourse that is focused on 
a positive and aspirational end goal, centred on the idea of justice; (2) a 
more progressive discourse to emerge, which focuses on the capabilities 
of regions and territories to develop and succeed; and (3) plural under-
standings of development, justice, well-being and the ‘good life’ to be 
imagined and brought to life.
3  Spatial Justice—Review of Academic 
and Policy Discussions of the Concept
Our aim in this section is to use and extend existing literatures on spa-
tial justice as a way of articulating an alternative approach to engaging 
with territorial inequalities, in both academic and, especially, pol-
icy contexts. We maintain that the concept and idea of spatial justice 
throughout its history has been primarily focused on an urban scale1 
but has the potential to make a useful contribution to understanding 
the unequal distribution of economic resources, public services and 
well-being at other geographical scales, not least the regional scale, par-
ticularly in relation to the spatial policies of the European Union. We 
conclude by arguing that a revised account of spatial justice, incorpo-
rating academic discussions on human capabilities and agency could 
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be formulated into a guiding principle for a new spatialisation of the 
European Social Model.
Reviewing the literature on spatial justice demonstrates that there 
have been two main periods of academic and policy engagement with 
the idea of spatial justice (see Fig. 2). The first period began in the late 
1960s and the early 1970s, while the second happened in the new mil-
lennium. The first period is marked by the publication of certain sem-
inal books applying the ideas of social justice to geographical thought 
and the latter period, from 2010 onwards, is characterised by almost 
an exponential increase in the volume of publications addressing spa-
tial justice. One of the first popular entries for the concept of justice 
that uses a spatial referent was made by Davies (1968) who focused 
on assessing the distribution of local services with respect to the needs 
of designated service areas. A few years later, Lefebvre (1970) concep-
tualised in La Révolution Urbaine the fundamental political and social 
changes needed in order to secure a spatially just society. Lefebvre’s 
definition of justice fundamentally relied on his notion of social trans-
formation that manifests itself mainly in cities and the urban context. 
Harvey (1973, 306) emphasised the urban context even further by 
noting that the urban would not only serve as the culmination of the 
Fig. 2 The cumulative number of hits for the term ‘spatial justice’ on the basis 
of a Google Scholar search
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spatial injustice that follows the capitalist mode of production but may 
be the starting point of its abolishment.
After this booming period at the turn of the 1970s, the literature on spa-
tial justice was reinvigorated at the beginning of the 2010s as a result of the 
publication of books on The Just City by Fainstein (2010) and on Seeking 
Spatial Justice by Soja (2010; Barnett 2018). Fainstein approaches the 
idea of spatial justice from the perspective of urban planning and argues, 
inspired by Rawls (1971), for the consideration of at least three components 
of a just city, focusing on: first, the distributive aspect when stressing the 
need for material equality across space; second, the need for urban social 
life to be characterised by diversity; and third, the central role to be played 
by democracy in navigating potential social and spatial conflicts. In many 
respects, Soja (2010) echoes many of the points made by Fainstein and 
others. In his seminal book, Soja uses the struggle between the Bus Riders 
Union and the Metropolitan Transport Authority in Los Angeles as a case 
study in order to build a general argument about spatial rights and the pro-
cesses that help to create spatial injustice in urban space.
A number of common themes arise in relation to these studies. First 
of all—and as can be seen from the above studies—there has been a 
sustained engagement with spatial justice through the lens of the city 
and the urban scale. Cities have been viewed as manifestations of the 
economic inequalities that characterise modern society, as well as acting 
as key sites within which alternative and just socio-spatial forms can be 
imagined. And yet, there is no necessary link between spatial justice and 
the urban scale. Merrifield and Swyngedouw (1997, 3), in this respect, 
criticise a prevailing static nature of the concept of spatial justice that 
does not take into account spatial, temporal and scalar differences. Soja 
(2010, 20), too, claims that “justice and injustice are infused into the 
multiscalar geographies in which we live, from the intimacies of the 
household to the uneven development of the global economy” (see also 
Israel and Frenkel 2017, 4). In short, we should not view spatial justice 
as something that is merely articulated through reference to the urban 
scale. At the same time, this does not mean that spatial justice plays 
out in exactly the same way at different scales. As such, we should also 
attend to the difference that scale might make to the forms and pro-
cesses associated with spatial justice.
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Second, authors writing on spatial justice draw attention to the way 
in which social and spatial forms of injustice can be linked to struc-
tural inequalities of different kinds. Dikeç (2001, 1793) conceptualises 
the relation between space and justice as fundamentally bound to sta-
ble structures. In his works on French urban policy, he contends that 
“institutional structures and practices that privilege competition, effi-
ciency, and economic success” play a role in establishing the conditions 
under which neoliberalism may thrive (Dikeç 2006, 64). For him, spa-
tial (in)justice cannot be attributed to specific acts but is the product 
of systematic exclusion and dominance (Dikeç 2001). Although writing 
from a different perspective, Young (2011, 52) too, has elaborated on 
notions of “structural injustice”, which she claims to exist “when social 
processes put large groups of persons under systematic threat of domi-
nation or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capac-
ities, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate 
or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising 
capacities available to them”. There is considerable merit to these kinds 
of approaches but there is a danger that they can also create a vision of 
injustice as something that lies beyond any kind of agency. If injustice is 
so structurally embedded, then how can individuals or agencies mean-
ingfully seek to redress it through the promotion of policies or strategies 
based on ideas of spatial justice?
Third, various authors have used the idea of spatial justice, not sur-
prisingly, as a means of charting the associations between social ine-
qualities and geographical understandings of space. While Pirie (1983) 
has questioned the necessity of introducing a spatial point of reference 
to understandings of justice, others contend that space and justice are 
intertwined. Space, at one level, can be thought of as something that is 
reflective of inequalities and injustices. Landscapes represent one kind 
of material and symbolic representation of such injustices (Mitchell 
2003, 788). At the same time, landscape does not just mirror social 
processes. Nor is landscape an enigmatic “palimpsest” (Sahr 2003, 21), 
a “spoor” (Mitchell 2003, 790) or even the “detritus” (ibid.) of social 
life. Landscapes, along with other kinds of spaces, are constitutive of 
inequalities and injustices. It is in this context that Dabinett (2011, 
2391) has argued that we should avoid seeing space as merely being a 
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container for justice or, in other words, of spatial justice being “short-
hand for social justice in space”. Rather, we need to consider how space 
can influence forms of (in)justice in various far-reaching ways.
Fourth, research on spatial justice illustrates the need to consider 
the extent to which individuals and places of different kinds possess 
the rights, the capabilities or the capacity to be able to shape more 
just social and economic forms. Lefebvre and other “right to the city” 
scholars during the late 1960s and early 1970s, for instance, conceived 
of spatial justice as being “a right to/or access to” something. Lefebvre, 
in this respect, claimed that justice could not be reduced to access to 
resources but rather involved the right to take part in urban transfor-
mation processes. Justice, in this regard, implies “active participation 
in the political life, management and the administration of the city” 
(Dikeç 2001, 1790). In a more recent contribution, Israel and Frenkel 
(2017) have drawn on the capabilities approach of Sen (1993, 2009) in 
order to develop a notion of justice that derives from a “person’s capa-
bilities and his liberties” (Israel and Frenkel 2017, 2). And of course, it 
is possible to extend this notion of justice by viewing spatial justice as 
something that reflects a particular place’s, locality’s, region’s or state’s 
capabilities or liberties. It is in this context that ideas of political rep-
resentation and capacity assume great significance.
Finally, work on spatial justice highlights the need to examine the 
pluralities of understandings of justice. While some universal goals—
such as freedom, liberty and well-being—may be constant, authors 
such as Sen (2009) have argued that we should guard against presup-
posing a uniform notion of a perfectly just situation against which 
reality is to be measured. For example, Israel and Frenkel (2017) note 
that as no single definitive measure exists for justice, it should be 
assessed on the basis of individual opportunities in a given context. A 
more choice-centred understanding of what is fair and what may cre-
ate well-being, therefore, needs to come into play (Sen 1993). And 
of course, this is not solely agent-centred but also place-centred. So, 
according to Storper (2011, 19), while “freedom and liberty; the abil-
ity to live our lives and be happy; and development of our capabilities” 
may well be common goals, “different individuals, groups and terri-
tories might fill in the detail on these goals in rather different ways”. 
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Thinking about spatial justice in such plural ways also raises significant 
questions in relation to how we might go about measuring variations in 
justice and well-being; in ways that go beyond simple measures of GDP 
(Stiglitz et al. 2009).
Despite this rich and recently reinvigorated body of academic liter-
ature on spatial justice, its implications for EU policies relating to spa-
tial inequalities, including territorial cohesion, have been underexplored 
to date. Part of the reason for this lack of engagement may well derive 
from the fact that academic discussions about spatial justice have mainly 
addressed the urban scale and, as such, have not found their way on to 
EU policy agendas operating mainly on a regional (or territorial) scale. 
But, as we have shown above, there are no a priori reasons why under-
standings of spatial justice should not be usefully applied at other scales, 
including those that are relevant to EU policies targeting spatial (in)
equality.
In sum, we argue that the spatialisation of spatial justice in the 
name of territorial cohesion policy has remained partial. Influenced by 
the coupling of the European Social Model and the EU’s global eco-
nomic competitiveness in the early 2000s, EU’s territorial cohesion 
policies have been far too strongly dominated by particular economic 
geographical discourses of growth and regional differentiation for well 
over a decade. As a result, there has been tendency for cohesion policies 
to focus almost invariably on regional disparities and regional competi-
tiveness-related issues. But given that the emphasis on “regions” is one 
of the peculiarities of the EU as a polity, the small impact of scholarly 
work on urban spatial justice and injustice on cohesion policies may not 
come as a terrible revelation.
It is for the above-mentioned reasons that we proceed in the final 
section of this chapter to outline some potential benefits accruing from 
adopting a language of spatial justice as a way of thinking creatively 
and differently about the European Union’s policies relating to spatial 
inequalities. We also provide a brief outline of a research project, with 
which we as authors are associated, that is examining the potential of 
using spatial justice as a way of developing new policy solutions to the 
entrenched socio-spatial inequalities that characterise contemporary 
Europe.
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4  From Territorial Cohesion to Spatial 
Justice: A New Agenda for the Empowered 
Regions of the European Union?
While we do not believe that the notion of spatial justice will neces-
sarily provide a panacea for addressing socio-spatial inequalities within 
Europe, we believe that it has the potential to explore other avenues and 
approaches that might prove to be more successful than those currently 
being used. First, we maintain that paying more attention to the con-
cept of spatial justice can allow academics, policy-makers and the pub-
lic alike to be enrolled more readily into regional coalitions of interest, 
capable of addressing inequalities. The discourse of justice is one that 
is meaningful and accessible to different stakeholders, and also allows 
connections to be made between demands for spatial justice and pre-ex-
isting struggles for other kinds of justice, whether in relation to the 
environment, gender and so on. It is a language and discourse, there-
fore, that have the potential to be flexible and inclusive, encompassing 
many different aspects of life and work. Using a discourse of spatial jus-
tice can also allow stakeholders within regions and beyond to coalesce 
around the delivery of a positive set of end goals instead of merely fight-
ing against negative conditions. The discursive limitations of other alter-
native discourses are apparent when one thinks in such ways; it may be 
easier, for instance, to fight for justice than it is to fight for ‘de-peripher-
alisation’ or more even forms of development.
Second, using the concept of spatial justice can enable a more pro-
gressive discourse to emerge, which focuses on the capabilities of regions 
and territories to develop and succeed, rather than being a discourse 
that views regions and territories as ones that exist merely to receive 
financial and institutional support from others. Approaching spatial 
justice as something that is based on “right to” rather than “regional 
distribution of” would necessitate an alternative approach to reduc-
ing socio-spatial inequalities within Europe, one that would be less 
concerned with an interregional redistribution of economic resources 
than it would be with providing regions with the necessary capacity to 
shape their own socio-spatial futures. Viewing spatial justice in terms of 
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capabilities does not necessarily provide a simple solution to the chal-
lenges facing ‘under-performing’ regions. After all, creating additional 
capabilities among such regions—whether in terms of granting greater 
political power, increased capacity to tax and spend, or an increased 
ability to create new institutional fixes—is not always easy, especially 
if it involves a transfer of power from other polities. Nor will the vari-
ous ways of increasing a region’s capabilities, outlined above, necessarily 
lead to a situation in which such regions will be able to pursue their 
socio-economic goals more effectively. As we noted in the previous sec-
tion, there are many structural factors that can impede the ability of 
a region to succeed, no matter how much capacity is devolved to that 
region. And yet, we believe that there is a value in focusing on the capa-
bilities aspect of spatial justice and on its implications for the European 
Union’s spatial policies, namely the way in which it refocuses the terms 
of the debate away from viewing regions as being almost helpless receiv-
ers of aid to being active shapers of their own socio-economic destinies.
Third, the use of the concept of spatial justice allows us to envisage 
how plural understandings of development, justice, well-being and the 
‘good life’ might be developed, ones that are attuned to the regions 
and territories from which they emanate. The idea of capabilities and 
agency by Sen starts with an acknowledgement that justice and well-be-
ing manifest themselves differently in various spatial contexts. Engaging 
with spatial justice, therefore, does not force regions onto a single tra-
jectory based on assumptions of a direct and linear relationship between 
economy and well-being. Rather, thinking in such ways opens up the 
possibility for different regions to develop alternative conceptions of 
what might constitute well-being for those individuals and groups living 
and working within those regions. Using spatial justice in such a way 
may also be less problematic as a normative policy aim than other alter-
natives such as assisting lagging regions so that they might “catch up” 
with the best-performing regions or the EU average.
While the above statements are tentative in nature, there is some 
limited evidence of how certain territories and regions in Europe are 
beginning to think in different ways about issues relating to develop-
ment, justice and well-being. Recent attempts to develop inclusive and 
alternative visions of long-term sustainable futures in different parts of 
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Europe—for example, in relation to attempts to define the Wales we 
want (Jones and Ross 2016)—show how certain national and regional 
governments are seeking to develop dialogues with relevant stakehold-
ers in order to create plural and long-term conceptions of ‘develop-
ment’, ‘well-being’ and ‘justice’. Although these conversations are in 
their early stages, they begin to illustrate the potential associated with 
engaging with notions of territorial inequality in different ways. These 
conversations have: (1) been focused around ideas of justice, well-be-
ing and sustainable development, precisely because these concepts have 
provided a language around which different stakeholders have been able 
to coalesce; (2) asserted that there is a need for states and regions to 
use their own capacity to define their vision of long-term futures that 
are characterised by well-being and justice; and (3) articulated visions 
of long-term futures that reflect the specific priorities that exist within 
their own territories and populations. There is some scope, we suggest, 
for the European Union to harness these emerging attempts to define 
long-term future visions of social and spatial justice as part of its poten-
tial attempts to address spatial inequalities.
Of course, the above suggestions are, at present, rather speculative in 
nature. There is a need to conduct research on the potential for these 
ideas to deliver a more progressive and successful future for various 
regions in Europe. As we noted earlier, the authors of this chapter are 
all involved in a multi-partner and inter-disciplinary research project, 
funded as part of the Horizon 2020 programme, which is examining 
the role that ideas of spatial justice might play in understanding and 
challenging socio-spatial inequalities in Europe (http://imajine-project.
eu). The project is: (1) examining conceptual approaches to understand-
ing inequalities in contemporary Europe; (2) developing more detailed 
ways of mapping different kinds of inequality; (3) charting the chal-
lenges facing different regions in relation to service delivery; (4) inter-
rogating the link between socio-spatial inequalities and migration at 
different scales; (5) examining the connection between inequalities and 
political representation and mobilisation; and (6) working with vari-
ous stakeholders to enable them to imagine alternative futures for their 
regions. While the project is in its early stages, our hope is that it will 
contribute in far-reaching ways to academic understandings of spatial 
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justice, as well as allowing us to contribute to emerging debates within 
various European institutions about the potential policy benefits associ-
ated with an engagement with spatial justice.
Evidently, there is a real need to engage effectively with such issues. 
Even if what one may term the golden years of European-level dis-
courses of territorial cohesion may well be on the wane, there is an 
urgent need for a new round of cohesion policies to address the politics 
of austerity, the rise of right-wing populism in Europe, and a deepening 
of the legitimacy crisis of the European Union. And yet, our argument 
in this chapter is that there may be useful alternatives to the previous 
rounds of territorial cohesion policies, which might help to spatialise 
the European Union’s Social Model in more effective ways, thus con-
tributing more directly to the well-being and welfare of people in vari-
ous parts of Europe. We contend that the academic literatures on spatial 
justice, human capabilities and agency point to one potentially fruitful 
way of achieving these goals.
Note
1. However, it should be mentioned that spatial justice arguments have also 
been applied in diverse ways to racial or environmental justice literatures 
at widely differing geographical scales. Nonetheless, the geographical lit-
erature on spatial justice has tended to focus either implicitly or explic-
itly on the urban scale.
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As EU Cohesion Policy has become focused on economic competitive-
ness and growth in less favoured regions, measures that traditionally were 
in the realm of Innovation Policy have emerged, raising questions about 
the compatibility, complementarity and even necessity of these two pol-
icy streams in reaching Cohesion Policy goals. Through the Regional 
Innovation Systems literature, in particular, innovation has emerged as 
a key factor in regional development. As innovation began to infiltrate 
Cohesion Policy, a debate has arisen about the compatibility of these two 
policy areas for less developed target regions, since it is rather the highly 
developed cores that are poised to benefit the most from a regional pol-
icy based on innovation capacities. This has implications for Central 
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and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which are experiencing strong 
patterns of regional polarisation (Kühn 2015; Lang et al. 2015). CEE 
countries are heavily dependent on Cohesion Policy interventions for 
regional development, which are shaped by increasing conditionality and 
are becoming closely associated with innovation strategies themselves. 
Through EU integration leading up to the European Union’s eastern 
expansion, member states held uneven positions in a multi-scalar system 
in shaping supranational policies and expertise (see Hudson 2003; Kuus 
2011), which would potentially put countries like those in CEE that 
are heavily dependent on European core economies at a disadvantage in 
shaping the policies that target their own development such as Cohesion 
Policy. Despite progress towards economic convergence between CEE 
countries since accession, other events such as the financial crisis have 
furthered regional polarisation across Europe, calling into question the 
effectiveness of these supranational European policies in less favoured 
regions (European Commission 2013, 2014, 2017; Hadjimichalis 2011; 
Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2014).
In the following, national policies in Czechia, Estonia, Hungary 
and Slovakia are investigated to assess how the interrelations of supra-
national EU policies—Cohesion Policy and Innovation Policy—have 
unfolded in CEE countries. The subject matter and empirical results 
form a contribution of the Marie Curie Initial Training Network, 
“RegPol2—Socio-economic and Political Responses to Regional 
Polarisation in Central and Eastern Europe”. These four countries, 
amongst others in CEE, emerged from similar socialist legacies but fol-
lowed different institutional and policy trajectories through their transi-
tions (Stark and Bruszt 1998; Bohle and Greskovits 2007), joining the 
EU through parallel accession processes that availed Cohesion Policy as 
a significant development tool. Nevertheless, they have followed differ-
ent institutional and policy trajectories, which provides an opportunity 
to investigate various national responses to and impacts of suprana-
tional policies. After presenting the overarching policy frameworks, 
the analysis compares policy-related programming documents such 
as strategic reference frameworks, partnership agreements and oper-
ational programmes (OPs), which are complemented by interviews of 
policy experts in the four countries, to determine whether the generally 
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observed convergence of Cohesion and Innovation Policy can be ben-
eficial for addressing regional polarisation in different types of CEE 
countries.
2  The Evolution of Supranational European 
Policy
The expansion of the EU to include the post-socialist CEE countries 
has been faced with the challenge of integrating regions of starkly dif-
ferent levels of economic development. This problem persists to this day 
through regional polarisation and peripheralisation processes resulting, 
in part, from the integration of all regions in the EU into the single 
economic market. As the balance of population and economic activity 
of the European Market moved eastwards following its 2004 expansion, 
the description of the average European region adjusted to reflect the 
relatively low economic productivity and institutional legacies of the 
so-called new member states. The EU would expand by approximately 
one quarter in territory and one fifth in population, but the total GDP 
would only stand to increase by 5% (European Commission 1997). In 
consequence, Cohesion Policy was reformed to benefit most regions in 
CEE, drawing substantial investment away from Southern Europe, in 
an attempt to offset the negative economic consequences of EU integra-
tion on the least developed regions. As conditionality for drawing EU 
funds and in adherence to the partnership principle, Cohesion Policy 
goals were translated into national development plans in CEE countries 
for the use of European funds through strategic frameworks for invest-
ment negotiated with the European Commission and further elaborated 
in Operational Programmes.
Always attracting the attention of academics and policy-makers, 
Cohesion Policy has been the subject of much debate, not least because 
the coming of each seven-year programming period offers a fresh 
possibility for reform. As such, the ideals of Cohesion Policy have 
been subject to both radical and incremental reforms in recent dec-
ades (Mendez 2012), including the reorientation of Cohesion Policy 
towards the Lisbon Agenda of 2000 and its economic competitiveness 
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and growth objectives (Mendez 2011), in an attempt to condition the 
EU for globalisation after Eastern enlargement. Key documents in the 
reform of Cohesion Policy are listed in Table 1. In adhering to the focus 
of this chapter on the post-socialist period, we approximate three EU 
policy periods to structure the development of Cohesion Policy and 
Innovation Policy: the ‘Europe of the Regions’ period of the 1990s to 
early 2000s; the Lisbon Agenda period of approximately 2000–2010; 
and the Europe 2020 period of approximately 2010–2020.
2.1  The Europe of the Regions
While not an official EU policy, the ‘Europe of the Regions’ slogan 
represented a suite of policies and institutional changes associated 
with experimental governance practices backed by subsidiarity and 
Table 1 Key reports influencing cohesion policy in CEE countries
Year Document Author
1997 Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider 
Union
European Commission
1999 ESDP—European Spatial Development 
Perspective
European Commission
2003 An agenda for a growing Europe: Making 
the EU economic system deliver (Sapir 
Report)
Sapir et al.
2004 Facing the challenge: The Lisbon strat-
egy for growth and employment (Kok 
Report)
European Commission
2005 Working together for growth and jobs— 
A new start for the Lisbon Strategy 
(Barroso communication)
European Commission
2009 An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion 
Policy (Barca Report)
Barca
2009 The White Paper on Multi-level 
Governance
Committee of the Regions
2010 Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sus-
tainable and inclusive growth
European Commission
2014 Investment for jobs and growth: 
Promoting development and good gov-
ernance in EU regions and cities (Sixth 
Cohesion Report)
European Commission
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partnership principles, thereby driving regionalisation processes. 
According to Loughlin (1996), amidst discussions of European feder-
alism in the 1990s, the rise of the ‘regional question’ was partly about 
reclaiming regional policy from central governments. The concept of a 
‘Europe of the Regions’ articulated the potential for EU–regional rela-
tions and laid the groundwork for regional competition (Borrás-Alomar 
et al. 1994). The European development strategy Agenda 2000 iden-
tified ambitious projects including enlargement, the adoption of the 
euro and the creation of the single market, as well as mentioning strat-
egies for tackling regional problems of industrial restructuring by way 
of technology infiltration, human skills development and SME sup-
port (European Commission 1997). Meanwhile, the European Spatial 
Development Perspective formalised regionalisation and territorial 
cohesion as core to Cohesion Policy, furthering the institutionalisation 
of European spatial planning processes for targeting regional inequali-
ties (European Commission 1999). Here, we begin to see potentials for 
coordination between Cohesion and Innovation Policy. The translation 
of such experimental governance models, economic restructuring strat-
egies and territorial development objectives to CEE countries, never-
theless, would come to present new challenges for implementation and 
raise new questions about the policy priorities in CEE.
In terms of Innovation Policy, the EU started to ‘Europeanise’ the 
production of scientific and technological knowledge from the 1980s 
through its Framework Programmes, which aimed to foster research 
and technology across member states and strengthen competitiveness 
(Borrás 2003). During the pre-accession period, the EU intensified 
its ambitions to develop an Innovation Policy that would acknowl-
edge the cohesion objective in less favoured regions and contribute to 
the EU’s innovation capacities (Lagendijk 2011). Out of these consid-
erations, the EU created a joint programme of regional and industrial 
policy based on the EU’s Innovation Programme and Article 10 of the 
ERDF, resulting in the launch of Regional Technology Plans (RTP) for 
less-favoured NUTS 2 regions and Regional Innovation and Technology 
Transfer Strategies (RITTS) focused on innovation support structures 
for increasing competitiveness in all regions. Moreover, networking 
and knowledge transfer arrangements such as the Innovating Regions 
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in Europe network (IRE) and its associated Mutual Learning Platform 
enabled implementation and diffusion of the RIS methodology across 
EU regions (European Commission 1994). Thus, the first innovation 
support programmes began to address spatial differences in innovation 
capacity and competitiveness.
2.2  The Lisbon Agenda
Lagging productivity with international competitors led to the Lisbon 
Agenda of 2000 for promoting economic competitiveness and growth 
in the EU, drawing together Cohesion Policy and Innovation Policy 
in a coordinated European strategy intended to integrate across sec-
toral policies (see Sapir et al. 2003; European Commission 2004). After 
lacklustre results, the Lisbon Agenda was relaunched in 2005, further 
emphasising innovation and entrepreneurship to encourage growth 
(European Commission 2005). Meanwhile, the Eastern enlargement 
and the financial crisis further contributed to the debate on Cohesion 
Policy reform during the 2007–2013 programming period, resulting 
in the promotion of a place-based development model as a means for 
delivering both traditional cohesion and Lisbon-related growth objec-
tives (Barca 2009; Farole et al. 2011).
The ‘Lisbonisation’ of Cohesion Policy strengthened the orientation, 
monitoring and evaluation of results, and showed multiple paths 
amongst member states to achieving the strategic guidelines (Mendez 
2011). Nevertheless, by concentrating regional development pro-
grammes towards economic rather than social and environmental 
interventions, cohesion came to be increasingly defined in terms of pro-
ductivity and competitiveness complementary to a broad-based innova-
tion strategy. The debate on Cohesion Policy reform during the Lisbon 
era foresaw contradictions in crossing a place-based Cohesion Policy 
with a spatially blind Innovation Policy, finding potential for “perverse 
dynamic structural effects” and “divergent capacities to engage in devel-
opment” (Farole et al. 2011, 1097).
Despite the controversy, the Lisbon Agenda was supported by the 
Committee of the Regions due to the strengthened role of regions 
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in the design and implementation of Cohesion Policy. Thus, the 
Lisbon Agenda was integrated into its conceptualisation of multi- 
level governance in an attempt to circumvent the strategy’s top-down 
nature (Committee of the Regions 2009). Others agreed that the 
regions played an important role in the ‘Lisbonised’ policy to combat 
underdevelopment (Farole et al. 2011). Nevertheless, decentralisation 
of regional policy had its downfalls. The multiplication of regional 
Operational Programmes during the 2007–2013 programming 
period placed greater demands on the regional (NUTS-2) levels, 
testing their institutional capacities. The disappointing results of 
the period, stemming from administrative burden, delayed imple-
mentation and low absorption due to pressures of the financial cri-
sis on public expenditures, would lead to greater centralisation and 
tighter controls in the following programming period (European 
Commission 2013).
Innovation became a central theme in the Lisbon Agenda and 
Cohesion Policy, which, according to Lagendijk and Varró (2013), led 
to three major trends of policy integration. First, Cohesion Policy and 
Community programmes such as Interreg moved larger amounts of 
funds to innovation-oriented measures (European Commission 2006). 
Second, industrial and regional policies were increasingly connected 
through the elaboration of ‘place-based’ cluster approaches (Barca 
2009). Third, an idea was put forward to connect research policy 
(including the European Research Area) to ‘place-based’ innovation 
approaches (Soete 2009). These moves aimed at building a stronger 
alignment of regional policy, industrial policy and research policy, in 
view of the Lisbon Agenda’s main ambitions to strengthen the Union’s 
competitiveness and cohesion. Nevertheless, the Eastern expansion 
of the EU slowed down the adoption of ‘place-based’ approaches in 
innovation policy, since most accession countries in CEE lacked 
sub-national governance structures. At the same time, the principles 
of efficiency, management and accountability were more strongly 
emphasised in policy-making, since more countries were now eligi-
ble for structural support. In response, the EU re-emphasised a more 
centralised approach to implement Cohesion Policy (Bachtler and 
McMaster 2008).
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2.3  Europe 2020
The Europe 2020 strategy effectively succeeded the Lisbon Agenda in 
renewing competitiveness and growth objectives for the 2014–2020 
programming period. The strategy for “smart, sustainable and inclu-
sive growth” (European Commission 2010) responded to issues exacer-
bated by the economic crisis, such as the de-growth that was occurring 
in some regions (Lois González 2013). Regional development strat-
egies were to be driven by the concept of Smart Specialisation, which 
attempts to translate a sectoral concept to a spatial context, bridging the 
EU’s Innovation Union strategy with Cohesion Policy (McCann and 
Ortega-Argilés 2013). The Innovation Union is a so-called ‘flagship ini-
tiative’ to implement the Europe 2020 strategy, whose proclaimed over-
arching goal is to enshrine a focus on innovation in a variety of political 
instruments, measures and funds to improve framework conditions for 
knowledge-intensive products and services.
In their analysis of the Europe 2020 strategy, Avdikos and Chardas 
(2016) interpret diminishing cohesion through convergence and 
enhanced place-based growth that “ignores the uneven relations of 
regions and localities in capitalism production” (p. 110) and “emphasizes 
‘soft’ factors of development” (p. 111) such as knowledge and innova-
tion capacities, calling for strong reservations over place-based policies. 
This comes after reviews of territorial development policies and pro-
grammes showed increasing regional disparities throughout the Lisbon 
era, especially in CEE (ESPON 2014; European Commission 2014). 
Recent research confirms these concerns, finding that the Partnership 
Agreements setting the national programmes for the 2014–2020 period 
focus on economic competitiveness rather than socio-economic con-
vergence as the driver of Sustainable Urban Development strategies 
addressed through Cohesion Policy (Nosek 2017).
After launching the Innovation Union initiative and mainstreaming 
the Smart Specialisation approach, the focus on innovation has become 
a key strategic pillar in EU Cohesion Policy. Smart Specialisation 
aims at establishing innovation as a priority for all European regions. 
However, the concept’s theoretical grounds are still provisional (Foray 
et al. 2009), and it contains a number of elements that were already 
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present in the innovations systems and entrepreneurship literature 
(McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2013). In policy terms, the basic novelty 
of Smart Specialisation is that it provides a clear policy prioritisation 
logic that is adaptable to different types of regional settings. This is 
accompanied by a move towards a more differentiated view on regional 
opportunities, by which only certain regions can be at the frontier of 
research and innovation (Lagendijk and Varró 2013). Accordingly, non-
core regions are supposed to find a made-to-measure way to position 
themselves in the global economy.
Overall, the EU is still struggling to meet the policy objectives set in 
the Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020 as well as with making sure that 
policy efforts to reduce regional disparities among European regions are 
effective. Key indicators such as the number of people at risk of pov-
erty or social exclusion worsened in recent years as a result of the finan-
cial crisis (European Commission 2014), providing further evidence 
for processes of regional peripheralisation (Kühn 2015; Lang et al. 
2015). Some scholars argue that one of the main reasons for this trend 
is the asymmetric economic integration of countries into the European 
Union, since the productivity gap is largely of a structural nature 
(Avdikos and Chardas 2016; Kalman and Tiits 2014). While the more 
advanced member states in the EU’s core specialise in high-income 
activities with increasing returns, such as knowledge-intensive services 
and medium- and high-technology manufacturing, more peripheral 
regions are focused on basic, less knowledge-intensive, low-income ser-
vices and low- and medium-technology manufacturing (Hansen and 
Winther 2011). This renders a rapid catching-up of peripheral regions 
fairly unrealistic, even with the help of targeted policies.
Moreover, a number of elements of EU Innovation Policy—and the 
EU’s economic policy framework on the whole—face major challenges 
in adequately meeting the realities and needs of all member states with 
different spatial structures, institutional settings and historical lega-
cies. By putting scientific excellence and cutting-edge research first, 
Innovation Policy mostly helps the largest and strongest institutions in 
Europe. It follows that the EU and the general macroeconomic frame-
work of the Eurozone, with its barely controlled market forces (e.g. 
cross-border flows of capital in the speculative finance, insurance and 
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real estate sectors to quickly developing CEE markets, Kalman and Tiits 
2014), played a far greater role in influencing growth in CEE coun-
tries from the 2000s than the political intent of the Lisbon Agenda or 
Cohesion Policy (Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2014). In spite of coordi-
nated policy measures, peripheral regions become an alternative location 
for capital and business activities in times of upturn, while in times of 
downturn, firms and capital tend to concentrate in urban, metropolitan 
locations (cf. Kalman and Tiits 2014). These upturns and downturns 
affect cohesion, potentially furthering processes of regional polarisation.
Further to the above-described shifts in Cohesion and Innovation 
Policy, the question nevertheless remains, how closely do the national 
policies in CEE integrate the innovation agenda with Cohesion Policy? 
The following section analyses the development of these policies in the 
CEE context, drawing from national policies and reflecting upon feed-
back from policy experts.
3  Cohesion Through Innovation or Cohesion 
Versus Innovation? National Responses 
from Central and Eastern Europe
As explained above, Cohesion Policy has developed through several eras 
of supranational EU policy guiding regional development, and, shift-
ing focus towards economic competitiveness, has become closely inter-
twined with a growth-through-innovation strategy. Turning to CEE 
national contexts, where regional inequalities are relatively high and 
significant development activities are funded through EU programmes, 
contradictions between policy goals, programme requirements, and 
capacities on the ground are most apparent.
The general orientations of domestic policies regarding cohesion and 
innovation can be traced through official documents, to the extent that 
they are formalised. The compulsory national programming documents 
for Cohesion Policy, therefore, provide a basis for comparing strategies 
between countries where cohesion and innovation may not necessar-
ily be high-profile political objectives. The following analysis of policy 
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documents supplemented by interviews with policy experts (see Appendix, 
Tables 3 and 4) reveals convergence tendencies between Cohesion Policy 
and Innovation Policy in selected CEE countries. The conflation of 
regional and innovation policies may, however, have different effects in 
countries characterised by different spatial and economic structures that 
pursue different strategies for growth and/or tackling regional inequalities. 
Indeed, shares of Cohesion Policy budgets allocated to specific thematic 
objectives varied widely across CEE in the 2014–2020 period, indicat-
ing different national preferences and priorities (KPMG 2016). This also 
has implications for Innovation Policy with respect to supporting rapid 
growth in the core or pursuing development activities in the peripheries.
3.1  Competitiveness and Convergence
National strategic documents for Cohesion Policy programmes from 
the three programming periods since CEE accession were analysed 
for elements of Innovation Policy and approaches to the competitive-
ness agenda (Appendix, Table 3). The results from Czechia, Estonia, 
Hungary and Slovakia indicate a variety of responses emerging from 
within shared European policy frameworks (Table 2). Prior analysis 
showed that competitiveness and growth were pursued through differ-
ent national approaches including: service upgrading in Czechia; sci-
ence, technology and entrepreneurialism in Estonia; and greater labour 
force participation in Hungary (Loewen 2015). In comparison, compet-
itiveness in Slovakia has focused on utilising low-cost labour in manu-
facturing through FDI investments as well as service upgrading, as in 
the Czech case (Ministry of Construction and Regional Development 
2003, 2007; Government of the Slovak Republic 2014). These 
cross-country differences reflect heterogeneity in size, economic struc-
ture and level of development as well as in their national development 
strategies and approaches to core concepts of Cohesion Policy such as 
socio-economic convergence.
Regarding convergence, it is important to distinguish between the 
spatial scales of national strategies with respect to innovation pro-
grammes and whether they are oriented towards developing cores or 
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peripheries. Expert interviews indicated that national convergence 
strategies have been favoured in Czechia, Estonia and Slovakia, while 
the reduction of regional inequalities remains relatively important in 
Hungary, due to strong historical patterns of polarisation. In Czechia, 
regional inequalities have been historically low, and were therefore 
not considered to be a significant problem (Interview, Pardubice, 3 
July 2017). Similarly, experts in Estonia and Slovakia indicated that 
regional inequalities remain a relatively low political priority despite 
their strength (Interview, Tallinn, 5 May 2016; Interview, Tallinn, 17 
May 2016; Interview, Bratislava, 18 January 2016 (2)). In contrast to 
the others, the reduction of regional inequalities remains relatively 
important in Hungary, due to strong historical patterns of polarisa-
tion. The reduction of regional inequalities has accordingly been a core 
development priority since the late socialist period (Interview, Pécs, 25 
November 2015 (1)), and remains a prominent objective within the 
current highly centralised system (Interview, Budapest, 24 November 
2015 (1)). Nevertheless, the shift to the competitiveness agenda has 
enabled a stronger case for investment in the capital regions in all four 
countries due to the promotion of agglomeration and spillover effects, 
on the one hand, and centralisation of policy programming and imple-
mentation, on the other.
3.2  Cohesion Policy and the Capacity for Innovation
In terms of Innovation Policy, there were no targeted strategies at the 
national level in CEE prior to EU accession, although there were sus-
tained R&D efforts prompted by the Soviet Union during socialist 
times (Interview, Bratislava, 18 January 2016 (1)). The political and 
economic integration of CEE countries in the 1990s was led by influ-
ential economic, political and financial institutions such as the EU, the 
World Bank and the IMF (see, for example, The World Bank 1992, 
1995), which national political elites in CEE willingly accepted (Kattel 
and Primi 2010; Interview, Tallinn, 28 February 2017). European pro-
grammes such as PHARE focused on building democratic governance 
institutions and constructing the internal market during the transition 
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and pre-accession periods. But they were also instrumental in build-
ing the regions and piloting regional Operational Programmes (Bruszt 
2008), thus tying into ‘Europe of the Regions’ ideals of regionalisation 
and Cohesion Policy mechanisms.
Economic policies inspired by international organisations marginal-
ised the idea of formulating targeted innovation policies, instead aim-
ing at other priorities such as privatisation and attracting foreign direct 
investment. The political emphasis focused on macroeconomic stability 
and restructuring processes, such that the erosion of the socialist R&D 
system and opening to market demand were key forces in reforming 
the innovation system (Suurna and Kattel 2010). In the post-accession 
period, the EU impact on innovation policies in all four countries 
has been tremendous. In countries such as Slovakia, for instance, EU 
accession brought innovation policy onto the agenda for the first time. 
National strategies were formulated closely along the normative position 
of EU policy, and remained very short-term in their outlook (Interview, 
Bratislava, 2 February 2017). Some authors also point out that the 
adherence to more general EU conditionalities, such as the principle of 
fiscal and monetary discipline endorsed by those institutions, has lim-
ited the array of policy options available to CEE countries (e.g. Faragó 
and Varró 2016).
Innovation Policy was introduced in CEE countries in tandem with 
the ‘Lisbonisation’ of Cohesion Policy, and they were thus already 
intertwined during the first two programming periods of CEE partici-
pation, 2004–2006 and 2007–2013. In these periods, the new member 
states designed their regional policy programmes in close consultation 
with Brussels, producing formulaic and homogenised national develop-
ment strategies to form the basis of similarly formulaic OPs. Following 
a different logic of regional development from pre-accession instru-
ments (e.g. PHARE, ISPA), arguably little policy learning from the 
pre-accession period was transferable. The complicated process orien-
tation of the new Cohesion Policy (through Structural and Cohesion 
Funds), in practice, shifted the priority towards spending eligible funds 
rather than tackling real regional problems on the ground (Interview, 
Pardubice, 3 July 2017), highlighting lacking capacities in the less 
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developed regions to implement innovative, growth-inducing projects. 
Poor absorption of available funds became a serious threat to Cohesion 
Policy in CEE, and project selection moved towards favouring ease 
of implementation over project merit in achieving policy objectives 
(European Commission 2013). Moreover, project writing for the 
peripheral regions was taken up by core-based external experts includ-
ing NGOs in Czechia and private consultants in Hungary (Interview, 
Prague, 21 November 2016; Interview, Békéscsaba, 26 January 2016). 
Scholars have found that a significant ‘project class’ developed in both 
countries (Kovách and Kučerová 2006), whereas new elites with the 
ability to cross public and private sectors due to personalism and multi- 
functionalism also emerged in Estonia (Aunapuu-Lents 2013). In 
Slovakia, the centralisation of policy-making at the national level led 
to the concentration of high-level civil servants and experts in the field 
of innovation policy in the capital city, Bratislava. The same goes for 
expertise on EU-related issues (Interview, Nitra, 28 September 2016). 
Also, the impact of the Structural Funds following EU accession 
reinforced the problems in Estonia and other CEE countries that 
emerged during the pre-accession period, such as low coordination and 
cooperation between administrations and weak administrative capacity 
(Interview, Tallinn, 28 February 2017).
In the current programming period for 2014–2020, even closer pol-
icy coordination with Europe 2020 emphasised innovation and com-
petitiveness following periods of poor Cohesion Policy performance. 
Nevertheless, CEE countries brought experience and lessons learnt 
from the previous periods. Reforms to Cohesion Policy favoured the 
centralisation of Managing Authorities and a reduction of Operational 
Programmes (especially Regional Operational Programmes) across the 
board. This potentially granted further central state controls over pro-
ject selection and implementation, while competitiveness (i.e. innova-
tion) programmes extended Cohesion Policy to all regions in Europe, 
including urban and highly developed areas. In the case of Slovakia, a 
targeted and long-term innovation strategy only started to emerge in 
this period, when the EU made it a requirement for member states to 
draw up Smart Specialisation strategies to access Structural Funds.
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Experts tend to question the role of cohesion in the current period, 
and concede that the emphasis on competitiveness promoted by 
European policy is disadvantageous to peripheries (Interview, Pécs, 25 
November 2017 (2); Interview, Pardubice, 3 July 2017). In CEE coun-
tries such as Hungary, where Cohesion Policy has traditionally been 
used to provide basic infrastructure in severely underdeveloped areas, 
there is a lack of suitable projects in the peripheries for competitiveness- 
based economic development (Interview, Budapest, 24 November 2017 
(2); Interview, Pécs, 25 November 2017 (1)). Moreover, in Estonia, gov-
ernment officials perceive a lack of capable partners in the peripheries, 
and the blind project selection process tends to favour firms in the core 
(Interview, Tallinn, 17 May 2016). Therefore, in some cases, an innova-
tion or competitiveness-based strategy can run counter to the objectives 
of cohesion.
The different national approaches highlighted by experts in CEE 
countries nevertheless share a common perspective reflecting their 
peripherality in the EU, whether it is expressed in terms of geographical 
proximity, relation to the economic core, or influence on policy-mak-
ing. Moreover, the dependence of certain CEE countries on their own 
cores (i.e. highly developed capital regions) as centres of innovation 
and drivers of national development, such is the case in the countries 
studied herein, bring the relevance of Cohesion and Innovation Policy 
into question. It is reasonable to predict that in increasingly centralised 
national settings such as in CEE, an Innovation Policy that benefits the 
capitals may eventually be seen as more politically palatable than the 
Cohesion Policy, which faces difficulties in implementation and a his-
tory of perceived poor performance.
4  Conclusions
This chapter examined the apparent convergence of Cohesion and 
Innovation Policy as it particularly pertains to CEE countries, wherein 
these supranational policies are main drivers of growth affecting 
spatial patterns of development. The theoretical contradictions 
between these two policy areas as well as the abilities for member 
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states to derive their own national responses to promote growth while 
addressing strong regional polarisation suggests the need to carefully 
rethink the interaction of these policies for the future EU program-
ming period.
The analysis has shown that Cohesion Policy, increasingly inter-
twined with Innovation Policy, has been used as a tool for economic 
growth in CEE countries with little relative regard for regional 
inequalities. Nevertheless, the traditional aims of Cohesion Policy to 
support backward regions are still seen to be important for stabilis-
ing socio-economic processes related to regional growth and decline, 
as national policy experts have been shown to recognise incompatibil-
ities between cohesion aims and growth-through-innovation strategies. 
Some recommendations regarding the policy convergence are formu-
lated below.
While innovation can be a strategy for economic growth, 
thus contributing to cohesion, it is crucial to avoid essentialising 
Cohesion Policy in such terms. The relationship between Cohesion 
Policy and Innovation Policy must be more clearly understood. As 
Cohesion Policy underwent the neoliberalising ‘Lisbonisation’ pro-
cess, reorienting it to competitiveness and growth, the principle of 
growth-through-innovation has risen as the EU’s economic strategy. 
On a national level, some countries such as Estonia were early imple-
menters of this principle compared to others such as Slovakia, where 
it was not specifically implemented until the current programming 
period. Continuing these developments, Innovation Policy has the 
potential to co-opt Cohesion Policy as a tool for economic develop-
ment, thereby constraining it, and jeopardising its legitimacy as a mod-
erating force across the EU.
The shift in Cohesion Policy towards narrowly conceptualised 
post-Lisbon objectives such as ‘innovation’ run the risk of favour-
ing trendy over banal policy areas. The notion that growth-through- 
innovation is an appropriate strategy for all regions must be challenged, 
and regions with poor innovation capacity should not be excluded 
from interventions. As Cohesion Policy has been extended to all of 
Europe’s regions, and the divisions between the more developed, tran-
sition and less developed regions blur, it may be useful to reconsider 
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the relevant institutional arrangements embodied in territorial and 
administrative hierarchies. Pre-Lisbon (and pre-accession) institu-
tional arrangements and policies focused on democratic legitimacy and 
power sharing, such as through the Europe of the Regions strategy and 
pre-accession instruments to CEE countries, have renewed relevance 
and could be revisited as a model for Cohesion Policy. Strong regions 
are a necessary condition for successful partnerships with central gov-
ernments to implement Cohesion Policy programmes, whether they 
should be focused on economic development, innovation or otherwise, 
but the centralisation of policy and programming has weakened legiti-
macy and capacities. Thus, preserving the integrity of Cohesion Policy 
should remain top of mind when pursuing a growth-based innovation 
strategy.
Where could the development of Cohesion and Innovation Policies 
lead? Rather than equating one policy with the other, as some might 
be apt to do for all practical purposes, it may be useful to dissect the 
economic domain from Cohesion Policy altogether. If Innovation 
Policy were to stand on its own as the EU’s economic policy, Cohesion 
Policy could refocus on the traditional domains of infrastructure or 
social investment in underdeveloped regions. Alternatively, Innovation 
Policy could be adopted as the economic strategy of Cohesion Policy 
with equal standing alongside social and environmental strategies. 
Either way, transparency between the two policy domains would 
improve understanding of the impacts of different policy interven-
tions, more directly responding to the needs of countries and regions 
of different levels of economic and social development. In a time of 
uncertainty surrounding Cohesion Policy and the very meaning of 
cohesion, efforts must be made to demonstrate its relevance in the 
(post-) neoliberal era. Clearly distinguishing between economic 
and other aims of Cohesion and Innovation Policies may serve this 
purpose.
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4.1  Four Key Points
– Cohesion Policy has shifted in its overall aim from reflecting ideals 
of regionalisation and integration associated with the ‘Europe 
of the Regions’ strategy, to competitiveness and growth associ-
ated with the Lisbon Agenda, and to innovation associated with 
Europe 2020.
– In CEE countries, these shifts coincided, firstly, with transition and 
EU accession, democratic and institutional capacity-building, and 
extreme underdevelopment of peripheral regions, and secondly with 
‘catching up’, crisis-induced polarisation, political centralisation and 
regional competition.
– Recently, the EU’s Smart Specialisation approach has accelerated 
the ‘Europeanisation’ of national innovation policies, especially in 
CEE countries due to their brief history in formulating innovation 
policies. While the EU’s influence has been beneficial in provid-
ing policy advice and best practices, it also demands adherence to 
predefined principles (i.e. ‘ex-ante conditionalities’), thereby limit-
ing the member states’ room for manoeuvre when choosing policy 
options.
– Cohesion Policy has come to be the EU’s main investment strat-
egy whose distinct competitiveness focus, while having contributed 
to growth and increased convergence at the member state level, is 
likely to sustain current polarisation processes among EU regions. 
As Cohesion Policy is above all trying to keep the EU economically 
competitive at the global scale, it is moving away from its traditional 
goal of promoting spatial cohesion by supporting development at the 
regional and local levels.
Appendix
See Tables 3 and 4.
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1  Cohesion Policy to Which End?
Judging by its name, the objective of the European Union’s (EU) 
Cohesion Policy (CP) seems clear: to promote cohesion in the EU. But 
what do we mean when we talk about cohesion? Answering this question 
is complicated for two interrelated reasons.
First, the main legal basis for CP—Article 174 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union—provides an exceedingly broad 
and vague definition of “economic, social and territorial cohesion”. 
Rather than contributing to a better understanding of the concept, this 
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formulation points to the various domains it shall apply to. Moreover, 
it does not clarify at which level cohesion shall be promoted. From the 
perspective of this chapter, this scale-insensitivity is particularly 
problematic as shown by the polarising dynamic of simultaneous 
improvements of economic cohesion at the national level (Forgó 
and Jevčák 2015) and deterioration at the regional level within member 
states (Lang et al. 2015; Medve-Bálint 2014).
Second, as illustrated by the incessant debates surrounding it, the 
evolving political context of European integration continuously reshuf-
fles the form and function of CP. To begin with, Manzella and Mendez 
(2009) suggest that CP was initially a side-payment for securing the 
support of the Mediterranean member states (MS) for further market 
integration. Subsequently, the eastern enlargements raised concerns as 
to whether a “Europe of Regions” actually provided a suitable frame-
work for the effective and accountable implementation of the policy 
(cf. Bruszt 2008; Leonardi 2005; Molle 2007).
Enlargement also raised the question of whether CP was promot-
ing an equality-oriented “Social Europe” or a neoliberal “Competitive 
Europe” (cf. Faludi 2010; Waterhout 2008). On the one hand, the 
influential Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy (Barca 2009) proposed 
a set of liberal reforms, such as more efficient governance, a concentra-
tion of funds on core priorities, and a place-based approach to regional 
development. On the other hand, critics claim that the “Lisbonisation” 
of CP involved trading “more (place-based and conditional) growth” for 
“less redistribution and cohesion” (Avdikos and Chardas 2016).
The two observations are interrelated. In terms of Sartori’s (1970) 
typology of concept misformation, the first observation points to con-
ceptual stretching. This problematic practice leads to “indefiniteness and 
elusiveness” because “the more we climb toward high-flown univer-
sals, the more tenuous the link with the empirical evidence” (p. 57). 
Consequently, the second observation illustrates that the lack of concep-
tual clarity surrounding cohesion lends itself to diverging interpretations 
about CP’s objectives, incites continuous debate, and limits the possibil-
ity of evaluating the policy’s actual achievements.
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The present chapter addresses this issue. Section 2 suggests that the 
continuous reshaping of CP can be understood in terms of experimen-
talist governance theory. Section 3 introduces computer-assisted text 
analysis (CATA) as a method to quantify and clarify what we mean 
when we talk about cohesion in CP. Section 4 presents the findings. 
First, it compares the Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 2020 strategy to 
establish a baseline for changes in policy objectives. Second, it finds a 
corresponding tendency in regional-level cross-border cooperation pro-
grammes. However, an in-depth analysis reveals a divergence of pro-
gramme objectives between old and new member states. These findings 
suggest that a more place-based CP may lead to different paths to cohe-
sion. Section 5 uses data from roughly one hundred in-depth interviews 
to provide some tentative explanations for this regional-level variation. 
The last section concludes with a summary of the argument and policy 
implications.
2  Implications of Concept Misformation 
for Policy Change
The last section argued that the evolving political context of European 
integration drives continuous policy change. This section proposes that 
this is the case because the open-ended nature of integration builds 
the requirement for continuous adaptation into the process of EU 
policy-making. While this characteristic often leads to the problems 
described above, the theory of experimentalist governance emphasises 
the possibility of a more benign solution (De Búrca et al. 2014; Sabel 
and Zeitlin 2008, 2010, 2012; Zeitlin 2015).
Experimentalist governance suggests that a virtuous feedback loop of 
shared policy design, place-based implementation, and results pooling 
can reduce the gap between policy inclusiveness and policy efficiency. 
In other words, this approach highlights continuous adaptation as an 
opportunity to simultaneously boost input and output legitimacy 
(Scharpf 1997).
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The experimentalist governance process proceeds in four steps. First, 
higher and lower level units engage in a deliberative policy-design 
process, at the end of which they agree on a set of general framework 
objectives as well as on measures to monitor their attainment. Second, 
lower level units are given sufficient autonomy to engage in experimen-
tation so as to devise creative and place-based solutions to the frame-
work objectives. Third, their progress is closely monitored and all 
individual experiences are pooled and shared to allow peer review and 
mutual learning. Fourth, based on these learning processes, institutional 
structures and framework goals are periodically subjected to scrutiny 
and recalibrated to reflect changing internal and external conditions. 
The repetition of this cycle supports the dissemination and connection 
of distributed knowledge (Newell 2005), the mainstreaming of best 
practices, and the naming and shaming of underperformers.
CP has several of the characteristics associated with experimental-
ist governance: it is the essential multi-level policy of the EU (Hooghe 
1996), it relies on implementing broad framework objectives (European 
Parliament and Council 2013) through an increasingly place-based 
approach (Avdikos and Chardas 2016; Barca 2009), the role of evi-
dence-based learning is becoming more central (Leonardi 2005, Ch. 3; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Novak 2013; Neacsu and Petzold 2015), and peri-
odic framework revisions have led to wide-ranging changes in policy sub-
stance and structure (Bachtler and Mendez 2007; Molle 2007). Moreover, 
the partnership principle (Demidov 2015) aims at the involvement of 
national, regional, and local actors in determining programme priorities. 
Finally, initiatives like ESPON and INTERACT are specifically intended 
to promote evidence-based decision-making by enabling the gathering 
and dissemination of knowledge acquired through the implementation of 
CP (Faludi 2008).
Considering these features, it is understandable that Mendez (2011) 
asked whether the “Lisbonisation” of CP constitutes “a successful 
case of experimentalist governance”. However, he concluded that “the 
effects on mutual learning - a core feature of experimentalist govern-
ance - have been limited or non-existent and are likely to remain so 
in the immediate future” (ibid. 534). Importantly, he highlighted 
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that the experimentalist dynamics “are handicapped by a lack of  clarity 
and prioritization over EU Cohesion objectives, the lack of political 
commitment to assessment indicators and targets[,] and uneven perfor-
mance reporting which focuses too much on financial implementation” 
(ibid. 534).
In sum, the first two sections of the chapter established concept mis-
formation as an important impediment to the operation of a virtuous 
feedback loop in CP. To address this issue, CATA provides an easy-to-
use and reproducible way for disentangling the diverse policy objectives 
(Craciun 2018) subsumed under cohesion. Therefore, from an experi-
mentalist governance perspective, it has the potential to contribute to 
more constructive policy debates and to virtuous policy change.
3  Methodology
The analysis uses an extended methodological framework to trace 
changes in policy objectives. It uses a quantitative method (CATA) 
for gauging changes in policy objectives and a qualitative method 
(semi-structured interviews) for explaining the variation identified by 
CATA.
Text analysis represents a scientific method for “making replicative 
and valid inferences from data to their context” (Krippendorff 1980, 
21). CATA is a form of text analysis that uses computers, rather than 
human coders, to analyse texts. It is used to automatically quantify the 
existence of certain concepts of interest as well as their embeddedness in 
the broader institutional context in which they are used (Berg 2001).
The chapter utilises CATA to analyse an original set of documents. 
The analysis focused on the following key policy concepts: social, 
employment, cohesion, growth, innovation, competitiveness. The first three 
concepts broadly reflect the Social Europe discourse, while the last three 
reflect the Competitive Europe discourse (see Sect. 1). Additionally, the 
analysis includes development to highlight changes in the meaning of 
core objectives, as well as priority to indicate the influence of the 2013 
CP reform.
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The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the Lisbon Agenda and 
Europe 2020 strategy are examined to identify changes in the EU’s 
overarching policy objectives. Second, all Czech and German cross- 
border operational programmes (OPs) are analysed for the 2007–2013 
and 2014–2020 programming periods to see how the macro objectives 
were translated into regional-level objectives. The principle of multi- 
annual programming ensures that the former period reflects the objec-
tives of the Lisbon Agenda, while the latter period reflects those of the 
Europe 2020 strategy. The focus on cross-border OPs highlights the 
significance of regional-level conditions and agency in translating the 
macro strategies as it allows variation within MS to be studied.
Third, the comparison of Czech and German cross-border OPs works 
as a natural experiment (cf. Dunning 2017) which allows evaluating 
the impact of the old/new member state cleavage on the translation pro-
cess. Accordingly, the chapter divides cross-border OPs into three cate-
gories (Table 1): OPs of two old member states [OMS/OMS], OPs of 
old and new member states [OMS/NMS], and OPs of two new mem-
ber states [NMS/NMS].
Some caveats need to be mentioned. First, cross-border OPs are 
not distributed equally across countries and categories. As such, the 
comparatively lower number of Czech OPs runs the risk of skewing the 
analysis if one of the OPs is an outlier in terms of the objectives under 
analysis. Second, not all the OPs fall neatly into the categorisation. 
On the one hand, Switzerland and Lichtenstein are non-EU countries. 
On the other hand, Austria and Sweden joined the EU only in 1995. 
Insofar as the former are concerned, the respective OPs always involve 
at least two EU MS, whereas insofar as the latter, both countries are 
commonly considered to be EU-15 countries. Moreover, the Poland–
Denmark–Germany–Lithuania–Sweden (South Baltic)  cross-border 
OP cannot be included in the analysis for methodological reasons as 
the programme document was not available in German. Third, the 
number of German OPs changed between programming periods due 
to the merger of the Syddanmark–Schleswig K.E.R.N. OP and the 
Fehmarnbelt Region OP into one Germany–Denmark OP. The analysis 
includes both cross-border OPs of the 2007–2013 period.
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Before using CATA techniques to reduce the complexity of the doc-
uments, the texts needed to be pre-processed (Craciun 2018). In prac-
tice, this entailed (1) transforming all the documents into .txt format, 
(2) cleaning the text by removing the parts that are not directly relevant 
to answering the research question, and (3) taking out stop words (i.e. 
common words for each language that appear often in the structure of 
the sentence but do not provide any content).
The web application Voyant Tools (Sinclair and Rockwell 2017) was 
used to conduct three different kinds of analysis. Trend analysis pro-
vides a line graph of word frequencies in different policy documents and 
Table 1 Analysed Czech and German cross-border cooperation OPs
Source Own elaboration
The OPs analysed are shown in italics.



























[NMS/NMS] 4) Czech Republic–Poland
5) Slovakia–Czech Republic
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enables researchers to measure and compare the relative importance of 
policy objectives. Collocation analysis reveals a network graph of high-
est frequency terms that appear in proximity with each other within the 
documents (cf. Lehecka 2015). For the purpose of this chapter, the tool 
was used to show how the meaning of the policy objectives has changed 
over time. Finally, correspondence analysis, a type of cluster analysis, was 
used to illustrate the proximity of individual OPs in terms of the policy 
objectives (cf. Greenacre 2010). This technique is used to visualise the 
OMS/NMS divide.
In a final step, the findings obtained via CATA were contrasted with 
qualitative evidence from six of the analysed OPs (italics in Table 1). As 
these six OPs cover all three categories ([OMS/OMS], [OMS/NMS], 
[NMS/NMS]), their analysis allows us to develop explanations for the 
variation across these categories. The evidence was gathered in 104 
semi-structured interviews with representatives of regional and national 
administrative authorities, OP programme administrations, programme 
audits, Euroregion representatives, local politicians, and representatives 
of local non-governmental organisations and municipalities (Table 2). 
They took place between January 2016 and April 2017 and had an aver-
age duration of one hour. The questions focused on the achievements 
and challenges of cross-border cooperation in the border region, pay-
ing attention to issues related to the implementation of the respective 
INTERREG programmes.
Table 2 Distribution of interviews
Source Own elaboration
The OPs analysed are shown in italics
Cross-border cooperation OP Category Number of interviews
Germany/Bavaria–Austria [OMS/OMS] 5
Germany/Bavaria–Czech Republic [OMS/NMS] 24
Germany/Saxony–Czech Republic [OMS/NMS] 23
Austria–Slovakia [OMS/NMS] 20
Austria–Czech Republic [OMS/NMS] 16
Slovakia–Czech Republic [NMS/NMS] 16
Total 104
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4  Analysis
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, a comparison of the Lisbon 
Agenda and the Europe 2020 strategy establishes the evolution of the 
EU’s macro objectives. Second, the Czech and German cross-border OPs 
of the 2007–2013 and 2014–2020 programming period are scrutinised 
to illustrate how the changes in the macro strategies translate into region-
al-level OPs. In a third step, the distinction between OPs according to the 
three categories is used to study the context-dependent implementation of 
the CP, suggesting OMS and NMS cleavage as an explanatory factor.
4.1  Macro Strategies: Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020 
Strategy
The trend analysis of the Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 2020  strategy 
is based on two key policy framing documents: the Presidency 
Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council (European Council 
2000) and the Communication from the Commission EUROPE 
2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (European 
Commission 2010).
The most significant findings include a substantial decrease of the 
relative word frequency of the concepts social and employment and a 
simultaneous increase in the frequency of the concepts of growth and 
innovation (Fig. 1). This development resulted in an alteration of the 
ranking of the first three most frequent policy concepts from the Lisbon 
Agenda (social, employment, growth) to the Europe 2020 strategy 
(growth, social, innovation).
The change in focus may be explained by the macro political con-
text at the time of drafting the two documents. On the one hand, 
the Lisbon Agenda reflects the expected effects of impending Eastern 
enlargements, putting questions of social inclusion and employment at 
centre stage. On the other hand, the Europe 2020 strategy was drafted 
during the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crisis of the late 
2000s and reflects a greater concern with innovation-driven economic 
growth.
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While word frequencies provide a picture of the change in the EU’s 
macro objectives, a more detailed understanding can be gained by con-
ducting collocation analysis to uncover shifts in the meanings attached 
to these objectives (Fig. 2). At the document level, collocation analysis 
of the Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020 strategy confirms the general 
trend from social towards growth-related issues. Specifically, the term 
social not only features prominently in the Lisbon Agenda, but is closely 
related to employment, protection, and exclusion. In contrast, the Europe 
2020 strategy is alluding to a variety of terms referring to Europe, osten-
sibly demonstrating the intention of signalling supranational political 
unity during the financial crisis. Moreover, the latter document is clearly 
identified as a strategy for growth, based on goals and measurable targets.
Turning to the concepts development and cohesion, additional sig-
nificant differences can be observed. While development in the Lisbon 
Agenda is related to employment and human, the Europe 2020 strategy 
links development closely to the structural funds as a key delivery frame-
work. The link to research is present in both documents, but the Europe 


























Social Innovation Employment Growth Cohesion Competitiveness
Fig. 1 Trend analysis of policy concepts in the Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 
2020 strategy (Source Own elaboration based on Sinclair and Rockwell 2017)
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In both documents, cohesion is related to employment. However, while 
the Lisbon Agenda refers to employment growth, the Europe 2020 strat-
egy refers to productivity growth. At the same time, the Europe 2020 strat-
egy frames cohesion in both social and economic terms, while in the Lisbon 
Agenda, it has a purely economic focus. Having established the evolution of 
the EU’s macro objectives, the analysis now turns to regional-level OPs.
































Fig. 2 Collocation analysis of the Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 2020 strategy 
(Source Own elaboration based on Sinclair and Rockwell 2017)
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4.2  Cohesion Policy Implementation: Cross-Border 
Cooperation Programmes
To answer the question of how changes in the macro strategies trans-
late into regional-level OPs, trend analysis was conducted for all cross- 
border OPs with Czech and German participation. This moves the 
focus of the analysis from the supranational to the regional level and 
from the strategic to the policy implementation phase.
To this end, the cross-border OPs of the 2007–2013 programming 
period were aggregated and compared to the OPs of the 2014–2020 
programming period for both countries separately. Trend analysis of the 
German OPs found that development was by far the most frequent con-
cept in both programming periods. Moreover, the introduction of the-
matic priorities in the 2014–2020 programming period was obvious in 
the documents. Similar results were obtained in the trend analysis of the 
Czech OPs, where the term development was the most frequent concept 
in the programming period 2007–2013. In the following period, it was 
superseded by the term priority.

























Fig. 3 Trend analysis of German and Czech cross-border OPs (2007–2013 vs. 
2014–2020) (Source Own elaboration based on Sinclair and Rockwell 2017)
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In fact, these two concepts were so prevalent as to hide the degree 
of change in the frequency of other core concepts. Hence, they were 
excluded in the next step of the analysis, both for Germany and for the 
Czech Republic (Fig. 3). This procedure revealed that the use of the 
terms innovation and growth has increased significantly, while the terms 
social, employment, cohesion, and competitiveness have become less fre-
quent or stayed almost unchanged. The lower frequency of the term com-
petitiveness can be interpreted as a shift in terminology towards the more 
inclusive term of growth. The trend in Czech cross-border OPs broadly 
corresponds to what has been observed in the German case. It shows 
a rise in the frequency of the term innovation and (to a lesser extent) 
growth and a simultaneous decline in the frequency of the term social.
These findings corroborate the argument that the transition from the 
Lisbon Agenda to the Europe 2020 strategy involved a broad reorien-
tation of the CP towards more “liberal ” ideas of welfare creation. The 
greater focus on thematic priorities, as well as the increased importance 
of growth, confirm Avdikos and Chardas’ (2016) critical assertion that 
post-2014 CP means “more (place-based and conditional) growth”. The 
next section turns to the differences between the three categories of OPs.
4.3  Context-Dependent Implementation:  
The Old/New Member State Cleavage
The final section analyses whether the OPs show variation along the 
OMS/NMS cleavage. To this end, the German cross-border OPs were 
divided into [OMS/OMS] and [NMS/OMS] and the Czech OPs were 
divided into [OMS/NMS] and [NMS/NMS]. The analysis first com-
pares the categories in each programming period and subsequently 
highlights the change over time in each category.
In the 2007–2013 programming period, social was the most frequent term 
both in [OMS/OMS] and in [OMS/NMS] cross-border OPs. However, 
while [OMS/NMS] OPs were dominated by this term, [OMS/OMS] OPs 
were more diversified. Here, innovation was as frequent as social and employ-
ment and growth also featured centrally. These findings can be interpreted as 
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illustrating a preference of the NMS for social cohesion via redistribution and 
solidarity, while the OMS appear to be influenced by liberal ideas of creating 
equality through empowerment of the individual.
Importantly, the divide between [OMS/OMS] and [OMS/NMS] 
OPs has become more pronounced in the 2014–2020 programming 
period. The two most significant developments are a decline in the use 
of social in [OMS/NMS] OPs and a dramatic rise in the use of innova-
tion in [OMS/OMS] OPs.
Analysis of the three categories over time reveals that the increased 
frequency of the term innovation for all German OPs (Fig. 3, left 
side) derives exclusively from [OMS/OMS] OPs. This is the case, 
because over the two programming periods, the frequency of innovation 
rises steeply in [OMS/OMS] OPs (Fig. 4), but declines in [OMS/
NMS] OPs (Fig. 5).
Moreover, when it comes to [OMS/NMS] OPs (Fig. 5), only the con-
cept of growth became more frequent in the later period. In fact, while 
growth was one of the least frequent concepts under investigation in the 
2007–2013 programming period, in the 2014–2020 programming 
period, it became the second most frequent. Simultaneously a notable 
decline in the use of the term cohesion could be observed. Nevertheless, 
despite declining frequency, social remained the most frequently used term 
in [OMS/NMS] OPs.
Fig. 4 Trend analysis of [OMS/OMS] OPs across the 2007–2013 and the 2014–
2020 period (Source Own elaboration based on Sinclair and Rockwell 2017)
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The analysis of [NMS/NMS] OPs shows that while the concepts 
growth and employment have become more frequent in [NMS/NMS] 
OPs, cohesion has become less so (Fig. 6). Moreover, the term innovation 
has become only slightly more prevalent in the 2014–2020 program-
ming period. This means that almost the entire increase in the use of 
innovation across all Czech OPs (Fig. 3, right side) derives from [OMS/
NMS] OPs. Considering that [OMS/NMS] OPs referred to innovation 

























Social Innovation Employment Growth Cohesion Competitiveness
Fig. 5 Trend analysis of [OMS/NMS] OPs across the 2007–2013 and the 2014–
2020 period (Source Own elaboration based on Sinclair and Rockwell 2017)
Fig. 6 Trend analysis of [NMS/NMS] OPs across the 2007–2013 and the 2014–
2020 period (Source Own elaboration based on Sinclair and Rockwell 2017)
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a clear ordering of the three categories has emerged in the 2014–2020 
period for the term innovation: [OMS/OMS] > [OMS/NMS] > [NMS/
NMS].
However, comparing Figs. 5 and 6 does not confirm this conclu-
sion. If the [OMS/NMS] and [NMS/NMS] categories feature lower 
frequencies of innovation than the [OMS/OMS] category, it is surpris-
ing that German OPs have lower frequencies than Czech OPs (Fig. 3). 
These findings are, however, explained by further sub-dividing the 
[OMS/NMS] category into OPs involving the old German Länder 
(states) and OPs involving the new German Länder. Additional analysis 
suggests that OPs involving the new German Länder closely resemble 
the [NMS/NMS] category, while those involving the old German 
Länder closely resemble the [OMS/OMS] category.
These findings are also corroborated by correspondence analysis of 
all German OPs of the 2014–2020 programming period (Fig. 7). First, 
analysis shows that [OMS/OMS] OPs form a cluster on the left side 
towards the term innovation. [OMS/NMS] OPs form a cluster on 
the right side towards the term social. Second, the only exception to 
this pattern is the Czech–Bavarian OP, which is highly similar to the 
Austrian–Bavarian OP. Moreover, the same analysis for the 2007–2013 
programming period revealed that the Czech–Bavarian OP used to be 
much more clearly aligned with the other [OMS/NMS] OPs. This drift 
Fig. 7 Correspondence analysis for all German cross-border OPs (2014–2020) 
(Source Own elaboration based on Sinclair and Rockwell 2017)
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suggests that the Bavarian side largely succeeded in determining the 
content of the Czech–Bavarian OP in the 2014–2020 programming 
period. Correspondence analysis, therefore, confirms that there is a sig-
nificant and growing difference between the old and the new German 
Länder in terms of OP objectives.
In summary, the analysis found significant changes between the 
Lisbon Agenda (social and employment ) and the Europe 2020 strategy 
(growth and innovation ) and showed that these changes are also visible 
at the regional level. However, it also highlighted that there are signifi-
cant differences among the three categories of OPs, which point towards 
the salience of OMS/NMS cleavage. The chapter now turns to these 
differences and provides a tentative explanation.
5  Divergent Paths to Cohesion in Old 
and New Member States?
The findings suggest an interesting conclusion about the pathways 
towards cohesion: at the level of macro strategies, the shift towards inno-
vation and growth suggests that enhancing labour productivity is seen as 
a core strategy towards greater cohesion. This strategy corresponds to 
the neoliberal “Competitive Europe” discourse.
However, analysis of the OPs suggests that change in the macro 
objectives has led to a divergence between OMS and NMS. While the 
OMS appear to be in line with the liberal ideas of the Europe 2020 
strategy, the NMS appear to pursue a different trajectory. In fact, the 
significant rise in growth and employment in combination with a decline 
of social in [NMS/NMS] cross-border OPs suggests that labour market 
participation is a preferred strategy towards cohesion. This strategy cor-
responds more to the “Social Europe” discourse.
These findings can be interpreted as evidence for the dominance of 
OMS in framing an increasingly liberal CP paradigm, which NMS are 
reluctant to adopt. To give a tentative explanation for these different tra-
jectories, this section presents local-level evidence from six cross-border 
OPs, spanning all three categories.
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First, the interview data confirm that differences in the level of eco-
nomic development and infrastructure endowment are a major obstacle 
to determining common OP objectives in [OMS/NMS] programmes. 
Whereas the Czech and Slovak respondents (NMS) tended to empha-
sise the lack of public infrastructure on their side of the border, German 
and Austrian (OMS) respondents tended to highlight the importance 
of “soft” factors as preconditions for knowledge-based growth. In par-
ticular, regional capacities for innovation-driven growth, such as insti-
tutions of higher education or high-tech enterprises, exist outside urban 
agglomerations in federal Germany and Austria, but only to a lesser 
degree in the more centralised Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Second, there are significant differences in the levels of administra-
tive capacity and autonomy with regard to designing and implementing 
OPs. For example, German and Austrian federal states are more autono-
mous and better endowed with financial and human resources than the 
recently created Czech and Slovak self-governing regions. In the latter 
countries, key decisions regarding the CP are usually taken in national 
ministries. Correspondingly, the interviews suggest that the design 
and implementation of OPs in the Czech Republic and Slovakia tend 
to reflect the preferences of national ministries or governments, rather 
than the conditions in the border region. Moreover, frequent changes 
of administrative staff in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, often in the 
aftermath of elections, were associated with a limited capacity to build 
and retain operational knowledge within the institution responsible 
for OP administration. This situation supposedly sustains a culture of 
ad hoc decision-making that is seen as detrimental to the coherent 
 translation of EU-level regulations into national and sub-national policy.
Third, while Austrian respondents repeatedly stressed that CP funds 
are “expensive money” which demands efficient and accountable spend-
ing, Czech and Slovak respondents regularly depicted the OP funds as 
a way to prop up local budgets. The introduction of thematic priorities 
in the 2014–2020 programming period was received with scepticism, 
especially in NMS, where respondents criticised that local conditions 
and developmental potential are not properly reflected in the thematic 
priorities (especially with regard to the economic potential of tourism 
and infrastructure projects). To sum up, different levels of economic 
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development and institutional capacity, and different positionalities as 
net-contributing or net-receiving MS can partially explain the divergent 
strategies towards cohesion in OMS and NMS.
6  Conclusion
The chapter employed an extended methodological framework to address 
the conceptual ambiguity of cohesion. Building on experimentalist gov-
ernance theory, it was argued that conceptual clarity is an important 
precondition for unleashing the CP’s virtuous feedback loop. CATA was 
applied to the EU’s macro strategies as well as cross-border OPs to quan-
tify and clarify what lies underneath the conceptual “veil” of cohesion.
The analysis has shown, first, that the EU’s macro political objectives 
evolved from social and employment-related issues in the Lisbon Agenda 
to growth and innovation-related issues in the Europe 2020 strategy. 
Second, scrutinising German and Czech cross-border OPs of the 2007–
2013 and 2014–2020 programming periods, the chapter confirmed the 
trend towards growth and innovation objectives at the regional level. The 
third part of the analysis revealed a divergent trend among three catego-
ries of OPs. While [OMS/OMS] OPs clearly shifted towards an innova-
tion-driven cohesion strategy, this trend was less pronounced in [OMS/
NMS] OPs and in [NMS/NMS] OPs. By contrast, growth and employ-
ment objectives became relatively more important in [OMS/NMS] OPs 
and, especially, in [NMS/NMS] OPs. Subsequently, interview-based 
evidence from six cross-border OPs was used to suggest potential expla-
nations for this divergence.
We believe that observation of the divergent paths to cohesion raises 
important questions about their respective long-term trajectories. In terms 
of economic cohesion, does a place-based CP lead to efficient specialisation 
or to a polarisation of productivity levels? In terms of social cohesion, will 
the greater workfare focus in OMS and the greater welfare focus in NMS 
balance the size of the welfare state and lead to the emergence of a shared 
European Social Model? In terms of territorial cohesion, what are the impli-
cations of the innovation focus in OMS and the social focus in NMS for 
the relative socio-economic position of urban and rural regions?
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Against this background, we suggest a rethinking of spatial policies 
in Europe. First, future rounds of CP reforms need to take the “diver-
gent paths” into account and acknowledge the different policy prefer-
ences between OMS and NMS regarding cohesion. Second, considering 
that especially [OMS/NMS] programmes struggle to determine shared 
cross-border objectives, the legal instrument of European Groupings 
of Territorial Cooperation should be mainstreamed as a solution to the 
problem of political bargaining that surrounds national funding enve-
lopes. Third, the recent proposal of the EU Commission to concentrate 
future CP funding exclusively in below-average GDP MS should be 
combined with a stronger focus on the promotion of good governance 
and systematic institutional capacity building.
While the chapter has presented an innovative methodology for 
unveiling divergent paths between OMS and NMS, the analysis was 
restricted to a limited number of MS as well as to cross-border OPs. 
Future research can build on the methodological foundations pre-
sented in this chapter, to test the validity of the presented results with 
a broader corpus of policy documents. Moreover, regarding experimen-
talist governance theory, the methodology can be further developed to 
allow an analysis of whether and how the pooling and sharing of local-
level experiences impact supranational CP reforms.
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1  Introduction, Theoretical Background, 
Goals and Methodology
The concept of growth poles has been introduced by the French 
economist Francois Perroux (Perroux 1950, 1988) and further 
developed by Jacques-Raoul Boudeville and José Ramón Lasuén 
(Lasuén 1973; Schätzl 1998). These authors consider growth poles 
as urban centres polarising a larger region, where a single large firm 
or an economic sector generates a growth process, and where sec-
torial polarisation determines the regional polarisation of firms and 
population (Benedek and Moldovan 2015). The intensity of regional 
polarisation depends on the market share size of the dominant eco-
nomic sector, and can be counterbalanced through the establishment of 
new growth centres, which may reshape the regional spatial structure. 
8
Urban Growth Pole Policy and Regional 
Development: Old Wine in New Bottles?
József Benedek, Ştefana Varvari 
and Cristian Marius Litan
© The Author(s) 2019 
T. Lang and F. Görmar (eds.), Regional and Local Development  
in Times of Polarisation, New Geographies of Europe, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1190-1_8
J. Benedek (*) · Ş. Varvari · C. M. Litan 
Babeş-Bolyai-University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania  
174     J. Benedek et al.
An important effect is attributed to growth poles, namely that they 
can bring about spatial diffusion of growth towards their zone of 
influence.
In his overview of growth pole strategies, Parr (1999) demonstrated 
how the scientific concept of dominance and economic space elab-
orated by François Perroux became a normative concept in regional 
economic planning. Moreover, Lang and Török demonstrated in a 
recent paper how the view of supporting metropolitan areas as national 
growth engines also became a central element of national urban poli-
cies (Lang and Török 2017). The greatest academic and practical 
interest in growth pole strategies characterised the period from the 
mid-1960s to the mid-1970s (Parr 1999). However, it failed to achieve 
its main objective, namely the diffusion of growth, and was conse-
quently largely abandoned in the period following the mid-1970s. For 
this reason, its revival during the 2000s in Europe came as a surprising 
evolution.
Against this background, the main aim of this chapter is to evalu-
ate the process and outcome of establishing urban growth poles as key 
elements of the new regional policy in Romania. This question is par-
ticularly relevant for the production and reproduction of socio-spa-
tial disparities. Therefore, we will address in particular the question of 
whether the strong prioritisation of urban growth poles has reduced or 
increased regional disparities in Romania in demographic and economic 
terms. The evaluation of urban growth poles will follow a twofold logic: 
one is based on quantitative estimation of the economic effects of the 
urban growth pole strategy (priority axis 1, ROP 2007–2013); the sec-
ond line of argumentation evaluates the qualitative effect of the growth 
pole strategy in relation to the main objectives of the major strategic 
planning documents: Law 315/2004 on regional development and 
the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) for the period 
2007–2013. We argue that growth pole strategies have different features 
within the Romanian planning context reflecting space, society and 
governance. Our aim is not to come up with a “total impact” assessment 
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but rather to emphasise the “conditioning factors” of growth pole policy 
effectiveness (Fratesi and Wishlade 2017).
2  Setting the Scene for the Growth Pole 
Strategy: Regional Inequalities in Romania
Following EU accession in 2007, internal spatial inequalities have 
increased significantly in Romania (Benedek and Török 2014). This 
process is not particularly specific to Romania, being significant in other 
CEE countries as well. Moreover, the idea is generally accepted that 
regional disparities tend to increase during phases of national economic 
growth, followed by a phase of decrease. According to this perspective, 
the increase of economic inequalities in Romania seems to fit into this 
general picture. The difference in GDP per capita from the EU average 
(EU28 = 100) of the poorest (Nord-Est 34) and richest (București-Ilfov 
136) Romanian NUTS-2 region reached in 2015 its maximum level 
(Eurostat 2017). It is an expression of the strong spatial concentration 
on the development of very few regions, mostly the capital region. This 
value is exceeded only by four EU countries (France, Slovakia, Belgium 
and Germany). If we compare the gaps in GDP per capita from the 
EU average between the poorest and richest NUTS-2 regions for 2015 
and 2004 (102, respectively 40), we see a strong internal spatial polar-
isation process in a short period of time, unique among EU countries. 
At the same time, Romania converged significantly at the national 
level: GDP per capita compared to the EU average increased from 26% 
in 2000 to 49% in 2012, achieving and exceeding the main goal set 
in the NSRF 2007–2013: increasing GDP per capita in Romania by 
15–20% by 2015.
In other words, the external, country-level convergence to the EU 
average was accompanied by a strong internal territorial polarisation, 
creating a dual spatial structure (Benedek 2015). This development con-
tradicts the regional development goals based upon the principles of 
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subsidiarity, decentralisation and partnership set out in the main plan-
ning document, the Regional Development Act 315/2004.
3  The Growth Pole Strategy of Romania: 
Description and Implementation
Generally, the Romanian case confirms the findings of the territo-
rial governance and regional studies literature which states that EU 
Cohesion Policy has two major territorial influences: first, it has con-
tributed to a change in the structure of territorial administration 
with the creation of development regions and a corresponding new 
institutional framework at the regional level, and, second, it has 
 contributed to a change in the territorial relations between institu-
tions and across different levels of territorial government (Bachtler 
and McMaster 2008). Before EU accession, it was an obligation for 
the EU candidate country Romania to meet the requirements of 
Chapter 21 of the acquis communautaire which sets the conditions 
and rules for regional policy and requires adoption of the NUTS 
 system. The European Commission (EC) exercises in this way huge 
influence over the outcome. In addition, the pre-accession EU fund-
ing programmes PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD supported among 
other activities the institution building process. However, the EC 
does not regulate the status of regional institutions in the  member 
states, which has hindered deeper regionalisation. In other words, 
the EC has contributed little to the strengthening of regional powers 
and resources in CEE (Bachtler and McMaster 2008).
The Regional Development Act adopted in 1998 and subsequently 
amended in 2004 stipulates three fundamental principles (subsidiarity, 
decentralisation and partnership), as well as three fundamental goals 
(reduction of regional disparities, regional harmonisation of sectoral 
government policy, supporting regional collaboration) of regional pol-
icy. These goals are part of the uncritically adopted European policies 
in Romanian spatial planning following the collapse of communism 
(Stringer et al. 2009; Tănăsoiu 2012; Benedek 2014). As part of this 
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process the general guidelines and principles of the European spatial 
planning documents have been superseded by the Romanian spatial 
planning system (Pușcașu 2009; Cotella et al. 2012; Benedek 2013; 
Benedek and Cristea 2014). More specifically, the NSRF 2007–2013 
defines five EU-financed development priorities (Government of 
Romania 2007), among them sustaining a balanced territorial devel-
opment which represents an adoption of mainstream European spatial 
documents. A second main development goal of Romania was the 
reduction of the economic and social disparities between Romania and 
other EU member states by a GDP increase of 15–20% by 2015. These 
main goals were supported—within the scope of convergence—by seven 
Operational Programmes (OP). The stated strategic goal of one of these, 
the Regional Operational Programme (ROP), was to support bal-
anced and sustainable regional development. This is further sustained 
by five specific aims: increasing the social and economic importance of 
cities; applying the principle of polycentric development; providing 
 better access to regions, especially by enabling access to city centres 
and improving public transportation in cities and their surrounding 
areas; improving regional social infrastructure; enhancing regional com-
petitiveness; increasing the regional economic importance of tourism 
(MRDT 2012). All except one (tourism) targeted cities, the first two 
expressly, the next two indirectly. The support given to social and eco-
nomic infrastructure development was concentrated in cities (Benedek 
2016). In other words, the specific aims attributed to the strategic goal 
of regional development gave a structural advantage to NUTS-3 units 
(counties) with higher urbanisation rates, contributing in this way to the 
widening of regional disparities. Within the ROP, each goal was assigned 
to a priority axis and the corresponding budget allocation, all of which 
favoured large urban concentration: (1) sustainable development of city 
growth poles 31.36%; (2) improvement in regional and local transpor-
tation infrastructure 19.76%; (3) improvement in social infrastructure 
14.81%; (4) consolidation of regional and local business environments 
17.93%; development and promotion of tourism 16.14% (MRDT 
2012). The projects implemented in Axis 1 of the ROP amounted to 
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around 2.26 billion EUR, of which 621 million EUR were dedicated to 
just seven growth poles.
These seven urban growth poles have been defined in Law 
1149/2008 of Urban Growth Centres as polarising cities, transport 
hubs, concentrating economic and cultural activities, which will ben-
efit by being given priority for from European and national financing 
(MRDPA 2008; MRDT 2012). In addition, the same law has defined 
13 urban development poles and 170 urban centres as parts of a 
polycentric regional development policy.
One specific feature of the growth pole strategy in Romania is 
represented by its strong connection to urban development and 
planning. All growth poles follow the classification of urban cen-
tres by Law 351/2001 National Spatial Development Plan—
Section 4: The Settlement Network, which has differentiated 12 
upper tier cities: the capital city Bucharest (ranked 0) and 11 other 
cities ranked 1. The seven growth poles were selected from the lat-
ter category, one from each development region except the capi-
tal region: Cluj-Napoca, Iași, Timișoara, Constanța, Craiova, Brașov 
and Ploiești.
The same is valid for their governance structure, the newly created 
metropolitan areas being based in the same legal framework, where 
metropolitan areas are defined as “territories surrounding major urban 
agglomerations, where strong transportation, economic, social, cultural 
and infrastructural interrelations are established” (RP 2001). They dif-
fer from the “Suburban Areas”, which are “territories surrounding cities, 
where economic, infrastructural, commuting and leisure interdependen-
cies are established” (RP 2001).
The seven designated growth poles established associations of local 
administrations called “metropolitan areas” with their neighbouring 
settlements, an eligibility requirement to obtain European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) funding through the 2007–2013 ROP for 
urban integrated development projects.
They received ERDF financial support to implement so-called 
Integrated Urban Development Plans, planning documents that were 
supposed to identify urban and metropolitan areas in need of urban 
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integrated development investments (urban, transport, social and eco-
nomic infrastructure) (Benedek and Cristea 2014).
4  Impact Evaluation of the Growth 
Poles Programme from the Perspective 
of Regional Inequalities
4.1  Data
In order to estimate the impact of the growth poles policy during the 
2007–2013 programming period we took into consideration two main 
indicators: population by residence as at 1 January each year and local 
public administration’s own incomes for each year for each admin-
istrative-territorial unit of Romania (own incomes are mainly made 
up of local taxes, fees and income tax payable by residents, economic 
agents, legal entities and public institutions of local importance). The 
time period analysed is 2004–2016 and was divided into three sub- 
periods: 2004–2007 (pre-programming period), 2007–2013 (program-
ming period) and 2014–2016 (post-programming period). We have 
to mention that Romania only started to receive European funds after 
2009 and received some of them after the programming period ended 
(in 2014–2016). Population data were collected from official statis-
tics provided by the National Statistics Institute (http://statistici.insse.
ro/shop/), and official data for own incomes from the Department 
for Fiscal Policy and Local Budgeting within the Ministry of Regional 
Development, Public Administration and European Funds from income 
and expenditure statements at the administrative-territorial unit level 
(http://www.dpfbl.mdrap.ro/sit_ven_si_chelt_uat.html).
4.2  Methodology
The data for each year were collected at NUTS-5 level and aggregated 
at county level. Taking into consideration the way in which the cities 
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were classified for the 2007–2013 programming period, we organised 
the data in three groups of counties (the groups were determined by the 
different types of urban areas in the county that received funding over 
the 2007–2013 programming period from the Regional Operational 
Programme Axis 1): Group 1, representing the growth poles and the 
counties that had growth poles; Group 2, representing the urban devel-
opment poles and the counties that had urban development poles; and 
Group 3, representing urban centres and counties with urban centres. 
Because Bucharest is a much more highly developed municipality than 
the rest of the cities, it was excluded from the analysis in order not to 
distort the results. For each county and for every year of the analysed 
period, we calculated the income disparities among the cities within the 
same county and income disparities between all localities in the county, 
even rural ones, respectively. Furthermore, we conducted two types 
of analysis: (1) comparison between Group 1 (treated ) and the rest of 
the country (Groups 2 and 3—non-treated ); (2) comparison between 
Groups 1 and 2 (treated ) and the rest of the country (Group 3—non-
treated ) in order to assess the changes in disparities during the analysed 
period and draw some conclusions regarding changes in the three differ-
ent sub-periods of time and the effect that the input of European funds 
might have had in this evolution.
Inequalities/disparities were measured using Gini coefficients, which 
were based on own income per capita of localities, as shown in the fol-
lowing formulas:
where k represents the county, t represents the year for which the Gini 
coefficient characterising the county is calculated, nkt represents the 
total number of cities in the county k in year t (usually constant for the 
analysed period), xikt represents own income per capita in year t for city 
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where k represents the county, t represents the year for which the Gini 
coefficient characterising the county is calculated, mkt represents the 
total number of administrative-territorial units in county k in year t 
(usually constant for the analysed period), xikt represents own income 
per capita in year t for locality i in county k.
According to the proposed grouping of the counties k belongs to 
GR1∪GR2∪GR3, where GR1 are those counties which had growth 
poles, GR2 is the group of those counties which had urban development 
poles and GR3 is represented by the rest of the counties. The groups 
{GRi}i=1,3 represent a partition of the total set of counties (except for 
Ilfov county, which includes the city of Bucharest). Nevertheless, if we 
calculated the Gini coefficient of the Ilfov county without considering 
the city of Bucharest, the results did not qualitatively change irrespec-
tive of including this country in the analysis of GR3 or not.
In this chapter we have not considered analysing the amount per 
capita received by different urban areas through the ROP Axis 1. 
Understanding such an influence remains for further research. Our pur-
pose here in partitioning the set of counties was to get a clear picture of 
the way municipalities were treated and how they benefited through the 
ROP.
Both analyses conducted are concerned with the mean comparison of 
disparities between treated and non-treated groups of counties and its 
evolution in time. The names and definitions of the time series inves-
tigated and graphically represented in the next section are relegated to 
Table 1 (see Appendix).
Since one of our aims in this chapter was to understand the time pat-
tern of the difference between the (average) disparities in treated coun-
ties and the (average) disparities in non-treated ones, we also employed 
statistical tests to determine whether, at a specific moment in time, the 
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the two sets of counties (Student’s t-test, or the more general Mann–
Whitney U-test). Moreover, in the spirit of the difference-in-difference 
methodology (DID) we also compared the average change over time in 
the Gini coefficient of the treated group of counties versus the average 
change over time in the Gini coefficient of the non-treated group (the 
two moments in time were usually represented by one year within the 
pre-programming period and another within the post-programming 
period). Detailed results of statistical tests relating to the next section 
are available upon request.
There are certain caveats to the presented methodology: the non-
treated group of counties cannot really be assimilated to a control group 
in a natural experiment, the sizes of the groups of counties are small 
for both parametric and especially non-parametric tests, own income 
per capita should be robustly tested whether representing or not a good 
proxy to measure income inequality between the cities/localities within 
a county, the DID method is subject to certain biases, etc.
Nevertheless, the patterns evidenced by this methodology in the next 
section should be taken into discussion when evaluating whether the 
regional policy has achieved its essential objective, which is the reduc-
tion of regional disparities.
4.3  Main Results of the Evaluation
According to the Final Implementation Report published in March 
2017 by the Management Authority of the 2007–2013 ROP, a total 
sum of EUR 3.97 billion was allocated for the entire programme from 
the European Regional Development Fund and the absorption rate of 
community funds was 93.5%, for implementing 4491 finalised pro-
jects and the creation of 24,994 jobs. When it comes to Priority Axis 
1 (major intervention area 1.1) the situation shows that a total of EUR 
1.05 billion was paid to beneficiaries, of which EUR 770 million came 
from the ERDF, for 505 finalised contracts (the absorption rate from 
the ERDF was 72% of the amount allocated for this axis).
This section presents the main results obtained by applying the above 
methodology in order to see how the disparities within counties changed 
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during 2004–2016 and the degree to which funds of different types, 
allocated through the 2007–2014 ROP, influenced these disparities.
The general picture is shown in Figs. 1–6 in the Appendix. On the 
one hand, Figs. 1 and 2a show for the whole analysed period a decreas-
ing trend in the Gini coefficients for all groups of counties, when the 
measure of inequality is calculated only for the cities within a county. 
However, more careful analysis reveals that the average Gini coeffi-
cient for the counties in GR1 has a sharp decrease (except year 2008) 
until 2009, and then a steady increase until 2014, followed by a slight 
decrease for the years 2015–2016. The average Gini coefficients of 
GR2 and GR3 show an almost continuous decrease during the period 
2004–2016, except for a sharp increase for the years 2010 and 2011. 
The average Gini coefficient of the reunion GR2∪GR3 follows the same 
evolution as each of the individual sets GR2 and GR3 (see Fig. 2a).
On the other hand, Figs. 3 and 4a present the evolution of the aver-
age Gini coefficients for the groups of counties, when the measure of 
inequality is calculated for all localities within a county. In this case the 
evolution is similar for all three groups, the average Gini coefficients 
showing an almost continuous decrease until 2014, except for a slight 
increase for the years 2010 and 2011. There is an abrupt increase in 
2015 for all three groups, followed by a decrease in 2016. The average 
Gini coefficient of the reunion GR2∪GR3 follows the same evolution as 
each of the individual sets GR2 and GR3 (see Fig. 4a).
When analysing the time pattern of the difference between the aver-
age Gini coefficient characterising the counties of GR1 with respect to 
the average Gini coefficient for the rest of the counties, a clear U-shape 
pattern can be identified (see Figs. 2b and 4b, Analysis 1).
In Fig. 2b this pattern means that the counties in GR1 start with 
statistically significant higher Gini coefficients than GR2∪GR3 for 
the pre-programming period (2004–2006), then there are no statis-
tically significant differences between the Gini coefficients for the two 
groups analysed for most of the programming period (2007–2012, 
except the year 2008). The difference sharply increases to positive sta-
tistically significant values for the post-programming period. (The 
significance is based on t-tests and/or Mann–Whitney tests with 
a  p-value < 0.05. See Fay and Proschan (2010) for a comprehensive 
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survey on the ways in which the decision rule and the p-value from 
either test of the two could be associated.) The DID technique proves 
that the difference in the average Gini coefficient between GR1 and 
GR2∪GR3 has returned to the same values in the post-programming 
period as was the case in the pre-programming period. The same quali-
tative view is offered by Fig. 4b, when the Gini coefficients as measures 
of inequality within counties are calculated based on all the localities of 
a county.
Figure 6 (Analysis 2) presents the evolution of the average Gini coef-
ficients when the treated group is GR1∪GR2 compared with change in 
GR3 (considered non-treated). Even with this change in the combina-
tion of groups, the average Gini coefficients follow the pattern already 
evidenced by Fig. 3 (see Fig. 6a), and the difference between the aver-
age Gini coefficients has a U-shape pattern (see Fig. 6b) similar to that 
given earlier in Fig. 4b.
Figure 5 alone does not show the patterns identified. The Gini 
coefficients calculated based on cities within counties move very 
close to each other when averaged for GR3, and GR1∪GR2, 
respectively.
The most important results of our empirical evaluation can be sum-
marised as follows:
a. during the programming period, the group of counties with growth 
poles show a steady increase in those Gini coefficients which are 
based only on cities in the counties;
b. immediately after the programming period, all considered groups of 
counties exhibit a sharp increase in average in those Gini coefficients 
which are based on all localities in the counties;
c. the most stable pattern statistically tested is represented by the 
U-shape difference between the average disparities of treated coun-
ties versus non-treated ones (in both Analysis 1 or 2, irrespective of 
how disparities within a county are calculated). This suggests that the 
programming period is just a transitory period of uniformity between 
treated counties and non-treated counties in terms of disparities. 
Whenever inequality rises again (after the programming period), 
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the treated group of counties always increases more rapidly than the 
non-treated counties.
5  Regional Policy and Growth Pole  
Strategy Between 2014 and 2020
The Partnership Agreement of Romania to the European Commission 
identifies the following challenges: poor competitiveness, high and 
rising social inequalities, underdevelopment of transportation and 
communication infrastructure, low energy efficiency, significant envi-
ronmental risks and low administrative capacity. They do not differ 
from the goals of the previous programming period: catching up with 
the EU average and increasing the employment rate. This is by no 
means surprising, since the biggest delays have been registered in these 
two sectors and the rate of employment is closely linked to productivity 
(Benedek 2016).
Of the European Union’s seven-year budget for 2014–2020, 
Romania will receive resources amounting to 21.826 billion euros, 
which should sustain the goals of the EU’s Cohesion and Rural 
Development Policies, helping Romania and its regions to catch up 
with the EU average, as well as improving the competitiveness of agri-
culture and the retention rate of rural areas.
For the 2014–2020 programming period, approximately the same 
amount will be allocated for sustainable urban development (Priority 
Axis 4 of the new ROP set at EUR 1.39 billion, of which EUR 1.18 
billion came from European Structural and Investment Funds) as in the 
previous period (Priority Axis 1 set at EUR 1.35 billion, of which EUR 
1.08 billion came from Structural Funds). Of the various regional prob-
lems the growth pole strategy was initially set up to address (depressed-
area revival, regional deconcentration of population and economy, 
equilibration of the national urban system, etc.) the pursuit of interre-
gional balance and the reduction of regional disparities therefore rep-
resent the prevailing goals of implementing the growth pole concept in 
the Romanian context.
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Considering increasing criticism of concentrating public 
resources in a small number of growth poles in the 2007–2013 
programming period, the Romanian Regional Development 
Strategy for the 2014–2020 cycle proposes a new approach, in 
which more attention is given to medium-size cities, especially 
the ones with the capacity to spread growth in their surroundings 
(Benedek and Cristea 2014).
To this end a new urban ranking methodology has been proposed 
by the Romanian Ministry of Regional Development and Public 
Administration for the 2014–2020 ROP. While the initial proposal was 
based on demographic, economic, accessibility and geographic criteria, 
the final outcome reflects rather a simplistic view: all county seats will 
function as growth poles (39 county seats), except Tulcea, which will 
benefit from the Danube Delta Integrated Territorial Investment instru-
ment and the municipality of Bucharest, which is the country capital 
and is considered a more developed region at the EU level, its GDP/
capita surpassing the EU average.
These county seats are eligible for funding under Axis 4 “Support 
sustainable urban development” of the 2014–2020 ROP. Main pri-
ority investments refer to: public transport based on Sustainable 
Urban Mobility Plans (roads, bike paths, acquisition of green/elec-
tric vehicles, etc.), rehabilitation of urban areas (brownfield rede-
velopment, etc.), urban marginalised communities (educational, 
cultural, and recreational facilities, green areas, public squares, 
parks, urban streets, and small-scale public utilities) and educational 
infrastructure (nurseries, kindergartens, technical and professional 
high-schools).
As a prerequisite for obtaining funds through Axis 4 of the new ROP, 
the 39 county seats must put together an integrated urban develop-
ment strategy at the administrative territorial unit level or the functional 
urban zone level of the county capital. The strategy should address the 
economic, environmental, climate, social and demographic challenges of 
the city (according to Art. 7 of the ERDF Regulation No. 1301/2013). 
Another novelty in the institutional framework, as specified in Art. 
8 Urban Growth Pole Policy and Regional Development …     187
7 of the Regulation (EU) No. 1301/2013 of the European Regional 
Development Fund, is the requirement to appoint an “urban authority”. 
These institutions will be established at the county seat level by order 
of the mayor and act as Intermediate Bodies. The Managing Authority 
of the ROP will task them with for selecting the priority list of projects 
to be financed by the Priority Axis 4 of the 2014–2020 ROP and other 
axes of the ROP, including those which could be funded from other 
sources (other operational programmes, local budget, national budget, 
etc.).
6  Conclusions
During the transition period, Romania has rapidly adopted the 
European mainstream discourse on polycentric regional development. 
Urban growth poles have been defined as main tools in achieving equil-
ibrated spatial development. Classifying the growth pole concept as part 
of the national urban system represents a specific feature of Romanian 
planning. Unfortunately, this could have contributed to the widening of 
regional inequalities. Our empirical analysis suggests that by proceeding 
in this way the national regional policy might have failed to achieve its 
main goal: to reduce regional differences at the development level in the 
medium or long run.
There are other instances of growth pole strategies that present sim-
ilar stumbling blocks to those in Romania. For example, in the case of 
Greece (Christofakis and Papadaskalopoulos 2011) critics have focused 
on such aspects as: the absence of a fixed and long-term typology of 
urban centres, the lack of empirical studies on the growth potential 
of designated cities, the absence of additional sectoral policies sup-
porting the growth pole strategy (transportation policy, mobility 
policy, etc.), urban governance difficulties, absence of integrated devel-
opment plans.
Urban agglomerations in general and growth poles in particular 
took centre stage in the current programming period. However, as an 
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indirect recognition of the fact that the high prioritisation of urban 
growth poles development in the previous programming period might 
have increased the level of regional disparities in Romania, the actual 
plans expanded the number of growth poles. They included one 
growth pole for each county (NUTS 3 level), namely their admin-
istrative centres. In this way, it is expected that the allocation of dif-
ferent financial instruments to support these new spatial planning 
categories could be a powerful instrument for the reduction of regional 
disparities.
The introduction of the growth pole concept in Romania can be con-
sidered a good example of the Europeanisation process. Nevertheless, 
the general guidelines and principles of European spatial planning doc-
uments have not been accounted for in a critical way.
The main scientific contribution of this chapter lies in its empirical 
demonstration of the medium and long run failure of regional policy 
in achieving its essential objective: the reduction of disparities between 
different regions/counties.
Indeed, our results show that, irrespective of whether just the cities or 
all the localities are considered in the calculation of within county ine-
qualities, there is a decreasing trend in disparities within counties along 
the analysed period. Even so, when looking at different sub-periods 
of time, it is noticeable that on average the disparities between cities 
within a county which has a growth pole slowly increased during most 
parts of the programming period.
Furthermore, analysis of the time pattern of disparities between 
counties with growth poles (or with urban development centres) 
and the rest of the counties showed that, for the post-programming 
period, the former group (treated ones) exhibits a higher pace of 
re-increasing inequalities within a county than the latter group (non-
treated ones). With its focus on sustaining large urban agglomerations, 
regional policies in Romania do not seem to have a medium- or long-
term effect on reducing inequalities within those counties compris-
ing large urban centres. This adds some new arguments to re-thinking 
spatial policies in Europe in times of increasing local and regional 
polarisation.
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Our future work will look at the influence that funds from ROP 
Axis 1 have on the different urban areas. We also want to include 
the municipality of Bucharest in the analysis, investigate the driv-
ing role Bucharest and Ilfov play in regional polarisation, as well as 
whether the regional policies applied to Romania are able to influ-
ence this process. The third direction is to compare treated cities with 
non-treated localities (cities and rural areas) without aggregation at the 
county level.
Appendix: Tables and Figures
See Table 1 and Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
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Fig. 1 Evolution in time of average Gini coefficients for all three groups of 
counties (Gini coefficients are based only on disparities between the cities of a 
county)
Fig. 2 (Analysis 1): a Evolution in time of average Gini coefficients for GR1 
(treated ) and GR2∪GR3 (non-treated ), respectively. b Evolution in time of the 
difference between the average Gini coefficients of the treated versus non-
treated groups of counties (Gini coefficients are based only on disparities 
between the cities of a county)
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Fig. 3 Evolution in time of average Gini coefficients for all three groups of 
counties (Gini coefficients are based on disparities between all localities of a 
county)
Fig. 4 (Analysis 1): a Evolution in time of average Gini coefficients for GR1 
(treated ) and GR2∪GR3 (non-treated ), respectively. b Evolution in time of the 
difference between the average Gini coefficients of the treated versus non-
treated groups of counties (Gini coefficients are based on disparities between all 
localities of a county)
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Fig. 5 (Analysis 2): a Evolution in time of average Gini coefficients for GR1∪GR2 
(treated ) and GR3 (non-treated ), respectively. b Evolution in time of the differ-
ence between the average Gini coefficients of the treated versus non-treated 
groups of counties (Gini coefficients are based only on disparities between the 
cities of a county)
Fig. 6 (Analysis 2): a Evolution in time of average Gini coefficients for GR1∪GR2 
(treated ) and GR3 (non-treated ), respectively. b Evolution in time of the differ-
ence between the average Gini coefficients of the treated versus non-treated 
groups of counties (Gini coefficients are based on disparities between all 
 localities of a county)
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The increasing role of finance is central to the current transformations 
of capitalism, with a globally growing amount of money looking for 
profitable forms of investment (Fernandez and Aalbers 2016). This 
search for a financial fix systematically channels money towards the 
built environment—and in certain contexts specifically towards hous-
ing (Aalbers 2017). In order to grasp this inherently spatial nature of 
financialisation (Sokol 2013), we build on the notion of uneven devel-
opment. Recent work in the field of economic geography aiming to 
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reconceptualise this approach has put specific emphasis on understand-
ing the concrete institutional mechanisms that produce socio-spatial 
unevenness on various scales (Dunford and Liu 2017; Hudson 2016; 
Peck 2016). Common to these propositions is the claim that capital-
ism should be understood as one interconnected and hierarchically 
structured system; however, empirical emphasis should be put on the 
intermediary scales of institutional infrastructures, policy developments, 
firm strategies and subnational spatial patterns in order to understand 
the mechanisms producing uneven development in a such a varied way. 
Thus, we approach the issue of spatial polarisation through the perspec-
tive of uneven development, since we believe this notion gives us more 
scope to understand the production of socio-spatial inequality as a mul-
tiscalar and non-linear process. Furthermore, we work with this notion 
because we seek to link our analysis to a body of literature analysing the 
spatiality of capitalism.
In this chapter, we analyse the development of Hungarian housing 
policies since the turn of the millennium, investigating how policy inter-
ventions reinforce and support the rolling out of uneven socio-spatial 
development in the field of housing. Housing is an important spatial 
fix under financial capitalism everywhere in the world; however, the 
concrete ways in which this is articulated vary across different institu-
tional contexts. We investigate the Hungarian institutional context as 
situated in a broader, European and global set of hierarchical, inter-
dependent connections. We believe this approach provides useful 
insights for understanding how policy interventions can channel mac-
roeconomic pressures in a semiperipheral context of the European (and 
global) economy.
We will not only highlight the role of housing-as-investment, but will 
also link seemingly more progressive and socially sensitive housing pol-
icies to the broader frame of housing under a financialised regime of 
accumulation. Analysing this branch of policies provides insights into 
how the state manages spatially concentrated social deprivation in a 
country with a very minimal share of social/public housing—which is 
the case for the majority of the Central and Eastern European member 
states, as well as most countries outside the European Union.
9 Reproducing Socio-Spatial Unevenness …     199
The starting point of our argument is that Hungarian housing poli-
cies are essentially dualised. By dualisation we mean that in a generally 
fragmented policy arena—since 1989 there has never been a coher-
ent housing policy in Hungary—most individual policy measures 
intervening in the field of housing either target the relatively well-off 
upper classes (although claiming to be general in their scope), or very 
marginalised social groups. The former aim to integrate middle-class 
households in a financialised housing regime based on individual own-
ership and debt, while the latter aim to manage and contain spatially 
concentrated manifestations of housing poverty. We will call these two 
approaches the liberal and social facets of housing policies. While these 
policies at the “top” and at the “bottom” of the housing sector are seem-
ingly separate interventions and are never connected narratively by gov-
ernment actors, in our view they are functionally interconnected and 
should thus be analysed in a holistic manner. This functional intercon-
nection is the most evident when we employ the framework of uneven 
development. Accepting the claim that global capitalism systematically 
produces socio-spatial polarisation, we will show how this happens in 
the field of housing in Hungary through the mediation of certain insti-
tutional logics. While dominant (neoliberal) approaches to housing pol-
icy are usually planned and executed without reference to their spatial 
dimension and are claimed to benefit households in a general way, we 
will demonstrate how they actually reproduce socio-spatial unevenness.
Even though our argument will be rooted in different empirical pro-
cesses, the main goal of this chapter is to reconstruct the institutional 
logics behind these spatialities, and not to provide an exhaustive pic-
ture of all the empirical aspects of capitalist uneven development in the 
domain of housing in Hungary.
This study can also provide valuable insights into more general ques-
tions about the spatiality of policy intervention in housing under the 
current wave of financial capitalism. The two modes of intervention 
which we study adhere to general directions of housing policy devel-
opment throughout Europe. The dominant model for housing pro-
vision in all European countries (and also globally) is to push for 
indebtedness-based individual homeownership, while marginalised 
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social groups living in an increasingly residualised social housing sector 
are targeted by narrowly focused and often controlling public interven-
tions (Czischke 2009). Furthermore, the vulnerable housing finance 
system that has developed in Hungary since the late 1990s, based on 
an externally dependent banking sector, short-term financial resources 
and individual mortgages (Raviv 2008) is quite typical for all Central 
and Eastern European countries—although historical and institu-
tional differences are crucial (Bohle 2017). Similarly, the significant 
role of EU funds in targeting those living in deprived housing condi-
tions is also quite typical for the region.1 Thus, our analysis can con-
tribute to a better understanding of variations in Central and Eastern 
European housing policy, while proposing a more systemic framework 
of macroeconomic processes driving these contextually specific policy 
interventions.
The empirical basis of this chapter is anchored in two lots of doctoral 
fieldwork. Pósfai has been focusing on core-periphery relations embed-
ded in the strategies of housing market actors in Hungary (within the 
framework of the Marie Curie ITN “RegPol2—Socio-economic and 
Political Responses to Regional Polarisation in Central and Eastern 
Europe”), while Jelinek has been working on the history of urban reha-
bilitations in Hungary from the 1970s (at the Department for Sociology 
and Social Anthropology of the Central European University). Both 
researches deployed a mixed methodology: qualitative insights from 
interviews with the main stakeholders and ethnographic observations 
of certain key projects were coupled with macrostatistical analyses and 
with the scrutiny of policy documents and plans. Since the main aim of 
this chapter is to reconstruct certain institutional logics behind the gen-
eral trend of uneven development, it will mainly be the interviews con-
ducted during these researches that provide the empirical backbone of 
our argument. While our understanding of the liberal and social facets 
of housing policies in Hungary were also informed by quantitative data 
and document analyses, we will restrict ourselves to the presentation of 
our most important qualitative findings (occasionally referencing some 
of our own prior publications using related quantitative data) due to the 
limited space we have.
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In this chapter we will thus argue that state intervention in the 
Hungarian housing market is dualistic, with seemingly disconnected 
policy instruments targeting two ends of the housing spectrum. While 
the dominant trajectory of neoliberal housing policy in Hungary is to 
promote indebtedness-based individual homeownership, spatially tar-
geted, small-scale and localised interventions in the public housing 
stock are meant to correct the exclusionary processes produced by this 
trajectory, but their effectiveness is highly questionable. State inter-
vention thus reinforces spatial patterns of capitalist development and 
deepens unevenness of the housing market, while seemingly applying 
“patches” to the areas that are the most obvious losers of this process.
2  The Liberal Facet of Housing Policies2
The declared aim of Hungarian housing policy is to promote individual 
homeownership (Misetics 2017). This has been the very clear political 
preference of all governments ever since the 1980s, and in the current 
conservative government this ideology of homeownership is reputed to 
be unquestionable at the level of the prime minister himself. According 
to a high-ranking official in the public administration, “the definition 
of Hungarian housing policy is actually just different forms of subsidies 
to homeownership”.3 This conservative political preference is of course 
well in line with and not independent of broader economic processes 
and general tendencies of liberal housing policies across Europe, which 
all promote similar aims (Fernandez and Aalbers 2016). Although 
in this sense the Hungarian housing regime follows the common 
European (and global) trajectory of housing financialisation described 
by Fernandez and Aalbers (2016), the concrete ways in which capital 
is channelled into the housing market are determined by the specific 
instruments employed.
In the following section we will explore the socio-spatial effects 
of two of the most important housing policy instruments of the past 
decades, which were implemented in order to serve the political aim 
of access to homeownership: (1) a non-refundable state subsidy allo-
cated to families mainly based on the number of children they have 
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(previously called szocpol, now called CSOK), and (2) state-subsidised 
mortgages. These two instruments have shifted in their significance vis-
à-vis each other, and also in their target groups and budgetary weight, 
but in essence have not changed. Both instruments declaratively serve 
access to individual homeownership, which is the dominant form of 
tenure in Hungary (owner occupancy is currently around 90%). Given 
the political priority of this aim, these instruments are also the ones 
that receive the most budgetary support. In 2005, for instance, budg-
etary resources supporting access to homeownership represented nearly 
95% of all public spending for housing purposes, and this proportion 
was never less than 85% during the whole pre-crisis decade (Misetics 
2013, 52). They are articulations of a liberal housing policy at the ser-
vice of economic actors in the field, and favouring those households 
that have significant savings, while also pushing for the privatisation of 
 housing-related risks through individual indebtedness (Crouch 2009). 
We will show how these instruments, in spite of being presented as a 
generalised housing support to the whole of Hungarian society, framed 
along the lines of demographics and conservative family politics, are 
actually channelling resources towards the middle classes (to the detri-
ment of lower social classes), and are also contributing to increasing spa-
tial unevenness.
The first instrument of the liberal facet of housing policy is a state 
subsidy supporting access to homeownership, which has been in place 
since 1994 (with a few years’ gap after 2009). Concrete allocation 
criteria have changed throughout the years, but it has always been 
framed as a demographic/social policy tool (for a long time it was 
also called the “social policy benefit”—szociálpolitikai kedvezmény, 
nicknamed szocpol ) allocated according to the number of children 
in a family. Since the early 2000s this has been complemented by 
the second main instrument of access to homeownership: mortgage 
lending. Mortgage lending was kick-started by the introduction of a state- 
subsidised mortgage programme in 2001, and then expanded very 
rapidly until 2010: there was a 35-fold increase in the stock of out-
standing mortgages between 2000 and 2010 (Hegedüs and Somogyi 
2016). The subsidised mortgage programme was stopped in 2004, but 
by then the liberalisation of the banking sector made the widespread 
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distribution of cheap mortgages denominated in foreign currencies pos-
sible (Pósfai et al. 2018).
Both “strands” are highly publicised housing policy initiatives, 
but are rarely linked in public discourse. However, they are mutually 
dependent on each other: the non-refundable housing allocation dis-
tributed on a “demographic” basis (szocpol ) is rarely sufficient in itself 
for acquiring property, and its efficiency is thus largely dependent on 
the availability of mortgages (or significant household savings). On the 
other hand, many households would not have the necessary capital for 
their downpayment for a mortgage without the non-refundable housing 
allocation. Thus, the latter is practically often used as a tool for capi-
talising otherwise not creditworthy households. This complementarity 
is well observed in the current situation, where a new wave of housing 
subsidies (this time called the “allocation for the home creation of fami-
lies”; családok otthonteremtési kedvezménye, or CSOK) was introduced at 
the beginning of 2016 in a context of historically low interest rates, and 
coupled with an impressive decrease (from 27 to 5%) of VAT on new 
housing construction. Currently, 80% of households receiving CSOK 
also have a mortgage: thus, although the family-based housing subsidy 
is framed as an instrument supporting deserving, employed, child- 
bearing Hungarian families, it actually becomes a tool catalysing further 
household indebtedness.4 Furthermore, the current housing subsidy 
(CSOK) has a few notable changes compared to its predecessor (szocpol ) 
that orient it even more towards new construction and towards house-
holds of higher social status. The latter can be achieved by cancelling 
the maximum value of real estate the subsidy can be used for, as well as 
through stricter employment and income criteria for the beneficiaries. 
As a result, the circle of households who can access this subsidy is nar-
rower.5 A project done by an NGO working in a poor and segregated 
Roma community demonstrated how families living in housing poverty 
have no possibility to benefit from this housing allocation.6
In the liberal facet of Hungarian housing policy, the government 
claims that it does not wish to intervene in or “distort” market pro-
cesses,7 and strongly relies on an agenda of privatising risks, costs and 
also operative management of housing provision. This privatisation of 
housing provision goes two ways: primarily, it means a strong reliance 
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on individual resources of households (the notion of “self-reliance” or 
“self-care”—öngondoskodás is absolutely central in government commu-
nication) through intergenerational transfers, private individual con-
struction and individual indebtedness.8 The other aspect of privatised 
housing provision is to economic actors. The role of economic actors, 
mainly banks involved in housing finance, is crucial from the concep-
tion to the implementation of housing policy. Since the above-described 
instruments are individually allocated financial transfers, financial insti-
tutions have become front-desk operators of housing policy in Hungary. 
This means that their role is crucial in consultation processes leading 
up to the definition of policies, and also that they are the institutions 
managing the implementation of housing policy. This strategy of priva-
tising implementation is particularly important for Hungarian decision- 
makers, who—in line with the liberal idea of self-reliance—do not wish 
to sustain a public apparatus in this sector.9
This neoliberal housing policy, which dominantly relies on a credit- 
based access to homeownership, is inherently polarising both socially 
and spatially. A credit-based housing finance system necessarily benefits 
households that have a higher wealth and income status. In their case a 
mortgage can act as an effective means of leverage in the process of indi-
vidual wealth accumulation. This becomes particularly important in the 
context of a society where inheritance and inter-generational transfers 
play a crucial role in access to housing. Credit lending policies of finan-
cial institutions are constructed in a way to favour clients with more 
reliable economic indicators, thus better-off households will receive 
credit with much better underwriting criteria.10 Policy instruments 
focusing on subsidising the cost of credit are thus disproportionally 
channelled to middle-class households (Hegedüs 2006) and to econom-
ically more prosperous geographical areas. A housing finance system 
based on individual credit (and additionally channelling state subsidies 
into property acquisition without any concern for affordability) will 
necessarily be translated into house price hikes very quickly. Current 
house price increases mainly affect core urban housing markets, which 
are already under pressure, reinforcing existing spatial unevenness.
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The selectivity of credit distribution is also true in a spatial sense; 
meaning that it is more difficult to secure external financing for 
housing in smaller or economically worse off localities. The spatial 
patterns of the Hungarian housing market in the past three decades 
have largely been determined by the mortgage lending policies of 
financial institutions. The dominant tendencies can be grasped by the 
dual, polarising terms of financial overinclusion and redlining (Aalbers 
2008). These notions allow us to grasp the dual pattern of homoge-
nisation and differentiation inherent to uneven spatial development. 
The former is a pattern of including social and geographical entities 
which were previously excluded from financial services. However, in 
the mid-and long term, this inclusion also creates the vehicle which 
allows for the extraction of resources from these more peripheral/mar-
ginal spaces and social groups. Consequently, a new wave of spatial 
(known as redlining) and social exclusion follows, as a strategy of risk 
management for the stakeholders involved in the process. The geogra-
phy of overinclusion and redlining largely overlap (Aalbers 2008). The 
story of Hungarian mortgage lending is well described in this logic. 
In the period preceding the financial crisis, mortgage lending rapidly 
rolled out in Hungary as the main tool of access to housing. This was 
supported by the two main policy instruments we identify as con-
stituting the liberal facet of Hungarian housing policy: family-based 
housing allocation and the state-subsidised mortgage programme. 
From 2000 to roughly 2008–2010 ever broader social and spatial seg-
ments were included in mortgage lending. The market incentives of 
financial institutions, the social need generated by the lack of other 
channels of access to housing, and the progressively relaxed criteria for 
access to state subsidies reinforced each other in this process. During 
this period, mortgages were granted to households with weaker 
repayment capacities, or in localities that later proved to be immo-
bile in terms of housing market activity. When the financial crisis hit 
Hungary, a social crisis of over-indebtedness, as well as a geography of 
financial overinclusion emerged (Bohle 2013).
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What we call the geography of financial overinclusion are the areas 
where housing markets were most direly affected by the financial cri-
sis. These are areas where house prices dropped the most significantly 
and default on mortgage payments represented a serious social issue. In 
these areas housing markets are—up until today—dominated by the 
sale of properties serving as collateral for non-performing mortgages.11 
Following the crisis, banks in Hungary introduced much stricter redlin-
ing policies, excluding certain geographical localities from their mort-
gage lending. Although this would need further empirical investigation, 
our initial analysis suggests that the geography of previous financial 
overinclusion and post-crisis geographies of redlining largely overlap.12 
This is also a consequence of the fact that redlining lists are (among 
other things) constructed based on employment and housing transac-
tion statistics.
How does this geography of mortgage lending link up to the hous-
ing policy instruments described above? According to data provided by 
one of the most important banks in Hungary, the housing allocation 
provided to families (szocpol ) was proportionally much more important 
in villages and smaller cities in the years before the crisis.13 Currently, 
after one and a half years of the “new” type of family housing alloca-
tion (CSOK; introduced in early 2016) we can say that the narrower 
socio-spatial focus of the current subsidy is clear compared to the 
pre-crisis period: villages are now receiving much less of this allocation, 
and the main beneficiaries are “intermediary” urban areas that have 
somewhat lower house prices.14
We can broadly identify (mainly based on evidence from interviews 
conducted with housing market actors in various locations) three typi-
cal geographies produced by Hungarian liberal housing policies. On the 
one hand, the core (most central) areas are the ones where capital (both 
mortgages and state subsidies) is concentrated in periods of crisis, and 
which are the primary beneficiaries of re-launching the housing mar-
ket. The controversy is that these areas would have prospering housing 
market activity even without any state subsidies. However, since these 
subsidies are not tied to any income restrictions, nor are they spatially 
targeted, eligible households often use them in these “core” locations as 
a supplement to their investment.
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Secondly, the areas which are the most affected by government hous-
ing policies and where non-refundable subsidies used to access home-
ownership have the strongest effect are the spaces which we coin as the 
“peripheries of cores”. Concretely, these mean the immediate agglomer-
ation area of Budapest, or major secondary cities and their immediate 
outskirts. These are places which are not excluded by banks’ redlining 
policies, and where households can strike a manageable balance between 
housing affordability and access to employment. In these areas, the pro-
portion of households benefiting from the non-refundable housing sub-
sidies is extremely high (in some places 80–90% of all transactions). 
Often, these households would not have sufficient savings to acquire 
a mortgage without the state subsidy. Thus, liberal housing policies 
have the most direct effect on these “intermediary” housing markets. 
Furthermore, these are the spaces where subsequent waves of government 
housing policy have left their trace in a superimposed way, and which 
become key areas for housing mobility and geographical mobility as well. 
For instance, families acquiring property in the suburbs of certain major 
second-tier cities (e.g. Debrecen) during the mortgage boom of the early 
2000s can now often benefit from the new housing allocation in their 
own trajectory of housing mobility, investing in the centre of the city. 
Housing markets of specific cities or agglomeration areas (e.g. the imme-
diate eastern suburbs of Budapest) where the majority of housing trans-
actions were previously realised with cheap mortgages (either subsidised 
or foreign currency mortgages) are also currently being mobilised by the 
new wave of public subsidies after years of immobility.
The third geography we identify is that of peripheralised housing 
markets. These are places which may have shown some housing mar-
ket activity in the most expansive phase of mortgage lending, but which 
experienced dropping house prices and a completely frozen housing 
market in recent years. In these areas house prices are so low that the 
family-based housing subsidy can be sufficient in itself for buying prop-
erty, often pushing non-creditworthy households to buy here. Before the 
crisis this was a quite widespread practice and led to situations of segre-
gation and blocked mobility (families being trapped in the bad quality 
housing they could acquire this way), increasing socio-spatial uneven-
ness. Currently, due to stricter rules of access, this usage of the subsidy 
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is less common/not possible on a wide scale. Furthermore, within these 
peripheralised spaces there are also certain localities (most notably small 
villages of the eastern and southern peripheries) which have been contin-
uously declining since the early 1990s. The spatial marginality produced 
by structural processes of economic transformation has been reinforced 
by the above-described processes of the housing market.
Since 2010, the government has introduced a number of measures 
aimed at handling the social and economic crisis of defaulting mort-
gages. As a result, access to credit has become much more restricted (both 
socially and spatially), and the housing market is becoming even more 
unequal. Having “learned the lesson” that financial overinclusion induces 
crisis, there was an aggressive political discourse of anti-liberalism and 
stricter regulation in relation to housing finance between 2010 and 2015. 
However, it is important to see how this anti-liberalism remains to be a 
political rhetoric, since the fundamental elements of a financialised hous-
ing regime are currently being quite efficiently reconstructed. From 2015 
onwards, the previous family-based housing allocation was rebranded as 
“CSOK” and mortgage lending started to be promoted again. The dis-
course supporting this new rollout of the same liberal housing finance 
system is that this time house price increases are supported by economic 
growth, mortgage lending is prudent and regulated, and the housing 
market is experiencing a healthy recovery, without any bubbles burst-
ing. All actors are aiming to prove that they will not commit the same 
“mistake” again. However, looking at the socio-economic reality behind 
this political narrative shows that it is fragile from several points of view. 
At the moment housing finance institutions can profitably function 
while targeting only a more restricted pool of customers. In the mean-
time, no other, radically different housing finance instruments have been 
introduced, there is thus an increasing share of Hungarian society who 
simply do not have access to any channels of housing finance. This will 
likely result in increasing social pressure generated from below, which 
will meet the financial institutions’ incentive for market expansion once 
their current market is saturated. In the absence of other policy meas-
ures, this could lead to similar patterns of financial overinclusion as 
before the crisis (if current regulations are relaxed in response to these 
pressures). A further limitation is that household savings currently being 
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channelled into housing will diminish if there is no significant increase in 
wage levels (which could lead to increased savings). This, along with the 
persistent lack of long-term financial resources in the Hungarian bank-
ing sector (Gál 2014), means that in the long term, financial resources 
for this model of privatised housing provision risk drying up—both 
on a household and on a corporate scale. Thus, although the declared 
objectives of these liberal housing policy instruments are demographic 
and economic growth, we can see how the socio-spatial unevenness pro-
duced as a consequence is not incidental, but incremental to this policy 
approach to housing.
3  The Social Facet of Housing Policy
Even though the dominant, albeit not necessarily explicit principle of 
Hungarian housing policy is a primarily liberal one, it has always been 
coupled with a social facet, which supposedly had to manage the neg-
ative consequences of uneven development. From a spatial perspec-
tive the function of the social facet has been to contain the tensions in 
those marginal and peripheral spaces, which are never reached by lib-
eral interventions. Within this supposedly socially sensitive domain of 
housing interventions we can differentiate between two different types 
of institutional logics. One (1) is the logic of the ever more paternalis-
ing welfare benefits connected to housing-related problems, while the 
other (2) is the “project society” (Sampson 2002) logic of territorially 
focused, integrated interventions. While the former logic is the prod-
uct of regime change, the latter is shaped by the Europeanisation of 
Hungary: the emergence of the idea of “integrated social urban rehabil-
itations” is tightly connected to Western European impacts and to the 
mainstreaming of urban policy within the EU (cf. Piattoni and Polverari 
2016, 413–26). Moreover, and probably more importantly, such terri-
torially focused and supposedly socially sensitive public investments 
are funded almost exclusively by the Structural Funds of the European 
Union. Thus when analysing the social facet of fragmented housing pol-
icies in Hungary, we should pay attention to the functional intercon-
nection and the changing relation of these two types of logics.
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The welfare type of intervention was codified in 1993 by the new 
Act on Social Policy. The basic logic of this intervention—called “hous-
ing maintenance benefit” (lakásfenntartási támogatás )—was that local 
governments could support those families that have housing-related 
difficulties. The exact amount and the details of targeting were deter-
mined by local governments, but research has shown that generally these 
benefits did not necessarily reach either socially or spatially the poorest 
households (Misetics 2017; Havasi 2005, 77). Even if they reached peo-
ple living in housing poverty, the amount of the benefit was extremely 
low (Misetics 2013). In 2004 there was a reform, and the amount of 
the benefit was nominally doubled (in real terms the average amount of 
the benefit did not change substantially between 1995 and 2014). At its 
peak, around 2011, more than half a million households got this bene-
fit, but its average amount was no more than 15 EUR (Misetics 2013).
All in all, the “housing maintenance benefit” was neither a political 
priority, nor an effective policy tool. For example in 2009 the govern-
ment spent 17.7 billion HUF on them, while they spent 10 times as 
much on measures supporting homeownership (Misetics 2013, 52). In 
sum, housing benefits followed a similar logic to welfare benefits in gen-
eral after 1989. Instead of helping to ameliorate poverty and decrease 
polarisation that were catalysed by the liberalising reforms of the 1990s, 
they solidified the boundaries of a sort of “welfare prison”, in which 
poor people are trapped and controlled by welfare institutions, instead 
of being helped to live in dignity (Szalai 2007). As Szalai states, a deeply 
divided institutional framework emerged, where on the one side there 
were non-supported citizens successful in the liberal market processes, 
and on the other side there were the needy who had fallen into the trap 
of the ghettoised welfare sub-system. Both socially and spatially the 
dualisation of society—into the well-off and poor groups—was prob-
ably slightly slowed down by benefits similar to housing maintenance 
benefit, but definitely not stopped. The proof of this is the emergence 
of segregated large-scale rural spaces (Virág 2010) and pockets of urban 
poverty (Ladányi 2008; Ladányi and Virág 2009) in the post-1989 
period, where people live in segregation, in very bad quality buildings 
and without the hope of entering the world of formal labour.
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Moreover, after the landslide victory of right-wing Fidesz in 2010, 
resulting in the party’s constitutional majority in parliament, the situ-
ation got even worse for poor people. A recently published overview of 
social policies in Hungary showed that since 2010—for the first time in 
the post-1989 history of Hungary—a coherent social vision has been 
carried out, which systematically contributes to the social and spatial 
polarisation of society (Ferge 2017). Fidesz explicitly supports the shift 
from welfare to workfare, which meant for example the suspension of 
centrally financed “housing maintenance benefits” (Misetics 2017). 
Now it is up to local governments whether they allocate resources for 
such issues or not—and it seems that this worsened the situation of 
those living in housing poverty (Kováts 2016).15 The criteria for allo-
cating the benefit again is up to local governments, and may contain 
elements such as “a clean and orderly living environment”, which results 
in growing dependence and exposure of the needy to the local authori-
ties. Local politicians, street-level bureaucrats and social workers became 
those proxy actors, who on the one hand suffer—both professionally 
and personally—from austerity measures that characterise the shift from 
welfare to workfare, and on the other hand manage and contain the 
frustration of citizens trapped in poverty. Amidst a general societal cri-
sis the housing crisis is deepening (Udvarhelyi 2014), and geographical 
unevenness is on the rise (Koós and Virág 2010), while the only cen-
trally allocated housing-related benefit targeting people living in poverty 
was suspended.
At the same time, from the early 2000s another type of intervention 
into housing took shape: EU-funded territorial investments. The logic of 
these types of investments has been to delineate an “action area” and to 
concentrate various types of resources within an intensive project. The 
keyword for such projects is that the interventions must be “integrated”. 
This means that various types of activities should be mixed, most nota-
bly hard and soft elements. In other words, infrastructural interven-
tions (renovating residential buildings or flats, renewing public spaces 
or public buildings, building communal spaces, etc.) should be mixed 
with social and educational interventions (vocational training, inten-
sive social work, supporting job finding, childcare, crime prevention, 
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health-related programmes, etc.). Geographically all these interventions 
must be carried out in an “action area”, which supposedly secures com-
plex treatment of the complex problems identified during planning. In 
order to delineate an action area, it must fulfil certain statistical criteria: 
the segregation index should be above a certain value. Currently the seg-
regation index is the proportion of people without a formal wage and 
who had undergone maximum primary education in the 15- to 59-year-
old population of a given territory, and a territory counts as a “segre-
gated area” if this index is above 35%. According to a recent study 3% 
of the population of Hungary, ca. 300,000 people, live in such segre-
gated residential areas (Koltai 2014, 52). 60% of these areas are in small 
settlements, the remaining 40% are in cities, but only 2% of them are 
in Budapest (Domokos and Herczeg 2010, 89); thus unlike in Western 
Europe, these segregated slums are dominantly located in rural settings.
Between 2007 and 2013 ca. 195 billion HUF (667 million EUR in 
2013 prices) were jointly allocated for territorially focused interven-
tions in Hungary, which is almost the same amount that the govern-
ment spent yearly in this period on liberal housing related measures. 
However, this amount was divided into three main types of activities 
for dozens of different causes during the programming period: “func-
tion enhancing urban rehabilitation” (140 billion HUF), “social urban 
rehabilitation” (48 billion HUF) and “slum elimination” projects (ca. 11 
billion HUF) (Koltai 2014; Terra Studió Kft. 2017). The first of these 
lies outside the scope of this chapter, as it focused on urban centres, 
without any social criteria. However, taking into account the experience 
of similar projects before 2007, it is very likely that these projects con-
tributed to gentrification and displacement in urban downtowns (Nagy 
and Timár 2007; Somogyi et al. 2007), and thus generally they also 
contributed to the production of unevenness.
The second, “social urban rehabilitation” was introduced in 
order to prevent the negative social effects of rehabilitation-induced 
displacement and polarisation. Only segregated areas could be deline-
ated as action areas, and there were dozens of projects in this period in 
locations where formerly no public investment took place for decades. 
While this could be a progressive step against uneven develop-
ment, it seems that many projects were controversial in spite of their 
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explicit socially sensitive framing. One type of controversy is rooted in 
the project logic of these interventions: local governments often sus-
pend the management of activities after the project is closed, because 
their lack of commitment to the goals of projects makes them see 
these investments as “financially unsustainable”. As the bottom line 
of social urban rehabilitations would be to provide complex social ser-
vices and physical upgrading for mid- or long-term periods, often the 
rapid abandonment of activities results in the disillusionment of the 
residents. Another type of controversy is induced by the structural sit-
uation of local governments, who are the official beneficiaries of these 
projects. As in many cases they suffer from insufficient central govern-
mental subsidies and consequently from an unsustainable fiscal situa-
tion, they try to capitalise on every incoming financial resource. This 
frequently means attempting to “tick the necessary boxes” needed for 
EU funds, and then spending the money on other types of activities 
than the ones which would genuinely help people in marginalised sit-
uations. There were examples of renovating churches, which were not 
frequently visited by the locally less well off, as “communal” infra-
structure projects, instead of renovating nearby social housing units 
without basic amenities. A third type of controversy may be that even 
though the interventions help a few dozen families materially, the spill-
over effect of the project catalyses a process of gentrification, that in 
turn prices out poor people from the territory. This is what happened 
in one of the showcase social urban rehabilitation projects in the 8th 
District of Budapest (Czirfusz et al. 2015). A fourth type of controversy 
is connected to spatially targeting these interventions. As delineation is 
done by the local government, there is room to manoeuvre to decide 
which segregated area will benefit from the projects. Unfortunately, 
the selection criteria were often out of line with the social sensitiv-
ity of the tenders; in other words, the principle of targeting was not 
based on the needs of the residents, but on other—mainly political— 
factors. For example, in one case the selection of the action area out 
of ten existing segregated areas was done by the local mayor based 
on which of these interventions would be the most popular for the 
local middle classes (and result in potentially more votes in the next 
election).
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Thirdly, slum elimination—with a total budget of 12 billion HUF—
was introduced at the end of the 2007–2013 programming period. This 
focused on both segregated areas and slums, but had a more crystal-
lised philosophy. Local governments had to form a consortium with a 
nation-wide public institution and with an NGO in order to upgrade 
physically and socially the segregated slums. Instead of desegregating 
(i.e. demolishing the buildings and relocating the residents to “inte-
grated” neighbourhoods) the projects aimed to keep the residents in 
place and provide social services locally with the continuous presence 
of social workers. This philosophy was criticised by various professionals 
and was nicknamed “beautifying the ghettos”, mainly because the roots 
of the problems (i.e. the structural factors leading to the systematic pro-
duction of marginalised territories) were not targeted, only the most 
basic needs of the residents (installing a place to wash their clothes and 
to have a shower, etc.). From another point of view, these projects also 
had a controlling, regulating function: many times CCTV cameras were 
installed, while little assistance was given to ease the burden on house-
hold budgets and similar needs. No doubt such support, though small, 
helped households, nevertheless, it would be hard to depict slum elim-
ination projects as a systemic answer to the production of unevenness.
All in all, the effectiveness of the programmes that we identified as 
constituents of the social facet of housing intervention is at the least 
questionable. The logic of welfare types of benefits contributed to the 
institutional dualisation of Hungarian society, not to speak of the rel-
ative fiscal insignificance of such public subsidies compared to lib-
eral interventions. Furthermore, with the recent shift from welfare 
to workfare, this hidden dualising effect became explicit. For example 
János Lázár, who is now the minister responsible for supervising all 
EU-funded investment activities, stated in 2011 that “who has nothing 
is worth nothing” (Index.hu 2011). At the same time, while the rhetoric 
of emerging logic-based EU-funded projects ran counter to the hous-
ing-related liberal principles of the government, their effects cannot 
systematically counteract the dualisation caused by all the other public 
interventions. Moreover, with the inflow of such transfers, the govern-
ment was able to fiscally back out from the support of people affected 
by housing poverty.
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4  Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to analyse housing-related governmental 
interventions in Hungary within a holistic framework. Even though 
since 1989 housing has been governed in a fragmented institutional 
environment by allocating various functions to different public and 
private institutions, we believe that there is a certain systematic logic 
behind institutional fragmentation, which results in the (re)production 
of socio-spatial unevenness.
Our chapter is a contribution to the recently expanding body of lit-
erature in economic geography, which aims to understand how  uneven 
development unfolds in various ways under financial capitalism. 
Furthermore, it is a contribution to the political economic understand-
ing of housing policy interventions (also strongly relating to the notion 
of housing financialisation). Although these conceptual approaches usu-
ally build their arguments based on empirical material from Western 
European and Anglo-Saxon cases, we believe it is important to balance 
this bias and give theoretical arguments from the position of non-core 
social realities. In our understanding this is an essential step to engaging 
with issues like regional and local development, and especially their rela-
tion to polarising tendencies in different contemporary post-crisis settings.
In Hungary, the liberal facet of housing policy receives significantly 
more budgetary resources than interventions in the social facet of 
housing policy. Since its declared aims are demographic and economic 
growth, it is not at all concerned with socio-spatial equity. Furthermore, 
while the former is a generalised, nationally implemented policy, the lat-
ter measures are often spatially localised and financially dependent on 
local municipalities (struggling with a constant lack of resources). Thus 
they are inherently uneven and are not able to do more than intervene 
on a small scale in situations of marginalised housing. This is similar to 
how general welfare instruments developed in the 1990s, which in the 
end had the effect of enclosing recipients in an enclave of poverty—
both societally and spatially (Szalai 2007).
The liberal facet of housing policies is dominant in Hungary, with 
mortgage-based individual homeownership being the only form of 
housing tenure supported by the government. The two main policy 
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instruments of this housing regime are a non-refundable government 
subsidy allocated according to the number of children in a family, and 
subsidised mortgages. Although these policies are not articulated in a 
spatial way and claim to generally benefit households across the whole 
social spectrum, we have seen that in fact they implicitly reproduce 
socio-spatial unevenness. Social polarisation is the result of a funda-
mentally credit-based housing finance system, which necessarily favours 
better-off households. The non-refundable housing allocation serves as 
a means of leveraging credit in 80% of the cases, and thus only facil-
itates access to further mortgage debt for a specific, selected pool of 
households. This—along with the fact that housing-related subsidies for 
housing acquisition are managed by banks—places a major part of the 
entire Hungarian housing finance system under the institutional logic 
of financial institutions. This logic—especially in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis—is one of increased risk management, leading to 
more social and spatial selectivity. As a result, the uneven spatial struc-
ture of the Hungarian housing market is reinforced.
At the other end of the spectrum of housing-related interventions, 
the most symbolic policy instruments aiming to target poorer house-
holds are the housing maintenance benefit, which follows the logic of 
welfare benefits, and various tools used in integrated territorial develop-
ment, which follow the logic of project society. While housing-related 
benefits are socially but not spatially targeted, they are delegated to local 
municipalities (similarly to the management of the very small remaining 
public housing stock), but through the lack of national-scale engage-
ment reproduce spatial unevenness. On the other hand, territorially 
focused, supposedly “social” urban rehabilitation policies targeting the 
less well off inhabitants of social housing units are a very clearly spatially 
articulated set of policies. These latter policies are financed by territo-
rial operational programmes within the national financing mechanisms 
for distributing European Union cohesion funds. The fact that invest-
ment in public housing practically only happens when EU funds can be 
used for this purpose already demonstrates the low priority of this issue 
in Hungarian policy-making. We do not claim that intervention in the 
housing situation of marginalised groups would necessarily produce fur-
ther unevenness in general. But these spatially localised interventions in 
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the dilapidated public housing stock do not give systemic responses to 
the socio-spatial inequalities produced by the dominant housing regime, 
and often induce further processes of marginalisation.
Altogether, there is a growing segment of Hungarian society that is 
not reached by either the liberal or the social facets of housing policy. As 
for liberal side of housing policies, many households do not fit into the 
stricter mortgage lending criteria put in place after the crisis or the polit-
ically preferred family model, which grants access to non-refundable 
subsidies. Thus, many households will not be able to access homeown-
ership, and will have to solve their housing problems by other means. 
Within the social facet of housing policies, there is a tendency to con-
tinuously narrow the scope of these interventions. Local municipalities 
are constantly diminishing their housing stock, and—in the context of 
a complete lack of central government funding for these purposes—are 
aiming to limit all housing-related budgetary expenditures. As a result, 
more and more households find themselves outside the scope of hous-
ing policies—both liberal and social. They do not have access to indi-
vidual, mortgage-based homeownership or to an increasingly restricted 
social housing stock. In this widening gap between the two ends of the 
currently existing housing policy, new forms of housing provision are 
developing, which are mostly invisible both to research and to policy. 
The actors driving these new forms are individual households in need of 
housing, and new smaller scale market actors recognising this gap.
The best response to this situation is not a new wave of excessive 
mortgage lending, similar to what happened before the crisis (which 
would attempt to push everyone into the dominant liberal housing 
model). Rather, new forms of affordable housing need to be devel-
oped. It is clear that publicly owned housing in its current form can-
not respond to these needs. As long as local municipalities despite 
lacking financial resources remain the owners of public housing units, 
there will always be the political will not to displace the less well off and 
instead provide new resources for renovation (or construction) from the 
European Union in a timely fashion. What is needed is state interven-
tion either in the form of state-owned social housing, developed within 
the framework of a national-scale programme, or in the form of provid-
ing support to create the institutional-legal and financial preconditions 
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for a new institutionalised rental housing sector. These new institutions 
of rental housing could range from publicly regulated housing compa-
nies to self-managed housing cooperatives, and could start filling the 
gap between the two extremes of current, polarising housing policies.
Notes
 1. Based on interviews conducted with various Hungarian urban experts.
 2. We use “liberal” here in a generic sense, referring to housing policies 
that generally point in the direction of privatised risks and costs of 
housing provision, as well as a housing model based on ownership and 
debt. This is what Crouch (2009) calls privatised Keynesianism, or the 
privatisation of risk, or what Aalbers (2017) calls a general direction of 
housing financialisation along different trajectories. We contrast it with 
the idea of “social” housing policies understood in a broad sense.
 3. Interview conducted with a high-ranking public official responsible for 
housing-related financial instruments within the Ministry of National 
Economy.
 4. Interview conducted with a high-ranking public official responsible for 
housing-related financial instruments within the Ministry of National 
Economy; referencing internally available statistics from the Hungarian 
National Bank.
 5. This is confirmed by interviews conducted with various real estate 
agents in second-tier cities (e.g. Békéscsaba, Kecskemét, Miskolc), as 
well as by interviews conducted with financial institutions distributing 
this subsidy.
 6. This was a community-led project concentrating on housing issues in 
Bag (a town in the eastern agglomeration area of Budapest). The web-
site of the program is available at http://bagazs.org/mit-csinalunk/hal-
lasd-a-hangod/; and a video about the results (this is where they address 
the issue of CSOK) can be viewed at https://youtu.be/zaQi2_Z0a4M.
 7. Interview conducted with a high-ranking public official responsible for 
housing-related financial instruments within the Ministry of National 
Economy.
 8. This element of self-care is perhaps most obviously put forward in 
a third important housing policy instrument: the “housing savings 
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contracts” (based on the German Bausparkassen model) which are con-
stantly increasing in size and importance.
 9. Interview conducted with a high-ranking public official responsible for 
housing-related financial instruments within the Ministry of National 
Economy; interview conducted with the person responsible for mort-
gage lending within the largest Hungarian bank; interview conducted 
with representatives of the Hungarian National Bank working on issues 
of housing finance.
 10. Interviews conducted with various financial institutions involved in 
mortgage lending.
 11. Based on interviews conducted with real estate agents in the eastern 
agglomeration area of Budapest, as well as in the agglomeration area of 
a large city in a de-industrialised region (Miskolc).
 12. This claim is made based on data provided by the largest Hungarian 
bank about their mortgage lending, and based on data from the 
Hungarian National Bank about non-performing loans. However, nei-
ther of these data sets are available on a sufficiently detailed geograph-
ical scale to be able to identify very precise overlapping geographies. 
The most we can claim is that an institutional and spatial tendency 
definitely exists that supports a causal link between the geographies of 
financial overinclusion and exclusion.
 13. We have compared these data to the number of inhabitants in the given 
settlement category—but this dominance of small settlements would 
be even stronger if we compared the data to the number of housing 
transactions.
 14. Based on interviews conducted with a number of real estate and loan 
agents from the financial institutions involved in distributing this 
subsidy.
 15. This move, that the costs of providing social services for the less well 
off are put on the shoulders of local governments, while the necessary 
financial means are not provided centrally, fits well with the more gen-
eral process in post-1989 Hungary. This process was called “decentral-
ization without subsidiarity” by András Vigvári (2008), who described 
how several duties were delegated to local governments in the name 
of autonomy, while financial autonomy was not granted for them. 
Although after 2010 recentralisation replaced decentralisation as 
the main tendency in the relation between the central and local gov-
ernments, there continue to be areas that chime with what Vigvári 
described.
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Part III




Over the past two and a half decades, the EU member states from 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have transitioned from state 
socialism to democracy, from a centralised to a market economy. At 
the national level, the post-socialist transition has brought economic 
growth to these countries. At a regional scale however, socio-economic 
inequalities have developed and the gap between centres and periph-
eries has increased (Kurkó 2010; PoSCoPP Research Group 2015; 
Leibert 2015). Over the years, capital cities and regional urban centres 
have transitioned more successfully and have found ways to integrate 
themselves into global production networks. As a result of higher cap-
ital investment compared to the rest of the region, these urban centres 
accumulate benefits in terms of job creation, higher tax revenues, more 
public investments in infrastructure, and higher levels of engagement 
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in a variety of political and innovation networks (Gottdiener and Budd 
2005). The peripheries however have not coped as well. More secluded 
rural areas, mining settlements and the former mono-structural indus-
trial regions are facing a much slower development or even decline. 
Left with limited access to desirable resources (material or symbolic), 
and with restricted room for autonomous action (Kreckel 2004), they 
are experiencing increasing marginalisation and peripheralisation (Pütz 
1999; Surd et al. 2011; Török 2014; Benedek 2015).
With accession to the European Union, CEE countries were incenti-
vised to adopt neoliberal competitiveness-centred policies. And despite 
the European Union’s plea for balanced, integrated and inclusive devel-
opment, its policies have favoured the increasing development of exist-
ing urban centres (Lang 2011; Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013). 
Thus, investment flows generated by advanced local and regional eco-
nomic agents were mainly concentrated in urban centres and their 
metropolitan areas, and did not trickle down to peripheries, as tradi-
tional models of economic growth would suggest (Spoor 2013; Benedek 
and Moldovan 2015). In this context, it is particularly the rural areas 
of the post-socialist countries that have experienced increasing periph-
eralisation (Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013). This is not to say that 
rurality constitutes a periphery per se. On the contrary, through sub-
urbanisation or by successfully marketing images of a rural idyll, some 
villages have seen intensive socio-economic development. Their share, 
however, is rather small, as specific conditions have to be met in terms 
of accessibility, the state of physical and service infrastructure, and 
attractiveness of tourist destinations (Keim 2006). More often, rural 
areas are struggling with economic and demographic issues brought on 
by market-driven devaluation of local assets (cheap labour, agricultural 
land, local skills and relations) (Nagy et al. 2015), and by fierce com-
petition with international distributors of products once sourced from 
regional or national rural areas (such as food, lumber, yarn or leather) 
(Keim 2006). As a result, rural peripheries in CEE are among the 
poorest regions in the European Union (Leibert 2013).
Taking one such post-socialist rural periphery as a case study, this 
chapter relies on structured interviews collected in July 2017 in villages 
of Sălaj County in Romania (Map 1). Sălaj is mostly rural (93% of 
10 Out-Migration from Peripheries—How Cumulated …     229
its settlements are villages and 61% of the population lives in villages, 
according to 2011 census data), without having (yet) developed a strong 
functional urban area around any of its four cities. This means that the 
county is mostly comprised of structurally disadvantaged villages. It is 
also the least developed county in terms of human, health, vital and 
material capital (Ionescu-Heroiu et al. 2013, 240) in one of the most 
polarised NUTS2 regions in Romania, the North-West Region. Here, 
the city of Cluj-Napoca, which is one of the main economic engines 
in the entire country, acts as the regional centre, while the North-West 
Region as a whole remains one of Romania’s “lagging regions”, with 
a GDP per capita (PPS) below 50% of the EU average (Cristea et al. 
2017, 7). As the villages in Sălaj are peripheral across various spatial 
scales, the case study area allows an in-depth analysis of the effects of 
increasing regional polarisation and peripheralisation.
Using this case study as a representation of post-socialist rural periph-
eries, the chapter aims to critically engage with the economic and 
Map 1 Geographic location of the North-West Region and of Sălaj County in 
Romania. Source Prepared by the author
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demographic struggles that such peripheries are facing, specifically in 
relation to one of the main contributors to peripheralisation,  selective 
out-migration (Kühn and Weck 2013; Kühn 2015; Leibert 2015). 
While previous studies on the topic have focused heavily on the struc-
tural factors that affect socio-spatial polarisation and peripheralisation, 
this chapter addresses a gap in the research by employing an actor-
based approach (Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013; PoSCoPP Research 
Group 2015; Miggelbrink and Meyer 2015) (as further elaborated in 
Chapter 2). The selected empirics first illustrate how actors affected by 
peripheralisation utilise different forms of out-migration as strategies to 
improve their quality of life (in Sect. 3.1). The empirical findings sec-
ondly showcase the impact the cumulative mobility of these actors has 
on shaping local development potentials and strategies, as described 
by local public officials (in Sect. 3.2). Overall the analysis contributes 
to the debate on how local development is affected in times of polari-
sation, by revealing how the interdependency between peripheralisation 
and out-migration limits the decision-making capacity of local adminis-
trative leaders, and diminishes local development capacities in peripheral 
settlements even further (in Chapter 4).
2  Peripheralisation and Selective Out-
Migration: A Deepening Vicious Circle
Recent studies examining the increasing regional polarisation in Central 
and Eastern Europe have focused on a more process-based and dynamic 
understanding of the terms “polarisation”, “centralisation” and “peripheral-
isation”. At the core of this conceptualisation lies the relation between the 
two interdependent types of spaces—centres (or cores) and peripheries—
both of which are continuously being re-created in relation to each other 
across various scales, and cannot define themselves as one or the other 
without referencing their counterpart (Keim 2006; Warf 2008; Bernt 
and Liebmann 2013; Kühn 2015; PoSCoPP Research Group 2015). 
Thus, peripheralisation can be described as a process in which peripheries 
experience a gradual and persisting decline in socio-spatial development, 
as well as a long-lasting solidification of structural deficits in relation to 
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a dominant centre, which widens the disparities between them (Keim 
2006). Such peripheries are faced with relatively low income, a low level 
of education, low quality occupation (e.g. subsistence agriculture or low-
skilled jobs) (following Kreckel 2004), demographic shrinkage, ageing, 
and the out-migration of young, highly-educated people (following Kühn 
2015). These deficits translate into institutional thinness and a limited 
capacity of the peripheral space to secure a high quality of life for its pop-
ulation, and implicitly cause a growing dependence on the centre (Keim 
2006; PoSCoPP Research Group 2015).
As a process, selective emigration is one of the main contributors to 
increasing peripheralisation, along with decoupling, dependency and 
stigmatisation (Kühn and Weck 2013, 40). On the one hand, the exist-
ence of strong emigration flows among young and skilled adults can be 
seen as a consequence of peripheralisation, as it indicates an existing lack 
of educational facilities, reduced availability for highly skilled employ-
ment, as well as an existing stigma regarding future perspectives (Bernt 
and Liebmann 2013; Leibert 2015). But at the same time, this brain 
drain (and the implicit demographic shrinkage that it accompanies) is 
also a cause for further peripheralisation. Not only does the decreas-
ing share of the active population reduce the amount of local taxes and 
incomes, thus diminishing the ability of the local municipality to main-
tain or modernise social and physical infrastructures, but also the emi-
gration of skilled professionals reduces the local capacity for innovation 
(Bernt and Liebmann 2013). Overall, out-migration and shrinkage neg-
atively influence the level of sustainability for existing local economies, 
the prospects of new economic projects, as well as the overall quality of 
life. Ultimately, this encourages future waves of out-migration and leads 
to a vicious circle that reproduces peripherality (Massey 1990).
While much of the existing literature investigates spatial disparities 
and the interdependence between out-migration and peripheralisation 
in terms of the participating structural processes, recent scholarship is 
also arguing for complementing this socio-structural focus with a more 
actor-based approach, noting the existing gaps in research regarding 
both the actors causing peripheralisation and the actors affected by it 
(Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013; PoSCoPP Research Group 2015; 
Miggelbrink and Meyer 2015). At the structural level, peripheralisation 
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is linked to demographic shrinkage and ageing, to selective out- 
migration and a lack of in-migration, and to low income and low-quality 
occupation (Kreckel 2004; Bernt and Liebmann 2013; Kühn 2015). But 
behind the major flows of migration, there is a sum of active individu-
als who are reacting to core-periphery relations by moving—albeit in the 
same direction. Or, as Bernt and Liebmann (2013, 219–20) put it, by 
leaving the periphery, emigrants are “voting with their feet” to express 
the perceived lack of perspectives for the future in their hometowns. In 
this sense, from an actor-centred position, migration is a way for individ-
uals to place themselves in a preferred living environment, depending on 
the needs and the possibilities that they and their families have.
But what causes someone to migrate? Recent scholarship shows that 
the decision is never simple, nor is it taken in a completely rational and 
optimising way. Instead, the decision is complex, taken because of mul-
tiple reasons, in relation to a person’s social network. It is located within 
their individual biography, connected to all the macro-structures that 
have shaped their identity, as well as to personal life experiences, and 
entangled with their future aspirations (Boyle et al. 1998). This focus on 
agency shows that people engaged in migration are actively concerned with 
re-placing themselves in a preferred living environment, which they per-
ceive as having a higher quality of life and greater chances for their and 
their families’ well-being (ibid.). As this can mean different things to dif-
ferent people, mobility is shown to be an extremely cultural event (Fielding 
1992) that can reveal personal values and attachments, and the entire 
world-view of those choosing to migrate. With the cultural character of 
migration transpiring, it becomes an example of behaviour, rather than a 
simple action. It becomes part of the person’s identity, an “expression of 
people’s sense of being at any one point in time” (Gutting 1996, 482).
With the composition and direction of mobility flows affecting core- 
periphery relations at the structural level (see also Moldovan 2017), an 
actor-centred analysis can help identify how the interplay of core-periphery 
relations has triggered out-migration as a mechanism of coping with periph-
eralisation, while also suggesting potential strategies and policies that could 
combat peripheralisation. The following empirical material aims to achieve 
just that. Firstly, the main individual narratives and lines of reasoning 
behind emigrating are used to identify the most pressing structural deficits 
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that peripheries are struggling with. Secondly, the narratives of public offi-
cials trying to increase local development reveal what strategies and policy 
tools peripheries are already employing and what is still lacking in order to 
decrease core-periphery inequalities.
3  Taking Individual Mobility Decisions 
from the Periphery
One of the drawbacks of the relational conceptualisation of peripher-
alisation is that it leaves unclear how to empirically identify peripheries 
(Bernt and Liebmann 2013; Kühn 2015). In order to avoid a  physical- 
spatial bias, the first step taken in the selection of the twelve villages in 
which the fieldwork was conducted was based on quantitative data, 
to show a lower level of local development in terms of human, health, 
vital and material capital.1 In the second step, ten of the twelve vil-
lages were selected as a case study area for the present analysis (Map 2), 
based on whether the subjective perceptions of local political leaders 
Map 2 Case study area: ten peripheral villages in Sălaj County. Source Prepared 
by the author
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and administrative workers fit the conceptual description of “peripheral-
isation”. In the end, all ten villages (ranging in size from 1041 to 6710 
inhabitants) share the following characteristics, albeit to various degrees: 
their population earn their main sources of income from low quality 
occupations (agriculture or low-skilled jobs), they lack physical infrastruc-
ture and facilities for higher education (only four of the villages have their 
own high school and vocational school, and the results of their students 
are quite poor), and they were described as struggling with population 
shrinkage and ageing, and with the out-migration of young adults.2 Out-
migrants predominately move either to nearby cores to enrol in university 
courses and pursue highly-skilled occupations, or engage in temporary 
and circular migration abroad, if they occupy lower skilled professions.
To show how out-migration is employed as a strategy to cope with 
or to overcome peripheralisation and how cumulated individual deci-
sions affect local development capacities, this chapter draws on a total of 
28 semi-structured interviews with local public officials, and 134 struc-
tured interviews with locals from 10 peripheralised settlements of Sălaj 
County (Table 1).3 The first set of interviews was conducted with local 
Table 1 The number of interviews conducted in the case study area
Source Prepared by the author
aIn order to protect the anonymity of the public officials who agreed to the inter-
views, the present analysis lists the sources for relevant quotes by mentioning the 
respondent’s occupation, but not the village of origin. Instead, each village has 
been assigned a random number from one to ten, in a non-alphabetical order
Name of settlement Interviews with public 
officialsa






Horoatu Crasnei 2 12
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political leaders and administrative workers, holding one of the follow-
ing positions: mayor, deputy mayor, secretary of the mayor’s office,4 
social worker, official in charge of the agricultural registry, school secre-
tary and accountant. These interviews sought to bring forth descriptions 
of the overall local socio-economic context, looking into the main issues 
that each village is struggling with as well as the strategies employed for 
local development. The second set of interviews was conducted with 
adult local inhabitants, who were presently employed or had been in the 
past. They were asked about their own occupational history, their per-
sonal experience with migration or commuting, and their future aspi-
rations. In order to capture the complexity and the embeddedness of 
the decision to become mobile, these interviews also enquired about 
the status of other household members and how they all managed their 
everyday lives together, aiming to show how the interest of the entire 
family was considered when making occupational choices. In this way, 
the discussions were also marked by those who were absent, especially 
through stories of children who moved away, so that the interviews also 
highlighted aspects of long-term emigration.
3.1  Local Strategies Employed by Individuals  
to Cope with Peripheralisation
In the case study area, agriculture is the main economic activity of the 
inhabitants. Even if the interviews systematically excluded individu-
als living on subsistence agriculture (as this is not a form of employ-
ment and also not an occupation favouring territorial mobility), most 
respondents revealed that besides the various jobs they held, they 
cultivate patches of land and rear animals, in order to produce house-
hold products for their own consumption. Respondents who were 
employed in the settlement of residence mostly worked as labourers 
in one of the smaller shops or workshops, or held positions in the 
public sector. Salaries were often described as modest and the lack of 
jobs deemed more suitable in the home village was a commonly men-
tioned issue. Consequently, many locals have been looking for job offers 
elsewhere. Following the occupational history of the respondents, 
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the interviews with locals reveal that they engage in four types of mobil-
ity in order to improve their situation: commuting, internal migration, 
international migration and temporary migration abroad. Choosing 
one of these mobilities is deeply connected to the actors’ identity, aspi-
rations, possibilities and attachments, and the choice reveals which 
structural disadvantages affect them the most. In this sense, each type 
of mobility represents a strategy to cope with the different effects of 
peripheralisation.
A first strategy employed is commuting to a town nearby. In fact, 
most respondents had themselves experienced commuting, either pres-
ently or in the past, or at least one of their family members had com-
muted for work. Mostly they or their family members commuted for 
low-skilled employment in industry or in services and trade. However, 
the interviews reveal a generational shift in the attitude towards com-
muting: while during the socialist period commuting to one of the large 
industrial sites was common practice, nowadays it is the middle aged or 
older adults who still commute. For them, commuting offers access to a 
wider labour market, while also allowing them to remain in the homes 
that they have built in the village. In their narratives, they often contrast 
living in the village, in a house with a small garden, to living in the city, 
in a flat. Moreover, living in an apartment would deprive them of the 
additional income they get from subsistence agriculture, but it would 
also take them away from the rural lifestyle, which they perceive to be 
calmer, healthier and safer than the urban one. Their attitude can be 
summed up by this respondent:
I cannot move to Zalău if I grew up in the village, I don’t like blocks of 
flats. The kids can go, if they want to, but I can’t. (interview, Male, aged 
45, Bănişor, July 2017)
Younger generations, however, seem to have their preferences reversed 
and favour migration over commuting. Since they are not living in the 
villages anymore, their stories were told by the parents or siblings left 
behind. And the story of internal migration starts with the local edu-
cational infrastructure. All analysed settlements have their own pub-
lic kindergarten and primary school (up to 8th grade), and four of 
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them also have their own high school and vocational school. However, 
the local high schools are not very prestigious. Their students systemat-
ically achieve low results at the Bacalaureat5 and tend to start working 
as qualified labourers after graduation. For this reason, the number of 
students who have started to commute to nearby cities to attend high 
school is quite high, even from those four villages where a local option 
of secondary schooling is available. The high school students who com-
mute are usually amongst the more dedicated scholars, so after gradu-
ation they tend to enrol in a university and move to Zalău, Oradea or 
Cluj-Napoca. Once there, in order to supplement their income, they 
start taking part-time or seasonal jobs, creating their own professional 
networks in the city. Very few return to live and work in the village after 
finishing their studies, as the jobs they could find in the villages would 
not suit their level of expertise. Even when some may want to return 
and start a business themselves, they find that they cannot recreate for 
themselves the opportunities that they have found in the city. A telling 
example is that of one respondent’s son. He moved to Cluj-Napoca for 
studies and after he obtained his diploma, he tried to start a tailoring 
business in the village, but failed because he couldn’t find employees:
I gave him the space, I gave him everything, he brought the latest 
machinery to open a tailoring shop. He barely found two people, and 
even those rather wanted to stay home. And after one and a half years, 
one of them moved to England. The other one got married and is on 
maternity leave, so she benefits now from having been employed. […] So 
the boy moved to Cluj […]. He does well for himself. (interview, Male, 
aged 57, Treznea, July 2017)
Another strategy employed by the locals, as a response to the low 
incomes available through employment in the peripheries, is inter-
national migration, for different periods of time. As the interviews 
revealed, some family members of the respondents had emigrated per-
manently, together with their spouses and children, and are only return-
ing for summer holidays to visit their parents. Although absent, they 
are still investing in the village. Not only are they sending money back 
to their parents, but they are also renovating their childhood homes or 
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building new houses, indicating that they would still like to return at 
some point in the future:
The children are abroad, they are working there, have kids on their own. 
They want to open a business and stand on their own two feet. They want 
to come here and open something in agriculture, but they keep saying 
that they’ll stay one more year, then one more year. (interview, Male, aged 
56, Bănișor, July 2017)
For those not willing to emigrate permanently, temporary or seasonal 
migration abroad represents the strategy for earning higher salaries. 
Usually they work in various European countries in agriculture, con-
struction or caregiving. The specifics of their life stories differed con-
siderably. Some were employed most of the year in the village or in 
a nearby city, but took unpaid leave to work for a couple of months 
abroad. Others combine episodes of seasonal work abroad with seasonal 
work locally and with social benefits. However, what came across in all 
of their stories was the desire to improve the quality of life for their fam-
ily and the difficulty of having to leave their family behind for months 
at a time. In fact, the vast majority of the respondents do not want to 
go abroad for work, but the low salaries in the village or the region push 
them towards migration. For example, one respondent, who had been 
working seasonally in agriculture abroad and locally ever since his late 
teens, said that now he was looking for a job nearby, because he was 
about to become a father. But he was disappointed in the salaries he 
was being offered, considering them insufficient to cover basic expenses, 
especially since his wife has no income of her own:
It doesn’t matter where I work, here, in Cluj, in Timișoara, in Spain, as 
long as we can get by as a family. But to be honest, if I could find a job 
here that is convenient with a salary of 2000-2200 RON,6 I wouldn’t 
travel abroad anymore. I would stay here with my family. But for less 
money, I wouldn’t stay, because we have to buy food, diapers, everything 
is expensive. (interview, Male, aged 24, Agrij, July 2017)
So while internal out-migrants tend to leave in order to access higher 
skilled employment in larger cities, in the case of international migrants 
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it is not the low quality of the employment available locally that pushes 
them towards mobility, but rather the low income it results in, and the 
harsh working conditions it entails. One respondent, who has been 
working in Italy for 1–2 months each year since 2002 as a caregiver or 
as an assistant cook, was particularly vocal about how they wouldn’t 
have been able to afford small renovation work on their house in the vil-
lage or to help their oldest daughter through college in Oradea on just 
the salaries offered in Sălaj County:
In Zalău at Universal [a factory specialised in clothing manufacture] they 
are hiring every day. But they can look for employees all they want, if they 
won’t offer salaries. They pay the minimum wage, around 1200 RON I 
think it is. Then you pay 250 RON for the commute and are left with 
under 1000 RON. You can’t get by with that! […] That’s not even enough 
to manage on, let alone set something aside. […] When we moved here, 
the house was in bad shape and all [the renovations] cost money. If I 
hadn’t gone abroad, we wouldn’t have managed anything. Unfortunately, 
that’s where we have to go to be able to do something. […] Here you 
work for 4-5 months, there you work for one month.7 And it’s much 
more difficult here. (interview, Female, aged 49, Sâg, July 2017)
While the reasons to emigrate and the destinations of out-migration 
differ, the interviews revealed that there is one common trait that con-
nects all types of migrants: they remain attached to their place of birth. 
In this sense, it isn’t only the long-term international out-migrants who 
invest in local housing. Seasonal migrants too, invest large parts of their 
additional earnings in building or refurbishing their houses. And even 
internal out-migrants often choose to return from the cities to their 
home villages when they get close to retirement age, craving the quiet 
countryside life. One respondent, who lived most of her adult life in 
Zalău and just moved back two years ago, explained:
I always wanted a house in the countryside, because this is where I grew 
up. I like it here, I like gardening. My daughter visited us earlier today 
and I was so happy to give her vegetables from my garden. Now noth-
ing could make me move away. (interview, Female, aged 48, Treznea, July 
2017)
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The respondents don’t mention it explicitly, but it is safe to assume 
that this favourable perception of the rural lifestyle results largely from 
improved living conditions in the village. These respondents have man-
aged to substantially improve their housing conditions, by renovating 
houses, equipping them with bathrooms and appliances, purchasing 
new agricultural technologies, and modernising their households with 
the higher income earned elsewhere. And the villages have also been 
modernised with asphalted roads, running water, television, internet or 
other services. In fact, improving public services and the available physi-
cal infrastructure is one of the main strategies employed by local author-
ities to encourage commuting over out-migration, or even to attract 
new inhabitants, as the following subsection will explore in more detail.
3.2  Development Strategies of Local  
Municipalities Against Peripheralisation
Being responsible for devising local development strategies, public offi-
cials in peripheral villages are very aware of the challenges brought on 
by demographic changes. The selective out-migration of young adults, 
in response to existing peripheralisation, has consequences for the ways 
in which local administrations can operate. One of the direct conse-
quences of having fewer young adults living in peripheries is that the 
number of children is also declining. In the villages analysed, kindergar-
tens and schools are struggling with a decrease in the number of pupils 
and have had to reduce the number of units they operate and some-
times merge classrooms of students together, thus reducing the already 
poor educational infrastructure even more. When one unit closes, stu-
dents from that area are usually transported by bus to a different school, 
which hikes education costs for the local administration:
The number of pupils is decreasing yearly, decreasing strongly… from 
2008 until now it decreased around 40%. There are fewer children, the 
birth rate is declining. […] From 2008 until now four school units have 
closed because there were no pupils. (interview, School secretary, Village 
7, July 2017)
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Education costs already put a strain on the local budget because some 
of the teachers are commuting from the cities nearby, and the villages 
cover their travel-related expenses:
Some of the employees at the school come from elsewhere. Monthly 
we pay for the teachers’ commute 4000-4500 RON.8 They come from 
Zalău, from Șimleu [Silvaniei], from neighbouring settlements and have 
their main work quota here. There are also some locals employed at the 
schools. (interview, Secretary, Village 9, July 2017)
This stems from a more general difficulty in keeping more educated 
locals as permanent residents, because not only teachers, but also other 
employees from the public sector are often not locals. More gener-
ally, this issue showcases how peripheries depend on cores in order to 
maintain such essential facilities as schools, day care centres or doctors’ 
offices, since they cannot provide the necessary specialised workforce 
themselves.
Another problem intensified by selective out-migration—and the 
implicit population shrinkage that it brings—is low public income.9 
And not only do the peripheral villages collect small incomes from 
taxes, but they also lack the capacity to attract major economic inves-
tors, as large enterprises wouldn’t be able to find the necessary work 
force locally:
Enterprises… it’s difficult because with the ageing population there is 
no way an investor could find sufficient labour force. (interview, Mayor, 
Village 1, July 2017)
As a result, the villages analysed sourced most of their money from 
national or European funds. Such a dependence on external funds for 
maintaining or improving local infrastructure dictates local actions to a 
high degree, as the villages analysed seek to fulfil the necessary criteria 
that would make them eligible for whichever funding opportunity is 
being promoted at that time at the regional, national or European level. 
When asked about projects implemented in the recent past, public offi-
cials mentioned mainly infrastructure investments, including the paving 
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of roads, refurbishing of community centres, building of day care centres 
and touristic information points, as these were the projects promoted 
through recent funding programmes. This is illustrative of the limited 
capacity of peripheries to react to actual local needs and to secure a 
better quality of life for their population. They even acknowledge that 
sometimes the projects they applied for weren’t necessarily a priority, but 
that they just tried to access as many funds as possible and to make the 
best of a bad situation:
We had a project that was already approved for a sewage system, the 
money was already approved, but during the Boc government10 they 
withdrew the funding. […] So we did what we could then, you know, 
the money is granted according to programmes. If there is a project for… 
people don’t understand, «why did you refurbish this community cen-
tre, we don’t need it». Well, it’s not about need, that’s how they issued 
funds, on refurbishing community centres. But some don’t understand, 
«why didn’t you use the money to implement…». You can’t! When it’s for 
paving, it’s for paving, you can’t move the money where you want. These 
are European funds, you can’t spin it the way you want. So that’s why 
we refurbished as much as we could, even schools, we transformed some 
of them in community centres. (interview, Deputy Mayor, Village 7, July 
2017)
This quote showcases very well how the issue for peripheries is not 
always a lack of resources. Instead the problem lies in the way in which 
these resources are allocated, in a way that doesn’t engage with local 
needs and potentials. Sometimes, public officials acknowledge that a 
certain project would not bring any benefits to their community and 
decide not to invest time and effort in it. For example, Village 2 refused 
to apply for European funds for a tourist information centre, even 
though they were easily accessible at that time, knowing that they don’t 
receive many tourists. In these cases the interviewees were especially 
vocal about their frustration with the way funds were being allocated, 
and blamed the national administration for not giving them more 
support in developing local potential. In the case of Village 2, the mayor 
considered that their biggest potential was agriculture:
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They made a big mistake in both the previous and the current National 
Rural Development Programme, because they should have allocated 
a large part of the money to enable people to open farms. At least two 
farms with large crop surfaces, or at least two-three farms with animal 
husbandry should have been created in each village, with several employ-
ees. […] Each farm would have employed 2-3-4 people to operate the 
necessary machinery. And the employees would have received a salary, 
paid taxes, and the entire standard of living could have been higher. […] 
The Romanian state should have developed, should have made European 
funds easier to access […]. The people here have tried, but they can-
not meet the conditions for co-financing. It makes no sense how much 
money they spent on tourist centres here and we have no tourists. (inter-
view, Mayor, Village 2, July 2017)
When asked about how they envisioned the future of their village, 
public officials said that they would like to see local potential being 
developed through encouraging larger scale and profit-oriented agricul-
ture, or that they would like to attract investors and more inhabitants. 
The way to achieve this, they further elaborated, was through accessing 
more funds. More specifically, their development strategy for stimu-
lating agricultural growth consisted in trying to help local inhabitants 
to access individual funds offered by the European Union, even if the 
results of this strategy have been mixed in the past, as locals with such 
ambitions have to meet strict requirements:
They [trainers on how to access European funds through APIA11] came 
and presented here for the people. But the people don’t really dare. They 
face difficulties along the way… Others said too that the requirements 
are too high, for them to prepare you a project costs I don’t know how 
much… I know people who prepared projects, but didn’t follow through. 
They let it be. And they paid some money and were left without money. 
Or who wanted to have a pig farm and the poor guy bought the land and 
now he can’t sell it because land was very expensive at that time… and he 
can’t have the farm because he said there were some requirements to get 
the funds. (interview, Deputy Mayor, Village 7, July 2017)
Such a development strategy for attracting investors and more 
 inhabitants also showcases a high dependency on external funding. As 
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a result of selective out-migration and the implicit demographic shrink-
age and brain drain, peripheral villages do not have sufficient (and suf-
ficiently skilled) local work force to attract larger enterprises. Therefore, 
public officials plan to use available funds to invest in the admittedly 
lacking physical infrastructure and hope that this alone will strongly 
affect demographic and economic growth. Indeed, over the past years, 
all villages had seen major investments in basic infrastructure that was 
meant to improve local living conditions: paving main and secondary 
roads, trying to bring running water, sanitation system, internet lines, 
public lighting to as many corners of their village as possible. Some 
villages were more successful than others. In fact, the case study area 
suffers from a slow implementation of modern infrastructure, as is typ-
ical for peripheries (Bernt and Liebmann 2013), and only two of the 
villages are connected to gas pipelines, while three of them do not have 
access to running water. In the interviews, public officials stated their 
aim to provide all the necessities one could find in a city and hope that, 
with a better infrastructure, commuting could become more attractive 
to young adults who would otherwise choose out-migration. Also, in 
the case of villages closer to one of the cities, authorities plan to attract 
city dwellers and become suburbanised, thinking that a better con-
nection to the urban core could result in local development. They are 
encouraged here by an increase in the number of migrants returning:
What I foresee for the future, and I encourage them to relocate here: our 
village is not far away from Zalău […]. Many came from Zalău to settle 
down, building houses […]. And that makes me happy, this resettlement 
from the city here, even if pensioners are coming. (interview, Deputy 
Mayor, Village 7, July 2017)
Additionally, they hope that the improved infrastructure could make 
the villages more attractive to investors as well, who could then be 
somehow persuaded to locate there and create jobs:
We hope the village will develop, but we will see if any foreigners come 
with foreign capital… it would be good… We have many young people  
who have moved away from the village, because there are no jobs. 
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Around 100-200 have left the village permanently and I think that if for-
eign investments would come, they would stay here. (interview, Deputy 
Mayor, Village 8, July 2017)
This again highlights the dependency of the case study area to exter-
nal funding, as well as the limited political power that peripheries have 
in relation to national or European decision makers. But at the same 
time, it also shows how peripheries strategise local development in rela-
tion to their dominant centre. Without explicitly referring to functional 
urban areas, the public officials appear to argue in favour of such socio- 
spatial arrangements. It seems that they envision a stronger connection 
to a nearby urban core as a way to encourage commuting and discour-
age out-migration, with the implicit effects this would have on demo-
graphic shrinkage and ageing and on local budgets. Local leaders also 
expect that this strategy would generate additional economic spillovers, 
as investors would take better note of them, were there a better linkage 
between them and an economic centre. The fact that this strategy would 
also make them more dependent on that core does not seem to bother 
them.
4  Re-thinking the Tools for Local 
Development in Peripheries: Conclusions
The actor-centred approach that was employed in the present chap-
ter focuses on how at times of polarisation, selective out-migration 
and local development influence each other. The decision of locals to 
leave peripheries because of existing structural deficits translates into a 
decrease of local tax income, active population, local capacity for inno-
vation, and overall local capacities to secure a high quality of life for 
the inhabitants. This in turn motivates future cases of emigration and 
creates a vicious circle that reproduces peripherality. In the case study 
area analysed, locals had chosen to commute or to emigrate from 
peripheral villages in their pursuit for higher education, better skilled 
employment opportunities or higher income. Each specific strategy they 
employ in order to improve living conditions for themselves and their 
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family (commuting, internal migration, international migration or tem-
porary migration abroad) reveals different personal values and attach-
ments, and highlights how actors are affected in different ways by the 
various effects of peripheralisation. But the migration trajectories also 
expose the different scales of core-periphery dependency. The choices of 
destination show how peripheral villages are affected not only by nearby 
cities or the county seat Zalău, but also by regional urban centres, such 
as Oradea and Cluj-Napoca. It also highlights the peripheral position 
that Romania as a country occupies at the European scale.
Not being able to compete with urban cores or international destina-
tions in terms of educational and occupational opportunities, and avail-
able physical, social and cultural infrastructure, the peripheries analysed 
experience demographic shrinkage and ageing as a result of youth emigra-
tion. This affects their local budgets and their ability to maintain existing 
public facilities, making them increasingly dependent on external public 
funds, which are allocated through national or European programmes 
targeting specific investments, as determined by the issuing institu-
tion. However, these are not sufficient to bridge the increasing core- 
periphery gap. Empirical analysis has revealed that while all villages in the 
case study area struggle with the effects of peripheralisation, they do so in 
slightly varying ways and to different intensities. As a consequence, each 
village has specific deficits that are more urgent to address, and also dif-
ferent local potentials that could be developed through targeted action. 
Judging by the narratives of public officials, the policy tools they are uti-
lising at the moment do not enable them to address their most pressing 
issues in a systematic way, but rather push all villages towards similar 
strategies and solutions. In this context, a settlement can only hope that 
their specific issues will become the subject of the next line of funding. 
This is the reason the current chapter argues in favour of devising and 
effectively communicating policy tools that would strengthen the ability 
of local administrations to act autonomously, which would grant them 
more power in actively influencing how funds allocated for stimulating 
local development can be spent. Empirical findings have shown that 
more dialogue is needed between actors from peripheries and regional 
and national policymakers, in which the former should be given a more 
active role in shaping the policies that affect them.
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Notes
 1. For a more detailed view on the methodology employed to measure 
regional inequalities between the settlements of the North-West Region 
through statistical data, see Moldovan (2017).
 2. One of the two villages excluded from this analysis was described 
by public officials as having experienced a recent socio-economic 
increase: the population was growing, larger companies were attract-
ing commuters themselves, some agricultural entrepreneurs had 
made larger investments, and migration abroad was diminishing. 
The other excluded village did not experience such socio-economic 
 development. Locals there had pronounced pride in the local agri-
cultural tradition and a strong feeling of attachment to the village, 
which seems to keep villagers from emigrating or commuting in 
larger numbers.
 3. The fieldwork was organised in collaboration with the Faculty of 
Sociology from the Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca. Data were 
collected by a team of six researchers (including the author), who spoke 
with political leaders and administrative workers, and sixteen under-
graduate students, who completed their mandatory professional prac-
tice through this fieldwork by interviewing locals. All interviews were 
held in Romanian, relevant quotes have been translated into English.
 4. The position of secretary in Romanian local government refers to an 
official who holds responsibility for the general management of the 
town hall. A secretary organises and directly manages the activities of 
the local administration according to written provisions laid out by the 
mayor.
 5. The Bacalaureat is a national exam held in Romania after the 12th 
grade, after graduating from high school.
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 6. At the time of the interviews (2017), 1 EUR was worth about 4.56 
RON. So the amount mentioned, of 2000–2200 RON, is equivalent 
to 450–480 EUR, and represents about twice the minimum net wage, 
which at the time of the interview was set at 1065 RON.
 7. Regarding the sums of money, the respondent is comparing how long 
it would take to earn about 1000 EUR: one month abroad, and 4–5 
months in Sălaj. 1000 EUR seems to be the usual amount of money 
earned by temporary migrants, as this amount was mentioned by other 
respondents as well.
 8. The amount mentioned, of 4000–4500 RON, is equivalent to 900–
1000 EUR.
 9. In fact, Sălaj County has the second smallest estimated operational 
budget for County Councils and County Residences, for the 2014–2023 
Implementation period in the entire country (Cristea et al. 2017, 139).
 10. Emil Boc was the prime minister of Romania during 2008–2012.
 11. APIA stands for the Agency for Agricultural Payments and 
Interventions (in Romanian: Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru 
Agricultură).
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High unemployment rates, the falling availability of public trans-
portation, the shrinking quality of locally available education, local 
shops going out of business, the closing down of post offices, schools 
or kindergartens, and selective out-migration are all manifestations 
of peripheralisation, which particularly affect rural communities in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Rural settlements across CEE often 
struggle to find a development path that allows them to reverse these 
dynamics. In some cases, village-based initiatives aiming to counter-
act peripheralisation emerge from these settlements. This chapter looks 
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into two examples of such initiatives from Hungary and Romania. In 
each case, the projects were initiated and managed by the local authori-
ties—local mayors.
While developed by local authorities, we still consider these pro-
jects as community-owned. We acknowledge that they might not com-
ply entirely with the definition of a community-owned project in the 
end. However, given the CEE context, these initiatives dominate the 
landscape of local development projects and are the closest examples 
to a community-owned project one can find. Both the Hungarian and 
Romanian case emerged in areas where development policies failed to 
reverse processes of peripheralisation. Villages undergoing peripheralisa-
tion lose those inhabitants who could become drivers of community- 
based local development. On the other hand, local civil society is 
decreasingly involved in publicly funded, local development projects. 
For this reason, it is understandable why mayor-led projects dominate 
the landscape of local development in CEE. The question might rise 
though whether mayor-led development projects are capable of enabling 
locals to participate and actively shape local development projects. Our 
research looks closely into that since local participation is an integral 
part of locally driven development.
This research presents the development of community-owned 
projects from CEE and should be considered as complementary to the 
abundance of studies on community-owned initiatives from Western 
Europe (Hanley and Nevin 1999; ADAS Consulting 2003; Walker 
and Devine-Wright 2008; Hargreaves et al. 2013; Seyfang et al. 2013; 
Becker et al. 2017). It is therefore imperative to consider the develop-
ments from CEE in their own context, applying only to a certain degree 
the terminology and conceptualisations developed for similar studies 
in Western Europe.
M. Mihály 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of 
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Studying a Hungarian social and solidarity economy (SSE) initiative 
and a Romanian community-owned renewable energy project (REP), 
we are primarily interested in the following questions:
• What is the capacity of local initiatives to change the peripheralisa-
tion dynamics by enriching the capabilities of local actors to innovate 
and acquire broader economic and political power?
• To what extent do mayor-led, local development projects foster local 
participation?
• What can be improved or changed within the existing policy 
approach towards the development of community involvement in 
the process of local development, thus increasing the efficiency of 
 development policy?
While formulated separately, all three questions are interlinked and to 
answer any of them we would have to discuss the other two as well; 
thus, throughout our research we answer all of them combined. Further 
on, the chapter introduces our theoretical perspective and main norma-
tive argument followed by a short methodological outlook. The fourth 
and the fifth sections analyse the two cases of community initiatives 
from Hungary and Romania, respectively. The conclusion summarises 
the main findings and answers the main points raised in the introduc-
tion. In the last section we offer policy recommendations based on our 
theoretical and empirical materials.
2  Counteracting Peripheralisation Through 
Capability-Based Local Development?
Peripheralised spaces are often simultaneously affected by selective 
out-migration, shrinking public infrastructure and the decline of local 
economies. These different manifestations of peripheralisation amplify 
each other’s effects (Kühn 2015). To go against the various manifesta-
tions of peripheralisation, the traditional understanding of local develop-
ment needs to be questioned (Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013). 
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Economic concerns, such as growth, income and employment have 
historically dominated the concepts of local development (Armstrong 
and Taylor 2000; Pike et al. 2007). This traditional local development 
was commonly the subject of a top-down national spatial policy (Pike 
et al. 2006, 26), grounded in solid macro and micro economic theories 
(Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose 2011). The priority of economic devel-
opment left socio-environmental issues lagging (Winter 2016, 131) and 
contributed to further peripheralisation. Currently, a new approach to 
local development that brings local agency to the forefront is developing 
(see Eversole et al. 2014; Evans and Syrett 2007). In the analysis of our 
case studies we aim to go beyond the economic dimension of local devel-
opment and shed more light on local actors and better understand the 
social sustainability of local development projects.
We look at mayor-led local development projects through the lens 
of a capability approach to understand in what ways local development 
projects may (or may not) go against the processes of peripheralisation. 
Within the capability approach it is argued that even if the inhabit-
ants of peripheralised areas get marginalised, they have an agency and 
are capable of advocating their own interests. Therefore, they cannot be 
considered passive recipients of development projects (Sen 1999). For 
this reason, it is important in any local development project to build on 
the strategies of locals and make them capable of changing their desti-
nies and live with their opportunities (Gébert et al. 2016, 27). As Sen 
puts it: “Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help them-
selves and also to influence the world, and these matters are central to 
the process of development” (Sen 1999, 18). To advocate one’s own 
interests, one needs basic skills. For this reason, the inevitable element 
of capability-based local development is to eliminate shortages of cer-
tain skills. Thus the idea of empowerment is closely related to delib-
erative participation (Kesby 2005). For this reason we are particularly 
interested in the governance of local development initiatives. At the 
same time we are aware that for marginalised communities it is “often 
difficult to gain access to processes of political decision-making from 
which they may be culturally, educationally, and linguistically, as well 
as physically, remote” (Amin et al. 2002, 17). The exclusion of local 
citizens from processes of decision-making is striking in CEE. Mészáros, 
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a civilian and expert of local (community economy) development pro-
jects in Hungary describes the situation as follows:
Discussing trust between each other in an environment where decision- 
makers clearly do not trust the competencies of the locals is only theoreti-
cal. (Mészáros 2013, 93, translated by the authors).
The lack of involvement of citizens in decision-making during state 
socialism and later on during the post-socialist period has negatively 
influenced the development of CEE citizens’ civic engagement. Another 
reason for the low level of civic engagement could be that a high ratio 
of the population is at risk of poverty and social exclusion (37.3% in 
Romania and 28.2% in Hungary, Eurostat 2016, estimated data for 
2015). Those people who have been pushed to the periphery of a soci-
ety fear for their futures and put most of their energy into developing 
survival strategies for their everyday challenges. Expecting marginalised 
people to be societally engaged without supporting them may be unre-
alistic (Harkai 2006).
Civil society was oppressed during state socialism in CEE and did 
not become a real partner of the state in the post-socialist period either 
(Fekete et al. 2017). Compared to Western Europe, civil society is weak 
and underfinanced in CEE (Fekete et al. 2017; Ciepielewska-Kowalik 
et al. 2015; Defourny and Nyssens 2014). This already weak civil soci-
ety is further weakened through getting institutionally excluded from 
the public funding of local development projects (for Hungary see 
Kabai et al. 2012; Keller 2011). Mayors are local development actors 
who are capable of accessing governmental (EU and national) fund-
ing in local development policies. Therefore local development projects 
run by the local municipality are dominant in CEE. For this reason we 
decided to analyse two different types of local initiatives, both run by 
local municipalities from two different CEE countries.
Even though in our case study local initiatives are of different types 
and from different countries, the similarities between the challenges 
and opportunities encountered in both cases are striking. During our 
initial inquiry we were surprised by the way in which similar back-
ground dynamics were present in both cases, regardless of their type 
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or geographical location. While with a limited capacity for generalisa-
bility, our research presents a detailed account of the interplay between 
national policies and locally rooted initiatives. Without using compar-
ative methodology, we present a detailed account of each case, offer-
ing a clear understanding of common challenges and similar problems 
faced by local initiatives. Based on this understanding, we outline a 
series of public policy proposals that could address the main shortcom-
ings and serve as a guiding agenda for supporting local development 
initiatives.
3  Methodological Approach
We apply storytelling while communicating and conducting our 
research. Stories are central to human existence and, as Lewis (2011) 
argued, it may be beneficial to use storytelling in doing and communi-
cating research. Semi-structured interviews provided us a space to listen 
to the emerging stories of our interview partners and therefore “to give 
voice to the voiceless” (Lewis 2011, 506), but storytelling is also a better 
method of communicating our research to a wider audience.
3.1  Research Methods
In both cases, we conducted semi-structured interviews with all the 
involved actors which constituted the basis of our empirical data. 
This technique allowed us to translate main theoretical concepts into 
guiding questions while also giving the opportunity to keep an open 
mind regarding other possible points arising during the interviews. 
Complementary to that we used participant observation, secondary and 
primary statistical data in order to acquire a better understanding of the 
context before and while meeting with the interviewees.
For our interviews, we relied on a snowball sampling technique, 
using as an entry point the official manager/owner/responsible person 
from the project. From there on, we tried to map the entire population 
of involved actors by asking every interviewee to name another involved 
actor. We repeated the process until no new actors were mentioned.
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3.2  Case Selection
Despite the research methods being similar for the two projects, we 
applied a different means of case selection. The Hungarian case was 
selected using a two-step case selection method. First we identified the 
peripheralised areas, relying on existing research on regional polarisation 
(e.g. Koós 2015; Kovács 2010, 2012; Dusek et al. 2014; Pénzes 2015). 
After that, “best practice” bottom-up local development initiatives were 
selected by consulting 12 experts from the field of local development 
and SSE and by examining awards and “best practice” reports. Finally 
three cases were selected from those peripheralised villages of Hungary 
that had the highest deprivation index (Koós 2015). The first of the 
three selected cases, an organic village farm run by the local mayor, will 
be introduced in detail further on in this chapter.
The Romanian case was also selected using a two-step case selection 
method. First we mapped all the villages in which renewable energy 
projects (REPs) were being undertaken, but in doing so we relied on 
secondary statistical data. After that we used a phone questionnaire 
to get in contact with local authority representatives to find projects 
owned by the local community or projects in which the local commu-
nity had an important share. Only in 2 of the 68 localities with ongoing 
projects did the local community own the project. Since we are primar-
ily interested in bottom-up, locally based initiatives we chose to look 
closer at these two cases. As the technology-community interaction 
developed similarly in both villages, in this chapter only one REP will 
be presented. The story of Hustiu1 village highlights best the benefits 
and shortages that are common to both cases.
4  The Hungarian Case: The Organic Village 
Farm of Kispatak
The centralisation of local development in Hungary, which has been 
ongoing since the second half of the 1990s, had a negative impact on 
traditional civil society organisations (CSOs) and small- and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), particularly on their ability to access national and 
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EU funding for local development (for a detailed overview see Kabai 
et al. 2012; Keller 2011). Due to this centralisation process, civil and 
municipal actors ceased to be interdependent, as the latter gained privi-
leged access to funds for rural development and became unevenly repre-
sented in decision-making processes. Therefore, mayors of villages have 
higher chances of accessing national (such as workfare support) and 
international funding (such as EU funding), while traditional CSOs are 
struggling. As a consequence, mayor-led social and solidarity economy 
initiatives are dominant in remote, rural areas.
To overcome regional inequalities in the 2007–2013 financing period 
the 33 “least privileged micro-regions” (Leghátrányosabb helyzetű 
kistéréség, LHH) were privileged in accessing funding for rural devel-
opment (Government Decree no. 311/2007. [XI. 17.]). However, while 
the programme was successful in channelling more EU funding into 
peripheralised areas (Kabai et al. 2012) it was criticised, amongst oth-
ers, for privileging local mayors too much over other local actors. Czike 
(2011, 12) argues that the first period of the LHH Program became 
“the playground of the local mayors” and civilians, entrepreneurs or rep-
resentatives of Roma could not make their voice heard.
4.1  General Context and Case Description
To better understand the potential and shortcomings of SSE initia-
tives in the context of peripheralisation, a mayor-led project, an organic 
village farm, was purposefully selected from Kispatak,2 a small and 
remote village in Northern Hungary in one of the 33 “least privileged 
micro-regions” that were privileged in accessing public funding for rural 
development between 2007 and 2013.
The different manifestations of peripheralisation, including economic 
and infrastructural shrinking, have been amplifying each other’s effect 
in the village, making it less attractive to middle-class families. Due 
to the economic crisis in the years after the regime change, the agri-
cultural cooperative—which, as in many other villages of Hungary, 
was the main employer in Kispatak (see Kovách 2012)—needed to 
close down in the early 1990s. The likelihood of living in poverty in 
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Kispatak is particularly high compared to other settlements of Hungary 
(Koós 2015, see Map 1). Roma people, who are deeply affected by 
socio-spatial marginalisation in Hungary (Nagy et al. 2015), are over-
represented in the village. Based on the Community Intervention Plan, 
40% of Kispatak’s inhabitants are of Roma origin (Anonymised Source 
2011),3 while the ratio of Roma people at the national level is only 
3.2% (KSH 2013).
In 2007, the mayor of the village set up an organic farm to tackle 
long-term unemployment and poverty by giving the village a new pur-
pose. The mayor of Kispatak argues that the main challenge his vil-
lage faces is that it has lost its function, such as producing food for the 
 cities, something that is common for settlements of this size (Interview, 
Kispatak, 23 March 2016). For this reason, the mission of the initiative 
is to re-establish this function by producing healthy and environmen-
tally friendly organic food at reasonable prices. Through this activity 
Map 1 Settlement deprivation map of Hungary, 2011 (Source Koós 2015, 64). 
Kispatak (H1, indicated by Mihály) is located in an area where settlements with a 
high deprivation index are concentrated
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meaningful local employment4 would once again become available in 
the village.
The programme effectively started in 2012 with 25 local volunteers 
who cultivated 0.6 ha, and grew to 3.5 ha in 2015 and 30 paid employ-
ees. In 2012, organic vegetable and fruit production was supplemented 
with a village shop and handicrafts centre, a food processing manufac-
ture funded by a LEADER grant in 2013, and a herb processing manu-
facture funded by an ESF grant in 2014.
4.2  Potential and Shortcomings of the Project
4.2.1  Potential Outlined in Best Practice Reports
[The organic village farm project] became a best practice, not only in the 
region, but in the whole country. Parallel to this the local identity, the 
working culture, the self-esteem of the people has positively changed, 
which is a large step. (Katonáné Kovács et al. 2017, 6–19)
The organic village farm of Kispatak is widely regarded as a “success 
story” in academic and policymaking spheres.5 Articles written about 
the organic village farm emphasise that the locals do not wait for some-
one to solve their challenges. Instead, “they” take their own future in 
their hands. The question might arise whether “they” refers to the whole 
village or only to some inhabitants? Continuous development or growth 
was also emphasised in a Best Practice Report referring to the farm as a 
success story (Anonymised Source 2016).6 Specifically, growth in land 
(more land became available in the project), growth in the number of 
involved people and growth in the number of activities (the organic 
farm’s shop expanded to include handicrafts, food and herb processing) 
are highlighted. It may be argued though that the growth of the initia-
tive was not a success in itself, but the result of optimising the use of the 
resources (EU funding or workfare project), which were made available 
predominantly for mayors through rural development or employment 
policies.
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4.2.2  Dependency on Workfare Project
Of the three activation programmes (labour market training courses, 
wage subsidies and workfare programme), public employment (or 
workfare programme) is the one that explicitly aims to increase the 
employment of disadvantaged people (Fekete et al. 2017, 27). The pro-
gramme has grown rapidly in recent years, affecting thousands of peo-
ple. Workers in public employment are continuously settling into secure 
income, which is less than the minimum wage in Hungary. A public 
work employee earns 160 EUR net per month, while the official mini-
mum wage in Hungary was around 230 EUR net in 2016. Only 5% of 
programme participants have successfully settled in the primary labour 
market (Csoba and Nagy 2011). This is by far the worst result among 
active labour market instruments.
In the case of the organic village farm all employees are employed 
through public employment (of the total number of workfare employ-
ees in the village, 25 work in the organic farm). Only the two experts in 
sales and gardening are employed through normal labour contracts. By 
providing low-paid workfare employment for about 32%7 of its active 
population, the local municipality has become the largest employer 
in Kispatak.8 However the policy aim of public employment is to 
make local projects independent of public funding; activities financed 
through the public employment programme mainly mean savings of 
costs for the local municipalities (Váradi 2016, 30). Even though the 
organic village farm produces goods for the market and their earned 
income has nearly tripled in four years (from 3000 EUR in 2012 
to 8874 EUR in 2016), 2016 was the first year when the non-profit 
limited company could officially employ people through conventional 
labour contracts (the two experts).
From the perspective of the employers, who are mainly local munic-
ipalities,9 workfare projects provide a cheap local workforce, which is 
a competitive advantage over organisations that do not have access to 
workfare projects. Having privileged access to workfare employment, 
local municipalities can build products and provide services at lower 
costs than SMEs and traditional civil society organisations, which may 
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distort the market. Public work employment can be problematic from 
the perspective of long-term unemployed people also, as people who are 
employed in these kinds of SSE projects are paid low wages. The fact 
that the beneficiaries of the organic village farm must work for less than 
the minimum wage affects their motivation and self-esteem negatively 
(Field notes Kispatak, 11 May 2016).
4.2.3  Providing Meaningful Work for the Workfare Employees
The idea of the current workfare employment fits very limitedly with 
the capability-based approach. Since its reform in 2007/2008 pub-
lic employment has been increasingly embedded in “a turn towards an 
exclusionary social policy” (Zolnay 2013). People affected by poverty, 
who are often inhabitants of peripheralised rural areas, get stigmatised 
in “neoliberal”, “radical municipal” and “far right” discourses. Within 
these discourses people affected by poverty are seen as having had a 
choice in deciding whether they want to live from transfer payments or 
conventional employment (Zolnay 2013). Workfare employment was 
introduced to provide employment instead of social benefits to people 
affected by poverty. Practical experience in Hungary shows that local 
governments, the main local coordinators of workfare programmes, are 
not able to provide real work for less qualified public employees, and 
often recruit them for “pretend” work. The project of Kispatak devi-
ates from this practice and aims to provide meaningful work for the 
target group. Through their trading activity their aim is to become less 
dependent financially on public funding (Interview, Kispatak, 23 March 
2016).
4.2.4  Participation, Power and Decision-Making
Ethnographic fieldwork in Kispatak has revealed a certain degree of 
hierarchy between the three branches of the initiative. The organic gar-
den was subordinated to all other branches, such as handicrafts and 
sales, and fruit and vegetable processing. Those working in the different 
branches seemed to accept and confirm this hierarchy:
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During a visit to the handicraft house, Marika, an employee of the hand-
icraft and sales branch starts to tell her view about the work in Kispatak. 
According to her, the workers in the garden are the ones who did not per-
form ‘well enough’ to be moved from there. For that reason they had to 
stay in the garden. Marika does not like to work in the village garden due 
to the ‘crudeness’ of the people. They are always swearing, she says. (Field 
notes, Kispatak, 10 May 2016)
During a visit to Uncle Jenő, who is a Roma and leader of the work-
ers in the organic garden, we met his wife. His wife told us that she 
was able to “get out” of the organic garden due to her back pain. Now, 
her responsibility is to plant flowers in the public spaces of the village, 
which is a much “calmer” job, she said (Field notes, Kispatak, 11 May 
2016). In addition to Uncle Jenő’s wife, the workers in the organic gar-
den feel that working in the village garden is a punishment for them 
(Field notes, Kispatak, 11 May 2016).
Workers from all the different branches agreed that working outside 
of the organic garden is a somewhat privileged position. This might 
be problematic, as the garden is in the very heart of the organic village 
farm project, giving jobs for half of the project employees. Tensions 
inside the organic village farm could be curbed by providing an oppor-
tunity for people to rotate within the three different branches. Another 
way of easing these tensions would be to involve people more in the 
operation of the village farm, and later on to let them decide themselves 
in which branch they would like to work.
There are two contrasting views on how certain decisions are made 
in the organic village farm. The mayor argues that the municipality is 
responsible for securing financial and non-financial resources, but they 
let the experts decide on professional questions. However, one of the 
two experts on the farm shared a story that contrasted with the mayor’s 
description of decision-making processes:
Uncle Karcsi (gardening expert) showed me the farm’s lavenders. They were 
moved a few years ago. He told me that it had been a sore point for him 
that no one asked his opinion where the lavenders should be replanted 
when the decision was made. (Field notes, Kispatak, 11 May 2016)
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During our fieldwork in Kispatak we got the impression that the project 
was rather hierarchic and centred around the mayor, who has invested a 
lot of energy into the project taking on most of the responsibilities and 
control over the decisions. The mayor is the one who took the future 
of the village in his hands in the sense that he is the one who mainly 
defines the direction of local development (Interview, Kispatak, 23 
March 2016).
4.3  Kispatak, Lessons to Be Learnt
As a result of re-structuring the agricultural sector, the inhabitants of 
rural areas became particularly affected by the labour market crisis that 
characterised the early transition period. As there was a very limited 
number of alternatives for the unemployed to get a job locally, current 
local development strategies within CEE need to tackle long-term, in 
several cases generational, unemployment. Long-term unemployment, 
public funding and local development are interconnected in Hungary.
By initiating the project in Kispatak, the mayor gained access to 
national and EU funding and made it available for the community. 
National funding was channelled through the workfare project and 
covered employment costs, which are the main fixed costs of the ini-
tiative. EU funds contributed to the acquisition of most of the assets. 
Since 2010, Kispatak has been awarded around 600,000 EUR of EU 
funding for implementation of the project. Considering how neglected 
small and remote settlements were in the rural development policy dur-
ing socialism and after the regime change, the amount of EU funding 
that Kispatak had access to is justifiable. Nevertheless, it would be of 
particular importance to open up both project-based funding and fund-
ing on a statutory basis for local development actors other than mayors. 
CSOs or SMEs engaging in local development initiatives should also 
have equal access to national and international public funding.
In terms of social policy, studies on peripheralisation show that cit-
izens living in peripheralised rural areas cannot be considered exclu-
sively accountable for their poverty. It would be important therefore 
to transform policy more in line with the capability-based approach. 
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Considering that the workfare programme is expensive and ineffective 
in reaching its aim, namely the integration of long-term unemployed 
people into the labour market, the state could substitute the workfare 
programme with a framework to increase the capabilities of the inhabit-
ants of peripheralised areas. Apart from local municipalities, CSOs and 
SMEs should also become partners of the state in the (re-)integration 
of the inhabitants of peripheralised areas. All actors involved in local 
development processes (local municipalities, CSOs and SMEs) must 
have equal access to funding on a statutory basis. This funding could be 
given based on the number of long-term unemployed people that the 
organisation could employ.
5  The Romanian Case: A Renewable 
Energy Project
By researching the relationship between rural communities and REPs10 
in North-West Romania we expected to find some positive impact on 
rural development resulting from this relationship. After statistical anal-
ysis of large-N secondary data and the analysis of primary data from the 
questionnaire completed by local authorities, we found that REPs had 
no impact on the socio-economic indicators of the host communities. 
This finding goes against a significant stream of literature that argues 
that once implemented, REPs could serve as a source of local growth 
and development (OECD 2012; ADAS Consulting 2003; Del Rio and 
Burguillo 2008; Cuellar 2012). It was surprising to find that not only 
was there no sign of a positive impact, but the connection between the 
project and the local community was absent as well. Local authorities 
acknowledged the lack of any effect of the project on their well-being, 
highlighting also that they had little real interaction with the project 
so they do not expect any benefits for their community to start with. 
Of the 52 communities that had set up solar power projects, 2 local 
authorities had a completely different assessment of their relationship 
with the project and the project’s benefits for them. In both cases, local 
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authorities owned the solar power project and set each of them up by 
gaining access to EU structural funds.
Defining community renewable energy projects (COREPs) as pro-
jects “where communities (of place or interest) exhibit a high degree of 
ownership and control, […] benefiting collectively from the outcomes” 
(Seyfang et al. 2013), Becker, Kunze, and Vancea highlight a list of pos-
sible benefits brought by COREPs. Of them the most important are 
“addressing climate change, the overall reduction of energy consump-
tion, the protection of biodiversity, sustainable agriculture, a transition 
town agenda, or social justice and the empowerment of disadvantaged 
social groups […] increas[ing ] the acceptance of community energy 
schemes among the population” (Becker et al. 2017, 28). Building on 
that argument, we claim that the ownership of the project can have a 
serious and lasting impact on a community’s well-being by also influ-
encing local innovation capacity and political engagement. To observe 
whether it was true for the two community-owned projects we went to 
these communities and mapped their interaction with the project. The 
resulting story of the socio-technological interaction uncovers interest-
ing opportunities for alternative, sustainable development at the local 
level as well as major shortcomings preventing this development.
5.1  General Context: “Overall… It Looks Great”
In 2009, the Romanian government increased its support for renew-
able energy projects in order to achieve Europe 2020 goals (Directive 
2009/28/CE). The increased level of financial support led to an impres-
sive development of the renewable energy sector (Cebotari et al. 2017). 
The share of renewables11 in the power generation mix increased from 
less than 1% in 2010 to 11% in 2014.
The North-West region has the highest number of solar, hydro and 
biomass power projects, which means that within a general growing 
trend, the North-West leads in three of four major types of renewable 
energy generation technologies. Contrasted with quickly rising polarisa-
tion within the region (Benedek and Moldovan 2015), it represented an 
interesting case for our research.
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Development of the renewable energy sector is mostly due to a very 
generous green certificate support scheme (Legea 220 din 27/10/2008). 
It was private energy and non-energy actors who invested in renewable 
energy technologies in order to benefit from high energy prices as well 
as from green certificates.12
Wanting to capitalise more on the fast development of the renewa-
ble energy sector, in 2010 the government designed a different initia-
tive aimed at boosting renewable energy generation by encouraging 
community ownership of REPs. By offering financial assistance to rural 
authorities, policy-makers expected this initiative to encourage local 
authorities to develop their own project, through which they could 
reduce unemployment in rural areas, increase revenues to the local 
budget and include isolated communities in the national economic cir-
cuit (Organismul Intermediar Pentru Energie 2010a). This initiative is 
an alternative to green certificate allocation; however, the two are mutu-
ally exclusive, which means that if you accessed financial assistance for 
project deployment you cannot apply for green certificates, at least in 
the first five years of the project’s activity.
Of the 172 REPs registered in rural settlements in the North-West 
region, only two solar power projects owned by local authorities in 
rural settlements resulted from this initiative (Cebotari and Benedek 
2017; Transelectrica 2015). This result raises important questions 
regarding the policy’s efficiency. Given the good intentions and great 
opportunities for local communities, why do we have so few commu-
nity owned projects? And, more importantly, how are those projects 
performing?
5.2  Looking into Details: “Locally Owned Solar  
Power Project—Potential and Shortcomings”
5.2.1  Locally Owned Projects Without Local Involvement
To understand the co-evolution of REPs and the dynamics of local 
communities, semi-structured interviews were conducted with all local 
actors involved. Contrary to initial expectations, the mayor and the 
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vice-mayor of Hustiu were the only persons involved in the process of 
application, deployment and management of the project from the local 
community’s side. When applying for financial support, they contacted 
an external company from Oradea13 that put together the business case 
for the project on behalf of the community. Once confirmed, another 
private company from Cluj-Napoca14 set up the project. A third private 
company from Oradea is now in charge of management and daily activ-
ity of the project. So except the mayor and his team, there are no other 
local actors involved throughout any stages of the project. This initial 
finding was puzzling since community-owned projects should have a 
wider engagement of local actors.
5.2.2  Expected Benefits and Real Payoffs
When discussing the main reason for setting up a solar power project, 
the mayor mentioned that there were two complementary rationales: 
the necessity to decrease the community’s public energy spending and 
the opportunity to access EU funding. He did not expect the project 
to create local employment or more community engagement from 
local actors (Interview 1, Hustiu, 26 February 2016). According to 
Organismul Intermediar Pentru Energie, local authorities (i.e. the local 
mayor) are the only elective actors who can submit the application 
for a community-owned project15 and who can become the owner of 
the project (Organismul Intermediar Pentru Energie 2010b). The fact 
that the mayor did not expect the project to have any impact on local 
involvement has shaped the way in which the project was implemented. 
In addition, there is a clear disconnect between the goals of the support 
scheme, to create employment and local engagement, and the view of 
local authorities regarding the impact of the project.
However, the project helped Hustiu cut its annual public electricity 
related spending by 70%. These financial savings allowed larger flexi-
bility for the local budget and the mayor was able to invest in other 
local projects. Regardless of these benefits, the mayor said that, if given 
the chance, he would not proceed with the application again for two 
reasons. First, at the local level, the community did not appreciate the 
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effort to deploy the project and, second, at the national level the mayor 
had to fight a complex and unclear legislation in order to be able to 
implement the project.
As the mayor pointed out, no one really appreciated the work 
involved in setting up the project since “they saw no direct bene-
fit to their own pockets. Explaining to them that we could have bet-
ter side-walks or a renovated kindergarten does not work” (Interview 
1, Hustiu, 26 February 2016). The vice-mayor, however, confirmed 
that there was no strategy to communicate the results of the project to 
the wider community and that there were no other community actors 
involved in setting up the project because there was no need for that 
(Interview 2, Hustiu, 27 February 2016). Also, the private manager 
of the project said that he believed that there was no real connection 
between the authorities and the community when it came to discuss-
ing the activities and benefits of the project (Interview 3, Hustiu, 27 
February 2016).
At the national level, local authorities had to face a difficult challenge. 
While the project was set up in accordance with the guidelines set by 
the Ministry of Energy, those guidelines proved to be incompatible with 
the rules set by Transelectrica, Romania’s national transmission and bal-
ancing operator. The guidelines also contradict some of the regulations 
set by Romania’s national regulatory authority for energy (ANRE). As 
pointed out by the mayor, to avoid breaking the funding agreement and 
be able to benefit from the energy produced in the project, he had to 
travel several times to Bucharest and get special exemptions in order to 
operate legally. This negotiation process took more than nine months 
and proved to be quite difficult for the local authorities since it required 
in-depth knowledge of energy legislation (Interview 1, Hustiu, 26 
February 2016).
In this context, the community-owned project seems to be placed 
in between Bucharest and the local community. While the rural settle-
ment stands to benefit from the project, the central authorities establish 
the rules and norms and those can be negotiated or changed only in 
Bucharest. This leaves the members of the community outside of the 
project management scheme. There is no communication regarding the 
benefits of the project, no negotiation over the redistribution of those 
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benefits and no real debate over the project’s future development. As it 
stands, local authorities have to involve national regulators to negotiate 
local development while leaving local actors outside because they lack 
the time and resources.
5.3  Visible, Invisible and Lost Benefits
The mayor concluded that, apart from financial savings, which are an 
important gain for the local community, there are no other important 
benefits. If given another chance, the mayor would not take on this 
opportunity again because the amount of work invested in the deploy-
ment of the project was far more costly than the benefits.
Surprisingly, however, the mayor and his team were already work-
ing on another application for a micro-thermal plant project that 
would supply heating to all public buildings while also serving as a 
possible resource for a local thermal spa. He plans to make this invest-
ment partially from the local budget but most money will come from 
EU structural funds allocated through the national government. He 
saw no contradiction with his earlier comments because the new pro-
ject “will not be connected to the national grid, it will be operated 
locally, we don’t have to get involved with anyone from Bucharest, 
once approved it is with us, here, locally” (Interview 1, Hustiu, 26 
February 2016).
The concept the mayor was referring to is “distributed generation”, 
a strategy that allows the producer to consume the energy locally with-
out feeding it to the national grid. In this way, the mayor of Hustiu 
can avoid all the taxes and levies and manage the village’s own energy 
consumption and production, while also decreasing heating costs. This 
innovative practice is rooted in his experience with the solar power pro-
ject, an experience that produced more than simple financial savings. 
It offered local actors the possibility to learn the most efficient way of 
producing and consuming energy, forced them to negotiate benefits for 
their community at the central level and helped them to push their local 
agenda to national policymakers. In this respect, the solar power project 
has produced important indirect benefits for local authorities that have 
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learned to innovate in the field of energy, got engaged in the energy 
governance scheme and adapted their future development strategies 
accordingly.
However, there are lost opportunities as well. Due to both national 
regulations and local disinterest, local actors are still excluded from 
the development of REPs. This is a lost opportunity to increase com-
munity involvement, create employment opportunities, and develop a 
local network of entrepreneurs in the field of renewable energy technol-
ogies. This is the reason it is still too early to discuss sustainable develop-
ment enabled through renewable energy technologies. A proactive local 
authority can play an important role in promoting this type of develop-
ment, but without wider community involvement projects run the risk 
of being easily dumped once local authorities change.
6  Conclusions
While acknowledging the limitations of case studies and storytelling 
research, we still believe the two stories presented within this chapter 
offer an interesting and insightful perspective on local development. 
So in the end, what did these two cases reveal regarding the potential 
of local initiatives to reduce peripheralisation and what are the major 
shortcomings?
As we saw from both stories, mayor-led projects are not opened 
up to community participation. Since local authorities are favoured 
when it comes to accessing financing for such projects, it is hardly 
surprising that they also assume a leading role in project implemen-
tation. What is unsettling however is the lack of wider engagement 
of local actors, even at the individual level. While local authorities 
believe that they act on behalf of the community, they do not make 
any visible effort to engage wider participation and ensure growing 
potential throughout the community. As argued in the theoretical sec-
tion of this chapter, we view wide community engagement crucial 
for locally led development in order to counteract peripheralisation 
dynamics.
274     S. Cebotari and M. Mihály
Despite this important drawback, we acknowledge that in the spe-
cific economic and social context of CEE, these two cases represent 
the best of what’s possible in terms of community projects. Accepting 
this reality, we argue that local decision-makers used the existing pol-
icy framework to lay the foundations of a locally-rooted initiative that 
brought financial and non-financial benefits to the local community. 
Moreover, these projects have positive externalities that could impact 
peripheralisation processes in the long run, the most important of 
which being the increasing capacity of local authorities to negotiate 
with national and regional authorities to shape projects to their own 
needs and the innovative thinking which allowed them to integrate 
the project within the local landscape without breaking the funding 
agreement.
To summarise, the projects as they are now have had little to no 
impact on deeply rooted peripheralisation dynamics. Nevertheless cer-
tain changes that occurred through the two projects might offer some 
foundation on which innovation and wider engagement can develop. 
Current, mayor-led projects are closed to the public and not adapted 
for wide community engagement; therefore they have limited capacity 
for empowerment. If this challenge can be overcome, the projects may 
have a better potential to reverse peripheralisation dynamics in those 
communities.
These two cases are interesting examples of the mismatch between 
existing conceptualisation of community-owned projects in Western 
Europe and the practical situation in CEE countries. Both cases offer 
a good example of an intermediary stage of development, one in which 
the projects are bound to local communities and are not led by the 
central government or private actors, but are still halfway towards a 
wider, participative community engagement. Our contribution takes a 
bottom-up perspective and considers that in times of rising polarisation 
local development should be primarily connected to local communities. 
In this respect, our main contribution to the field lies in the problema-
tisation of two main aspects: first, what is a community initiative in the 
context of CEE as compared to the examples from Western Europe and, 
second, can we still consider these types of projects promising for locally 
rooted development?
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7  Policy Recommendations
Based on our empirical and theoretical work, we have formulated some 
policy recommendations to address the main shortcomings of existing 
national policies. While different with respect to the wider contexts 
and the specific fields of activity, both stories have several important 
cross-cutting dimensions that could serve as foundations for public pol-
icy recommendations.
7.1  Reconceptualising “Local Community”
Existing policies have a static and rigid understanding of local commu-
nities. As we saw in both cases, existing legislation favours local authori-
ties, thus it is the local mayor who decides whether a community should 
pursue a project or not. This is the reason alternative local actors (NGOs, 
SMEs, CSOs, informal citizen groups) are deprived of the possibility to 
participate and access financial resources to implement local projects. To 
change this situation we have to address the following challenges:
7.1.1  Redefine Local Communities
All policy initiatives that address rural communities have to enlarge 
their understanding of “community”. Actors such as local SMEs, CSOs 
or local NGOs should be accepted to apply for governmental funding 
alongside or in cooperation with local authorities. Enlarging the num-
ber of elective actors can ensure wider participation of local communi-
ties, diversity of proposals and higher levels of approval for the projects 
to be implemented.
7.1.2  Accessibility of Funding (EU and Governmental)
Once the notion of community is widened, we have to make sure that 
all relevant actors have equal access to funding. In this respect, public 
policies that aim to encourage local community projects have to allow 
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a wider range of actors to apply and benefit from funding. Moreover, 
we would argue that successful implementation of a community-owned 
project requires wide and diversified participation of local actors, and 
projects that bring together different community actors should be 
encouraged.
7.2  Policymaking Is a Two-Way Street
When discussing local development, we have to acknowledge the 
importance of local actors and the direct beneficiaries of public policy. 
The current policymaking structures in Romania and Hungary, which 
are guided by a top-down logic, have to be re-organised to put the per-
spective of local actors at the forefront.
An important change to the existing legislation would be to trans-
form the policymaking process by means of a bi-directional mechanism 
primarily rooted in input from the local community. In order to ensure 
the required and timely input, any policymaking process should include 
local actors during three distinct stages: policy design, midterm evalua-
tion and policy adaptation.
7.2.1  Policy Design
Before implementing such a change, we need to understand the 
resources and capacities of local actors. The existing policy discourse fol-
lows presumed causal models that are not connected to local realities. 
Given the fact that the processes of peripheralisation destroy social and 
human capital, we should engage experts to first focus on creating pol-
icies that contribute to the re-building of local human and social cap-
ital and then set the context for a participative policymaking process. 
Any policy encouraging local development first has to target the devel-
opment of inclusive human and social capital by promoting knowledge 
generation at the local level.
Considering the lack or availability of local human capital, any policy 
on local development should start with public discussion of the initia-
tive. Public debates should take place in communities targeted by the 
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policy so that all possible stakeholders have the opportunity to influence 
the policy. With broad involvement of local actors, policymakers could 
succeed in acquiring the needed local knowledge and input while also 
ensuring wider public support.
7.2.2  Policy Evaluation
Following this initial phase, the primary beneficiaries of the policy 
should evaluate it. There could be different methods to collect feedback 
from local actors, but all those methods should rely on information 
from a wide range of actors. By involving the local community in pol-
icy review and evaluation, policymakers would secure feedback directly 
from the source and would have the possibility to compare locally 
sourced data with large-N statistical data.
7.2.3  Policy Review and Change
Based on such a midterm evaluation, policies should be revised and 
adapted and during this policy correction process local actors play a 
central role because they can provide feedback on the policy’s effects 
and inside information on how to improve the efficiency of the 
policy.
By involving local actors in policymaking and review processes, the 
real needs of the community will be assessed accurately.
Notes
 1. The name of the village was changed.
 2. The name of the village and the actors of the initiative have been 
altered.
 3. Anonymised citations are used to protect the anonymity of the case 
study selected.
 4. Based on the interview (Interview, Kispatak, 23 March 2016) with the 
local mayor, the word “meaningful” was also used by him.
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 5. Two of the 12 experts that we contacted referred to the village farm as an 
example of good practice in counteracting the processes of peripherali-
sation. When searching for the project on Google Scholar, we identified 
ten scientific articles that referred to the project as good practice, while 
six of the these ten articles argued that the initiative was socially inno-
vative. Three different policy recommendations on social economy and 
sustainable rural development highlighted the farm as good practice.
 6. A Best Practice Report was prepared and labelled “best practice” by 
Hungarian scholars and practitioners. It was aimed at decision-makers 
in the field of sustainable rural development.
 7. Own compilation, based on KSH 2011 data and Kajner et al. (2013).
 8. As a result, unemployment in the village (4.35%) is lower than the 
national average (NGM 2015).
 9. Apart from local municipalities, religious institutions and CSOs are 
also entitled to employ people through the government’s Public Work 
Program (Frey 2007).
 10. This chapter looks specifically at solar power projects. North-West 
Romania has the highest number of solar power projects imple-
mented at the national level while solar power technology seems to 
be the most popular within the region as well. The high number of 
cases offers a good possibility for comparison and cross-case analysis. 
Complementary to that, the only two community owned REPs are also 
solar power projects.
 11. Much of the electricity generated in Romania comes from hydro-
power plants. Even though hydro-generation is considered a renewable 
energy source, according to Romanian legislation only hydro-power 
plants with a maximum installed capacity of 10 MW are entitled to 
the renewable energy support scheme. In this context, renewable energy 
in this chapter refers to all types of renewable energy sources, exclud-
ing hydro-power plants with an installed capacity greater than 10 MW 
unless otherwise stated.
 12. The government allocates green certificates to all registered production 
units that deliver renewable energy to the national grid. Producers can 
sell these certificates later on to suppliers of energy who have to prove 
that a part of their energy comes from renewable energy sources.
 13. Oradea a city on the border with Hungary and the seat of Bihor county.
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 14. Cluj-Napoca is the second biggest city in Romania and is the “unoffi-
cial” regional centre for the North-West region.
 15. An association of local authorities (asociatie de dezvoltare intracomuni-
tara) can also apply for financing. This association however is composed 
of local authorities, so in the end it is still the mayor who takes the final 
decision.
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This chapter investigates the innovation activities of two low-tech 
 manufacturing firms located in South Estonia and the Erzgebirgskreis 
in Saxony (Germany). These settings, facing population decline, rel-
ative economic stagnation and a geographical outside location, are 
referred to as peripheral regions in the context of this chapter. The con-
ceptual point of departure relates to the question of how firm-internal 
capacities and network linkages drive firm innovation, coexist and 
operate as mechanisms to circumvent the structural shortcomings 
of regional settings. Informed by dominant theoretical debates in 
economic geography and innovation studies peripheral regions are 
widely perceived as lacking the potential for sophisticated firm inno-
vation. Departing from the concept of agglomeration advantages (van 
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der Panne 2004), the understanding is that a critical mass of relevant 
actors and resources drive firm innovation. Thus, dense metropolitan 
regions in which diverse actors and heterogeneous functions concen-
trate provide the most conducive conditions for innovation (Tödtling 
and Trippl 2005). They constitute productive arenas for face-to-face 
interaction and thereby for the exchange of spatially sticky tacit knowl-
edge (Gertler 2003). These perspectives emphasise distinctive agglomer-
ation arguments within the debate on knowledge, innovation and space 
(Ibert 2007), thereby implicitly and explicitly portraying larger city 
regions as innovation hotspots (Florida et al. 2017). Nonetheless, recent 
scholarship affirms that innovative firms also reside in peripheral regions 
(e.g. Rodríguez-Pose and Fitjar 2013; Grillitsch and Nilsson 2015), 
suggesting their capacity to bypass thin regional environments and to 
moderate the additional complexities they might induce. This chapter 
presents two in-depth investigations of innovation projects (‘zooming 
in’) and links their particular findings to the wider empirical basis of the 
research project (‘zooming out’). Thereby, this chapter adds to emerging 
accounts on innovation in peripheral settings and provides insights that 
allow us to better understand how firms located in peripheral regions 
pursue and organise innovation activities.
2  Conceptualising Firm Innovation
Baregheh et al. (2009, 1334) define innovation as the ‘multi-stage 
 processes whereby organisations transform ideas into new/improved 
products, services and processes’. Departing from this definition, three 
theoretical building blocks constitute the understanding of innovation 
adopted in this chapter and will be briefly outlined in the  following 
paragraphs: process orientation, knowledge foundation and interac-
tion. The two latter aspects form the basis for a more elaborate con-
ceptual discussion that informs the chapter’s analytical perspectives 
(Fig. 1).
The process nature of innovation involves a particular evolution-
ary understanding. Innovation is directed by the state-of-the art in 
respective fields and builds, to varying degrees, on existing capacities 
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and awareness levels of the organisations and individuals involved. 
Consequently, organisations build capacities and progress in their 
respective markets by pursuing innovation activities (Fagerberg 
2006).
Innovation-centred debates in economic geography highlight the crit-
ical role knowledge takes on in associated transformation processes. This 
knowledge foundation relates to learning processes which are considered 
key for successful innovation (Gilly and Torre 2000). The shift towards 
an increasingly knowledge-based economy (Lundvall and Johnson 
1994) corroborates the function of knowledge as the central resource 
and in particular the premium assigned to highly contextualised tacit 
knowledge (Gertler 2003). This knowledge grounded nature of innova-
tion is driven by resources and capacities internal and external to firms 
(Edquist 2006).
Acquisition of external capacities links up with the interactive nature 
of innovation. Confronted with increasing complexities, innovation 
does typically not happen in isolation (Fagerberg 2006; Shearmur 
2012). Interaction is pivotal for successful innovation as it provides 
Fig. 1 Conceptualising firm innovation (own elaboration)
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access to external resources that help to moderate associated complexi-
ties (Nonaka 1994). Furthermore, interactivity provides a lens to con-
sider innovation as social, cultural and relational practice (Malecki and 
Tootle 1996; Welz 2003). The following sections provide a brief con-
ceptual discussion by linking these theoretical building blocks to the 
notions of firm-internal capacities and networks.
2.1  Internal Capacities
The critical role of firm-internal capacities for knowledge creation, 
learning and innovation is frequently emphasised (e.g. Edquist 2006). 
It is widely accepted that firm competitiveness is significantly driven by 
internal resources and how they are coordinated (Taylor and Asheim 
2001). Firms can be perceived as unique bundles of resources such as 
technological capabilities, production experiences and organisational 
routines, specific human resources or the existing customer base which 
collectively ensure competitiveness (Foss 1997; Flåten et al. 2015). 
Thus, firms become generators and processors of knowledge that draw 
capacities from embedded learning and the particular routines that 
shape the distinct characteristics of firms’ knowledge bases (Taylor and 
Asheim 2001). Concerning the focus of this contribution on firms 
operating from peripheral, i.e. structurally challenging regional settings, 
it can be argued that firm-internal resources are of great importance for 
maintaining innovative capacity, as firms cannot rely so much on rich 
and diverse resources available locally.
However, while substantially driving innovation, firm-internal capac-
ities alone are not sufficient. Relations for instance to suppliers and 
customers, research and educational institutions, state agencies and 
chambers are considered central mechanisms through which firms 
access external resources and expertise. Yet, the capacity of firms to rec-
ognise and internalise external knowledge from different sources and 
localities is understood to rely on their internal capacities (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990).
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2.2  Networks
Firm networks can be broadly defined as ‘nodes and links connecting 
these nodes, in order to facilitate interactions among agents’ (Johansson 
and Quigley 2003, 165). Networks are constituted by complex 
interactions amongst individuals and organisations and considered 
resources-rich arrangements (Copus and Skuras 2006). Networks pro-
vide central means to access external knowledge and mediate com-
plexities, thereby becoming fundamental aspects of innovation-related 
practices (Rammert 1997; Fitjar and Rodríguez-Posé 2016). Malecki 
and Tootle (1996) suggest a pragmatic distinction between trade net-
works, concerned with formalised exchange of goods and services, and 
knowledge networks, constituted by flows of information and knowl-
edge. Knowledge-intensive and learning-oriented linkages between 
partners are in particular understood to ground on high degrees of 
reciprocity and trust and, thus, to induce mutually active partnership 
(Ozman 2009). Although distinctions between different types of net-
work ties appear analytically useful, trade and knowledge related links 
might overlap in reality. Firms are embedded into various overlap-
ping and mutually influencing contexts which surface as multi-layered 
relations and interactions of various kinds. It is therefore proposed to 
perceive networks systemically, as coordinated and ongoing sets of eco-
nomic and non-economic relations (Dubois 2013). This understanding 
implies an inherently dynamic and fluid nature of networks: new links 
between actors evolve, existing links reproduce, alter or might disappear 
over time (Ter Wal and Boschma 2009).
Network perspectives allow us to shed light on how actors interact in 
and with their various environments and, importantly, how actors con-
struct their specific environment(s) needed for innovation (Jakobsen and 
Lorentzen 2015). This chapter explores the linkages and networks firms 
from peripheral regions mobilise as part of their innovation endeavours. 
For these firms, networks are considered potential means to compensate 
for structural shortcomings of regional settings such as lacking agglom-
eration advantages (Johansson and Quigley 2003). Thereby, networks 
offer an approach to extend the role of geographical proximity and actor 
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co-location, prominently inscribed in influential conceptions of dynamic 
regional economies (Moulaert and Sekia 2003), with spatially less restric-
tive perspectives. This chapter does not deny the potentially easing role 
of co-location and face-to-face interaction for knowledge creation and 
innovation. However, it is increasingly recognised that actor proximity 
can also be organised temporarily or virtually without compromising 
interaction quality (Torre 2008; Maskell 2014). More recently it also has 
been suggested that the interaction requirements of firms differ and that 
firms with lower interaction needs might choose to reside outside dense 
city regions (Shearmur and Doloreux 2016).
3  Methods and Data
This chapter mostly draws on interviews with firm representatives. 
Inspired by the innovation biographies approach (Butzin and Widmaier 
2016) interviews explored concrete innovation projects. Interviews 
with individuals from the management level (CEOs, technical manag-
ers, etc.) grant access to information on decision-making and strategic 
considerations. To ensure direct observation, interviews were conducted 
in the workplace of respondents. Descriptions provided by interviewees 
were enriched and validated by triangulating data from media coverage 
and internet sources. The empirical material was used to reconstruct 
central elements and assertive dynamics of investigated innovation 
projects.
The analytical proceedings of this study rely on a multiple-case 
approach (Yin 2014), i.e. detailed investigations which shed light on 
the main phenomenon of interest (innovation) and the specific contexts 
in which this phenomenon occurs. Studying multiple cases in-depth 
allows us to detect similarities and differences, reduces the risk of chance 
associations, and thereby increases the scope for analytical generalisa-
tion (Eisenhardt 1989). Following an embedded case design, this chap-
ter integrates the unit of specific innovation projects as well as the firm 
level. Variation sampling was used to construct a heterogeneous sample 
of different types of innovative firms located in differently structured 
peripheral settings, potentially allowing to draw conclusions beyond the 
contingencies adhering to individual cases.
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4  Research Contexts: Regional Starting 
Points and Low-Tech Manufacturing
The cases investigated as part of this chapter are located in different 
regional contexts, the Erzgebirgskreis in Saxony (Germany) and South 
Estonia.1 Maps 1 and 2 provide overviews on the case study regions and 
the location of cases. Although differently structured the study regions 
share, with reference to their respective macro contexts, exposure to soci-
oeconomic challenges such as population decline, relative economic stag-
nation and a geographical outside location (see Table 1). Following Kühn 
et al. (2016), such challenges are considered indications of ongoing 
peripheralisation processes.
Both study regions are characterised by long traditions of manufac-
turing industries which continue to provide a major economic base. The 
significance of manufacturing corresponds to a relatively low impor-
tance of service sectors. Most relevant manufacturing activities in the 
Erzgebirgskreis, formerly an important mining region, are metal pro-
duction and processing, mechanical and electrical engineering as well as 
food processing. Case 1 in Sect. 5.1 illustrates an innovation project by 
a shaving equipment manufacturer. It relates to the historical legacy of 
the brush-making industry within this part of the Erzgebirge, which can 
be traced back to the eighteenth century. During its peak in the nine-
teenth and twentieth century, the region hosted multiple brush manu-
facturers, including small family businesses and large manufacturers. Up 
until today, a number of companies active in brush- and broom- making 
reside within the region. Structurally important industries in South 
Estonia are wood processing, furniture manufacturing, electronics and 
the food sector. Additionally, forestry and agriculture retain importance 
in South Estonia with its share in value added exceeding 14%. Case 2 
in Sect. 5.1 presents an innovation project implemented by a company 
from the food sector.
Given the importance of manufacturing activities in both study 
regions, the sectoral focus is on innovation in low-tech and medium 
low-tech (LMT) manufacturing. Although not necessarily on top of 
innovation policy agendas, LMT manufacturing continues to have 
substantial economic importance and is, e.g. through buyer-supplier 
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Map 1 Case study area and location of cases in the Erzgebirgskreis
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relations, highly interwoven with high-tech industries (Hansen and 
Winther 2011). Due to the characteristics of innovation in LMT man-
ufacturing, e.g. generation of incremental rather than disruptive inno-
vation, focus on experienced-based knowledge rather than science and 
R&D (Hirsch-Kreinsen 2008), the innovation capacities of LMT sec-
tors appear ‘overlooked and possibly misjudged’ (ibid., 12). Explicitly 
focusing on innovation in LMT manufacturing, the chapter addresses 
existing sectoral biases in innovation studies and provides insights into 
the innovation dynamics of activities that bear economic relevance for 
many peripheral regions.
Map 2 Case study areas and location of cases in South Estonia
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5  Firm Strategies and Practices
This section presents detailed insights from two information rich 
cases studied as part of a wider research project. Case 1 from the 
Erzgebirgskreis draws on interaction with numerous external part-
ners while the Estonian case exhibits just a few external linkages. 
Although both firms show differences along demographic indicators 
(see Table 2), associated knowledge bases and regional settings, the 
subsequent analysis reveals a number of similar mechanisms mobi-
lised for innovation as well as implicit and explicit strategies to bypass 
certain shortcomings. Section 5.2 provides a discussion of the specific 
cases, and zooms out to draw a more comprehensive picture of find-
ings by selectively referring to further cases investigated as part of wider 
research.
5.1  Zooming In: Detailed Case Explorations
5.1.1  Case 1: MÜHLE2
The company behind the MÜHLE brand was established in 1945 in 
the village of Hundshübel in the western part of today’s Erzgebirgskreis. 
After expropriation in 1972, the firm was re-privatised in 1990. At the 
time of the interview MÜHLE, initially manufacturing shaving brushes 
but now producing a comprehensive range of shaving accessories, had 
73 employees, annual sales of approx. 12.5 million EUR and an export 
ratio of 70%.
Design quality, sustainability, manual production, family ownership 
and a high in-house production depth are portrayed as MÜHLE’s main 
features and as crucial elements for maintaining its leading market 
position. Over the past 7–8 years, MÜHLE has experienced a period 
of dynamic growth during which turnover trebled. These dynamics are, 
amongst others, linked to the strategy of gradually expanding in-house 
production depth and the exploitation of new marketing potentials 
offered by the internet. Accordingly, MÜHLE extensively uses online 
marketing channels and social media.
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Developing a New Product Range
The CEO and co-owner depicts the innovation activities of the com-
pany as a ‘marathon’ during which various processes require coordi-
nation: e.g. monitoring and identification of market potentials and 
technological solutions, elaboration and implementation of design 
specifications, etc. Typically, innovation within MÜHLE draws on 
Picture 1 MÜHLE premises in Hundshübel (picture by author)
Picture 2 Illustration of MÜHLE’s product range (courtesy by MÜHLE)
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extensive monitoring and research activities in technology and design 
related fields, without necessarily having a precise product idea in 
mind. This case study investigates the development of a new prod-
uct range. The origins of this innovation project can be traced back 
to long-term technology monitoring activities, lasting for 5–6 years. 
This monitoring was driven by intentions to reduce production costs 
and to widen sales opportunities by implementing new technol-
ogy solutions. Metal injection moulding (MIM) replaced conven-
tional machining methods in the manufacturing process of stainless 
steel parts, resulting in substantial cost reductions. Although MIM 
technology itself is long established, it is rarely applied for delicate 
design-oriented items—such as safety razors and shaving brushes. 
Accordingly, only a few companies master the complex technology 
for such specific applications.
After identifying the leading company in the field, based in Baden-
Württemberg, MÜHLE engaged in a loose but mutually very open 
and rather long-lasting technical consultation process, involving 
repeated on-site visits and telephone communication. At this early 
stage, practical consulting with the leading player was considered cru-
cial regarding learning about the technology and thereby identifying 
its potentials:
They showed me what is doable with the technology regarding decorative 
applications and I realised that this is indeed something future-oriented 
for us, potentially affecting wider parts of our product range. (Interview, 
Hundshübel, 9 February 2017)
Subsequently, it was decided to integrate MIM into the develop-
ment of a new, stainless steel-based product range. In this context, an 
important decision by MÜHLE was to collaborate with a known local 
partner experienced in injection moulding—although using rather con-
ventional plastics-based applications—to anchor the new technology 
within the region. This decision was guided by the rationale that being 
geographically close and familiar eases the handling of associated com-
plexities and upcoming issues:
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We were very interested to establish the technology with a partner from 
the region […]. Although they didn’t know the specific method, they 
were very interested, and we decided to go ahead together. […] Because I 
see the potential for our wider product range, I thought it is good to pro-
ceed with a local partner. We know each other and we have short ways. 
(Interview, Hundshübel, 9 February 2017)
Collaborating with this local partner involved close coordination to 
find solutions for upcoming technical issues. During this process, the 
local technology partner further consulted with external actors. Based 
on continuous efforts of adapting the technology to the specific require-
ments needed, these joint activities induced successive learning, ulti-
mately facilitating the launch of the new series in autumn 2016. Even 
though, due to some persistent technical issues, production started in 
‘homeopathic quantities’. At some point in the process of better under-
standing and adapting MIM technology, specifications for the new 
product series were elaborated. At this stage an industrial designer from 
Meißen (Saxony) with whom MÜHLE has an established and trusted 
relation, joined the development, closely liaising with both MÜHLE 
and the technology partner. The designer’s contribution to the devel-
opment concerned elaboration of the industrial design, thereby bring-
ing in specific capacities such as CAD and 3D design applications. 
Coordination of these technological and design-related features between 
the different partners is described as a complementary ‘ping-pong’ 
game, suggesting frequent and iterative exchange, eased by familiarity 
and rather short distances between the partners. Thereby MÜHLE’s 
goal to not only progress technologically but at the same time to create 
products with specific usability features were realised. Besides these cen-
tral partners, the development further involved a supplier of birch bark. 
This material was perceived as a valuable component to create holisti-
cally innovative products, combining new technologies, new materials 
and a distinct, progressive design. The final partner, a manufacturer 
of specialised sand-blasting equipment based in the Chemnitz region, 
got involved in the surface finishing stage in the production process. 
Instead of outsourcing the finishing process to this partner, MÜHLE, 
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after consulting with the supplier, came to a financial arrangement to 
integrate the technology within the firm, thereby further expanding its 
specific in-house production depth. Figure 2 provides an ego-centred 
network map.3
Firm-Level Strategies
Going beyond this specific innovation process, the MÜHLE case pro-
vides additional insights in terms of wider firm strategies to bypass 
shortcomings of the regional environment. The interviewee links such 
shortcomings mainly to the notion of physical distance to larger cities/
main markets, considered central for marketing activities but also as 
sources of design-related inspiration:
Fig. 2 Network map of MÜHLE’s development
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If our production were in Leipzig or Berlin, a lot more would be feasible 
in terms of co-operations, we would have more buzz in our showroom, 
we could host cultural events in our production facilities. This is more 
difficult here. (Interview, Hundshübel, 9 February 2017)
To compensate for these specific shortcomings MÜHLE has adopted 
a number of strategies related to widening the firm network. Firstly, 
comprehensive activities in terms of virtual and (social) media mar-
keting were started (including an online shop, presences on Facebook 
and Instagram, a dedicated (printed) company magazine). Secondly, 
as a major piece of its marketing strategy MÜHLE opened a flagship 
store in Berlin in 2014, constituting in itself a significant organisational 
innovation by which market distance was reduced and the firm network 
expanded:
With the flagship store in Berlin we can reach people a lot easier and 
present as well as transport our brand very differently. (Interview, 
Hundshübel, 9 February 2017)
Additionally, high levels of mobility and membership in initiatives—
such as the ‘Association of German Manufactories’ or the ‘German 
Design Council’—ensure co-presence and exchange with relevant 
actors, customers and suppliers, as well as the influx of inspiration and 
ideas from various fields. At the same time, however, MÜHLE’s loca-
tion in the Erzgebirge plays a crucial role for brand identity and authen-
ticity, succinctly expressed by the interviewee:
for me, MÜHLE only works here in the Erzgebirge, separating the two is 
somewhat unthinkable. (Interview, Hundshübel, 9 February 2017)
5.1.2  Case 2: OSKAR4
OSKAR, a meat processing company, was established in 1992 in the 
village of Saarepeedi in Viljandi County. OSKAR has around 100 
employees and its sales of approx. 7.3 million EUR are exclusively 
304     M. Graffenberger
generated in Estonia. OSKAR is a small player in the highly competi-
tive and de-regulated Estonian meat market which is largely dominated 
by Finnish companies/brands. Despite its small size, OSKAR is mar-
ket leader in multiple product categories and has in the past frequently 
acted as a ‘pioneer ’, by introducing new products in niches that were 
eventually adopted by competitors and thereby diffused more widely. 
A recent strategic re-orientation has been a focus on high-priced prod-
ucts, resulting in substantially increased sales, while processed quantities 
remained stable. According to the interviewees, OSKAR further differ-
entiates itself from competitors in a number of ways, e.g. by rejecting 
controversial technologies (such as MSM5) or by manufacturing prod-
ucts with high meat contents.
Development of ‘Green Label’ Products
The term ‘green label’ refers to a product assortment which does not 
contain artificial additives (‘E-free’), first launched in 2009.6 The devel-
opment was mainly driven by two intertwined factors: first, fierce com-
petition in the Estonian meat market, which was facilitated for instance 
by using MSM technology to achieve lower prices, and, second, by hav-
ing a public discourse on more healthy and natural nutrition. Within 
this field of tension products free of artificial additives were identified 
as a potential niche and considered a ‘logical’ progression for OSKAR, 
Picture 3 OSKAR premises in Saarepeedi (picture by author)
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as the technological pre-requisites for such products closely aligned with 
OSKAR’s manufacturing practices:
As we have never used MSM raw material, our products have anyway a 
high meat content. Which is what you need to produce E-free products. 
If you have too much fat, water or starch there is no way to keep the 
product in one piece. […]. So removing E-numbers from products was a 
logical next step for us. (Interview, Saarepeedi, 14 January 2016)
Lacking specialised technological knowledge, OSKAR needed to 
acquire external technological knowledge, in particular natural substi-
tutes for artificial additives and recipes for their application to kick-start 
development. Consequently, OSKAR went through an iterative con-
sultancy process with different European suppliers, finally acquiring 
technology from a leading firm based in Germany. Key to successful 
product development was combining the technological tools acquired 
with internal practical knowledge and experiences, in particular of 
OSKAR’s food technologists. Rather than acquiring a ready-to-use 
 technology, substantial adaptations were necessary to meet the desired 
product specifications regarding taste, texture and visual appearance:
We had to accommodate components and recipes to our conditions, and 
sometimes we got different results. So we had to find ways to get good 
results. […]. We had to combine their knowledge and our knowledge. 
[…]. We were testing every day to find out which compounds work.  
The components are not always working as sales representatives say, so 
you have to test and test all over again, which is time-consuming and 
expensive. (Interview, Saarepeedi, 14 January 2016)
This iterative firm-internal process took about six months, at the end 
of which the first product was finalised. Subsequently, the ‘green label’ 
assortment gradually expanded, with each of the individual products 
requiring specific iterative circles. Product development was followed 
by marketing activities, including elaboration of suitable packaging, 
creation of the indicative ‘green label’ and, importantly, the process of 
building trust and authenticity with consumers:
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There was a certain discussion with our first product, also from the 
media. They didn’t understand the E-free products. […]. It was hard for 
us to get the customers to trust our product, it maybe took a year until 
people accepted the concept. (Interview, Saarepeedi, 14 January 2016)
The launch of a ‘green label’ product assortment coincided with a gather-
ing of the Estonian meat industry, during which products were presented. 
According to anecdotal evidence provided by the interviewees, competi-
tors mostly reacted with incomprehension. However, this reaction illus-
trates the way OSKAR moved away from conventional industry practices, 
thereby opening a particular market niche. As the interviewees report, by 
now most competitors have introduced their own E-free product ranges. 
Figure 3 provides another ego-centred network map.
Fig. 3 Network map of OSKAR’s ‘green label’ development
12 Bypassing Structural Shortcomings: Innovative Firms …     307
Firm-Level Strategies
The ‘green label’ project illustrates the importance of  firm-internal, 
practical expertise for effective assimilation of externally acquired 
knowledge. Going beyond the development outlined above, the impor-
tance of internal expertise is also evident at the wider firm level. In addi-
tion to emphasising the importance of specialised food technologists for 
product development, OSKAR’s range of internal capacities also relates, 
for instance, to the construction of specific manufacturing equipment 
by technicians. These highlight the comprehensive in-house manufac-
turing depth available to OSKAR:
We even build our equipment. We have excellent guys in-house who pro-
duce equipment for new technologies. Thereby we can test at a small scale 
and then make larger equipment for producing larger quantities later on. 
(Interview, Saarepeedi, 14 January 2016)
Being exclusively active in the Estonian market, distance to its primary 
market Tallinn is described as somewhat problematic and associated 
with high transaction costs. At the same time, it is crucial to be visi-
ble on the Estonian market, despite having only limited resources for 
marketing. In this respect OSKAR’s participation in national trade fairs 
(food and non-food related) and organising supermarket demos and 
tastings allows the firm to generate visibility and partially bridge the dis-
tances to main markets:
Trade fairs in Estonia are a good place for us to get in touch with end- 
consumers. There are lots of experts but also normal people who are sim-
ply interested in what we show. […]. The main reason for us to go to fairs 
is to catch the end-consumer. (Interview, Saarepeedi, 14 January 2016)
5.2  Zooming Out: Discussion and Cross-Case 
Reflections
The illustration of two innovation projects of firms from different 
peripheral contexts underpins the importance of (i) network linkages to 
external partners to acquire knowledge/expertise and (ii) firm-internal 
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capacities. Both appear as decisive and intertwined mechanisms that 
facilitate firms’ innovation endeavours. Each of the cases presented 
reflects different facets on how this coupling might operate. MÜHLE 
mostly draws on acquiring specific technological expertise through pur-
posefully built relations and further mobilises existing linkages to inte-
grate this expertise into the firm. While internal capacities facilitate 
this integration process, network mechanisms prevail. In developing 
‘green label’ products, OSKAR primarily utilises internal practice-based 
expertise to adapt externally acquired knowledge to its specific require-
ments. This coupling can be understood along the lines of Cohen and 
Levinthal’s (1990, 128) conception of absorptive capacity which posits 
the capability of firms to ‘recognise the value of new, external informa-
tion, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends’ as a critical innova-
tion resource.
Considering the larger set of cases investigated as part of the wider 
research affirms the importance of diverse in-house production and 
experience-based capacities (e.g. ERZ1, ERZ2, ERZ3, ERZ7 | EE1, 
EE5, EE10) as well as their strategic expansion (e.g. ERZ3, ERZ13 
| EE11) for maintaining competitiveness and innovation potential. 
For instance, ERZ2, a case manufacturer, maintains departments for 
model construction, mould making and a sewing unit—which, col-
lectively, ensure a high level of in-house production capacities and, 
thereby, increase the firm’s readiness to handle emerging requests flex-
ibly. In addition to expanding technological capabilities as illustrated 
by the MÜHLE case, in-house production can further expand by 
internalising the preparation of technical drawings rather than buy-
ing them in as external services (EE11), or by establishing of new 
distribution channels directly targeting end-customers (e.g. ERZ3, 
ERZ13). Maintaining extensive and further diversifying in-house pro-
duction capacities enhances flexibility and reduces dependency on 
external partners. Thereby, firms build self-sufficiency which comple-
ments the acquisition of innovation relevant knowledge from exter-
nal and extra-regional sources. Thus, building internal capacities 
along various dimensions can be considered a strategy of firms from 
peripheral regions to compensate for lacking relevant knowledge avail-
able regionally, which, at the same time, reduces firms’ interaction 
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requirements. These indications confirm recent research by 
Flåten et al. (2015) who argue that strong internal capacities, built by 
workplace-learning, constitute central factors for the competitiveness 
of firms in ‘thin’ Norwegian regions. Consequently, this research con-
tributes to a more nuanced understanding of the factors that shape 
the innovation capacity of firms from peripheral regions active in 
LMT manufacturing: the firms investigated as part of this study tend 
to rely on diverse and multifaceted internal capabilities, coupled with 
multi-scalar external linkages—including local and non-local con-
tacts. These observations deviate from the seemingly established norm 
on how innovation in contemporary knowledge economies is organ-
ised, i.e. by focusing on core-competencies and knowledge sourcing 
from local partners (Flåten et al. 2015). Nevertheless, as this research 
illustrates, these practices induce organisational learning—which 
in MÜHLE’s case, by anchoring technological capacities within 
the region, expands to a distinct regional and inter-organisational 
dimension.
Focusing on the wider firm level reveals mechanisms by which firms 
manage distances to primary markets or knowledge sources. Such mech-
anisms operate for instance by establishing permanent outposts in rel-
evant hotspots, or the generation of temporary co-presence via high 
levels of mobility and trade fair participation. Following Maskell’s 
(2014) conceptualisation, MÜHLE’s flagship store can, while being pri-
marily a particular marketing tool, be understood as a ‘listening post ’. 
Such an observatory, strategically established as a subsidiary in one 
of the most relevant hotspots for MÜHLE (Berlin), offers the poten-
tial to identify relevant knowledge and informal information (e.g. spe-
cific demands, trends, perceptions, etc.) directly from consumers and 
industry players. It thereby contributes to the identification of relevant 
market developments. While such a flagship store certainly represents 
a special example, the importance of trade and consumer fairs is fre-
quently referred to across cases. Besides their role regarding marketing, 
fairs are widely considered arenas to make contact and to source rele-
vant knowledge (e.g. ERZ2, ERZ9, ERZ12 | EE1, EE3, EE4, EE7). 
For instance, during trade fairs, ERZ2, ERZ9 and EE4 established 
initial contacts with actors which, subsequently, became pivotal for 
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innovation projects as either initiators (ERZ2, ERZ9) or collaboration 
partners (EE4). Therefore, it can be assumed that the peculiar ecology 
of such settings offers firms productive means to overcome distance and 
to benefit from organised and temporary centrality.
6  Conclusions and Implications
The empirical material presented in this chapter demonstrates that in 
order to maintain innovation capacity and competitiveness firms operat-
ing from peripheral regions benefit from a twin strategy. This strategy is 
composed of (i) building internal capacities such as in-house production 
depth and absorptive capacity and (ii) sourcing knowledge and exper-
tise at different scales through established as well as newly built network 
ties. These strategies, implicitly and explicitly, work as mechanisms to 
bypass some of the structural shortcomings of peripheral regions. These 
mechanisms emerge as directive principles, although their coupling and 
balancing varies between and is contingent upon individual cases and 
the characteristics of projects and firms.
Expanding firm-internal capacities and associated knowledge bases 
increases the demand of firms for qualified labour and specific human 
resources. Therefore, in the long run this particular strategy might result 
in rising pressures to find adequate personnel. Especially when consid-
ering the challenging demographic developments (ageing, continued 
out-migration, etc.) many peripheral regions currently are and will be 
confronted with in the future. A substantial number of firms as well as 
regional development actors interviewed as part of the wider research 
indicate pressures arising from tensed local labour markets—and the 
issue of recruiting qualified staff is likely to gain even more relevance 
in the future. To satisfy demand, it will be most important for firms to 
build attractiveness and visibility—regarding both soft aspects such as 
employability as well as hard (e.g. monetary) incentives. Building long-
term visibility and attractiveness within and beyond regions requires 
coordinated strategies involving private actors, intermediaries such as 
economic promotion agencies, business chambers and associations as 
well as educational institutions. Facilitating such coordination processes 
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needs to be a priority of and should be further encouraged by regional 
decision takers and policymakers.
This research echoes previous studies (e.g. North and Smallbone 
2006; Townsend et al. 2016) which emphasise the importance of access 
to high-quality information and telecommunication technologies 
(ICTs) for businesses located in peripheral regions. Increasingly digital-
ised economies rely on powerful ICT infrastructure for networking and 
marketing, standard working routines and upcoming shifts related to 
automation and data exchange (e.g. industry 4.0). Thus, if adopted, the 
provision of high-performance (digital) infrastructures can effectively 
support businesses from peripheral regions to access wider resources, 
enlarge networks, expand their reach and ultimately to mitigate isola-
tion and distance (Townsend et al. 2016). Yet, peripheral regions are 
frequently excluded from access to high-capacity ICTs and ‘discrimi-
nated against by investments in the telecommunication infrastructure 
because of the relatively low and dispersed nature of demand’ (North 
and Smallbone 2006, 52), fuelling the digital divide in technology land-
scapes (Townsend et al. 2016). Many firms consulted in this research 
use tools such as online procurement and marketing, social media and 
sophisticated virtual communication/co-development practices as part 
of their daily business and strategic innovation routines. However, firms 
from the Erzgebirgskreis in Germany, in particular, perceive the state of 
their ICT landscape as a distinct ‘anachronism ’ and an inhibiting fac-
tor for competitiveness and business development. Thus, in the context 
of ongoing peripheralisation processes, this chapter argues that the pro-
vision of spatially inclusive access to high-performance ICT must be 
considered a major component of (national) infrastructural as well as 
regional development policy.
Finally, Faulconbridge’s (2017) reflection on relational policy 
approaches offers valuable links in light of the previously presented find-
ings. This study corroborates the role of actor mobility and the multi- 
scalar organisation of networks in the innovation activities of firms 
from peripheral regions. It can therefore be suggested that regional 
development and innovation policy should strive for measures that 
promote both local/regional as well as (inter)national connections—
rather than pursuing local innovation and the promotion of localised 
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networks as guiding imperatives of relational policy. Policy initiatives 
that take into account the mobility of innovators and encourage firms 
from peripheral regions to participate in (in)formal networks, trade 
fairs and industry conventions etc., can effectively support the forma-
tion of multi-scalar relations, allowing firms to exchange/acquire inno-
vation-relevant expertise from a broad and dispersed range of actors. 
Instruments that support for instance trade fair participation, currently 
maintained by funding agencies in both Saxony and Estonia, could be 
further strengthened, but need, at the same time, better promotion to 
become more widely recognised amongst potential beneficiaries: firms 
from peripheral regions.
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Notes
1. In this study‚ South Estonia is referred to as the area consisting of the 
counties Põlvamaa, Võrumaa, Valgamaa and Viljandimaa.
2. This account is grounded on one interview with MÜHLE’s co-owner, 
mainly responsible for product development. Quotes were translated 
from German. For validation purposes, this section was cross-checked by 
the interviewee.
3. Read clockwise starting at 12:00 hours, the network maps in Figs. 2 and 
3 capture the order in which the networks evolved.
4. This account is grounded on a joint interview with the company’s CEO 
and its chief technologist.
5. MSM (mechanically separated meat) is a method by which leftover meat 
scraps are harvested using mechanical tools to remove remaining pieces 
of meat from animal carcasses. MSM does not count towards the meat 
content of final products.
6. OSKAR markets these products using a ‘green label’, which is prominently 
positioned in green on the product’s packaging. The label says ‘E-vaba’ 
(translated as ‘E-free’), indicating the product is free of such substances 
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as artificial colouring agents, preservatives, emulsifiers, stabilisers, flavour 
enhancers, etc. which, if used, must be indicated as ‘E-codes’ on conven-
tional products. ‘Green label’ is a marketing tool by OSKAR and does not 
have official recognition by Estonian regulative bodies.
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In recent years, the focus of debates on suitable responses to 
peripheralisation has increasingly shifted from structural factors of 
regional polarisation to the practices and room for manoeuvre of the 
local actors subjected to it (Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013; Kay 
et al. 2012; Nugin and Trell 2015; PoSCoPP 2015; Timár and Velkey 
2016). This emphasis on approaches that focus on the agency of local 
actors has been particularly prominent in the literature on socio- spatial 
ascriptions (Bürk et al. 2012; Lang 2013; Meyer and Miggelbrink 
2013; Paasi 1995; Wacquant et al. 2014) and place leadership practices 
(Horlings and Marsden 2010; Hidle and Normann 2013; and others) 
that intensely discuss leading through image making as a potential 
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development strategy (for example Paasi 2013; Raagmaa 2002; Semian 
and Chromý 2014). While the latter certainly plays a crucial role in 
attempts to overcome territorial stigmatisation—constituting an inher-
ent part of peripheralisation—this chapter questions whether this new 
focus on agency in the form of active image making also represents a 
suitable response strategy for rural areas1 facing structural disadvantages 
while simultaneously being encouraged to act as resilient places, pro-
actively fighting those very disadvantages (Bristow 2010; Fischer-Tahir 
and Naumann 2013; Kay et al. 2012).
This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted in four rural areas 
of Estonia between 2015 and 2017, as part of the Marie Curie 
Initial Training Network ‘Socio-economic and Political Responses to 
Regional Polarisation in Central and Eastern Europe’ (RegPol2). It 
critically scrutinises the potential agency of place leaders to actively 
shape structurally disadvantaged areas through image making. 
Following the ongoing neoliberalisation of regional policy along the 
lines of competitiveness and economic growth, rural areas are increas-
ingly urged to perform as active ‘place-sellers’ (Bristow 2010, 160; 
PoSCoPP 2015; Woods 2013). In the same vein, the local leaders 
in our four case study areas, which are subject to both material and 
discursive peripheralisation, also turned to image making and place 
marketing as ways to overcome these processes and enhance regional 
development. The case studies included the following municipal-
ities: Järva-Jaani in Central Estonia, the Island of Kihnu in Western 
Estonia, as well as the newly amalgamated Setomaa2 and Tõrva 
municipalities (northern part of Valga County) in Southern Estonia 
(for an overview see Map 1). The local decision makers in these areas 
built on the promises of consumption-oriented place promotion and 
post-productivist entrepreneurialism that is encouraged by success-
ful best practice examples usually located in structurally advantaged 
urban areas (Bristow 2005; Shearmur 2012). However, due to the 
rapid trend of (sub)urbanisation in Central and Eastern Europe in 
general, and Estonia in particular, rural areas have been increasingly 
subjected to the processes of material peripheralisation. These have 
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resulted in tangible structural disadvantages such as socio-economic 
decline, selective out-migration and institutional thinness (Leetmaa 
et al. 2013; Nugin and Trell 2015; PoSCoPP 2015). Like other rural 
areas in post-socialist space (Kay et al. 2012), our case study areas are, 
moreover, confronted with considerable discursive peripheralisa-
tion. Whereas in Setomaa and Kihnu Island this takes the form of a 
struggle with territorial stigmatisation, Järva-Jaani and Valga County 
(including Tõrva municipality) are dealing with the issue of invisi-
bility. Against this backdrop of great material and discursive periph-
eralisation, the question arises as to whether this new focus on place 
leadership and active image making can really fulfil its promises with 
regards to regional development.
Our case studies convey the limits of such agency-based approaches 
in structurally disadvantaged rural areas. While leading through image 
making may function as a possible solution to challenges of regional 
Map 1 Case study areas (Illustration by Grete Kindel)
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polarisation, these examples show that it may also bring about new 
problems of idealisation and responsibilisation through urging local 
leaders to take on ever-growing responsibilities for coping with material 
and discursive peripheralisation. These challenges faced by rural place 
leaders do not only result in a shift of responsibilities from the national 
to the local level due to a heroisation of local agency, but also precipitate 
neglect of the structurally difficult context in which these response strat-
egies are supposed to take place.
As the chapter will reflect upon, this new focus on agency also has 
consequences for researchers who wish to make sense of leadership and 
image making, since they are also agents in those very processes they 
aim to understand. After introducing the debate on the development 
potential of leadership through image making, we therefore, move on 
to discuss the challenges experienced by local leaders who attempt to 
put these agency-based approaches into practice and the implications 
they have on the research process. Our analysis builds on 66 interviews 
conducted with local and regional decision makers and community 
leaders representing the fields of politics, administration, entrepreneur-
ship, culture, media, tourism and social work (including youth work 
such as education and sports). These people are well known locally for 
their engagement with these issues. However, it is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to analyse all interviews and participant observations (for 
a detailed analysis, see Grootens 2018; Plüschke-Altof 2018), hence 
only a selection of these are used in this chapter. They illustrate the chal-
lenges facing local actors engaging in leadership through image making, 
a situation widely found in other rural areas in Estonia, Central and 
Eastern Europe and beyond. Table 1 gives an overview of the inter-
viewees represented in this chapter. In order to ensure their anonymity, 
the names have been changed. Moreover, for the same reason, the table 
only indicates their fields and regions of activity and not the concrete 
functions they fulfil in the case study areas. Through this analysis, we 
show the complexity of acting in peripheralised rural places. This also 
questions the focus on agency-based solutions in contexts of structural 
disadvantage.
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2  The Potential to Act in Times 
of Peripheralisation: Leading  
Through Image Making
Increasing regional polarisation in Central and Eastern Europe and 
beyond has attracted the attention of researchers trying to make sense 
of these processes from diverse theoretical standpoints (see Kühn 2015; 
PoSCoPP 2015 for overview). For some time, this debate has focused 
on the structural difficulties to which peripheral places are subjected, 
thereby depicting local actors as passive and receptive (Kay et al. 2012). 
Recent scholarship has, however, started to analyse these processes with 
the help of a more relational approach conceptualising peripheralisation 
as a multi-scalar, multi-level and, above all, contingent process that can 
only be understood in relation to its counterpart of centralisation (Keim 
2006; Kühn 2015; PoSCoPP 2015). By focusing on the (re-)produc-
tion of uneven spatial developments, this approach urges us to question 
Table 1 List of interview partners (Illustration by the authors)
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why certain types of spaces, such as the rural areas studied here, are 
more prone to peripheralisation than others (Keim 2006). While not 
all rural areas are necessarily peripheral, rurality is often associated with 
peripherality, mirroring not only existing material difficulties but also 
the dominant stigmatisation of rural places, especially in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013; Kay et al. 2012; 
Plüschke-Altof 2016). Moreover, as a processual concept, peripheralisa-
tion has the potential to include the room for manoeuvre of local actors 
(Kühn 2015). The re-emphasising of agency in these often structurally 
defined contexts connects to the ideas of Massey (2004) who, among 
others, warns against the danger of ignoring agency in places and merely 
seeing them as victims of distant global processes (re-)produced some-
where else in space. Following the recent popularity of agency-based 
approaches, these are instead considered as room of negotiation or 
power struggles, and potential sites of agency by influencing local-global 
relations (Massey 2004; Woods 2007; Kay et al. 2012).
One way of conceptualising this room for manoeuvre in a regional 
development context is prevalent in the concept of place leadership. 
This concept departs from a focus on studying static heroised individ-
uals seen as leaders. Instead, it centres more on leadership as ‘a mul-
ti-actor process of place-making’ (Mabey and Freeman 2010, 509). 
Leadership, in this reading, is not necessarily seen as an individual activ-
ity but as a multi-faceted process of formal and informal actors oper-
ating within and beyond place boundaries in an attempt to improve 
economic—and potentially other—outcomes (Beer and Clower 2013; 
Sotarauta et al. 2012). Going beyond studying formal leadership only, 
practised by mayors or governors, place leadership in this sense can 
also entail the actions of non-elected leaders, such as cultural activists 
or entrepreneurs, among others. In other words, the concept of lead-
ership widens our understanding of place leaders, which can there-
fore, include all those actors purposively working towards improving 
their places. Despite the critique of the concept that it suffers from 
‘conceptual confusion and endemic vagueness’ (Alvesson and Spicer 
2012, 369) and its rather functionalistic and normative tendency 
towards measurable outcomes (Mabey and Freeman 2010), place 
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leadership thus has the potential to highlight the role of agency in the 
development of places. Rodríguez-Pose (2013) even goes so far as to 
consider leadership the missing factor in explaining why some regions 
grow and others do not.
It is not only in the literature that leadership is usually seen as positive 
in itself and openly appreciated, but in our fieldwork this was also visible, 
as one of our field notes from a visit to Kihnu Island by the Minister for 
Rural Life illustrates. For him, ‘local leadership of regional development is 
extremely important; it’s the only counterweight to the central authority.’3 
He highlights the role of leadership in institutionally thin regions subjected 
to the consequences of centralisation, which is also echoed in the academic 
literature (Beer and Clower 2013). In policy discourse, as Estonia’s plans 
for using EU Structural Funds between 2014 and 2020 show, a belief in 
the importance of human agency can also be witnessed. Framed under the 
umbrella of enhancing administrative capacity, training events are organ-
ised for public sector officials and actors working with NGOs and social 
partners (Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Estonia 2014). In our 
interviews, leadership was often understood as positive engagement with 
communities and connected to activeness in these communities. As Kulno 
from Järva-Jaani mentioned, ‘I really participate in every event, because 
first of all I am [working at the school]. It is my example for the students 
[to show] how everything should be done.’ This open appreciation of lead-
ership and activeness for the communities in the areas studied makes it 
clear that these concepts are not only theoretically recognised as essential, 
but also practically appreciated by actors living in these regions.
Alongside place leadership, also the importance of socio-spatial dis-
courses has been acknowledged in the research on regional polarisation 
and peripheralisation. Since the cultural turn in human geography, a 
growing body of literature has focused on the discursive dimension of 
regional polarisation. On the one hand, it largely concentrates on the 
meaning that communicative processes have for the evolution and per-
sistence of peripheralisation processes (Bürk et al. 2012; Lang 2013; 
Meyer and Miggelbrink 2013; Paasi 1995; Wacquant et al. 2014), espe-
cially in rural areas (Kay et al. 2012). On the other, it treats regional 
images as ways of dealing with peripheralisation, or as so-called 
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soft development factors. These can be employed as external market-
ing tools or as an endogenous resource to strengthen social capital in a 
region (Paasi 2013; Semian and Chromý 2014). Despite acknowledging 
the power of images that tend to stick to places by influencing individ-
ual as well as collective actions (Bürk et al. 2012; Wacquant et al. 2014), 
the literature also highlights the agency of people and places to nego-
tiate the images they are subjected to (Meyer and Miggelbrink 2013; 
Valentine 2007).
In the research on place marketing and place making in particular, 
there is a strong focus on ‘proactive localities’ (Leetmaa et al. 2013, 17) 
that has also inspired the debates in our Estonian case studies and con-
sequently trickled down into numerous national and local development 
plans (Agan and Kask 2009; Raagmaa 2002). The local leadership in 
these areas became aware of the crucial role that images might play for 
their place development in two different ways. While Kihnu Island and 
Setomaa previously struggled with processes of territorial stigmatisa-
tion ranging from a feeling of neglect to the tangible loss of potential 
investors in the region, Järva-Jaani and Valga instead encountered the 
problem of invisibility or of being ‘blank spaces on the map’. The con-
clusions that they drew from these differing experiences were, however, 
very similar. The cultural activist Toomas from Setomaa and teacher 
Kulno from Järva-Jaani noted that they ‘seriously reconsidered things 
and then decided that the orientation had to be changed’ (Toomas) and 
from that point ‘do whatever it [takes] to be in the big picture, to be in 
the big plan’ (Kulno). Hence, they opted for the response strategy of 
active image making, which Bürk et al. (2012, 339) describe as ‘trying 
to prove the opposite.’ It means that local actors acknowledge the neg-
ative images ascribed to their region and turn them on their head to 
create positive ones. This kind of image reversal is one of the most com-
mon response strategies to ‘discursive act[s] of peripheralization’ (Bürk 
2013, 169). It stands in contrast to the other most common responses: 
that of reproducing negative ascriptions, which might lead to a feeling 
of hopelessness among the locals, and that of an absolute rejection of 
the ascribed socio-spatial images (Bürk et al. 2012).
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3  Unexpected Challenges? Responsibilisation 
and Idealisation
Leadership and image making have thus been discussed as agency-based 
approaches with the potential for a better understanding of peripher-
alisation processes and dealing with them. However, while offering an 
alternative to a structurally determined conceptualisation of place devel-
opment, this new focus on agency also poses unexpected challenges for 
local actors in structurally disadvantaged rural areas who try to put these 
response strategies into practice.
A central challenge local actors experience when trying to react to 
the backdrop of a new regional policy focus on leadership and agency 
is the accompanying shift of responsibilities from the national to the 
local level. In our case studies, it became clear how local actors are urged 
to take over ever more responsibilities from the state under the veil of 
active citizenship. For example, during one fieldwork visit, the local 
entrepreneur Jaagup was confronted with this kind of responsibilisation 
by national politicians paying a visit to the Setomaa region. After he 
had extensively reported to them on the enormous efforts undertaken 
by local activists to overcome regional peripheralisation, the politicians 
replied with an appraisal of local activism while simultaneously suggest-
ing there should be an increase in the number of such active people in 
order to boost regional development. Jaagup then replied by emphasis-
ing that his time is, in fact, limited and that his ‘wife might also like 
to see him once in a while.’ Hence, while the politicians drew on a 
discourse that shifts the responsibility for regional development away 
from the state to the regions themselves, Jaagup pointed out the conse-
quences this focus on place leadership have for the personal lives of the 
people who take over these responsibilities. The problem of local activ-
ists ‘terribly overburdening themselves,’ as Setomaa journalist and cul-
tural activist Greeta phrased it, has been an issue in all of our four case 
studies. In a broader sense, the case studies thus point to the neoliberal 
promotion of rural leadership as, in fact, propagating a ‘broader “self-
help” ethos’ that urges local actors to take on state responsibilities while 
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simultaneously downplaying the individual burdens that come with it 
(Kroehn et al. 2010, 498).
The neoliberal appraisal of leaders taking on responsibilities (and 
simultaneous denial of the price they pay for it) has a further downside: 
the blaming of people who are either unable or unwilling to take on 
these responsibilities. In our case studies, this blaming often took the 
form of a division between the active and the non-active. For example, 
Greeta and Toomas, two cultural activists from Setomaa, criticise the 
non-active as not being willing ‘to take on any kind of responsibility.’ 
Liis, a social worker from Järva-Jaani, criticises unemployed people, say-
ing that, ‘they are the kind of people that don’t want to go and work.’ 
Priit, one of Kihnu’s political leaders, went so far as to make the fol-
lowing request from the interviewer: ‘if you have any active people who 
want to live on a small island, then send them here.’
In line with the research on territorial stigmatisation (Bürk et al. 
2012; Wacquant et al. 2014), this simultaneous appreciation of active-
ness and a lack of understanding for the non-active usually goes hand-
in-hand with a depiction of the social pathologies of the latter who are 
portrayed variously as development-resistant alcoholics, social welfare 
abusers or Soviet nostalgics with personal initiative levels ‘close to zero’ 
(Toomas). Imbi, a cultural activist from Valga region, puts it this way:
Work? Oh yeah, there are so many out there who are searching for 
employees. This is what they say. There used to be a lack of employment, 
now there is a lack of employees. Because the state benefits those lazy peo-
ple who are sitting dust to dawn in the park with their bottles of beer. 
Gives them money, and they don’t go to work. (Interview, Valgamaa, 23 
November 2016)
The strong focus on leadership and active coping, therefore, does not 
only lead to the placing of responsibilities onto local actors, but also 
to the disqualification of those who are unable or unwilling to meet 
these normative standards. Thus, there is an interesting ambiguity here 
that mirrors how local actors are also deeply embedded in neoliberal-
ised (regional) development discourses. On the one hand, they take a 
critical stance towards local responsibilisation by emphasising the price 
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they pay for taking on responsibility for regional development. On the 
other, they reproduce these discourses by setting themselves as positive 
role models of leadership and activeness and blaming and responsibilis-
ing exactly those among the local population who cannot partake in the 
new development and cannot live up to these roles.
Apart from the issue of responsibilisation, which highlights the use-
fulness of some actors and the ascribed uselessness of others, we also 
encountered practices of idealisation. The attempts to overcome territo-
rial stigmatisation with active image making often result in a purely pos-
itive portrayal of the place through which structural disadvantages fade 
into the background. Ragnar from Setomaa and Airi from Kihnu—
both active in the field of entrepreneurship—also acknowledged that, 
due to image campaigns, ‘from outside we look better than we actually 
are’ (Ragnar) and ‘if we want them to see how poor we are […], then it 
is possible,’ but ‘no one wants to do that’ (Airi). Further, when talking 
to entrepreneur Artur and politician Robert, from Järva-Jaani, this ide-
alisation became evident. At the start of the interview, they were not 
keen to discuss the problems in their region at all, as Artur explained: 
‘there is no point in just whining, it will not take you anywhere.’ This 
tendency among dominant local groups to idealise their place towards 
the outside and thereby omit persistent material difficulties has also 
been problematised within the research on rural idylls (Little and Austin 
1996; Matthews et al. 2000; Valentine 1997; Watkins and Jacoby 
2007). Not stating these difficulties might thus also mean not dealing 
with them in practice, which is a considerable risk considering ongoing 
peripheralisation in these areas.
Moreover, those who wish to address persistent problems might be 
faced with a situation in which they are treated as ‘traitors’ or ‘trou-
ble-makers’ who destroy the beautiful image of a place that others 
have worked so hard for. Journalists in the Valga region experienced 
this when they decided to openly problematise and illustrate the con-
sequences of its ongoing decline in population. For example, one of 
the journalists, whom we here call Helle, explained how the difference 
between what still appeared in her memories of the place where she 
spent her early childhood and ‘what is there now’ motivated her to deal 
with the topic in a set of newspaper articles, including a photo series. 
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This initiative was supported by a local leader who gave an open inter-
view about the problems he encountered. While the articles initiated an 
intense debate on the peripheralisation of the region, they also resulted 
in the same leader being accused of having ‘ruined our image.’ Further, 
there were complaints against Reili, the newspaper editor, as to why 
they would only depict ‘ugly houses when we have nice ones here too.’ 
As a consequence, the editor decided to publish a counterbalancing 
photo series portraying only sites of beauty within the region.
What is evident from these examples is that the local leadership aims 
to put into practice what has been suggested to them in recent regional 
policy debates, namely, to be active leaders and place sellers. However, 
against the backdrop of rural peripheralisation processes, they also 
quickly experience the limits that such agency-based response strate-
gies have in structurally disadvantaged places. While certainly offering 
novel possibilities for local development, leading through image making 
therefore, also poses new challenges of responsibilisation and idealisa-
tion in structurally disadvantaged rural places. How then to address per-
sistent material difficulties and the limits of local agency when openly 
stating them is seen as development resistance or re-stigmatisation of 
the region?
4  Researching Leadership and Image  
Making: Reflections on the Agency  
of the Researcher
When trying to make sense of these practices of place leadership 
and image making, we as researchers also faced the challenges of act-
ing in structurally disadvantaged places. Since our research took place 
in regions facing material difficulties, we noticed that we were seen as 
potential solution bringers and allies of our interviewees, as this occur-
rence during one of our field visits to Kihnu shows:
After saying thanks for the interview and goodbye, the interviewee Katrin 
(who is active in the fields of entrepreneurship, culture and tourism) once 
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again re-emphasised the difficulties that they were facing in the commu-
nity, dealing with unemployment and lack of future economic prospects. 
She finished the conversation by expressing her hope that the research she 
was now participating in could also have a positive influence on finding 
some new ideas for development. (Field notes, Kihnu, 21 January 2016)
On another field visit, after finishing the ‘official’ part of the interview, 
Egert, a local politician from the Valga region continued to discuss the 
future perspectives of the place: ‘But if you [the interviewer] would 
come here and work on improving the region, then…’ He left the sen-
tence unfinished. For the farewell he prompted, ‘Why don’t you move 
here? What are you doing in [the city] anyway!’ These examples show 
how hope is vested in the researchers to provide some sort of solution 
for these places, which also includes the expectation to engage in local 
image reversal campaigns. This is further demonstrated by the follow-
ing field note from a meeting of a local development group in Valga 
County:
At the end of a lengthy meeting, which saw lively discussions on the 
pros and cons of engaging in place marketing projects with the help of 
development funds, Peep (a former interviewee and local politician) 
approached me with a request: ‘Listen, how occupied will you be with 
your work in the near future? I was wondering if you might care to write 
something for our local newspaper? I mean, your research clearly shows 
that it is not a question of wanting to deal with image making but that 
we must, that we must develop the region into a brand.’ (Field notes, 
Valgamaa, 30 November 2016)
This local re-interpretation of our research aims and results initially 
left us puzzled. Did we really convey this image when introducing our-
selves and our research? After repeated occurrences of such incidents, 
it became clear that these were attempts to make our research part of 
local development and image making processes; our research itself was 
seen as instrumental in the processes we were studying. For us, this 
resulted in real conflicts of loyalty: how could we ever address findings 
that could be deemed critical or not relevant by Peep, Katrin, Egert and 
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others after they had provided us with access to the field and vested so 
much hope in us? How should we position ourselves towards these local 
expectations that we get involved?
This not only made us very conscious of the question of how to 
frame or present our research results (cf. Hörschelmann and Stenning 
2008), but also of the fact that as researchers we cannot exempt our-
selves from local processes of which we inevitably become part. This also 
requires carefully reflecting upon our own agency as well as the ways 
in which we change the places through our mere presence in them 
(Annist and Kaaristo 2013; Blondel, forthcoming). We are aware that 
researchers vary in their willingness to engage with the social processes 
they study. Their roles can differ from that of a ‘neutral’ bystander where 
any interference with social groups leads to ‘systemic bias’ (Hammersley 
2006, 11) and is thus to be discouraged, to a more activist position that 
views contributing to social change and empowerment of marginalised 
groups as a duty of social research (Kitchin 1999). While it, therefore, 
depends on the positionality of the researcher whether these practices 
are interpreted as legitimate requests by certain actors to play a more 
active part in the research or as attempts to instrumentalise it for their 
own purposes, they certainly influence the researcher’s position in the 
field and the knowledge produced.
Next to our embedded roles as researchers in the field, the method-
ological choices we make also influence knowledge production in its 
final form. As Miggelbrink and Meyer (2015) have strikingly noted, 
the only way not to reify spatial images is by refusing to use them at 
all, rendering research on these topics and writing about them impos-
sible. Therefore, the risk of reproducing hegemonic images of place— 
stigmatising or idealising—in the way we put questions to our inter-
viewees or present our results is real and often remains unreflected 
upon. Moreover, due to the difficulty in grasping local power structures 
when entering the field as an outsider, there is also the risk of invol-
untarily reproducing them in the form of bias in interview partner 
selection or data collection (Annist 2013; Hörschelmann and Stenning 
2008). These biases influence the stories we are told and hence also 
those we retell afterwards. This holds especially true in a post-socialist 
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context, where social networks are often quite fractured and key actors, 
therefore, difficult to find (Hörschelmann and Stenning 2008). We 
experienced this quite acutely when talking to Endrik, long involved in 
the political and cultural development of Kihnu Island:
Listen, Mart only gives you the names of his election union and they say 
the same to you. […] They belong to the same wing which is now in 
power. But if you want to listen a little bit to the opposite side as well,  
I suggest you speak to Kadri. (Interview, Kihnu, 22 February 2016)
Most such fieldwork experiences occurred after the ‘official’ parts of 
the interviews were over. Instead of exempting these ambiguous situ-
ations and the ambivalent feeling they cause from the research results, 
we suggest regarding them as rare opportunities to reflect analytically 
upon the intentions and hopes of the interviewee, who may provide 
the researcher with certain images of the region or recommendations 
for other interviewees for a specific reason. Considering the contextu-
ality of socio-spatial discourses (Valentine 2007), it is thus key to ask 
ourselves continuously how we have influenced the field through our 
presence, if we have spoken to all relevant groups, and what kind of 
stories the interviewees would convey to other people or in a different 
setting.
5  The Limits of Agency in Structurally 
Disadvantaged Places: Conclusions
Agency-based concepts such as leadership or image making have been 
at the heart of recent debates on responses to regional polarisation 
and also have an important place in this book: Regional and Local 
Development in Times of Polarisation: Rethinking Spatial Policies in 
Europe. While acknowledging the potential in these concepts, in 
this chapter, we have first of all shed light on the limits experienced 
by local practitioners in structurally disadvantaged areas who try 
to employ leading through image making as a potential solution for 
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the peripheralisation of their regions. After acknowledging the room 
for manoeuvre that these agency-based approaches might open up 
according to the literature and our fieldwork, we pointed out the 
potential challenges they pose. On the one hand, we have problema-
tised the process of responsibilisation of local actors, in which local 
leaders are praised for their activeness (while downplaying the risk of 
being overburdened by taking over these responsibilities) and simulta-
neously those actors who are neither willing nor able to take up these 
responsibilities are blamed for their ‘inactiveness.’ This responsibili-
sation of local actors goes hand-in-hand with the danger of neglecting 
the structurally disadvantaged contexts in which they find themselves. 
On the other hand, whereas leadership and active image making are 
often discussed as strategies to overcome stigmatisation discourses, 
and therefore peripheralisation processes, we have demonstrated that 
they also pose the risk of idealising these places. In this way, image 
making—as an example of leading peripheral places—very clearly 
shows how the active showcasing of some positive or clearly defined 
images inevitably hides other negative or more ambiguous images. 
It is important to also bring the latter to the fore so as to make the 
challenges of acting under the circumstances of peripheralisation 
visible and therefore debatable.
Secondly, this chapter has reflected on the agency of the researcher 
trying to make sense of these response strategies. As researchers, with 
our writing, case and interviewee selection or even our mere pres-
ence, we are not exempt but in fact deeply embedded in the field we 
study, and therefore in the local image making and development pro-
cesses. Our research practices themselves might even contribute to the 
processes of responsibilisation, idealisation or stigmatisation we have 
described, since we are also active agents in the processes we study. 
Failing to acknowledge this agency of researchers misses out on gaining 
a more reflective understanding of the processes we aim to comprehend.
Thus, in order to gain deeper insight into the ways in which 
peripheral places are produced, we propose a more processual under-
standing of place development in general and of the ‘hidden diversi-
ties’ (Kay et al. 2012, 55) within peripheral rural places in particular. 
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Places can thereby be conceptualised in a heterogeneous way, which 
acknowledges the multiple modes of (non-) engagement, images 
and relations constituting them. This also results in a rather nuanced 
approach towards agency where rural areas as a whole can be seen as 
‘inconsistent and becoming ’ (Kay et al. 2012, 60, emphasis added). Such 
a structurally contextualised understanding of agency can only come 
to the fore by going beyond the orthodox methods of standard inter-
view situations. Ethnographic methods, as Hörschelmann and Stenning 
(2008) propose, are useful in this regard as they are better able to grasp 
local power relations. Only due to longer term or repeated visits to the 
field were we able to understand such power structures and see beyond 
the visible leaders and positive images. We thus believe that such ambiv-
alent fieldwork situations as we have described above should in particu-
lar be reflected upon in analyses instead of omitting them as disturbing 
background noise. We argue that only by using these ‘slower’ methods is 
it possible to overcome situations in which only the same spokespersons 
for development, who convey the ever-same images, are interviewed and 
listened to. More concretely, this means that when researchers are select-
ing cases they should also keep an eye open for those not-so-perfect 
leaders and ‘less glossy’ images in order to not simply showcase yet 
another best practice example of actively coping places.
By paraphrasing Halfacree (2006, 49), we therefore argue that ‘only 
through a focus on contextual practice,’ which re-considers the struc-
tural limits of agency, can we as practitioners and researchers try to 
come closer to understanding the ‘truth’ of place making in rural space, 
which also applies to situations in which structural factors are prevent-
ing an active response or there are no marketable images to instrumen-
talise. Only by acknowledging this multiplicity of images, these modes 
of activeness, and thereby also the complexity of agency in structurally 
disadvantaged contexts, are we able to gain more realistic insights into 
the potentials of image- and agency-based responses to regional polari-
sation. Despite their promise such strategies have to consider both prob-
lems of stigmatisation (and invisibility) and problems of idealisation as 
well as not only the possibilities but also the (structural) limits of acting 
in peripheral places.
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Notes
1. Even though we are aware of their conceptual differences, for the pur-
pose of this chapter we use place, region and area interchangeably.
2. For more information on the historical region of Setomaa and its leader-
ship practices, see Annist (2013) and Plüschke-Altof (2018).
3. Interviews were conducted in English or in Estonian and subsequently 
translated into English.
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Part IV
Conclusions: About the Relevance of 
Scientific Research for Political Practice 
and Policy Making
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The goal of this concluding chapter is to shed light on the conceptual 
value of the book. We discuss the chapters within the framework of the 
overall conceptual approach linking territorial cohesion and socio- spatial 
polarisation with the notion of spatial justice and also connect analyt-
ical findings with essential policy recommendations, both of which 
complement each other. Growing social polarisation and economic 
inequalities unfolding in new forms across various places brought about 
academic and policy debates on the meanings of ‘development’, the 
ways its dimensions (economic, social, cultural, political) are interre-
lated, and, moreover, on how macro-structural changes are entangled 
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with local and regional processes as well as institutional and social con-
texts (Pike et al. 2017; Storper 2014). This book contributes to discuss-
ing socio-spatial inequalities in relation to macro-structural changes 
from a critical-spatial perspective of the European ‘peripheries’—not 
only adding a new scalar focus for researching spatial unevenness, but 
also unveiling how power relations of global/financial capitalism are 
reproduced through institutional practices across scales (yet played out 
in many different ways within the periphery) and excavating the reasons 
for the ‘system failures’ of actual development policies (see Hudson and 
Pickles; Hadjimichalis; Pósfai and Jelinek in this volume).
Nowadays, when austerity measures and neoliberal policies are 
imposed by a few member states and a specific European elite influences 
development in the whole European Union (see Hudson and Pickles as 
well as Hadjimichalis in this volume), it is more than timely to ask ques-
tions going beyond classical economic development. How can we support 
regional and local development in a way that helps to decrease socio-spa-
tial polarisation? What kinds of policies are needed to offer equal oppor-
tunities for similar living conditions and life chances in all areas and 
across different categories of space? How do we want to live in future?
As these questions show, we do not understand socio-spatial polarisation 
as a static and unidirectional concept but as a dynamic one (Kühn and 
Lang 2017) that can be challenged, rejected or even reversed in the long 
run (Keim 2006; Lang 2013). The so-called peripheries ‘do at times have 
options, which can become game-changers’ (Kühn et al. 2016, 13) and 
the dynamic, procedural and open character of discourses allows not 
only central actors but peripheral ones to speak and eventually counter-
act hegemonic discourses with alternative ones. Some chapters in this book 
F. Görmar · T. Lang 
Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig, Germany
T. Lang 
Global and European Studies Institute, University of Leipzig,  
Leipzig, Germany
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show that actors can regain control over the development of their regions 
if they are supported by a political framework that does not restrict bot-
tom-up developments but gives appropriate room for manoeuvre (see 
Graffenberger; Cebotari and Mihály; Plüschke-Altof and Grootens in this 
volume). Society as a whole has to think about how we want to live in 
future, whether we just want to set minimum standards for the availability 
of public services (Kersten et al. 2017) or give every inhabitant of periph-
eral locations the same opportunities that people have in metropolitan 
areas. Such approaches could feature an extension of democratic partici-
pation at the regional level, regional coalition building, the development 
of new action strategies in the sense of community-based regionalism, 
local economic development (see Graffenberger in this volume), or even 
de-growth aspirations (e.g. Dax and Fischer 2017; Soja 2010, 9).
Dealing with uneven spatial development and growing socio- 
spatial polarisation is a highly debated field in regional policy and spa-
tial science. From a conceptual theoretical viewpoint, we see the main 
contributions of the book to this debate in a better understanding of five 
interrelated topics, which we will present in the following sections: (1) 
the regional policy paradox in the European Union, (2) the historical leg-
acies leading to administrative centralisation trends in Eastern Europe, 
(3) globalisation and regional industrial restructuring causing further 
polarisation, (4) the mechanisms that produce inequalities, and (5) the 
production of inequalities through social practices and discourses. Based 
on these key topics, we argue for more agency centred research in periph-
eral contexts, which focuses on how actors, organisations and institutions 
on multiple scales shape the development of currently peripheralised 
places. In the final section of this chapter, we will also discuss the meth-
odological and policy related issues linked to such an approach.
1  The Regional Policy Paradox  
in the European Union
This book—a collection of chapters based mainly on fresh empir-
ical studies—discusses how European cohesion policy and Eastern 
European Countries’ (CEE) regional policies have emerged and were 
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institutionalised, and how the combination of various public interven-
tions dealt with polarisation processes that have intensified during the last 
two decades. Several chapters help to better understand a certain paradox: 
that despite generous regional policies in the European Union—designed 
to contribute to a decrease in regional disparities—regional polarisa-
tion has intensified, especially in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe 
(Hadjimichalis in this volume). Interestingly, researchers are increasingly 
working with spatial policies and development themes including the con-
cepts of ‘territorial cohesion’ and ‘spatial justice’. However, these ideals 
can be achieved apparently less and less (Jones et al. in this volume).
This has undoubtedly challenged geographers, planners and political 
scientists, giving them the opportunity not only to combine expertise in 
demography, sociology, political science, classical, new and evolutionary 
economic geography but also in media studies, ethnography and other 
disciplines and their methodological armoury. Economic geographers 
in their own turn have increasingly turned their attention to applied 
questions of regional development, innovation, socio-spatial inequalities 
and spatial justice. The financial crisis inspired a shift towards critical 
approaches that manifested in a growing number of projects grounded 
in (neo-)Marxism and also in public involvement targeting socio- 
spatial injustice (stemming from neoliberal practices and emerging 
centralised systems) in CEE in various ways—as was experienced in 
Margaret Thatcher’s United Kingdom. Additionally, political renewal of 
authoritarian state power in some Visegrad countries accompanied by 
not only a seeming rise of neoliberal policies but also by nationalist crit-
ics towards global capitalism and Brussels provides a rich source of new 
material to critical geographers.
Up until recently, dominant economic geography theories (such as 
new economic geography or evolutionary economic geography) and 
related policy approaches such as growth pole strategies (see Benedek, 
Varvari, and Litan in this volume) argued that less-favoured, thus 
peripheralised regions would benefit from knowledge spillovers from 
and increased connectivity to growing centres. In contrast, recent 
studies indicate that the hierarchy-reinforcing effects of these features 
are considerably stronger than the convergence effects (Iammarino 
et al. 2017, 2). At the same time, critical political economists 
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point to the limitations of growth-based development, which 
are linked to the limited availability of natural resources, a growing 
focus on personal satisfaction and well-being and new societal chal-
lenges, such as recent migration patterns or demographic change pro-
cesses (Dax and Fischer 2017).
The last 20 years witnessed a shift in the rationale of regional poli-
cies from distributive policies to a globally oriented innovation policy 
putting regional competitiveness at the centre. Transnational corpo-
rations (TNC) and global organisations such as the World Bank have 
greatly impacted public governance to meet the needs of global capital. 
The prevailing rhetoric suggests that countries, regions and cities com-
pete globally to offer companies the best environments. In parallel with 
globalisation, and also as its enabling and spurring factor, the 1980s 
already saw extensive deregulation: areas that used to be under state 
control (finance, telecom, media) were taken over by TNCs (Dicken 
2015), even though they were still supported by their mother countries. 
In this discursive environment, Central and Eastern European inno-
vation policies were hibernated during the transition period and, later 
after the accession, formulated following normative EU policies that 
remained very short-term in their outlook (Loewen and Schulz in this 
volume). 
Cohesion Policy is above all trying to keep the EU economically compet-
itive at the global scale, it is moving away from its traditional goal of pro-
moting spatial cohesion by supporting development at the regional and 
local levels. (ibid.)
After EU accession, which brought large-scale cohesion and regional 
policy instruments to Eastern Europe, it would have been logical to 
see a decrease in regional differences; instead the discrepancies have 
grown (Finka 2007; Lang 2015). This somewhat paradoxical result can 
be explained by ‘the blend of EU-driven regional policies in national 
political conventions. This appears to favour an ongoing territorial 
polarisation towards the large cities, which consequently leads to the 
peripheralisation of communities disengaged from development compe-
tition’ (Brad 2018, 142).
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The general change in thinking has inevitably led to territorial 
restructuring of governance in response to global processes. An impor-
tant trend in this regard is the emergence of so-called ‘soft spaces’, 
which alongside the tactical use of ‘fuzzy boundaries’ is related to a 
policy impetus to break away from the shackles of pre-existing work-
ing patterns. EU policies have contributed intensively to a breakaway 
from current administrative structures and to the creation of these 
soft spaces; they are leading in ‘soft planning’ (Purkarthofer 2016; 
Purkarthofer and Mattila 2018; Telle, Špaček, and Crăciun in this 
volume).
Another trend is the rising impact of EU sectoral regulations. The 
EU uses numerous directives and policy tools that have impact on ter-
ritorial governance and spatial development. EU environmental legisla-
tion has been the most influential, but many other areas are becoming 
increasingly operative (Cotella 2017). The norms and regulations dic-
tated from Brussels are frequently ‘spatially blind’ and may amplify 
economic problems in peripheries. As Paasi and Metzger (2017, 27) for-
mulate it,
The world is much more complex than what can be grasped with the con-
ceptual tools available at any given time.
Concepts that ignore spatial variety and the need for institutional capac-
ity building and fail to involve local actors fall particularly short in 
CEE (Brad 2018; Loewen 2018; Cebotari and Mihály in this volume). 
Instead, development policies should be ‘solidly grounded in theory and 
evidence, combining people-based with place-based approaches, and 
empowering local stakeholders to take greater control of their future’ 
offering the most realistic and viable options for peripheralised regions 
(Rodríguez-Pose 2018, 206; see also Iammarino et al. 2017). More 
flexibility seems to be needed to better translate general EU policies to 
specific national, regional and local conditions. This would also help 
to introduce locally rooted and distributed policies (Iammarino et al. 
2017; Jones et al. in this volume; Küpper et al. 2017) that address all 
dimensions of regional development alike and do not only focus on the 
economic realm.
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2  EU Policies Meeting Historical Legacies: 
Discrepancies in Administrative Capacities
Administrative decentralisation and the restoration of pre-war struc-
tures occurred in most CEE countries in the 1990s. Small local munic-
ipalities struggled to follow global economic processes and, as a result, 
discrepancies between national cores and peripheral regions increased. 
This, in turn, forced ministries to centralise services. The concept of 
new public management spread and CEE national public authorities 
themselves began to compete: regional and local operations were grad-
ually taken under the direct control of ministries and central agencies, 
which starkly contrasts with devolution in Western European countries.
By the end of the 1990s, governing practices in CEE countries were 
affected by Europeanisation processes, and the pressure increased in the 
2000s as a result of EU accession and harmonisation with the acquis 
communautaire. These changes had a far greater impact as CEE coun-
tries were not used to such rules and lacked, unlike their Western coun-
terparts, established democracies. The negotiations regarding national 
and EU policies were mostly done in the interest of getting bureaucracy 
to function well on both sides. Since the period of negotiations was 
limited, capacity differences at lower levels in the administrative hier-
archy were not taken into account. The commission mainly focused 
on increasing national level performance (Bachtler et al. 2014), which 
further increased the discrepancies between national and local/regional 
capabilities and, in fact, excluded the application of partnership and 
subsidiary principles.
The European Union tended to choose central governments to dis-
tribute pre-joining aid and to implement Structural Funds since it was 
sceptical of local/regional administrative capacities (Kungla 2007). For 
the implementation of EU regional development policies, new parallel 
administrative structures were established. This led to increased fragmen-
tation and weakened the possibility of harmonising policies in CEE. It is 
evident that re-centralisation and the subordination of spatial planning 
to sectoral regulations came about under European Commission pres-
sure. Since CEE politicians and officials wanted to optimise the funds 
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they could get from the Structural Funds, they agreed to the expecta-
tions of Brussels without much objection (ESPON 2017).
Cohesion Policy has shifted in its overall aim from reflecting ideals of 
regionalisation and integration associated with the Europe of the Regions 
strategy to competitiveness and growth [...]. In CEE countries, these 
shifts coincided, firstly, with transition and EU accession, democratic and 
institutional capacity-building, and extreme underdevelopment of periph-
eral regions, and secondly with ‘catching up’, crisis-induced polarisation, 
political centralisation and regional competition. (Loewen and Schulz in 
this volume)
Furthermore, parallel spatial strategy processes have been started, so local 
development officers have been involved in designing a number of dif-
ferent, greatly overlapping local/regional strategy processes: LEADER, 
coastal fisheries, ERDF measures and county development strategies (see 
EMoF 2018). The latter received less attention since there have been no 
definite sources for their implementation. In addition, technical work 
(strategy and project writing) is usually outsourced to professional firms 
and these strategies are usually evaluated by city-based ministerial officials 
and consultants. Thus, capacity building focused mainly on the national 
level and the dissonance between CEE national and regional/local gov-
ernance increased. The administrative systems in CEE dealing with EU 
measures became effective as soon as procedural regulatory and financial 
obligations were put in place, but had difficulties with programming, pro-
ject selection as well as the implementation and integration of evaluation 
feedback (Bachtler et al. 2014). In addition, regions that have long faced 
serious decline and a loss of human resources are most probably less able 
to apply for and manage complex projects. As European policies seem to 
focus more on verifying expenses than on results, this does not yield the 
expected rise in knowledge and competitiveness, but has created, especially 
in the still weak CEE civil societies, a rise of quid pro quo (clientelist) rela-
tionships and an expansion of a professional ‘project class’ (Kovách and 
Kučerová 2006). Increased competition and specific criteria limit the num-
ber of potential applicants and strengthen the chances of organisations that 
are narrowly specialised to consult on certain measures. The consultancy 
firms that have built Europe-wide networks, including offices in Brussels, 
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expand. Moreover, empirical studies suggest that individual Euroregion 
offices act more as gate-keepers to Structural Funds than as knowledge 
pools: despite the many cross-border projects that have been set up, infor-
mation sharing and joint objectives have proven to be very limited and the 
capacity of public authorities differs greatly (Telle, Špaček and Crăciun in 
this volume) potentially leading to dysfunctional joint actions (Telle 2017; 
Špaček 2018).
Thus, it is unsurprising that EU post-accession investments have 
contributed to great regional differences in CEE countries, while turn-
ing convergence, partnership and subsidiarity principles into a farce. 
For the sake of accountability, the EU designed parallel administrative 
structures, which have weakened local and regional development capac-
ities in CEE. To avoid or resolve sectoral conflicts, networking between 
national administrations is enforced, but this widens the gap with 
lower-level administrations. Generally, this calls for more administra-
tive decentralisation in CEE countries. The cases of Czechia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania show that the centralised EU 
regional policy cannot fulfil its objectives when there is a lack of capac-
ity in localities and regions. Even national regional policy programmes 
are now too centralised and ultimately favour the development of urban 
cores (Raagmaa et al. 2014; Brad 2018; ESPON 2017; Loewen 2018; 
Špaček 2018; Loewen and Schulz in this volume). 
Nevertheless, the example given by Nordic countries shows that 
strengthening local governments and compensating thin organisational 
density by bolstering and creating cooperative institutions can counter-
vail peripheralisation processes (Isaksen 2001; Trippl et al. 2015).
3  Globalisation and Regional Industrial 
Restructuring: Causes for Further 
Polarisation?
During the last two decades, we have witnessed a triumph of neolib-
eral thinking. New narratives about globalisation and metropolisa-
tion spread not only among business leaders, but were also actively 
distributed by scientists (such as new economic geography by 
354     G. Raagmaa et al.
Krugmann and Venables 1995 and spiky world by Florida 2005) 
and influential policymakers (such as the new economic geography 
approach by the World Bank 2009). Sometimes, size has become 
the only criterion for the competiveness of enterprises, cities and 
even universities leading to various amalgamation processes in 
Europe and furthering the increase of regional disparities and spatial 
injustice.
Hudson and Pickles in their chapter draw parallels with the sit-
uation at the turn of the 1970s. There are several common features 
when comparing this early globalisation phase with CEE restructur-
ing in the 1990s: privatisation, inflow of foreign capital and green-
field investments, takeovers and closedowns, the changing role of 
trade unions, let alone unemployment, environmental degradation 
and depopulation of old industries that dominated urban agglomer-
ations. Still, there are also remarkable differences. While Northeast 
England can be considered a periphery of the UK, whose capital 
London became the global financial centre, industrial agglomerations 
in CEE are considered to be peripheries of peripheries and are hardly 
accessible from the European core. In the 1990s, globalisation and 
the neoliberal values associated with it were rapidly accepted by the 
political elites in several CEE countries (but not everywhere)—they 
wanted to rid themselves of their socialist legacy. During the tran-
sition period, so called ‘cowboy capitalism’ (a hyper-liberal variation 
of capitalism—see Gersemann 2005) caused massive unemployment, 
simultaneous collapse of existing social security systems and high 
crime rates.
Enterprises in CEE were privatised and often taken over by Western 
companies. Their management concentrated in the capitals; decision- 
making and R&D operations were moved abroad, whereas the 
branches in Eastern Europe focused mainly on materials and labour 
(Woods 2011). At the same time, CEE governments lacked (and 
still do) the means as well as the rights (due to EU limitations on 
state aid) to boost local companies. Rising wages led to the closing of 
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labour-intensive firms, which has been counterbalanced by asymmetric 
restructuring and concentration of service jobs into national centres.
In consequence, there is a huge difference between the volume of 
private R&D investments in Western and CEE countries. Future cohe-
sion policy reforms need to take this ‘innovation gap’ into account and 
acknowledge the different national policy frameworks. So far, regional 
capacities for innovation-driven growth, such as institutions of higher 
education or high-tech enterprises, are more developed and more 
equally territorially distributed in old member states (Telle, Špaček, and 
Crăciun in this volume).
These observations show that, despite the high human development 
level in CEE (UNDP 2016), differences in the international divi-
sion of work have remained. CEE developed from an elite industrial 
region in the socialist block to a semi-periphery, specialising in labour 
intensive subcontracting for Western companies. Factories located in 
peripheries were closed down and nearby settlements lost a major share 
of their population and housing. This has also directly affected migra-
tion patterns within the EU: millions of Eastern Europeans have reset-
tled to (Western-)European metropolises in search for better wages and 
living conditions leaving their countries’ peripheries without skilled 
workers and entrepreneurs. Moldova for instance lost over 40% of 
its total population during its never ending transition. A vicious cir-
cle of peripheralisation emerged: youth emigration from secluded rural 
areas, mining settlements or the former mono-structural industrial 
regions (Moldovan in this volume) has led to an imbalanced age struc-
ture, downsizing of services and less progressive local policy making. 
Migration processes raised problems not only in peripheral regions but 
also in central areas of immigration, where neoliberal dualised hous-
ing policies—i.e. public support to households and regions with higher 
wealth and income—left the problem of housing shortage unresolved 
producing polarisation and marginalisation at various scales simultane-
ously (Pósfai and Jelinek in this volume).
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4  Understanding the Mechanisms 
that Produce Inequalities: (Re)
Conceptualising Macro-Processes
Revealing the highly complicated mechanisms that produce socio- 
spatial inequalities has given rise to a need to re-think the political eco-
nomic approach in current debates, particularly in relation to the recent 
crisis (Hudson 2015). In consequence, the critical stream of political 
economy that considers unevenness inherent to capitalism has grown 
during the last years providing a deeper, more nuanced understanding 
of socio-spatial processes. In line with this thinking, several authors in 
this volume (Hudson and Pickles; Hadjimichalis; Pósfai and Jelinek) 
argue for re-politicising the economic—understanding polarities as the 
outcome of historically emerged, imbalanced yet dynamically chang-
ing power relations, that manifest in centralities/peripheralities in flows 
of capital, labour, knowledge etc.; moreover, they stress the complexity 
and interrelatedness of socio-spatial processes that produce unevenness. As 
Hudson and Pickles put it,
…the analysis and diagnosis of the regional problem of inequality 
and peripheralisation requires a complex articulation of forms of over- 
determination, relationality and context that is both economic, cultural 
and political. (Hudson and Pickles in this volume)
The critical political economic conceptualisations of socio-spatial une-
venness were inspired by the crises of capitalism—i.e. the structural 
problems of industrial regions in the 1970s and 1980s, the collapse of 
state socialism, and the 2008/2011 financial crash and economic down-
turn—which led to clear manifestations of socio-spatial inequalities 
(Christophers 2015; Hudson and Pickles; Hadjimichalis; Pósfai and 
Jelinek in this volume). Moreover, the crises also highlighted how mac-
ro-processes shape the everyday life and well-being of people making 
academic explanations available to the layperson and opening up mac-
ro-concepts to everyday life, local communities and individual agency 
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(see Hadjimichalis; Pósfai and Jelinek; Moldovan in this volume) that 
should be considered as sources for social and economic recovery as well 
as for new academic concepts such as spatial justice.
What then are the powerful macro-processes that produced new 
socio-spatial inequalities and reproduced old ones under the recent crisis 
and the following recovery in Europe—as put forward by the authors of 
the book? The institutional context of global capitalism and its operat-
ing mechanisms (i.e. financialisation, the rentier economy and the repro-
duction of dependencies through debts), which unfolded unevenly and 
spread the risks and effects brought about by the crisis in a highly unequal 
way among households, places, regions and states, eventually recovered 
and produced an increasingly polarised system in the last few years (see 
Hadjimichalis; Pósfai and Jelinek in this volume). Understanding how 
financialisation got along with centralised control of capital flows, the 
reinforcement of inequalities and dependencies through uneven (unjust) 
access to loans and distribution of wealth, and how processes penetrated 
everyday life (e.g. through housing mortgage loans) elucidated the need 
for re-defining state policies in terms of goals, scope and spatiality.
Another process fuelling socio-spatial polarisation across Europe is 
migration (Lang 2011). Yet while it is considered a factor of growth in 
neoliberal development policies, for critical academic research it is a source 
of understanding of how everyday life, individual agency and structural 
processes are entangled and inequalities (re)produced. Thus, commuting 
‘out’ or moving elsewhere is a structural process supporting peripherali-
sation—shrinking and ageing of the population, resulting in economic 
decline—and also an individual strategy to cope with such processes (see 
Moldovan in this issue). Recent migration trends are embedded in global, 
European and also sub-national divisions of labour but the consequences 
emerge locally. Thus, rural shrinkage can be understood relationally, link-
ing macro-processes, regional economies, local (community) strategies and 
individual agencies. Discussing such issues in a CEE/Romanian/rural con-
text, we take hints how national and EU policies are homogenising such 
spaces, and how limited community power is in such ‘multiply peripheral-
ised’ places (see also Cebotari and Mihály in this volume).
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5  The Production of Inequalities Through 
Social Practices and Discourses: The Value 
Added of Agency Centred Research  
in a Peripheral Context
The socio-spatial polarisation and reproduction of peripheralities in 
Europe inspired research along various theoretical approaches and the re- 
conceptualisation of peripheralisation as a multidimensional,  multiscalar 
process relating to various places and agents simultaneously (PoScoPP 
2015). This dynamic and relational understanding of uneven socio- 
spatial processes raised more concern among scholars not only about 
the spatiality of structural shifts, power and social justice, but also 
about their varied ‘landscape’ produced by locally embedded social prac-
tices and agencies. Researching socio-spatial inequalities through this 
lens is a source of knowledge on the struggles, strategies and practices 
of institutions, firms, individuals and communities that produce dif-
ferent peripheralities, and thus for critiquing the blindness of domi-
nant concepts of regional development when it comes to diversity and 
local/regional agency (Massey 2004; Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2014; 
Pike et al. 2017). Moreover, research focused on a peripheral context 
(Graffenberger; Plüschke-Altof and Grootens; Mihály and Cebotari in 
this volume) helps not only to understand and re-conceptualise the mak-
ing of inequalities, but also to re-consider individual and institutional 
strategies as well as community actions as relevant responses to decline 
and crisis, which are worth embracing in new, more just policy measures.
Social practices are shaped directly or indirectly by discourses and 
underlying power relations (see Brad 2018; Hadjimichalis; Plüschke-
Altof and Grootens in this volume). Thus, understanding the ways in 
which terms, notions, definitions are produced discursively and reacted 
to by various agents in peripheries (and beyond) reveal how the hegem-
onic values and norms of neoliberal capitalism are produced, translated 
into policies and practices (while pretending to be politically ‘neutral’), 
and how they penetrate everyday life (re)producing unevenness.
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Institutional practices/agencies and the discursive processes shaping 
them are drivers reproducing inequalities; yet such processes involve 
many dimensions and scales/places. While researching the power rela-
tions of agents acting at various scales, we also should see how inequali-
ties unfold and are reproduced at particular scales and within particular 
institutional contexts, as is discussed by Kuus, Loewen and Schulz, as 
well as Telle, Špaček, and Crăciun in this volume. Analysing the une-
ven production and flow of expertise related to EU regional policies in 
transnational discourses, Kuus highlights the methodological problem of 
giving ‘… an analytically rigorous and empirically nuanced account of 
these processes’ (Kuus in this volume), due to the strong national bias 
of our analytical toolkit. To overcome this, Kuus suggests a flexible, 
transnational approach to understand economic, political and symbolic 
peripherality.
Researching inequalities from the periphery through social practices and 
agency has further empirical, methodological and epistemological les-
sons. Revealing the institutional (and thereby socio-cultural) aspects of 
division of labour and changing power relations under global capital-
ism to get more sophisticated knowledge on uneven development has 
become mainstream in social geography (Massey 1984; Hudson 2015). 
(i) The spatial embedding of firms was a lens through which the social 
relations/practices producing inequalities have been studied since the 
early 2000s (Coe and Yeung 2015). Yet we still have little knowledge 
on firms in peripheries, even though firms in peripheries do innovate 
by overcoming local and regional deficits through networking beyond 
their local context. Analysing this process, Graffenberger in this vol-
ume links the problem of peripheralisation to innovation debates, and 
discourses on culture, institutions and structural change in economic 
geography; moreover, he refutes the narrative of periphery as a place of 
no innovation and highlights the multiple agencies behind it. By doing 
so, he provides inputs for articulating the specific needs of such firms 
and places, and argues for more varied state policies from developing 
ICT infrastructure to support networks of knowledge transfer, and 
also for considering local firms as agents of change. (ii) Communities 
are also considered the makers of local processes/spaces, and have become 
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a popular subject for academic research in the West; yet the concep-
tualisation of community agency rested largely on Western experi-
ences, something that should be looked at in light of differences in the 
potentials and limits of communities in European peripheries (Loewen 
2018; Cebotari and Mihály in this book). Analysing CEE community 
projects, Cebotari and Mihaly stress the centrality of state (municipal) 
agency, represented by local leaders (mayors), which is not only the 
result but also a driver of peripheralisation; while it enhances local state 
capacities, the lack of local social involvement questions the social sus-
tainability of local initiatives, and their potential for further, cumulative 
change, thereby easing peripherality. Thus, the methodological problem 
of (not) differentiating between communities and municipalities/local 
state in EU policy measures hides a deeper problem of power relations: 
state dominance and lack of empowerment in peripheral localities in 
CEE. (iii) The individual agency of local people has also been widely dis-
cussed challenging structuralist arguments on understanding the mech-
anisms of uneven development (Massey 1984, 2004), and recently as a 
source of knowledge on the diversity of local/regional trajectories and 
a resource for putting places that are lagging behind on a new track 
(Rodríguez-Pose 2013). Although the potential of local agency such 
as leadership and image making has gained more attention and posi-
tive connotations, studies from CEE peripheries highlight the limits of 
such connotations. Plüschke-Altof and Grootens argue in their chap-
ter that local leaders struggle with enhanced responsibilities and related 
risks in rural Estonia—e.g. by ‘idealising’ their localities while changing 
their image—but their scope is limited heavily by the structural context 
of multiple dependencies and the lack of resources. Such conclusions 
should make scholars wary of articulating ideas, arguments, concepts 
on structures and agencies that might play out very differently in core/
peripheral/semi-peripheral contexts; e.g. thinking about ‘successful’ 
local leadership as a resource for counteracting peripherality, and also as 
a neoliberal argument that places the socio-spatial consequences of neo-
liberal policies in the responsibility of local actors.
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6  Methodology, Positionality  
and Policy Issues
In our view, the book contributes to a better understanding of 
socio-spatial polarisation as a relational, multi-dimensional and mul-
ti-scalar concept. This understanding includes processes of peripher-
alisation and (de-)centralisation, highlighting not only economic but 
also infrastructural, political as well as social and discursive aspects. The 
book also provides alternative viewpoints working out (1) the polit-
ical geographies of spatial injustice, (2) current forms of policy and 
governance in relation to socio-spatial polarisation, and (3) different 
approaches to regional and local development. Many chapters in the 
book are based on interactions (interviews) with local, regional and 
national politicians and policy makers, companies, NGO leaders and 
also the general public. This approach explains the functionality and 
underlying power structures related to dominant normative assump-
tions, conceptualises what territorial cohesion and spatially just policies 
actually mean to different stakeholders and, last but not least, under-
stands which role academics and academic concepts can play for the 
development of local initiatives.
At the moment, it seems that in most cases priority is still given to 
the economic dimension of regional development and complex prob-
lems are simplified to technical questions. In contrast, the normative 
concept of ‘spatial justice’ with its holistic approach can add to a more 
nuanced understanding of regional development and territorial cohe-
sion as it seeks to ensure ‘access to and use of resources’ for future gen-
erations and encourages locally and regionally rooted solutions without 
neglecting distinctive structural problems (Pike et al. 2007, 1264; see 
also Jones et al. in this volume).
This book offers a specific epistemic lens for understanding grow-
ing socio-spatial inequalities and the diverse and interrelated processes 
behind it: the authors lived and worked in contexts in which peripher-
alisation and peripherality are experienced in everyday life. Seeing the 
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world from inside places hit by economic decline, powerlessness, social 
and environmental crisis and seeing how neoliberal capitalism is ‘lived’ 
there can be used as sources for motifs to make new claims, arguments 
and challenge concepts and theories attached to powerful centres of 
knowledge production. This entanglement of the mundane and the aca-
demic in a researcher’s work is inspiring, and being constantly aware of 
it is a source of being reflective, of placing ourselves/our work within 
academic life and being attached to and arguing for/against existing 
concepts and theories, as well as to see our work in a ‘wider world’ in 
which our projects are seen, critiqued or praised for (not) being bene-
ficial to those who have been researched. Moreover, our reports might 
have far-reaching effects on socio-spatial processes by supporting vari-
ous policies. Here we should always keep in mind the development—
routes/detours, milestones, relations—of our own academic career to 
relate our work to the ‘world out there’ (discussed explicitly by Hudson 
and Pickles in this volume).
Being part of the world in which we work also raised methodological 
concerns. One key issue pointed out by some authors in this book is the 
agency of the researcher deeply embedded in the studied field (regions, 
places, institutions) that might shape the interpretations of local pro-
cesses and the related actions. Moreover, while doing fieldwork and 
relying on information from local actors brings about knowledge that 
is contingent and fluid, reflecting various viewpoints and realities, there 
is no fast and easy way to grasp the complexity of strategies, practices, 
relations linked to a place. We need to see the whole picture (always 
in motion) while understanding individual agencies and their struc-
tural contexts (including our own role) (see e.g. Kuus; Plüschke-Altof 
and Grootens). Revealing the complex relations that produce periph-
eralities might support moving beyond case studies (that either provide 
best practices or places of experimentation to achieve them) and getting 
closer to diverse realities and policies to address community and indi-
vidual needs that are outside core areas.
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Writing a policy recommendation chapter is both challenging and 
rewarding at the same time. On one hand, it requires us to translate 
complex academic research into practical policy suggestions. On the 
other hand, it offers an understanding of purpose for the researcher 
since a policy chapter is one of the few gates through which social sci-
entists can contribute to shaping a policy discourse. Given this context, 
our main aim is to formulate clear and comprehensible policy recom-
mendations drawing from the existing academic debate and research 
presented in the previous chapters.
While the results of processes of polarisation and peripheralisation 
are mostly visible in remote, isolated or excluded spaces, the dynam-
ics fuelling these processes connect to all levels of policy-making. 
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It is important, therefore, to consider policy-making, in this context, 
as a collection of processes which transcend sectoral and administrative 
boundaries in a multi-actor setting. Given that understanding, we would 
like to highlight three distinct administrative levels on which the prob-
lem of uneven spatial development is tackled. Firstly, the EU level strikes 
as the one where the polarisation problem is highly debated and triggers 
policy action across different EU level actors and institutions. Through 
the mechanisms of Cohesion Policy, and lately also including some 
mechanisms of innovation policy (see Loewen and Schulz as well as 
Telle, Špaček and Crăciun), EU level policy-makers aim to address exist-
ing regional discrepancies. While this discussion at the EU policy level 
is clearly getting more and more attention (see Jones et al.), national 
states retain the sovereignty to decide upon how to redistribute EU and 
national funding to tackle peripheralisation. Member states’ interest in 
keeping financial management tools at their disposal is down to a num-
ber of reasons. However, it is clear that by doing so, member states also 
ensure a possibility to shift EU policy goals to their own, national polit-
ical aims. In this respect, especially in the case of CEE countries, a series 
of different policies emerged with the main (or at least declared) goal 
of reducing spatial and income inequalities and promoting even devel-
opment (see Benedek, Varvari and Litan as well as Posfai and Jelinek). 
While not with the same amount of political and economic power, 
regional and local levels offer us the possibility to see the way in which 
policies (EU or national) interact with local communities and decision 
makers. In this way, we can see these policies in action (or inaction) (see 
Moldovan, Cebotari and Mihály, Graffenberger as well as Plüschke-
Altof and Grootens). To a certain degree, all these administrative levels 
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are connected through the policy framework. It is important, therefore, 
to observe how each level of policy making and policy implementation 
evolves, but at the same time to consider all of them inter-linked and 
dependent upon each other.
The first three sections of this chapter discuss the main shortcomings 
and possible improvements of existing public policies at the EU, national 
and combined, regional and local level. Based on this discussion, the final 
section outlines five policy recommendations to address rising polarisa-
tion and peripheralisation at both the EU and the member state level.
2  Polarisation Viewed by EU Policy-Makers
There is growing interest among researchers in EU-level policies that 
aim to improve territorial cohesion, thus reducing socio-economic dis-
parities within the EU. This book, while looking at specific contexts 
mostly from Central and Eastern Europe, has several chapters that dis-
cuss the EU policy framework, identifying a series of challenges related 
to Cohesion Policy and subsequent successful implementation of terri-
torial cohesion goals.
One of the serious issues with Cohesion Policy, as discussed by Jones 
et al., is the fact that, while it is a well-intended policy, territorial cohe-
sion remains an elusive and complex concept. This elusive character of 
the concept leaves it open to different interpretations, thus it is often 
misused or manipulated in order to promote specific (or even different) 
priorities in different national/regional contexts. Even at the level of the 
European Union, it seems that Cohesion Policy lacks consistency and, 
therefore, a clear understanding of the pursued goals. It is true that con-
tinuous changes in the policy are required given the varying national 
contexts, thus we end up having different programme goals in different 
states to suit local needs. At the same time, there must be an over-arching 
understanding of what Cohesion Policy aims at. Probably the top-rating 
priorities are to design a consistent policy and to avoid having a series 
of place-based cohesion policies with different local understandings of 
programme goals (Telle, Špaček and Crăciun). Another shortcoming of 
Cohesion Policy is its convergence with innovation policies as presented 
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by Loewen and Schulz. The authors stress that convergence between the 
two policies can lead to the over-centralisation of management author-
ities at the national level. This in turn would offer national authorities 
control over the selection and implementation of projects. Given the 
availability of material and knowledge resources in metropolitan and 
urban centres, this type of management would benefit the core regions 
within CEE countries. Although well intentioned and timely thought, 
this convergence can in this way decrease the positive effects of Cohesion 
Policy by re-orienting it towards strict economic development, thus 
neglecting its moderating force across the EU. Based on these observa-
tions, we can see that Cohesion Policy remains an elusive and complex 
concept which can lead to different interpretations by different national 
authorities. Its convergence with innovation policies makes it more prone 
to local misinterpretations that in the end might steer Cohesion Policy 
away from the territorial convergence goal altogether.
Given these major challenges, we believe that EU level policy-mak-
ers have to consider a series of changes within Cohesion Policy in order 
to ensure its efficiency and keep it focused on the reduction of socio- 
economic disparities across the EU. One important measure in this 
direction would be a better conceptualisation of Cohesion Policy goals. 
A clear outline of what Cohesion Policy means and what it is expected 
to deliver would help national policy-makers produce better mecha-
nisms of fund management and resource allocation. Further clarifica-
tion of the policy’s goals should look at how it was meant to interact 
with other policies (for our discussion considering innovation policy). 
There must be a clear separation between Cohesion Policy and any 
other policy working in a similar direction. For example, although inno-
vation policy could and should serve as possible mechanism to promote 
economic development, it should not overshadow the social and envi-
ronmental goals underlined in Cohesion Policy. In this way, Cohesion 
Policy needs to be updated such that it adds more clarity regarding its 
goals and objectives. When reconsidering Cohesion Policy at both the 
conceptual and the mechanism level, we have to be sure that it gives 
enough insight and clarity that national policy makers are able to follow 
the policy guidelines without transforming the opportunities offered by 
it into tools of political struggle at the national level.
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3  Polarisation Viewed by Member  
State Policy-Makers
It would be mistaken to believe that national policy makers do not 
consider reducing spatial inequalities a priority for their government. 
Regardless of the country specific context, national level policy-mak-
ers within the CEE region do devise instruments to reduce intra and 
inter-regional disparities. The question remains, however, how effective 
are those policies and what can be done to improve them?
It is often the case that policies devised by national authorities are 
based on strict economic analysis and neglect the complexity of une-
ven development. In Romania for example, national policies aimed 
at reducing disparities within the regions in fact have widened the 
gap. National policy-makers chose to focus on developing core cities, 
hoping for positive spillovers to foster development throughout the 
region. Discussed in detail by Benedek, Varvari and Litan, it seems 
that sustaining large urban agglomerations does not reduce peripher-
alisation within counties with large urban centres. On the contrary, 
this approach seems to have contributed to the widening of regional 
inequalities. Hungarian housing policy offers another example of a 
national-level policy that reproduces socio-economic discrepancies 
regardless of the assumed goal of reducing them. As presented by Posfai 
and Jelinek, Hungarian housing-related benefits are socially but not 
spatially distributed; however, the management of these benefits is del-
egated to local municipalities, which, due to a lack of national scale 
engagement, reproduces spatial discrepancies. Overall, the authors 
argue that housing policies in Hungary, as they work currently, pro-
mote home ownership in the peripheries of the core for the upper 
middle class. In this way, the policy simply perpetuates existing spatial 
inequalities that exclude from the scheme those people who need hous-
ing benefit the most.
These two examples point to a structural problem when analys-
ing national-level policies. Often these are designed with short-
term political gains in mind. Given the ambiguity of EU-level 
policy mechanisms, it is left for national-policy makers to for-
mulate policies that promote territorial and social convergence. 
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National political actors are also tied to specific electoral cycles, so 
the immediate results may surpass long-term effects once a policy is 
designed. A couple of improvements could be made here to ensure 
more impactful policies to reduce regional and social disparities. 
Firstly, in the case of EU funds, national policy makers must ensure 
that Cohesion Policy goals are also clearly formulated within every 
national policy. In this way, the guiding principle of national-level 
policies should also coincide with the outlined goals of Cohesion 
Policy. Secondly, moving beyond the policy design stage, national 
authorities have to get more actively involved in regional develop-
ment. This could be ensured by bringing together national and local 
authorities, representatives of the non-governmental sector and civic 
organisations in order to analyse and change implemented policies. 
National-level policy making is crucial in bridging the gap between 
EU-level policy goals and local implementation and acceptance of 
these goals. National-level policy makers are here probably the most 
important link in promoting (or even compromising) the idea of 
even development.
4  Local-level Policy Effects and Pushbacks
Regional and local actors are rarely considered active policy-makers, 
least so in CEE countries. Given the lack of serious policy mechanisms, 
their role is often a practical one, accessing funding from the national 
level and complying with policy requirements. It is important, however, 
to consider this administrative level as true reflection of a policy’s effi-
ciency and success. It is often down to regional or local actors to imple-
ment the policy and observe the changes it produces.
In some cases, local actors assume an active role in changing the sit-
uation of their locality. This is often viewed as healthy and beneficial; 
local leadership is, therefore, praised by national authorities and consid-
ered to be a driver for locally based development. While certainly val-
uable, local leadership also gives national authorities an excuse to shift 
the responsibility for structural problems to local actors. This issue is 
well described by Plüschke-Altof and Grootens discussing the Estonian 
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context where, in some areas, local leadership assumes an important 
role in shaping the image of the locality, trying to move beyond the 
periphery label. This active involvement offers at the same time an ideal 
opportunity for national policy makers to shift the responsibility to the 
local level thereby minimising the importance of their involvement and 
overlooking structural problems that cannot be solved at the local level.
The role played by national authorities is of utmost importance since 
no real progress can be made without structural changes and substan-
tial support for less developed regions. As pointed out by Graffenberger, 
inclusive access to high-performance information and telecommuni-
cation technology (ICT) must be considered a major component of 
(national) infrastructural as well as regional development policy. In this 
respect, national authorities have to assume an active role in ensuring a 
dense network of connections within and especially outside the region 
for local actors since it could foster local development, exchange of ideas 
and experiences and further the innovation capacities of these actors.
While in some cases local leadership is effective and welcomed, more 
often than not local communities are deprived of real political or eco-
nomic instruments to influence local development processes. This is 
a very serious challenge for local development throughout the CEE 
region. If policies follow a strict top-down logic, with only national 
authorities deciding what type of projects better fit regional and local 
development, we risk ending up in situations where local authori-
ties implement projects only for the sake of accessing funding, but 
lacking any serious impact on local development. As pointed out by 
Moldovan as well as by Cebotari and Mihaly, in the cases of Hungary 
and Romania, the policy direction designed by national authorities 
does not take into account local needs or the way those needs might be 
shaped. This is the reason some of the projects implemented through 
EU funding still fall short of reducing disparities between centres and 
peripheries.
While local actors rarely play an active part in the policy-making pro-
cess, it is still important to consider them important to the policy pro-
cess. A series of policy proposals could be formulated here to increase 
the involvement of local actors. The first thing to do is to support local 
leadership by taking a structural approach involving central, regional 
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and local institutions. Simply considering local leaders as a good exam-
ple does not suffice. State actors and policies have to provide a support-
ive environment for local action by investing in local infrastructure 
and providing a foundation for local actors and extra-regional actors to 
interact. By doing so, policies aiming to support local development have 
to consider a closer relationship with local authorities and the non-gov-
ernmental sector. The design, implementation and evaluation of every 
policy should also involve local actors so that it ensures fitness to the 
local context.
5  Policy Recommendations: Five Guiding 
Points
Presenting the main challenges and possible alternatives to cur-
rent administrative lines, we would like to suggest a series of five pol-
icy proposals that could contribute to improving the existing policy 
framework.
1. Re-connecting Cohesion Policy to cohesion
Cohesion Policy is one of the most powerful policy instruments avail-
able at the EU level that explicitly aims to reduce territorial disparities 
and promote even development. While it has strong financial backing 
and institutional support, Cohesion Policy encountered a series of chal-
lenges that had to be addressed in order to ensure its efficiency during 
the following programming periods. In that respect, we would like to 
advocate three major improvements that would strengthen the impor-
tant role played by Cohesion Policy within the EU construct.
– Re-centre Cohesion Policy on the idea of spatial justice. As a pan-EU 
policy, Cohesion Policy must maintain a high degree of flexibility, 
ensuring adaptation to local contexts. This flexibility should rely on a 
clear understanding of the policy’s main goal, which, in our opinion 
should draw from the idea of socio-economic justice and support. 
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Clarifying this aim within the policy text should ensure consistency 
between the practical goal of the policy and the mechanisms it uses 
to achieve it.
– Open Cohesion Policy up for wider participation during the pol-
icy design stage. While member states are represented through the 
European Council, it is important that regions and intra-regional 
actors also get engaged throughout the policy design and evaluation 
stages. As there are different regional understandings of Cohesion 
Policy, it might be useful to integrate a wider range of views from 
regional leaders and local actors. Such an initiative would offer an 
alternative and complementary view on Cohesion Policy to the 
one formulated within the European Commission, EU Parliament 
or the Council of the EU. This would give wider legitimacy to 
the policy and lead to more coherence with the policy goals of 
regional leaders.
– Sustaining good governance and institutional capacity  building 
beyond its commitment to support less developed regions, Cohesion 
Policy instruments must also encourage a specific type of develop-
ment. Simple financial aid can encourage economic development. 
In order to maintain this development and diversify its effects into 
the social and political spheres as well, financial mechanisms must be 
combined with institutional support and sustainability goals. In this 
way, Cohesion Policy would also target lasting change within the less 
developed regions.
2. Increasing the participation of local and regional actors within national 
policy-making processes: let “place” also steer the design of policy
While local and regional actors are the main beneficiaries of regional 
development policies, they are also often excluded from decision- 
making processes. In addition to the standard public consultations, we 
suggest a series of three policy measures that could improve the partic-
ipation of local actors, thereby granting the policies consistency, legiti-
macy and local input.
378     S. Cebotari et al.
– Establish a co-decision instrument to ensure shared input during 
the policy design stage. To do this, central authorities would have 
to establish a regional platform for discussion and consultation that 
would include, in addition to local authorities, non-governmental 
organisations, business representatives, civil society organisations, etc. 
Recommendations from this body could later serve as input for dif-
ferent regional based policy approaches.
– Reduce the required documentation and bureaucratic procedures 
related to funding applications for local actors. As a result of the 
complex requirements and limited capacities of local actors, they 
often avoid applying for EU funding. Simplifying the procedures 
and focusing on qualitative evaluation of projects would allow for 
more flexibility and understanding of local needs. To avoid the mis-
management of funds, the administrative burden should be given 
to national, regional and local authorities, leaving applicants to 
focus on the qualitative part of their project application. Another 
improvement would be ensuring a resilient online system for project 
pre-application. That would allow easier access to data for national 
authorities, an easier application process for local actors and a quicker 
evaluation process of the project proposals.
– Give local authorities more tools to steer and manage the EU and 
national funding. Given their connection and contextual under-
standing of the existing challenges, local authorities are probably best 
placed to consider the distribution of funds to support local devel-
opment. Currently, local authorities have little to no tools to influ-
ence the way in which funds are managed and allocated. There have 
been many instances when local actors have accessed just for the sake 
of attracting more money to the locality. However, as we saw in the 
chapters of this book, in most cases these types of projects cannot 
produce locally based, long-lasting development.
3. National level engagement in building a supportive infrastructure at the 
regional and local level
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In order to create a supportive environment for locally based develop-
ment, national authorities should be encouraged to go beyond policy 
frameworks and consider direct involvement to support expensive pro-
grams or to manage national programmes for which local authorities 
lack human and financial capital.
In some cases, such a presence could be translated into state-owned 
social housing in less well off areas, thus offering affordable housing 
to lower income inhabitants. It is also important to consider increased 
support for educational and healthcare services in these areas since it 
is often beyond the capacities of local authorities to provide appropri-
ate incentives for qualified personnel to move to less developed areas. 
Hence, there is a need for the central government to step in and ensure 
support for them.
Another effective way to encourage local participation and to develop 
remote localities is to provide the required infrastructure and network-
ing possibilities at the local level. We highlight here the clear need for 
investments in ITC and networking infrastructures at the regional level 
to promote inter-regional exchange and cooperation. Access to an effec-
tive ITC infrastructure would allow local agents to connect with agents 
from across the region as well as national legislators at the EU level. This 
would enable local actors to increase their visibility, to acquire outside 
knowledge and experience, to connect to possible suppliers or customers 
and in the end to ensure locally based development.
4. Increasing human capital at the local level
The basis for sustainable development is local capital, financial and 
human capital being equally important for local communities in order 
to change the dynamics of peripheralisation. While financial capital 
can be ‘outsourced,’ local human capital is crucial to realising lasting 
local development. It can serve as a foundation for increasing partic-
ipation, community level decision making, proper management of 
financial resources or strategic investments for longer periods of time. 
In order to boost local human capital, a few public policies could be 
considered:
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– Allow for training and educational activities within every project 
financed by the European Union. As we saw in some cases, while the 
financial part of the project is financed from national or EU funds, 
there are no financing opportunities for training of local actors to 
manage the project, write applications or offer technical support for 
project implementation.
– Encourage engagement within the community. Every project imple-
mented should first of all prioritise local engagement. Outsourcing 
project-related activities also means outsourcing knowledge acquisi-
tion, innovation capacity and further project development. Hence, 
regardless of the project’s goal, local-level engagement within every 
project activity should always be an underlying aim.
– Capitalise all existing local resources. As discussed previously, pro-
jects are rarely fit for specific local needs. This shortcoming should be 
addressed by looking at local resources in the first place. National and 
local authorities should first be encouraged to evaluate available local 
resources (natural, financial or human) and promote those initiatives 
or projects that rely more on local resources.
Local human capital must be a central priority for policy makers. By 
encouraging local knowledge and local engagement, we can promote 
increasing innovative capacity, wider public engagement and subsequent 
better usage of financial resources.
5. Promote policy-making and programming at the local level
The policy-making paradigm, as it is at the current moment, is hierar-
chic, with EU and national-level authorities designing the policies and 
the mechanisms to implement them. Regional or local actors are pas-
sive recipients of EU or governmental programmes with little to no say 
about them. As discussed in this chapter, while well intended a lot of 
these policies do not deliver the expected results; in some cases they 
even make existing discrepancies worse. This is hardly surprising since 
it is rather challenging to design policies in the central, metropolitan 
regions that would be effective and context-sensitive to remote, periph-
eralised localities. To address this issue, we believe that the current pol-
icy structure requires a series of changes.
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– Offer local communities the possibility to design and propose pro-
jects or programmes for implementation within the main policy 
framework that better fit their local needs and capacities. This could 
be accomplished by establishing a co-decision mechanism at the 
regional level and aggregating all proposals for a more targeted policy 
approach at the regional level or local level. In this way, local actors 
could become important within the national or even EU level poli-
cy-making framework.
– Allow for larger flexibility in fund usage at the local level through 
participative budgeting. Allowing local communities to get engaged 
at the financial management stage of the project, while also encour-
aging wide participation at the local level, could ensure higher levels 
of social capital and at the same time ensure a more effective way of 
spending the project money.
– Accept for consideration projects and proposals that go beyond the 
established framework. Given their peripheral location, small com-
munities often need to reinvent themselves in order to attract and 
keep people. This assumes a different strategy than the one ‘by the 
book,’ so in this context, rural communities have to become innova-
tive and creative in their own way. This can be ensured by investing 
in local educational activities and offering more tools for policy mak-
ing and financial management to local actors.
It is important within the entire policy discourse that we change our 
way of communication. Remote, isolated and peripheralised local com-
munities should not be viewed as ‘subsidy requiring and dying places.’ 
This understanding can be changed once we give local communities 
the possibility to become central in a different, alternative way. Only by 
starting with the movement of peripheries from the periphery at a con-
ceptual level we can bring about de-peripheralisation processes.
Any successful policy approach to the problems of peripheralisation 
must consider the diversity of actors and institutions involved. Relying 
on this diversity and building on existing resources, the above five 
points could be used as a roadmap to ensure a structural approach is 
taken to address peripheralisation problems.
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